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This dissertation draws on multi-sited fieldwork to understand the history and development of 
biodiversity offsetting in Europe and beyond. It situates offsetting as a social technology of 
governance in the management of resistance and dissent against corporate and state 
degradation and violence, and as an instrument to flexibilise restrictive legislation imposing 
limits to industrial expansion in Europe.  
I analyse offsetting through the lens of corporate and state power and violence, contextualising 
it in the dominant social economic order, exploring its role in the advancement of social control 
and accumulation, and in the invisibilisation and entrenchment of the epistemic, physical and 
slow violence(s) exercised against human and nonhuman nature, in the form of industrialism 
and extractivism, state control and policing of dissent.  
While a critical literature on offsetting now contributes to our understanding of the tensions, 
politics and value struggles around offsetting, it has tended to focus on the ‘novel’ 
commodification and marketisation aspects of offsetting. It frequently privileges structural 
explanations rooted in the expansionary market logic unleashed under neoliberal capitalism, 
while overlooking the long history of the ideology and practice of offsetting, deeply rooted in 
industrialism, domestication and exploitation of human and nonhuman nature, and the need for 
corporate and state legitimacy in the face of (increasingly visible) social and ecological 
degradation and ever-more apparent failures of the green economy. 
By situating offsetting historically and in its political economic context, this thesis demystifies 
and denaturalises abstract ideas of the ‘market’. It challenges the emerging hegemony of critical 
analyses of offsetting that often resort to marketisation and financialisation as explanatory 
devices and contributes to the theorisation of the ongoing transformation of neoliberal 
capitalism, statehood and corporate citizenship, as part of wider processes of reconfigurations 
of governance that are the product of the dialectical relationship between capitalism, the state, 
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1. Introduction: conserving nature or conserving power?  
[S]ocieties that dominate nature also dominate people. Where there is the idea that a 
massive dam should be built to control a river’s flow, there is the idea that people should be 
enslaved to build it; where there is the belief that a giant metropole may serve itself by 
despoiling the surrounding countryside and devouring its raw materials, there are castes and 
hierarchies to ensure that this is accomplished (Sale, 2000: 122, drawing on Bookchin). 
 
Biodiversity offsets are more about managing communities and livelihoods than about 
managing biodiversity per se (Lori Anna Conzo, Environmental Specialist for the International 
Finance Corporation, Conzo, 2012). 
German energy giant RWE, I am told by one of my RWE interviewees, makes two products: 
cheap electricity and pretty new landscapes (E3). These ‘pretty new landscapes’ are meant to 
compensate for the destruction of the Hambacher Forst, the neighbouring old-growth forest 
that has had to give way to the encroachment of the world’s largest open cast coal mine in the 
German Rhineland. The same logic is being applied to the over 5,000 residents who have lost 
their homes due to the mine over the past forty years and are being resettled with the promise 
of ‘bigger’ and ‘better’ housing in new villages that are being “built from scratch”, as I am told 
(E4). Both the human and the nonhuman ecological ‘costs’ of the mine are being compensated 
in remarkably similar ways. Despite acknowledgement of ‘irreversible loss’ for the sake of the 
‘greater good’, this compensation is based on similar assumptions of fungibility, equivalence 
and restorability of human and non-human environments. While this dissertation focuses on 
the latter – the institutionalisation and normalisation of the offsetting of nonhuman nature 
(‘biodiversity’) – it is also inherently social, I will argue, as it serves to invisibilise the human and 
ecological ‘costs’ of development, and the multiple forms of violence it encompasses. 
Biodiversity offsetting – based on the idea that the destruction or degradation of nature can be 
meaningfully offset through the restoration or avoided loss of nature elsewhere – has become a 
popular policy instrument and corporate tool in Europe. Some European governments have 
recently introduced offsetting legislation in different forms and shapes (as in the United 
Kingdom, UK, or Spain), while others have a long history of offsetting regulation (such as 
Germany or the Netherlands). European transnational corporations, particularly in the 
extractive sector, many listed on the London Stock Exchange, have been pioneering offsetting 
initiatives across the world – in Madagascar, Mongolia and Namibia, among others. Within 
Europe, major mining and infrastructure projects have come to rely on offsetting to secure their 
local acceptance. The German coal mining industry, for instance, has historically invested in 
restoration, recultivation and, more recently, habitat compensation measures ever since it 
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commenced mining operations to ensure local and political support for its activities. Two major 
(and strongly resisted) proposed airport expansions in London and Nantes were designed to 
involve biodiversity offsetting, and even the University of Sussex has been offsetting its more 
recent expansion into the South Downs National Park (personal communication). 
These projects have been going hand-in-hand with the institutionalisation and normalisation of 
offsetting on an international, and now the European Union (EU) level. This includes, firstly, the 
efforts of major financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) to incorporate offsetting into their lending requirements and 
performance standards for project finance and the channelling of public conservation funds 
through the Natural Capital Financing Facility (NCFF) to finance large project offsets. Secondly, it 
involves the formal policy process through which No Net Loss (NNL) is becoming part of EU 
nature conservation legislation, culminating in the NNL (of Ecosystems and their services) 
initiative of the European Commission (EC) and the associated NNL working group. And thirdly, 
it takes place in the European high-level meetings and conferences where offsetting discourses 
and the offsetting industry are spread and (re)produced. 
When the EC first announced the NNL initiative (NNLi) to achieve its NNL of Biodiversity target, 
it was met with outcry by grassroots environmental (justice) activists and critical academics. 
‘Nature is unique’, they argued, ‘you can’t replace ‘nature here’ with ‘nature there’’. Grassroots 
groups started campaigning (successfully) against the initiative and publicly denounced 
biodiversity offsetting as commodification, marketisation and financialisation of nature, under 
the slogan that ‘nature is not for sale’ (Nature Not for Sale, n.d.). Critics from these movements, 
as well as social and natural scientists, pointed to the many practical, theoretical, ethical and 
philosophical problems with this newest wave in the commodification of Europe’s nature. 
Experiences in Australia (Maron et al., 2012, 2015; Gordon et al., 2015), the US (Robertson, 
2004, 2012; Burgin, 2010; Kaiser, 2001; Kihslinger, 2008) and elsewhere (Santos et al., 2015; 
NRC, 2001; Turner, Redmond and Zedler, 2001; Hallwood, 2007) had shown that the ‘success 
rate’ of offsetting was questionable at best. They pointed to the problems of measurements, 
accounting methods and lack of fungibility and commensurability of nature. More or less 
implicitly or explicitly, many blame(d) the capitalist drive for ever-further commodification and 
marketisation of ever more areas around us, the inherent expansionary drive of capital and the 
profit-drive of the current socioeconomic system (as we will see in the literature review). These 
critiques have been very useful in analysing the interests and assumptions involved in offsetting, 
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and their inability to compensate for ‘actually existing destruction’ in ‘actually existing places’ 
with human and nonhuman relationships. They illustrate the value struggles and the politics 
around tools and measurements, and play important roles in delegitimising offsetting. Others 
have worked out excellent critiques of the economic rationality and quantitative frameworks 
underlying the offsetting ideology, and the profit accumulation through offsetting taking place 
particularly in the US and Australia (e.g. Robertson, 2004, 2006; Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011; 
Niner et al., 2017; Maron et al., 2015). Such critiques have been fundamental to the successful 
contestation of the establishment of the NNLi. 
This dissertation aims to contribute to this literature by situating the role of offsetting in the 
managerial governance of resistance and dissent; contextualising offsetting historically and 
examining how it plays out on the ground. It embeds offsetting in the political economy of 
nature conservation and extractivism by examining it through the lens of power and violence in 
Europe and beyond. While the analyses outlined above have contributed enormously to our 
understanding of the processes and dynamics at play, they tend to focus on the ‘novel’ 
commodification and marketisation aspects of offsetting; sometimes privileging structural 
explanations rooted in the expansionary market logic unleashed under neoliberal capitalism, 
while ignoring the long history of the ideology and practice of offsetting, deep-rooted in 
industrialism, domestication and exploitation of human and nonhuman nature, and the need for 
corporate and state legitimacy in the face of (increasingly visible) social and ecological 
degradation and ever-more apparent failures of the green economy.  
The focus of my work lies on corporate and state power because offsetting cannot be analysed 
without an understanding of the social economic order and the use of offsetting for the 
advancement of social control and accumulation. I focus on violence because offsetting 
contributes, I argue, to the invisibilisation and entrenchment of the epistemic, physical and slow 
violence(s) exercised against human and nonhuman nature, in the form of industrialism and 
extractivism, state control and policing of dissent. The focus lies on Europe because, although 
offsetting is not a European phenomenon, much of the offsetting industry that I explore in this 
thesis is anchored, institutionally and intellectually, in Europe, and many of the corporations 
that are driving offsetting (e.g. from the mining sector) are European companies, listed on 
European stock exchanges and/or headquartered in European capitals. At the same time, the 
analysis goes beyond Europe because the history of offsetting in Europe is inseparable from the 
history of offsetting outside Europe, from corporate engagement particularly in resource-rich 
countries in the global South, and state involvement, including through international financial 
institutions, abroad. Offsetting needs to be situated historically and in its political economic 
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context to understand where it is coming from, why actors engage with it, and what its 
consequences are.  
1.1. Research aims  
This dissertation engages with the places and spaces of offset-making in Europe: the 
international conferences where offsetting is positioned as a solution to the loss of the world’s 
natural capital; the EU policy processes that serve to normalise and institutionalise offsetting in 
European conservation legislation; the international initiatives that involve offsetting to 
establish ‘green mining’ and cleaner coal, and finally an offsetting project ‘on the ground’ – to 
compensate for RWE’s Hambach coal mine in the German Rhineland. 
I firstly explore the role of offsetting in the ongoing transformation of neoliberal capitalism, 
statehood and corporate citizenship, as part of wider processes of reconfigurations of 
governance that are the product of the dialectical relationship between capitalism, the state, 
and its critics (cf. Kirsch, 2014). These transformations have gone hand in hand with escalations 
in authoritarianism (Bruff, 2016), “authoritarian populism” (Scoones et al., 2018: 1) and a 
deeper entrenchment of the state and particular economic relations into every aspect of life. 
Rather than accepting these economic relations – often referred to as neoliberalisation or 
marketisation – as drivers, however, I analyse the specific ways these transformations are 
accomplished in concrete cases, and historicise the institutionalisation and normalisation of 
offsetting in the history of green mining.  
Secondly, this research aims to contribute to demystifying and denaturalising abstract ideas of 
the ‘market’ (Wood, 1994; Lacher, 1999) and challenge the hegemony of critical analyses of 
offsetting which resort back to marketisation and financialisation as explanatory devices. The 
market, George Monbiot has argued, “sounds like a natural system that might bear upon us 
equally, like gravity or atmospheric pressure ... Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its 
power” (2016). By contrast, I aim to lay bare the lack of meaning in the abstraction of the idea 
of ‘the market’, and show how it acts as ‘empty signifier’, mobilised for particular interests. By 
focusing on the productive power of offsetting – in the governance of dissent, the 
invisibilisation of violence, and legitimisation of destructive activity, I aim to explore how 
offsetting relates to more fundamental processes of domestication, oppression and control of 
human and nonhuman nature. This denaturalisation and demystification, I hope, can help show 
cracks and fissures in the networks of power, to identify places and spaces for resistance, and to 
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overcome “critique for critique’s sake” (Walker, 2007: 365). As Connor Cavanagh and Tor 
Benjaminsen argue: 
[R]egardless of whether the object of our critique is development, capital, or the green 
economy, this can occasionally inspire little more than melancholia if not coupled with 
an assessment of possibilities for progressive action at multiple scales in the present 
(2017: 202-3). 
Thirdly, by focusing on Europe, this research corresponds to the call to examine political 
ecologies of destruction and degradation in Europe; to `go near’, in the words of Laura Nader 
(1972), but also to go `upwards’, towards the centres of political ecological power (Robbins, 
2002). Whereas many of the dynamics and forms of violence that I outline in chapter six are 
well-researched in the global South, they are more subtle, less visible and possibly even more 
entrenched in Europe, making them harder to contest. Yet, the historical responsibility – and 
political economic power – responsible for climate change and ecological degradation continues 
to be concentrated in the global North.  
This dissertation thus asks: 
• How has biodiversity offsetting been appropriated and revived by corporate and state 
actors in Europe and beyond? 
• What is the place of offsetting in the social governance of resistance and dissent and how is 
it shaped by that process? 
This research approaches biodiversity offsetting in the framework of the global and local 
political economy, state and corporate power and violence. I will argue that offsetting should be 
understood as a social technology of governance – a tool to manage resistance and dissent 
against corporate and state degradation and violence, and an instrument to flexibilise restrictive 
legislation imposing limits to industrial expansion in the EU. Biodiversity offsetting is mobilised 
to mediate between corporations, states and conservation organisations, by bringing people 
together and creating spaces and networks into which critics are co-opted. To develop this 
argument, I engage empirically with offset-negotiations and offset-making in different places 
and spaces across Europe and I travel (intellectually and physically) to different sites that have 
been, or continue to be, relevant for the institutionalisation and normalisation of offsetting in 
Europe.  
The remainder of this introduction consists of five parts. Firstly, I introduce (the history of) 
biodiversity offsetting in Europe and what I will later name the offsetting-extraction nexus. 
Secondly, I provide an outline of the remainder of this dissertation, before, thirdly, exploring the 
ethics and the politics of my work, and the motivations for engaging in this project. I then 
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elaborate on the methodological choices and frameworks used, before concluding with some 
reflections on the research process.  
1.2. Offsetting in Europe: institutionalisation and normalisation  
Biodiversity offsets, according to proponents, constitute “conservation actions intended to 
compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, 
so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity” (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon, 2004: 13) – a definition 
that I will come back to later on. Offsetting relies on the theoretical commensurability or 
fungibility of nature that allows for the creation of equivalence between lost nature and 
restored or protected nature. It further rests on the acceptance of (unavoidable) residual loss of 
development projects and the calculations of baselines and counterfactual scenarios that 
enable claims of additionality and NNL – or net gain – of biodiversity. Most offsetting schemes 
are embedded in Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) processes and form part 
of the mitigation hierarchy which requires (at least formally) the avoidance and minimisation of 
destruction before resorting to offsets. Some offsetting policies allow for the purchase of 
offsetting ‘credits’ which are supposed to guarantee NNL or net gain of biodiversity. In such 
schemes, biodiversity needs to be ‘measured’ and accounted as ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ in different 
currencies such as habitat for a particular (threatened) species – habitat banking – or kind of 
ecosystem – wetland mitigation banking. Different accounting technologies and metrics are 
employed to calculate these values and ratios, and multipliers are meant to incorporate 
uncertainties (such as restoration success) or associated risks and ensure that no habitat is lost. 
In practice, however, ‘rule-of-thumb’ solutions are common in offsetting programmes (Walker 
et al., 2009). 
Compensation and offsetting, and in-kind and out-of-kind replacement, tend to be 
differentiated in offsetting practice. Yet, offsetting has come to constitute a generic term for 
compensation schemes and projects that are based on the idea of commensurability of nature 
and concepts of NNL or Net Positive Impact (NPI) (Greenhalgh et al., 2010; Tregidga, 2013). I will 
therefore use these terms interchangeably. Furthermore, offsetting professionals and scholars 
usually differentiate between voluntary and mandatory offsetting – a difficult distinction given 
the blurry line between the two. Whereas some countries have developed mandatory legislative 
frameworks or policies, usually as part of their planning procedures, the absence of such a 
mandatory framework can in practice still mean that a permit is approved only upon the 
developer’s willingness to offset, and previously non-permittable development may be 
approved (as Sullivan and Hannis, 2017, show in the UK). In addition, even where governmental 
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policy does not dictate offsetting, project finance providers, e.g. the IFC, may require the 
developer to offset (chapter four). Many ‘voluntary’ projects further constitute ‘pre-compliance’ 
projects, in expectation of future legislation (Bennett, Gallant and ten Kate, 2017). To further 
complicate, many projects involve offsetting, but do not explicitly name offsetting – partly 
because, as an environmental consultant explains to me, offsetting has received “too much bad 
press” (B2). Offsetting is widely used as part of policies and corporate programmes under 
different names – by reference to the mitigation hierarchy, ‘net’ conservation gains, the need 
for compensation, mitigation, restoration, and replacement of lost habitat, for instance – and 
not recognised as offsetting as such (see also Reid and Nsoh, 2016: 131; Bull et al., 2016).  
Biodiversity offsetting projects and policies have rapidly proliferated over the last couple of 
decades and can now be found on every continent except Antarctica (Lave and Robertson, 
2017: 231). In 2016, Ecosystem Marketplace estimates, roughly US$4.8 billion were spent on 
biodiversity offsets globally, almost twice as much as five years earlier (Bennett, Gallant and ten 
Kate, 2017). They tracked 99 regulatory programmes in 33 countries (2017: 3). Biodiversity 
banking systems, which involve the sale of mitigation credits for the restoration, establishment 
of preservation of nature (wetlands, habitat, species or streams) for the compensation of 
damage by third parties to the developer, are heavily concentrated in the United States (US), 
Australia, Germany and Canada. An estimated 97% of all offsetting activity is conducted by the 
developers themselves, and the energy/extraction industries and (to a lesser degree) the 
transport sector have been responsible for 97% of all offsetting activity; with “virtually all offset 
land area reported as of 2016 funded by the energy development/extraction industry” 
(Bennett, Gallant and ten Kate, 2017: 5).  
Existing EU legislation mandates offsets for the destruction of habitat protected under the EU 
Birds and Habitats Directives as well as limited compensation under its Environmental Liability 
Directive and Environmental Impact Assessment regulation. The EC’s recent NNL initiative that 
came out of the 2020 Biodiversity Strategy (EC, 2011a) aims to institutionalise offsetting outside 
protected areas. Meanwhile, a number of European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) have initiated 
national or subnational offsetting frameworks and/or developed offsetting pilot projects, some 
of which have been met with public pushback. Pilot projects in France, Spain, the Netherlands 
and the UK have not been very successful (Bennett et al., 2017).  
The oldest and most developed compensation system exists in Germany, of special importance 
in this thesis, and further elaborated in chapter six. It is grounded in the German ‘Impact 
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Mitigation Regulation’ (Eingriffsregelung), established under the 1976 Federal Nature 
Conservation Act (amended in 2002 and 2009, BNatSchG, 2009), as well as amendments to the 
Federal Building Code (BauGB, 1998). The Eingriffsregelung constitutes a set of rules, rather 
than a single piece of legislation, and differs across the 16 German states. It is stated to strive 
for NNL, requiring avoidance of damage, restoration and compensation for ‘residual 
unavoidable impacts’. The Federal Nature Conservation Act (BNatSchG, 2009) now allows for 
the creation of compensation pools (resembling habitat banks), mainly run by municipalities, 
that facilitate the bundling of offsetting needs and large-scale offsetting. Offsets can be 
undertaken anywhere in the state, and pools are meant to increase efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of compensation measures (BMU, 2004). Compensation agencies provide offsets 
to developers. Private companies, including coal mine operator RWE (whose offsetting activities 
will be explored in chapter six), can receive eco-points for enhancing and upgrading natural 
areas (e.g. from spruce forest to beech tree forest) and sell them to municipalities as offsetting 
measures (Steinbach, 2015; see also Küpfer, 2008). These eco-points, attributed to the 
outcomes of compensation measures as well as development impacts, become the 
measurement unit for environmental loss (debits) and gains (credits) to allow for NNL claims 
(IEEP, 2014a). Eco-points are classified according to impact categories (such as soil, water, 
habitats/species or landscape features) and offsets must fall in the same category (IEEP, 2014a).  
The system is run by the public sector: 80% of biodiversity banks, known as compensation 
pools, are managed by local governments (Bennett, Gallant and ten Kate, 2017: 47), and 
transactions are highly regulated. Recent reforms, however, have led to a more flexibilised and 
less stringent system that facilitates more destructive development, campaigners have 
reported.1 According to Ecosystem Marketplace, the country is developing “more market-like 
features and involving private operators”, thus attracting more private investors (Ecosystem 
Marketplace, n.d.a). Spatial and temporal flexibility (geographic disconnect), as well as “the 
possibility of ‘storing‘ anticipated offsetting measures” were introduced through legislative 
amendments in 2002 and 2009 (IEEP, 2014a; Mazza and Schiller, 2014). The 2009 amendment 
differentiates between replacement compensation measures (Ersatzmaßnahmen) and 
restoration compensation measures (Ausgleichsmaßnahmen) (IEEP, 2014a). Whereas the latter 
is spatially, functionally and temporarily linked (on-site and in-kind), supposed to ensure “equal 
ecological functioning and [ecosystem] values”; the former allows for more functional and 
spatial flexibility, i.e. out-of-kind and off-site measures (IEEP, 2014a: 16). The Nature 
                                                          
1 German planning authorities frequently failed to find sufficient offsetting sites, which led them to wave compensation 
requirements because of the practical challenges to their implementation (Tucker et al., 2014; Mazza and Schiller, 2014). The 
increasing flexibilisation is meant to address this. 
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Conservation Act, in its ‘technical criteria’, stipulates in-kind or out-of-kind compensation 
(BNatSchG, 2009), preferring (but not legally requiring) restoration compensation over 
replacement compensation. Compensation payments are considered a last resort within the 
mitigation hierarchy (BNatSchG, 2009; IEEP, 2014a), a number of steps that involve the 
avoidance and mitigation of environmental damage before offsetting. The act further requires 
the developer to prepare an accompanying landscape conservation plan, outlining planned 
measures (BNatSchG, 2009). 
Meanwhile, companies – particularly from the extractive and energy sectors – have been 
pioneering project offsetting across the world, often as part of corporate conservation 
partnerships with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (chapters four and five). By 2015, 32 
leading transnational corporations, many from the mining, metal and aggregates industries, 
publicly committed to NPI or NNL policies (Rainey et al., 2015). They were led by Solid Energy 
(New Zeeland’s largest open cast mining company) and Rio Tinto (UK-listed metal and mineral 
mining corporation) (TBC, 2012; Rio Tinto, 2012a), followed by major sector leaders and almost 
a third of corporate members of the International Council on Mining and Metals. Other high-
profile industries include the aviation industry and the construction sector, involved in high-
speed railway projects, airport expansions and (renewable) energy infrastructure. European 
corporations have been experimenting with offsetting abroad, too. One particularly well-studied 
offsetting project was implemented by British-Australian multinational Rio Tinto in Madagascar, 
leading to concerns with green grabbing (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012) and displacement 
of local people to compensate for the destruction of highly biodiverse littoral rainforest for 
ilmenite mining (Seagle, 2012; Kill and Franchi, 2016). 
Having briefly introduced offsetting in Europe, with special emphasis on the situation in 
Germany, the following section will outline the structure of the remainder of this thesis. 
1.3. Outline of this dissertation 
This introduction is followed by a literature review, four substantive chapters and my 
conclusions. To develop the argument sketched out above, I first situate my work in the 
literature on biodiversity offsetting and neoliberal conservation. In the literature review, 
Approaching biodiversity offsetting, I identify three tendencies that continue to be dominant in 
much of this literature and which I hope to address in this thesis: firstly, an inclination to 
essentialise and naturalise ‘the market’, therewith reifying its power; grounded, secondly, in a 
states-versus-market dichotomy that continues to dominate much of the social sciences; and, 
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thirdly, the conflation of neoliberal theory and neoliberal practice. Lastly, I problematise the 
tendency to treat non-human nature, rather than ‘the social’, as the object of ‘offsetting 
governance’.  
Chapter three, Making Europe’s nature offsettable, examines some of the key places and spaces 
of offset-making in Europe. I start by tracing the discourses, the ideologies and the knowledge 
systems that have been fundamental to the normalisation and institutionalisation of offsetting, 
followed by an analysis of what I term the offsetting industry and the spectacular performance 
of conservation in and through high-level natural capital and offsetting conferences. All three 
are brought together and explored as means to enact the theatrics of legitimising destruction.  
Chapter four, Introducing No Net Loss – an attempt to anchor offsetting in the European political 
economy, shifts the focus to one political arena that has been important to the normalisation of 
offsetting in Europe: the policy processes led by the EC. The NNL initiative started as an 
ambitious project to establish offsetting in EU nature legislation, but – following civil society 
resistance and other reasons – has been watered down significantly. The initiative constitutes, I 
argue, an attempt to manage, flexibilise and weaken existing nature legislation in the EU, to 
secure access to land and capital by (European) firms, and to manage and diffuse dissent and 
resistance, effectively facilitating the management and flexibilisation of the very concept of 
limits to ecological destruction and accumulation.  
In chapter five, Green extractivism: a brief history of green mining and better coal, I then ‘zoom 
in’ and examine the use of offsetting by one specific industry: the extractive sector. Through an 
analysis of the development of ‘green mining’ and ‘sustainable coal’, I situate offsetting as a 
governance mechanism to deal with the increasing levels of dissent and resistance against 
(large-scale) mining projects and the emergence of biodiversity ‘risks’ – as mobiliser for 
corporate conservation partnerships and other green economy initiatives. 
Finally, in chapter six, Licence to operate – licence to trash – licence to pacify? Biodiversity 
offsetting in the German lignite coal mining sector, I analyse the use and productive power of 
offsets in an extractivist case study in the ‘heart of Europe’. This chapter examines how offsets 
play out ‘on the ground’; how they legitimise and invisibilise the social and ecological 
degradation and violence in the German Rhineland, through novel imaginaries of ‘better nature’ 
and ‘better future’.  
The Conclusion returns to the key themes raised in the dissertation and draws conclusions for 
our understandings of offsetting, extractivism, industrialism, corporate and state power, and 
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violence – and reflects on the need for an anti-statist, anti-authoritarian analysis to understand 
fundamental processes of domestication, alienation and domination of human and nonhuman 
nature.  
1.4. Politics of this dissertation 
All scholarly work is political (and activist). The only relevant questions are whether the 
scholar engages in political/activist work consciously or unconsciously, and whether that 
work supports the status quo, or attempts to subvert it (for either regressive or progressive 
social change) (Waterston, 2006: 116-117). 
Academics can be powerful agents in the contemporary political economy, and their role in the 
institutionalisation and normalisation of offsetting will be returned to in chapter two of this 
dissertation. Offsetting has relied (and continues to rely) on academic scholarship for the 
legitimacy it has needed to become a recognised policy tool, and projects frequently involve 
collaborations with (natural) scientists to do the mapping, surveying and modelling that 
offsetting is based on. Mining corporations – such as the German coal mine operator RWE – 
have historically relied on social science research in their management of resistance against 
their activities (e.g. Kirsch, 2002). At the same time, critical scholarship has played a crucial role 
in the delegitimisation of offsetting in public discourse and policy circles, making the European 
NNLi, for instance, much more difficult to implement than ever imagined by its inventors. Yet, 
critical scholarship can also run the danger of being co-opted and instrumentalised to 
strengthen its object of critique – just as many critiques of the EU carbon offsetting scheme 
have been used to correct “weaknesses” of the scheme (Paterson, 2009), therewith further 
legitimising offsetting and making critique increasingly difficult. “Resistance makes markets”, 
Matthew Paterson argues:  
with the effect of making them potentially more effective environmentally and to avoid 
the worst excesses of their socially unjust dynamics … But the effects here are of course 
contradictory. For many involved in opposing carbon markets, the point is to get rid of 
them, not make them work better. We are thus in the awkward position of shaping the 
form of something we may prefer didn’t exist (2009: 244-250).  
Even critical scholarship can thus contribute – unintentionally and involuntarily – to the further 
reification and normalisation of systems of oppression and exploitation; whether these are 
framed as neoliberalism, capitalism, statism, patriarchy or any other system of hierarchy. So 
how can we overcome such ‘complicity’? 
This research project is driven by a strong normative commitment to radical social change as 
well as to anti-authoritarian analysis. What does that mean in terms of scholarship? Following 
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some of the (numerous) ‘engaged scholars’ who have not shied away from causing controversy 
around their activist engagement more recently, it involves taking sides; siding with those who 
seek  
to produce a society wherein individuals may freely co-operate together as equals in 
every respect, not before a law or sovereign guarantee—which enter new forms of 
authority, imposed criteria of belonging, and rigid territorial bindings—but before 
themselves in solidarity and mutual respect (Springer, 2012: 1606).  
Stuart Kirsch, in his work on (and in support of) resistance against mining in Papua New Guinea, 
argues that “neutrality may not be possible in disputes between transnational corporations and 
indigenous communities because of structural inequalities that make it easier for corporations 
to take advantage of anthropological expertise and silence opposing voices” (2002: 175). The 
need to take sides, overcoming positivist mythologies of objectivity that maintain the status 
quo, goes hand in hand with a commitment not to make legible the structures of resistance, 
their ways of living and their ways of organising – i.e. to join the resistance, rather than to 
research the resistance. Jenny Pickerill and colleagues from the autonomous geographies 
collective argue that “too many academics are happy to build their careers on the backs of 
researching the oppressed”, but fail to join them in their struggle (The autonomous geographies 
collective, 2010: 246, drawing on Kitchin and Hubbard).  
Over the course of my PhD, this research has become more and more closely entangled with my 
everyday life of activism and struggle for social change, as the driving role of the mining industry 
became clear to me. I realised that the German coal industry – and particularly RWE, the coal 
mine operator in the Rhineland, where I grew up – have been involved in offsetting for many 
years, and that their nature restoration and compensation work has been fundamental in 
maintaining the legitimacy that has enabled them to continue coal mining and felling ancient 
forests so close to my own home. This thesis thus also draws on long-term involvement in anti-
coal struggles in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, my engagement with, and emotional 
attachment to, the Hambacher Forst, as well as my own bodily lived experience of the violence 
exercised against those who challenge the corporate and state power that makes its continued 
destruction possible. Emotions – such as love and rage – are fundamental to radical politics 
(Fanon, 1963; Clough, 2012). This involves calling for and recognising the importance of 
“emotional connectivity and the politics of affinity as the fundamental basis upon which any 
lasting transformation might take place” (Springer, 2012: 1616). Research findings themselves 
are grounded in identities, approaches and emotions of the researcher (cf. Thien, 2005), and we 
have much to learn from feminist work on the importance of a care ethic in academia (Lawson, 
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2009). “Especially in environmental justice struggles”, Marco Armiero and Salvatore de Rosa 
argue, “the body often becomes the first place of politicization, or we may say of 
subjectification; it literally becomes the space where people experience the oppression of 
capitalist relations and the opportunity for building resisting communities” (2017: 174) – 
whether in the form of direct action or academic writing, or both. In addition to rage, 
frustration and determination in response to this violence, the research has been shaped by the 
physical impressions and experiences of the forest that is being destroyed (and offset) – walking 
through, smelling, experiencing the forest – and being overwhelmed by the vast moon-like 
landscape of the mine that was once forest and that ‘necessitates’ this destruction. 
1.5. Strategising methodology  
There is no greater fallacy than the belief that aims and purposes are one thing, while 
methods and tactics are another ... The means employed become, through individual habit 
and social practice, part and parcel of the final purpose; they influence it, modify it, and 
presently the aims and means become identical (Goldman, 2003/1923: 260–261). 
The motivations for my research have influenced my methodological and theoretical choices. 
Within critical scholarship, Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans argue, methods have been 
criticised for their “disciplining or ‘hygienizing’ function”, with methodological debates around 
data gathering and processing techniques neutralising political disagreements and differences in 
views, leading critical debates to shift to epistemological and ontological terms (2014: 597; see 
also Knafo, 2010). Yet, methods are not ‘neutral techniques’ to organise data and design 
research, but the they ‘enact worlds’ that can disrupt the status quo; they are “instruments not 
for creating common ground, but for power struggles, competing enactments of worlds and/or 
creating disruptive positions in the worlds of international politics” (Aradau and Huysmans, 
2014: 598). The resulting narratives can be powerful tools of resistance, challenging hegemonic 
discourses that serve to legitimise powerful interests. 
The creation of these disruptive narratives involves denaturalising dominant market discourses 
and discarding, as much as possible, deductive reasoning about the nature of the world; about 
the nature of offsetting, of ‘neoliberal conservation’, and discourses around natural capital and 
ecosystem service thinking, instead paying attention to historical context and power (cf. Knafo, 
2017). This historicisation should thus focus on locating the agency behind the structural power 
and violence that offsetting is embedded in, and helps invisibilise. “Although there is a lively 
debate about the agency of subalterns in the academic literature”, Liza Grandia argues, “less 
discussed is the agency of elites or the complicity of intellectual groups that represent them” 
(2009: 723). The politics of this dissertation introduced above thus translate into a research 
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methodology that focuses on the “political reactions from above” (Geenen and Verweijen, 
2017: 2), the agency of the powerful that responds to resistance from below. However, it also 
requires an analysis of this agency situated within, and mobilising, structural power relations in 
order not to end up with an overly structural analysis that may run the danger of reifying social 
reality and privilege – analytically – explanations of social stability and maintenance of status 
quo over explanations of social change (Sewell, 1982). Only by identifying this change, and the 
agency behind it, can we identify the points of fruitful resistance. 
Consequently, my focus lies on the discourses, strategies, and interests of the actors and 
alliances promoting offsetting ideology and practice, in international forums, in policy 
processes, and in corporate decision making. Furthermore, it lies on the productive power of 
this agency2; situating it vis-à-vis resistance and exploring not just its mobilisation in response to 
critics, but also its role in the management of dissent. For a framework that helps me historicise 
offsetting and emphasise agency without dismissing structural power and violence, this 
dissertation draws on Sam Knafo’s work on agency (2010), Rob Nixon’s concept of slow violence 
(2011) and Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch’s focus on the dialectical relationship between 
corporations and their critics (2010) – expanded to include state actors. These three 
frameworks will be introduced in the next few sections.  
The analysis of offsetting as social technology of governance through the lens of power 
necessitates overcoming the tendency of critical scholars to “oppose power to agency as if 
those with power have no agency and those with agency have no power” – wrongly conflating 
agency with resistance, thus reducing it “to a limited moment of the analysis” (Knafo, 2010: 
494). Those who want to ‘change the world’, Knafo argues, thus always seem to be “‘in waiting’ 
for the moment when they will be empowered and finally able to change things” (2010: 494). 
This tendency is based on a very narrow (Marxist-inspired) view of ‘revolution’ and social 
change that relies on working towards a particular moment in history, as opposed to the 
association of revolution with prefiguration and formation of new relationships and institutions, 
alongside the erosion of relations of hierarchy and oppression. It also ignores that, firstly, even 
in the global state-system and neoliberal economic order, people are already enacting different 
worlds and futures through their resistance. Secondly, it is disempowering because it ignores 
the dialectical relationships between corporations, states and their critics (Kirsch, 2014); the 
ways in which corporate and state behaviour is shaped through resistance and the agency of 
                                                          
2 This use of the term ‘productive power’ is not to be confused with Foucauldian notions of power, which, James McCarthy and 
Scott Prudham argue, “remain somewhat diffuse for grappling with the class coalitions, interest-based politics, and scale-specific 
ecological dynamics we see as central to neoliberal experiments in reconfigurations of environmental governance” (2004: 280) – in 
other words, to identify ‘winners and losers’ in these processes. 
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the ‘powerless’. This ‘shaping’ involves concessions to pacify resistance (such as welfare 
policies) but also the material and ideological resources that are being channelled into the 
management and policing of dissent. In his work on anti-mining struggles in Papua New Guinea, 
Stuart Kirsch suggests that, rather than studying corporations and resistance movements 
independently, “we need to study [them] within a single frame of analysis” (2014: 232). 
Following Kirsch’s appeal to focus on this dialectical relationship avoids falling back into overly 
structuralist explanations of power and violence. 
Sam Knafo’s agency approach, however, reaches beyond an ontological focus on agency as a 
distinct object of research, which would not overcome the problem of dismissing or being blind 
to structures. But it recognises that structures are not God-given or pre-political, and neither 
are they determinant of how social reality unfolds: they are the product of agentive encounter 
and constitute the rules of the game, but do not determine how people navigate these rules 
(Konings, 2005: 108). Understanding these rules is crucial but should not guide analysis. Instead 
of simply dismissing structures, the agency approach involves prioritising agency 
methodologically, not ontologically. The latter rests on the assumption that structure and 
agency can be distinguished empirically, whereas the former “provides a principle of critical 
rigour to avoid reification ... it sets a methodological imperative that is central to the 
development of a proper historicist and critical approach” (Knafo, 2010: 494). This requires not 
ignoring structural power, but examining its productive dimensions through the lens of agency, 
and examining how they are established, invoked, and reproduced through agency. This focus is 
what makes it methodological. 
Without assuming that corporations or states are seamless unities of intention and action, this 
approach can show how powerful corporate and state actors mobilise and instrumentalise 
power relations and establish offsets for particular purposes. This helps overcome the tendency 
to explain offsetting with reference to some inherent logic, and allows me to focus on what 
practices do, and what effects they have, rather than what they say (Konings, 2010: 743) – 
helping to position offsets as managerial governance tools. Powerful discourses that the 
biodiversity offsetting ideology is embedded in – around natural capital and ecosystem services 
– tend to be drawn upon to explain the development of offsetting policies or projects. Yet, such 
discourses have no inherent causal effects or significance “outside of the way they are 
historically implemented and exploited by specific agents” (Knafo, 2010: 513). That is why I 
employ the agency focus to understand how such discourses are invoked and mobilised and for 
what purpose – to understand, in other words, their “productive leverage” (Knafo, 2010: 505) – 
rather than simply accepting the power – or performativity – of such discourses. This further 
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helps overcome the danger of structural determination (Knafo, 2010) that may emerge in 
analyses of marketisation and financialisation of nature. Analysing offsetting as a product of 
agency, rather than structures, or structural ‘laws’ of capital accumulation (rejecting Polanyi-
inspired inherent market logic and expansionary tendencies) not just helps de-naturalise such 
notions, but also helps demystify so-called market mechanisms. In practice, it involves analysing 
the multiple places and spaces of offset-making, and historicising and contextualising them to 
understand the how and the why. Adopting a multi-sited approach (cf. Marcus, 1995) enables 
me to link and to explore these multiple sites of offset-making, following the offsetting industry 
(introduced in chapter three) and the artefacts of offset-making (such as the case studies and 
PowerPoint presentations that travel across these sites of struggle). This re-focuses on the 
agents that are reproducing and that are empowered by such structures, and how this 
translates into change.  
The next step then requires reconciling the methodological agency focus and conception of 
power with an analysis of state and corporate violence, epistemological violence and the ‘slow 
violence’ inherent in ecological degradation and climate change, industrialism and statism – in 
addition to the direct physical violence targeting those resisting the former. In his seminal work, 
Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor, Rob Nixon explains:  
By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of 
delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that 
is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or 
action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into 
instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a 
violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and 
accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In 
so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic 
challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence (2011: 2). 
This violence is part of the rarely told story of biodiversity loss, coal mining and ecological 
degradation, in which many of the actors that I examine in this dissertation are complicit – 
extractive industries, policy makers and NGOs. It represents the other side of the coin of the 
violence that those who militantly resist processes of extractivism, such as in the Hambacher 
Forst, but especially in many places in the global South (where this violence is more direct, 
physical and life-threatening), are subjected to on a daily basis. Being slow and less visible does 
not mean it cannot be examined with a methodological agency focus. In fact, because it is more 
difficult to identify agency behind slow violence it is ever more important. Focussing on 
corporate and state strategies behind exploitative practices helps reorienting analysis away 
from suffering and toward harm (Benson and Kirsch, 2010: 475). A structural violence approach 
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could downplay the agency of corporate and state actors as agents who are responsible for 
social and ecological degradation, and may lead to “an approach that socializes suffering to such 
a degree that an entire social structure or historical trajectory can be described as the 
responsible agent” (Farmer in Benson and Kirsch, 2010: 475). The methodological agency 
approach can help make this agency visible, laying bare how power and violence are exercised 
and affecting human and nonhuman nature – offering a promising starting point for critical 
intellectual and political engagement.  
To sum up, pointing to the agency involved in the normalisation and institutionalisation of 
offsetting, this approach helps, firstly, to ‘denaturalise’ the concepts and categories that are 
used to describe (and therefore possibly further reify) social reality; secondly, to go beyond 
analyses of marketisation and financialisation (explored in the next chapter); and thirdly, to 
open space for resistance and radical contestation on both epistemic/intellectual and practical 
terms. The latter, in turn, involves a refusal to accept hegemonic narratives and facilitates the 
creation of much more powerful counter-narratives that can go beyond engaging with those in 
power in their own terms. Instead, it allows for creative thinking and ‘dreaming’ about 
alternatives. It further allows putting forward more radical demands and ideas around 
alternative futures and natures, grounded in non-market and non-neoliberal principles of 
solidarity and mutual aid. It goes hand in hand with the refusal to accept any form of hierarchy 
of ideas, any dominant framework of thought, and any restrictions on the living and working 
towards such alternative futures. In other words, it opens up the space for radical prefigurative 
politics and thinking.  
1.6. Methods  
The historicisation and contextualisation of offsetting, the agency approach, and the emphasis 
on the dialectical relationships require, firstly, investigating the narratives, interests and 
experiences of the actors involved in offsetting in different places; secondly, witnessing the 
(re)production of these discourses in places and spaces of offset-making; and thirdly, studying 
the testimonies and documentation of the history of interactions between the mining industry, 
conservation organisations and the state, articulated in the offsetting-extraction nexus. My 
methodology thus consists of 
• 46 semi-structured qualitative interviews (to investigate the dynamics inside the NNL 
working group, to understand better the work of biodiversity consultants, the work of RWE 
and the Better Coal initiative, and the violence and power exercised by corporate and state 
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representatives on the resistance movement in the Rhineland, as well as how it is shaped by 
the latter) (Annex 1) 
• Participant observation in 12 (high-level) conferences and meetings (to examine the 
hegemonic discourses, narratives and imaginaries around biodiversity offsetting and natural 
capital) (Annex 2) 
• Participant observation, grounded in my own experiences of the resistance and the 
corporate and state responses in and around the Hambacher Forst (to understand the 
technologies of governance employed by corporate and state actors) (Annex 3) 
• Close readings of policy documents, media articles, reports, and legal texts 
Interviews were carried out between 2014 and 2017, with various actors in Brussels, London, 
the Netherlands and Germany (Annex 1). Interviews have been coded and anonymised. All 
translations of German interviews and sources are my own. To understand the EU NNLi, I spoke 
to members of the NNL working group and others involved with the initiative: biodiversity 
consultants, members of the EC and national ministries, civil society representatives and 
industry lobbyists. These interviews usually lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and took place in 
offices, cafes and restaurants. Nine interviews were conducted via Skype/telephone. To 
understand the workings of offsetting in the German Rhineland, I conducted formal and 
countless informal interviews in and around the coal mine and the offset site: with employees 
of coal mine operator RWE, including its recultivation centre and the Public Relations (PR) and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) departments, the Bettercoal initiative, local residents and 
members of the resistance movement, activists living in the Hambacher Forst and civil servants. 
In addition, I interviewed – and spoke to informally – a number of members of the European-
level alliance that has been working to oppose the ‘Financialisation of Nature’ and engaged with 
the EU policy process. Most of these individuals work for grassroots organisations or 
independently. Furthermore, I had numerous informal chats with consultants, government 
officials, RWE – but also conservation and social justice organisations – during conferences and 
events. Therefore, no research participants have been identified in this thesis, and my 
descriptions remain deliberately vague.  
The semi-structured interviews were complemented by participant observation and “event 
ethnography” (Brosius and Campbell, 2010: 245) at 12 conferences and meetings (Annex 2). 
High-profile meetings, Kenneth MacDonald argues, are central new fields of conservation and 
cultural and social reproduction, “where organisational agency can be seen to work towards 
achieving and articulating the configuration of a new organisational order in which the interests 
of capital accumulation receive an unparalleled degree of access and consideration in 
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conservation planning and practice” (2010b: 271). In these meetings personal ties are formed, 
partnerships are initiated, and ideas are spread. These high-profile meetings are complimented 
by industry events and campaign meetings.  
In addition to these events, I attended a number of (guided and non-guided) field visits into and 
around the Hambach coal mine and Sophienhöhe, its main offsetting site, the Hambacher Forst, 
a number of information centres and viewpoints, and the occupation (Annex 3).  
The research on RWE and the Hambach coal mine further draws on long-term involvement with 
the resistance movement and my experiences within it, as well as having grown up close to the 
mine, in an area that is shaped – politically, physically and culturally – by RWE’s mining 
operations.  
Finally, I engaged in close reading of a wide range of policy documents, legal texts, Freedom of 
Information requests, civil society reports and academic literature around offsetting. The 
Freedom of Information requests asked for information related to meetings and communication 
involving EC officials about the NNLi and the EC’s Natural Capital Financing Facility and are 
publicly available on the Ask-the-EU website (AsktheEU, 2016). 
1.7. Some reflections on positionality and ethics  
Struggles over offsetting involve irresolvable value struggles, and negotiations over the 
assumed (ir)rationality of biodiversity offsetting are thus located firmly within political and 
ideological arenas (Sullivan and Hannis, 2015: 162). 
My fieldwork began at the first Natural Capital forum in Edinburgh in 2013, shortly after I 
started my PhD, and ended with the Sustainable Coal forum in 2017. Just as most research 
projects, it involved a number of unexpected turns and changes to my research outline – it was 
only when I had conducted much of the historical work (chapter five) that I realised the crucial 
importance of the mining industry and decided to analyse the offsetting activities of RWE, so 
close to home. That raised ethical questions that I had not considered previously: Could (should) 
I be researching the activities and strategies of a company that I was campaigning against at the 
same time, that I felt so strongly about; a company that I have taken direct action against in the 
past and that has taken legal action against me? Could I provide a fair representation of their 
work, given my own experiences of police and corporate violence in defence of RWE’s activities 
on my own body, and having been hospitalised following one such encounter? If anything, I 
decided, that was ever more reason to examine their activities systematically, to share these 
results with fellow campaigners and make them publicly available. Relationships and research 
findings are influenced by the identities of those who study them (Arendell, 1997) – what 
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matters, therefore, is being honest about these identities, disclosing my activist involvement, 
and being transparent about the politics involved in this research. 
The second dilemma – relevant, to a much lesser degree, also to the high-level conferences I 
attended, and other interviews I conducted – relates to the way I present myself vis-à-vis RWE 
interviewees and disclosed my positionality. Throughout my fieldwork engagement I never hid 
my critical position vis-à-vis the company, its coal mining activities and its nature restoration 
work. In fact, I believe that was one of the reasons my interview partners were willing to speak 
to me: to convince me of the valuable nature work the company engages in. I remain grateful 
for the time they spent answering my questions, and for the continued good contact with their 
nature restoration team. Many of the individuals I spoke to work hard and mean well, and are 
(rightly) proud of their restoration success and creation of local biodiversity in restored mining 
areas – and happy to show me this work. At times, it was difficult to ‘zoom back out’ and not 
forget about the larger context within which this nature restoration work takes place – and why 
it is needed in the first place. Conducting research within the corporation, Stuart Kirsch argues, 
“poses a risk of co-optation, because the tendency of ethnographers to emphasize with the 
subjects of their research may influence their findings or temper their critical perspective” 
(2014: 12). Such feelings were quickly overcome when the discussion came to the resistance 
against the mine. Particularly during the guided tours by RWE employees, my status as observer 
was repeatedly tested when confronted with abusive comments about those who were 
resisting RWE’s operations: the forest defenders who take great risk and make huge personal 
sacrifices to stop the company’s destruction of the ancient forest – people I care about, some of 
them my friends, and people with whom I shared so much more than my research participants. 
Witnessing the hatred towards activists and the throwaway comments by RWE employees and 
local politicians, wishing for their physical harm, made it difficult not to respond. 
Interviews about the EU NNLi, on the other hand, were less contentious, although also shaped 
by disagreement. These interviewees were much less antagonistic towards campaigners and 
critics – many even sympathetic to some of their concerns – but usually fended off critiques as 
‘without evidence’, and with the ever-powerful ‘better-than-nothing’ argument. My identity as 
white woman in her early thirties may have helped gain access with some interviewees, but also 
led – on a couple of occasions – to overly patronising responses by senior male interviewees. 
My identity as activist was helpful in approaching campaigners whom I had met at previous 
occasions – both on the EU level and in and around the Hambacher Forst. The research would 
have been much less fruitful and more difficult had I not had extensive pre-knowledge of the 
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area, previous contacts, as well as – interestingly – a certain legitimacy derived from my 
upbringing close to the mine.  
Despite the value of the formal interviews, some of the informal hallway conversations proved 
even more productive – although, unfortunately, I was usually not able to take notes and record 
powerful responses. At the same time, some of the most memorable moments – where the 
corporate and state power I that studied became most visible – were only indirectly related to 
my research. One such moment, which testified to this very power, came up at an event by the 
London Mining Network where one of the invitees, a Malagasy farmer who had been expelled 
from his land by Rio Tinto, was refused a visa following intervention from Rio Tinto. Lastly, some 
of the most interesting (and fun) experiences involved long bike rides around the mining area; 
following RWE’s cycling infrastructure, large parts of which were marked with protest graffiti 
against both RWE and the state; the confrontation with RWE’s enormous power stations during 
lightning and thunderstorms; cycling through the empty ghost villages that are waiting to be 
dug up for the ‘migrating mine’; and lastly, encountering refugee accommodation on RWE’s 
territory next to their power station (all figure 1, clockwise, starting top left). 
 
Figure 1 Rhinish coal region: field work on bicycle (own photo); approaching RWE’s power station (own photo); ghost 
village Immerath (Deicke, 2016), refugee accommodation at RWE’s power station (own photo). 
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2. Approaching biodiversity offsets: from financialisation to technology of 
governance  
This chapter engages with the neoliberal conservation and financialisation of nature debates in 
which biodiversity offsetting is embedded. I identify the contributions of these literatures as 
well as points of departure where my approach differs. Specifically, I point out three ways in 
which my analysis departs from previous work on offsetting and the neoliberalisation of nature: 
firstly, the over-emphasis on the marketisation aspect of offsetting that may risk essentialising 
and naturalising the market; secondly, the conceptualisation of the role of the state, often 
grounded in a problematic state-market dichotomy; and thirdly, the conflation of neoliberal 
theory and practice. I then outline how my framework aims to address these three points helps 
me reconceptualise offsetting as social technology of governance in the remainder of thesis. 
Biodiversity offsetting has emerged in the last decades not only as an element in corporate 
sustainability strategies and policy circles, but also – rather belatedly – in the academic 
literature. Unlike other so-called ‘market-based’ instruments such as carbon offsetting or 
Payment for Ecosystem schemes, academic researchers were not the driving force behind the 
invention and pioneering of this form of offsetting (Lave and Robertson, 2017; Calvet, 
Napoléone, and Salles, 2015). Indeed, most of the highly-cited literature in support of 
biodiversity offsetting schemes has come from a relatively small number of consultants and 
practitioners (sometimes in collaboration with academics) who are members of the offsetting 
industry that I introduce in chapter three. As Rebecca Lave and Morgan Robertson argue, 
consultants and other “private sector scientists” with financial interests in offsetting have 
“successfully claimed the mantle of scientific authority” (2017: 230, citing Briske et al.; see also 
Lave, 2012, 2014) and contributed to its ‘scientific legitimacy’ and that of the adequacy and 
integrity of the metrics and currencies used in offsetting (Walker et al., 2009; Lockhart, 2015). 
While lacking the traditional academic recognition associated with PhD titles or university 
positions, they publish in academic journals and are widely regarded as “authoritative voices” 
(Lave and Robertson, 2017: 230), backed up by institutionalised offsetting interests such as 
Forest Trends (introduced below) and the Business and Biodiversity Offsetting Programme 
(BBOP).3 
While environmental economists and ecologists have not been the driving force behind the 
normalisation and institutionalisation of offsetting, they have provided much of the groundwork 
                                                          
3 BBOP, founded by Forest Trends, is a coalition between corporate, financial, governmental and civil society actors with the aim to 
promote offsetting, and possibly the most important driving force behind offsetting in Europe. It will be introduced in more detail in 
chapter three.  
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that has made offsetting a legitimate policy option and corporate strategy, and they have 
developed many of the tools and methodologies that make aspects of biodiversity 
commensurable and offsettable. At the same time, natural and social scientists have pointed to 
the ‘flaws’ of offsetting practice (e.g. Bull et al., 2013; Bull, Lloyd and Strange, 2017; Thébaud et 
al., 2015; Moreno-Mateos et al., 2015). Accepting the general principle and the use of offsets, 
several such authors have pointed to problems with its implementation in practice, particularly 
related to the ecological principles that are needed to make offsetting ‘work’ (Kremen, 2005; 
Bruggeman et al., 2005; Moilanen et al., 2009; Bull et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2013; Bekessy et 
al., 2010) and the “true costs of offsetting” (Moreno-Mateos et al., 2015). They show that No 
Net Loss (NNL) aims are rarely delivered (Maron et al., 2012; Curran, Hellweg and Beck, 2014) 
and that restoration projects to offset for biodiversity loss frequently fail to meet their stated 
objectives (Moilanen et al., 2009; Palmer and Filoso, 2009). Malika Virah-Sawmy and colleagues, 
for instance, illustrate the “arbitrariness” of habitat value measurements in Australia, which 
ignore the “real-world challenges in compensating losses in an effective and lasting manner” 
(2014: 61). Others criticise problems with time lags between habitat loss and restoration, 
duration and lack of permanence, scale (the distance between impact and compensation sites), 
sites (in-kind versus out-of-kind compensation, e.g. tiger habitat compensated through the 
creation of more tiger habitat versus chimpanzee habitat), and lack of independent (third-party) 
monitoring, enforcement and long-term management (Lave and Robertson, 2017; Curran, 
Hellweg and Beck, 2014; Maron et al., 2012; Gonçalves et al., 2015; Bull et al., 2013). They have 
developed theoretical principles of ‘good practice’ such as site proximity (Pilgrim et al., 2013), 
multipliers to account for restoration uncertainties and time discounting (Moilanen et al., 2009; 
Bull et al., 2016; Bull, Lloyd and Strange, 2017) and counterfactual scenarios and dynamic 
baselines based on ‘biodiversity trends’ (Bull et al., 2014). Others still have linked these critiques 
to social (in)equity due to the distances between impact and compensation sites (Ruhl and 
Salzman, 2006; BenDor and Brozovic, 2007). James Salzman and J. B. Ruhl point to the specific 
challenges of biodiversity offsetting (compared to, for instance, pollution trading) due to the 
inherent difficulties of agreeing on biodiversity trading units caused by the lack of fungibility, 
requiring stricter trading rules that are alleged to reduce market efficiency (2000; see also 
Walker et al., 2009).  
These contributions are valuable because they identify many of the internal tensions and 
contradictions within offsetting practice, and contribute to the public de-legitimisation of 
offsetting. Yet such work has also enabled offsetters to ‘learn from their mistakes’, 
strengthening offsetting ideology by pointing out – but also offering solutions to – major flaws; 
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encouraging the use of ‘better metrics’ or ‘more sophisticated measurement technologies’ and 
closer monitoring. This has led to absurd statements such as “Metrics must incorporate 
irreplaceability”4 (Pressey et al., cited in Bekessy, 2010: 154). While critical of the ‘arbitrary’ 
nature of offsetting baselines, for instance, Shuling Yu and colleagues then go on to develop 
better mathematical models to “quantify the loss from coastal land reclamation and gain from 
offsets” (2017: 35). Coralie Calvet, Claude Napoléone, and Jean-Michel Salles, after having 
shown the limits to substitutability and the risk of economic objectives prevailing over 
ecological objectives, argue that “one of the main ways to improve the BO [biodiversity 
offsetting] system is to better incorporate scientific contributions and social representation of 
biodiversity” and recommend that “the scientific community should continue to investigate BO 
both in the natural and in the social sciences, providing both ecological and economics insights” 
(2014: 7372, emphasis added). Arguably, such secondary elaborations can have the effect of 
maintaining the offsetting paradigm; of making offsetting ‘a little less absurd’ whilst hiding the 
problematic premises and effects it engenders, making offsetting projects or policies more 
difficult to challenge and resist.  
At the same time, critical researchers engaging in the Financialisation of Nature (FoN) debate 
have picked apart and laid bare many of the problematic underlying assumptions of offsetting, 
the politics involved, and the ‘anti-scientific’ nature of offsetting in practice. Rooted mainly in 
critical geography literature, they have built on work on ‘neoliberalising nature(s)’ (Castree, 
2008a, 2008b; Bakker, 2010; Heynen et al., 2007; Mansfield, 2008; McCarthy and Prudham, 
2004), the privatisation of natural resources (e.g. Mansfield, 2004; Bakker, 2004, 2005) and 
what Kathleen McAfee has famously coined “selling nature to save it” (1999). This body of work 
covers the effects of ‘neoliberalisation’ on the ground in a wide variety of places, regions and 
countries (Castree, 2008a) – including, for instance, the introduction of fishery quota systems as 
‘marketisation and enclosure’ (Mansfield, 2004); the introductions of the ‘right to pollute’ in 
North America (McCarthy, 2004); the ‘regulatory rollback’ in state practices of water testing in 
Canada (Prudham, 2004); the privatisation of mineral resources in Peru (Bury, 2004), water in 
Britain (Bakker, 2004; 2005) and forests in the US (Heynen and Perkins, 2005). On the example 
of water, forest, minerals and other natural resources, authors have criticised the renewed and 
intensifying commodification, marketisation and financialisation of nature (e.g. Heynen and 
Robbins, 2005), and new wave of enclosures (Robbins and Luginbuhl, 2006). This work has 
contributed to an impressive body of literature around what Bram Büscher and colleagues have 
                                                          
4 The statement continues: “to avoid the trap of allocating low value to degraded habitat even if it is representative of a highly 
threatened ecological community” (Bekessy et al. 2010: 154). 
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coined ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Büscher et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2006; Igoe, 2010; Büscher, 2010; 
Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Brockington, Duffy and Igoe, 2008; Holmes, 2012; Liverman, 2004; 
Milne and Adams, 2012; McElwee, 2012; Pokorny et al., 2010; Büscher and Dressler, 2007; Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007; Igoe, Neves, and Brockington, 2010).  
Students of neoliberal conservation criticise the “inappropriateness of the analytical categories 
of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism, which separate nature into discrete and 
exchangeable units” (Lockhart, 2015: 336). Sian Sullivan argues that the “spectacular 
financialization of environmental conservation” has created new investment frontiers, turning 
economic and ecological crises into opportunities and infusing conservation practice with 
“financial categories” that produce new kinds of “human-with-nature relationships” (2013a: 
198). Evangelia Apostolopoulou and William Adams analyse the role of offsetting in enabling a 
social and spatial “reterritorialization of socionatures” (2017). This has been facilitated by what I 
analyse as spectacularisation of conservation in chapter three. The performative dimensions of 
spectacle (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Igoe, 2010, 2013) and ritual (Turner, 1969) have “given 
rise to an industry that sells the elite performance of sustainability as these dynamics and 
mechanisms enmesh distant investors and nature consumers in idealized 'local' conservation 
relations and landscapes” (Huff and Brock, 2017; see also Huff and Tonui, 2017). Spectacle, 
Ashen Ruins suggests, “adapts with technology” (2002: 5), incorporating novel and ‘innovative’ 
conservation instruments, and can go hand in hand with the increasing militarisation and 
securitisation of conservation (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014; 
Marijnen and Verweijen, 2016; Büscher and Davidov, 2013; Brock and Dunlap, 2018). This body 
of work has been fundamental to exposing the inherent reductionism and contradictions in so-
called market-based or neoliberal conservation approaches and the contested knowledges 
about nature that cannot be separated from “place-specific ecologies”, cultural practices and 
power relations (McAfee, 2003: 203).  
2.1. Offsetting nature – premises and critical approaches 
Grounded in the literature explored above, a growing number of authors have engaged in 
fruitful investigation and critique of offsetting. Morgan Robertson (2000, 2004, 2006, 2012) 
explores US American wetland banking and analyses how bankers, regulators and ecologists 
negotiate political conflicts which cannot be reduced to a “matter of economics” (2009: 36). He 
illustrates the scientific-political work that goes into the construction of nature as commodity: 
“The ‘red-legged frog habitat’ service”, he argues, “is not out there waiting; rather, it is 
fundamentally defined as a service in the process of its marketing and sale” (2012: 387). 
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Morgan Robertson continues to show the political importance of classifications and 
categorisations and argues that scientific disputes around the ‘offsettable’ have become 
essential to their commodification and the creation of value (2006: 368). “[E]cosystem science”, 
he argues, “increasingly serves as a metrical technology for the commodification of ecosystem 
services” (2006: 368).  
Based on extensive field research, Sian Sullivan analyses planning negotiations and policy 
proposals at connected sites of nuclear power production in the UK and uranium extraction in 
Namibia, where offsets are used to fulfil requirements of “off-site mitigation of environmental 
harm at points of both extraction and ‘consumption’ of uranium” (2013b: 80). She illustrates 
how offsets contribute to green washing of nuclear power and the associated extraction of 
uranium; “thereby disavowing damages to biodiversity whilst intensifying radioactive threat at 
these different nodes of the commodity circuit” (2013b: 87). These practices are part and 
parcel, she argues, of the financialisation of discourses and environmental conservation 
practices, the monetisation and marketisation of nonhuman natures and processes of value 
creation. This also involves the marketing of conservation through representation of ecological 
crisis, media performances and large-scale conservation events as ‘conservation spectacle’. She 
traces financialisation of conservation discourse and practice by means of four “interconnected 
and heuristically relevant domains”: “nature finance” (through the incorporation of 
conservation into financial investment opportunities and other mechanisms), “nature work” 
(through the framing of nature as service provider for human needs and associated valuation 
projects), “nature banking” (through the reconstitution of nature as natural capital to be 
(profitably) managed) and “nature derivatives” (through the establishment of biodiversity 
derivatives that promise payments from bets on its future value to hedge against unpredictable 
events, related to securitisation of risk of species extinction as tradable commodity with 
speculative returns) (Sullivan, 2013a: 203). Financialisation, she argues, here is “extending 
possibilities for nature’s speculative release into the realm of circulating money in its new 
universal form of derivatives” (2013a: 208). Elsewhere, she theorises the abstraction, 
distancing, flattening and dematerialisation of nature that is reinforcing the nature-culture split 
underlying offsetting (2010); the (anti-)ecological assumptions guiding “calculations of complex 
ecological assemblages so that they can become biodiversity offsets” and the “intensified 
distributions of new environmental values with which biodiversity offsets may be associated” 
(2013b: 80). She explores the technical and evaluative processes that make nature ‘legible’ as 
natural capital and constitute the ‘economisation’ of human and nonhuman nature (Sullivan, 
2014, 2017, in press) and the ontological dimensions and politics involved in the remaking of 
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nature as natural capital, “draw[ing] attention to the multiplicitous ways in which value(s) for 
nature(s) are fabricated rather than found” (Sullivan, forthcoming, 2017b; Sullivan and Hannis, 
2017; see also Dauguet, 2015). These values circulate across time and space, Louise Carver has 
shown in relation to the British offsetting scheme (2015).  
Examining the politics of market-making, Evangelia Apostolopoulou and William Adams identify 
four ways in which offsetting reframes nonhuman nature (conservation): into exchangeable 
biodiversity units, as de-localised, as monetarily valuable and compatible with economic growth 
(2015a). Crucial to these processes are the application and the politics of technical calculative 
devices that are used to quantify biodiversity value at impact and offset sites in the UK (Carver, 
2015; Carver and Sullivan, 2017; Sullivan and Hannis, 2017), including the accounting practices 
to incorporate natural capital into national and corporate annual accounts (Sullivan and Hannis, 
2017). Louise Carver and Sian Sullivan illustrate the creative use and modification of offsetting 
metrics for political compromise at the cost of conservation gains in England, and the impact of 
financial interests on complex impact-gain calculations (2017). These metrics that are 
fundamental to creating (the illusion of) equivalence and fungibility between environmental 
health and harm in different places, as well as the accounting frameworks that are used to 
calculate biodiversity values have been much subject of critique (Robertson, 2006, 2012; 
Sullivan, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013b; Corson and MacDonald, 2012). Andy Lockhart explores the 
political problems and contradictions that emerged in the attempt of the British government to 
“roll out” offsetting (2015). He explores issues around the political feasibility to deal with, and 
overcome, the inherent tensions in offsetting and argues that the questions critics should be 
asking are “not so much over the technical feasibility of offsetting, but the extent to which the 
technical complexities can be satisfactorily worked through the political milieu in which they are 
embedded and constituted” (2015: 341). By means of a French case study, Benoît Dauguet 
(2015) shows how biodiversity is made fungible and commensurable, and turned into a 
commodity, through its re-framing as ecosystem function. 
Through an analysis of the public consultation that formed part of the English policy process to 
set up offsetting, Sian Sullivan and Mike Hannis illustrate the irreconcilable value struggles 
involved in offsetting (2015), grounded in differences in ontology (Sullivan, 2013c) and values 
(O’Neill, 1997); and how it facilitates development through its incorporation in the English 
planning system (Hannis and Sullivan, 2012), while Evangelia Apostolopoulou and William 
Adams (2017) theorise offsetting in the UK in relation to processes of capitalist urbanisation. US 
wetland mitigation banking has further been discussed by Morgan Robertson (2004, 2006, 
2012) and Morgan Robertson and Nicholas Hayden (2008); US species banking has been 
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analysed by Jessica Fox and Anamaria Nino-Murcia (2005) and Jamie Pawliczek and Sian Sullivan 
(2011). Helen Tregidga (2013) draws on Foucault’s governmentality approach to analyse 
biodiversity accounting as a regime of practice, examining the invisible rationality behind it by 
means of a New Zealand case study. Others have illustrated how offsetting serves to position 
corporations as ‘saviours of biodiversity’ in the face of ‘unsustainable locals’ (Seagle, 2012; 
Brock, 2015). These two studies are some of the few analyses of project offsets that are not part 
of a national regulatory framework (see Benabou, 2014, for an examination of the international 
development of voluntary offsets through an economic sociology framework of market 
overflow and framing). Caroline Seagle shows how Rio Tinto frames local traditional practices as 
‘irrational’ and ‘unsustainable’ in order to legitimise the assumption of a declining biodiversity 
baseline and therewith allowing for the protection of forest to ‘offset’ for the disastrous impacts 
of its ilmenite mine in Southeast Madagascar (2012). Marine Maron and colleagues illustrate 
how the unrealistic (yet politically useful) use of baselines in offsetting for ‘avoided 
deforestation’ and the construction of counterfactual scenarios can ‘lock-in’ biodiversity loss 
(2015), while David Moreno-Mateos and colleagues argue, similarly, that “the design of offset 
policies may worsen the present state of biodiversity and existing policies to protect it” (2015: 
553).  
This literature has generated a very productive and important debate on the processes of, and 
problems with, the so-called marketisation and financialisation of nature, and it has engaged 
with fundamental changes in the political economy of conservation that are usually associated 
with neoliberal capitalism. While drawing on, and being very sympathetic to, much of this 
diverse body of work, my analysis departs from some of its underlying assumptions and 
conceptual understandings. These points of departure are partly grounded in my understanding 
of neoliberalism as theory and as managerial practice. Having given a brief overview of some of 
the main contributions of the critical literature on offsetting, in the following section, I draw out 
this understanding of neoliberalism, its history and its view of markets. This section will then 
help me anchor the three points of departure of my own research vis-à-vis the FoN literature 
below. 
2.2. Exploring ‘neoliberalism’ and its history 
The difficulty of defining – and the tendency to overuse – the term neoliberalism has been 
widely recognised (Springer and Birch, 2016; Davies, 2016). It is due to the very impossibility to 
narrow it down to a short and concise definition (Mirowski, 2009) that the term is used in partly 
overlapping and partly contradictory ways (Ferguson, 2010). Neoliberalism “remains a major 
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ideology that is poorly understood but, curiously, draws some of its prodigious strength from 
that obscurity”, Dieter Plehwe has argued (2009: 3). Even in the critical political economy 
literature, neoliberalism continues to be primarily associated with, or reduced to, free market 
thinking and minimal state intervention (e.g. Thorsen and Lie, 2006), or deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation (Graefe, 2005; Springer, 2016). “With very rare exceptions”,  
Angela Mitropoulos has argued, “those who use this term have engaged a rigorously selective 
reading of both its proponents and the world around them so as to claim that neoliberalism 
involves the extensive rule of free markets, deregulation, open borders, and the pursuit of 
private self-interest” (2016). Not only does this not resemble neoliberalism in practice, but it 
does not adequately represent different schools of neoliberal thought either – which feeds into 
the (mis-)conceptualisation of biodiversity offsetting as market instrument which I analyse 
below. 
It makes sense to distinguish between neoliberal theory/ideology and practice (Ferguson, 2010), 
or rather, between neoliberalism as a “historical thought collective” (Plehwe, 2009: 4, emphasis 
added), which pioneered and propagated neoliberal theory, and a managerial practice to 
engineer, limit and steer competition and re-structure social, political and economic life. 
Neoliberals themselves “rarely made a fetish of the distinction between theory and practice” 
(Mirowski, 2009: 427)5. The neoliberal theory – or ideology – of this historical thought 
collectively most famously originated in the Mont Pelerin Society (Plehwe, 2009; Mirowski and 
Plehwe, 2009, eds.), though the term itself was coined at the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris 
in 1938 (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). It was by nature a dynamic and reactionary project 
without much ‘essence’; “a quest for alternative intellectual resources to revive a moribund 
political project... flexible in its intellectual commitments, oriented primarily toward forging 
some new doctrines that might capture the imaginations of future generations” (Plehwe, 2009: 
15). Philip Mirowski has warned of identifying neoliberal theory exclusively with economic 
theory – neoliberal thinkers engaged with a variety of academic disciplines, and their object of 
interest was social, political and economic – instead viewing it as a ‘pluralist organism’ 
established in opposition to laissez-faire classical liberalism, social welfare liberalism, and 
socialism (2009). The goal was to restructure the fabric and collective imaginary of society 
beyond ‘economics’ (see Larner, 2000, drawing on Hall and Brodie). This is particularly 
important for a deeper understanding of the economistic rationality underlying the reductionist 
mode of valuation and conceptualisation of ‘nature’ that allows for the double-process of 
                                                          
5 Some have distinguished between / conceptualised as three overlapping yet distinct struggles, 
intellectual, bureaucratic and political (Mudge, 2008), or separation into ideology, policy and 
governmentality (Larner, 2000) 
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abstraction in which offsetting is grounded (explored in chapter 3). This rationality plays out and 
becomes spectacularise in the places and spaces of offset-making, in the collective imagination 
and shared understanding of conservationists, corporate leaders and environmental 
accountants and consultants, outside of (environmental) economic theory. 
Defining characteristics of the neoliberal project, according to the Mont Pelerin Society, include 
the belief that the conditions for the existence of a good society – including individual freedom 
– are not ‘natural’ and need to be socially constructed (opposing ‘laissez-affair’ thinking and 
openly interventionist), including through the re-definition of the shape and functions of the 
state (Mirowski, 2009). The ‘market’ is considered an “information processor”, according to 
Friedrich Hayek, a social construct rather than a natural occurrence, as often assumed (ibid).6 
For the purposes of public communication and “sloganeering”, however, neoliberals argued 
that “market society must be treated as a ‘natural’ and inexorable state of humankind” (ibid: 
435), often promoted with natural science metaphors.7 This understanding is important in order 
to avoid explaining the development of biodiversity offsetting in reference to an inherent 
market logic and roll-out of markets, as will be critiqued in the next section (2.3). The 
conceptualisation of biodiversity markets as the outcome of an inherent market logic, in other 
words, thus cannot explained with reference to neoliberal theory –  or practise. 
In practice, neoliberalism is much more closely related to particular kind of managerialism, Sam 
Knafo and colleagues have argued, for specific political economic goals (2018). Andrew Gamble 
explains that the “commitment to technocratic managerialism was much more apparent than 
any faith in neo-liberal principles about trusting in markets to deliver. Markets were used as 
managerial tools in the pursuit of publicly determined objectives” (2006: 31). This is the 
governance through market(instrument)s that will be explored and problematised in the next 
section (2.3). Sam Knafo and colleagues explain that neoliberal restructuring was grounded in a 
framework of optimisation intended to empower managers rather than roll out market-like 
mechanisms (2018). Similarly, Will Davies has argued that the role of managerialism was “to 
anchor modernity in the market, that is, to make economics the main measure of progress and 
reason. Economics is amplified by neoliberal intellectuals, to address problems that might 
otherwise have been viewed as political or sociological” (2016). The emphasis on rationality and 
                                                          
6 In parallel to the Mont Pelerin Society, a specific “Chicago version of young and radical neoliberalism” 
developed during the 1950s, which was much more trusting of corporations and corporate leaders and 
sceptical of states’ “lack of economic understanding” (Plehwe, 2009: 30-31). 
7 Such narratives were framed around choice and freedom, in accordance with “a neoclassical version of 
rationality and motives of ineffable self-interest” (Mirowski, 2009: 437). Inequalities were seen as a 
necessary foundation for society and force for progress. 
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modernity highlights the logic that underlies the re-structuring of governance with managerial 
tools and technologies of governance, as explored in chapters 3 and 4. It further, once again, 
helps understand the offsetting rationality necessary for the abstraction and commensuration 
of nature underlying offsetting.  
The very term neoliberalism is a ‘colonising process’, Will Davies has argued (2016), employed 
not to solve narrowly economic problems, but to extend them to address fundamental 
problems of modernity: “The central feature of modernity ... is that we cannot know in advance 
what will work, who to be, or what to invest in, but nor can we really duck such choices either” 
(Davies, 2016). Sam Knafo and colleagues outline the managerial innovations and bureaucratic 
tools – such as audits – that are part of this restructuring (2018; see also Gamble, 2006). This 
points to the importance of understanding the role of such tools – including offsets – in risk 
management and as social technologies of governance.  
Neoliberal practice is thus more adequately characterised by its concern with management, 
control and (violent) disciplining, or “the creation, legitimation and consolidation of new 
relations of control” (Konings, 2010: 742). This is visible in its contemporary manifestation in 
combination with, for instance, militarisation of borders, criminalisation of dissent and the 
regulation of sexuality and reproduction (Mitropoulos, 2016). The militarisation of conservation 
(Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016) and rise of green violence (Cavanagh and Benhaminsen, 
2014) might be added. These are neither coincidental nor novel or contradictory, Angela 
Mitropoulos argues (2016) – from its beginning, neoliberalism went hand in hand with the 
control and preservation of a particular – gendered and racialised – social order. Melinda 
Cooper has shown that the neoliberal success story should be understood as a response to the 
breakdown of the Fordist family wage, which had normalised and institutionalised particular 
gender and sexual relationships, with (white) men as (unevenly waged) breadwinners, white 
women relegated to the (unpaid) domestic sphere, and African American women to 
“agricultural and domestic labor in the service of white households” (2016: 8). The breakdown 
of the Fordist family wage thus constituted a threat to the idea of the white, heterosexual 
nuclear family. In addition to the changing gender and race composition of the work force, at 
the same time, neoliberal practice was shaped in response to the social and economic 
upheavals of the 1960s and 70s; civil rights movements and student radicalism (Cooper, 2016). 
It merged with a new social conservatism in the 1970s in the US in what Melinda Cooper calls “a 
convergent perception of crisis” (2016: 20) that was triggered by liberation movements 
demanding politics of redistribution, challenging sexual division of labour and sexual 
normativity. Together, neoconservatism and neoliberalism thus “‘united’ not to dismantle the 
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welfare state and introduce so-called free markets, but to reshape it in accordance with neo-
conservative family and racial values” (Cooper, 2017: 314; Kristol, 1983).  
The regulation, control and management of race, gender, sexuality and – increasingly, and 
intersecting – resistance, is inherently violent, and demands law and order regulation, 
criminalisation and policing; in other words the proliferation of unfreedoms. The violence 
associated with the disciplining and policing of this resistance has intensified since the 1990s. 
Neoliberal globalisation was always contested locally. Structural adjustment programmes and 
large-scale ‘development projects’ had long been triggering resistance in the global South; 
transnational solidarity movements formed in the 1980s and 1990s, developing and sharing 
critiques of neoliberal globalisation in collaboration with ‘organic intellectuals’ (Birchfield and 
Freyberg-Inan, 2005, drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci). In the global North, resistance 
movements have grown since the time of the so-called ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 (Smith, 2001; 
Wainwright, 2007), followed by demonstrations with thousands of people at the World 
Economic Forums in Melbourne and Davos, against the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank, the Quebec summit, discussions for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the EU 
gathering in Gothenburg and the G8 summit in Genoa (all in 2001), followed by world-wide 
demos against the Iraq war in 2003 (Bleiker, 2005).  
Resistance and critique against neoliberalism thus became more clearly articulated, visible and 
transnationalised in the 1990s: “from Seattle, to Chiang Mai, to Prague, to Quebec City and 
finally Genoa, domestic and internationally-represented protests developed solidarities, stirred 
public debate and attracted larger crowds committed to challenging neoliberal policies and 
institutions” (Ayres, 2004: 11). The critique became one of ‘neoliberalism’, or neoliberal 
globalisation, following the Zapatistas’ struggle in Chiapas, Mexico, and the resistance against 
the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 (Springer and Birch, 2016: 2). Protests 
targeted neoliberal development programmes, negotiations and trade agreements, and their 
social and ecological consequences. They challenged state actions, legitimacy and rationalities, 
in what Sian Sullivan has called multiple and complex “frontlines”; “public or private space[s] 
where the legitimacy of [state] interests and categories [are] questioned” (2003: 68). These 
frontlines, she argues, “are everywhere. Within both west and east, they are present wherever 
and whenever people live – maintain lifeworlds – that are different to and resist the 
dysfunctional fetishising of rationality and instrumentalism comprising a state-centric and 
imperialist modernity” (2003: 70).  
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With the transnationalisation and intensification of resistance came an increase in state 
violence associated with the disciplining and policing of this growing movement. From the 
beginning, resistance movements understood the important role of the state in neoliberal 
globalisation, whether in negotiating trade agreements, empowering global financial institutions 
or implementing and supporting structural adjustment programmes. They challenged state 
support of corporate projects – extractive or otherwise – and were confronted with state 
violence in response. Simon Springer (2016) goes as far as analysing neoliberalism as a form of 
violence. By erasing the interconnectedness between places and spaces that are full of violence, 
he argues, neoliberalism facilitates narratives of irrationality and ‘other’, while positioning itself 
as nonviolent and as “the lone bearer of reason”, in contrast to ‘irrational’ and ‘violent’ peoples 
who need to be civilised and who are blamed for the miseries imposed on them (Springer, 2016: 
9). Neoliberalism has long been critiqued for the violence it engenders by its students (Bumiller, 
2009; Coşar and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012; Hristov, 2014; Nixon, 2011; Springer, 2015). Anti-
neoliberal (globalisation) resistance movements, Sian Sullivan suggests, are a reaction to this 
structural violence (2005). She draws on Pierre Bordieu’s “law of the conservation of violence” 
(1998) to explain the relationship between structural and political violence and violent 
responses: “You cannot cheat with the law of the conservation of violence: all violence is paid 
for... The structural violence exerted by the financial markets, in the form of layoffs, loss of 
security, etc., is matched sooner or later in the form of suicides, crime and delinquency, drug 
addiction, alcoholism, a whole host of minor and major everyday acts of violence” (Bourdieu, 
1998: 40). Violence in the (anti-)globalisation struggle thus emerges from the experience of rage 
in response to the structural violence in neoliberalism (Sullivan, 2005). Branwen Gruffydd Jones 
makes a similar argument for understanding resistance against the backdrop of a social order of 
structural violence, manifest in globalisation and structural adjustment programmes in 
Mozambique (2005: 57). Neoliberal globalisation and the pursuit of profit, she argues, involve 
the reordering of “the conditions of real, concrete individuals, communities and societies, 
whose logics are quite different from those of capital” – a structurally violent process (2005: 
57). The new social order of insecurity and structural violence in turn generates further forms of 
insecurity, violence, inequality, social exclusion and dispossession, masked by the promises and 
language of economic growth (ibid). The resulting resistance is ‘managed’ by means of co-
option (Bumiller, 2009) and increasingly violent disciplining (Sullivan, 2005) of dissent – as 
illustrated in chapter 6.  
Having outlined my understanding of neoliberalism as theory and practice (and their 
differences), in the next section I will examine some of these points in more depth, relating 
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them back to the critical body of literature on offsetting and financialisation of nature. This 
understanding of neoliberalism helps me avoid essentialising and naturalising ‘the market’, 
overcome a problematic state-market divide, and avoid the conflation of neoliberal theory and 
practice. The FoN literature could benefit from a more critical problematisation of these points, 
I will argue. 
2.3. Back to Financialisation of Nature: Starting points, building blocks and 
departures 
Much of the FoN literature work outlined in section 2.1 has been conducted in a broadly 
Marxian tradition, often drawing on Karl Polanyi (1944), as well as a number of eco-Marxists 
inspired by their work (Foster et al., 2010; Clark and York, 2005; Smith, 2007; O'Connor, 1994). 
An early and influential contribution has been Noel Castree’s work on ‘neoliberalising nature’ 
(2002; 2008a; 2008b), where he examines emergent literature around these issues and asks: 
what are the main reasons why all manner of qualitatively different nonhuman 
phenomena in different parts of the world are being `neoliberalised'?; what are the 
principal ways in which nature is neoliberalised in practice?; what are the effects of 
nature's neoliberalisation?; and how should these effects be evaluated? (2008a: 131). 
This initial wave of research very much focused on hegemony of neoliberalism; neoliberalism 
was found everywhere (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002). Despite increasingly differentiated analyses 
and recognition of the importance of new practices, metrics and “technologies of measurement 
and abstraction” (Robertson, 2012: 388), this ‘finding’ of neoliberalism tended to be conflated 
with structuralist accounts based on the observation of the expansion of capitalism into 
previously uncapitalised spheres of (social) relations, including nature. Noel Castree identifies 
certain ‘rationalities’ that are prevalent in much of the literature in his ‘ideal-typical 
characterisation’ of neoliberalism as ‘abstraction’: privatisation (assignment of property rights), 
marketisation (assignment of prices), deregulation (roll-back of state ‘interference’), 
reregulation (polices to enable privatisation and marketisation), ‘market proxies’ (market-like 
management in the public sector) and ‘flanking mechanisms’ in civil society (to outsource 
former public services) (2008a: 142). In his early review of the neoliberalisation of nature 
literature, he argues that neoliberalisation is explained by (fractions of) capital pushing either 1) 
to overcome the economy-environment contradictions by “bringing [the environment] more 
fully within the universe of capital accumulation”; 2) for submission of the non-human world to 
become “a means to the end of capital accumulation – period”; 3) as a “’degrading nature to 
profit’ strategy”; or, lastly, 4) as a means of the state to overcome the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism (Castree, 2008a: 146-8). Matthew Himley’s review of the neoliberal nature 
35 
 
literature confirms this tendency to focus on the advancement of capitalist economic relations 
on nature (2008). 
Since then, scholars have not left the idea of total ‘neoliberal hegemony’ unquestioned (e.g. 
Robertson, 2004); they have gone much beyond simple acceptance and critique of ‘market-
based instruments’ as mere ‘rollout of capitalism’ and provided differentiated analyses of the 
making of new social worlds (e.g. Robertson, 2012; Sullivan, 2006, 2012; Carver, 2015; Lockhart, 
2015). Many have recognised the differentiation of diverse processes of neoliberalisation – 
rather than one uniform and coherent neoliberalism – as uneven and frequently contradictory 
processes (Bakker, 2004, 2010; Büscher and Dressler, 2012; Dressler and Roth, 2011), and the 
differences to “textbook neoliberal ideology” (Castree, 2008a: 137; Brenner and Theodore, 
2002). Yet, much of the financialisation of nature literature continues, implicitly, to accept so-
called neoliberal market instruments as mere ‘‘actually existing [environmental] 
neoliberalism[s]’’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) and, more importantly, as “project[s] of 
mobilizing ecological forces in the service of neoliberal hegemony … creating and stabilizing new 
areas for capitalist activity, even as it is subject to the tendential crises of capitalism which 
guarantee that this work is never concluded” (Castree, 2008a, referencing Polanyi, 1944 and 
O’Connor, 1994) – often activelt supported by state forces. Commodification, marketisation and 
financialisation are thus analysed as consequences of an inherent (neoliberal) capitalist market 
logic (e.g. Smith, 2007; Castree, 2008a). More or less explicitly, much of the literature accepts 
these kind of views, taking a ‘rollout’ and ‘rollback’ for granted (e.g. Robertson, 2006), and 
exploring the “real subsumption of nature” (Smith, 2007: 33). According to Evangelia 
Apostolopoulou and William Adams, neoliberalisation of nature occurs because capitalism has a 
“strategic interest in promoting a neoliberal version of conservation, via its further inclusion into 
market function ... and to grab and exploit hitherto protected natures without any ‘green’ or 
’eco-friendly’ argumentation” (2015b: 16). They position the reliance of offsetting logics as “the 
systematic application of market logic and market-based mechanisms to environmental 
management and governance” (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017, in press), echoing Catherine 
Corson and colleagues’ analysis of the “incorporation of market logics into environment and 
conservation policy” (2013: 1). Once again referring back to Castree’s work, Evangelia 
Apostolopoulou and William Adams associate biodiversity offsetting with the “deregulation and 
the market friendly reregulation of environmental and planning legislation, both key processes 
in the neoliberalization of non-human nature” (2017). Through a performativity framework, 
Sian Sullivan analyses the fabrication of natural capital as “attempts to enrol previously 
uncosted ‘standing natures’ in the forward-driving movement of capital” (2017, in press). 
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Neoliberal nature, Bruce Braun argues, is conceptualised in the neoliberalisation of nature 
literature “as an ‘environmental fix’ for a crisis of accumulation” (2014: 6).  
Yet, as Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings argue, such Polanyian analyses, based on a view of the 
“shifting boundaries between state and market, which would see markets as having become 
‘disembedded’ from the state”, rely on a tendency to analyse things through “hegemonic self-
representation through the key tenets of neoliberal ideology” (2009: 67-68). This view is 
representative of much of the critical literature on neoliberalism (cf. Lane and Newell, 2016). In 
their critique of Jamie Peck’s analysis of neoliberalisation (which can be extended to much of 
the critical literature on neoliberalism), Richard Lane and Peter Newell argue:  
In simply taking neoliberal ideology at face value here, a problematic definition of 
neoliberalism is replaced with an equally problematic definition of the process of 
neoliberalisation. This overlooks the ‘hidden hands’ and the ‘connective tissues’ involved, 
replacing these with an overly structural ‘forward-leaning dynamic’. There is a focus 
here on process, but without a clear identification of practices (2016: 252).  
In other words: There is a danger of a circular argument emerging when the outcome of 
neoliberalisation is explained as neoliberalisation. Even when authors recognise differences 
between theory and practice (Castree, 2010; McCarthy, 2006), point to the importance of 
details (Bakker, 2005) and acknowledge that “generic neoliberalism” does not exist (Castree, 
2008a: 137), they tend to explain practices as outcomes of the “forces” of neoliberal capitalism 
(e.g. MacDonald, 2010a: 515). The danger here is to fall into the trap of a circular logic; 
explaining the outcome of environmental governance – neoliberal nature(s) – with the very 
existence of the processes that have led to their emergence. It is tempting to recognise the 
nature of environmental governance as social, political and historically contingent, but – rather 
than taking the implications seriously – then to rely on capitalist (market) logics for (causal) 
explanations of these processes. In his excellent investigation of ‘corporate conservation’, for 
example, Kenneth MacDonald concludes that “what is key here is that this restructuring is an 
organized practice, by which I mean simply that it occurs through organizations that are 
increasingly shaped by the eco-modernist imperatives of capitalist development” (2010a: 542). 
Capitalist or corporate-driven conservation is then identified to lead to “accumulation by 
conservation” (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015) and other forms of “accumulation by dispossession” 
(Harvey, 2004; Smith, 2007) on the cost of communities and their livelihoods. 
Crucially, this argument is not to deny the importance of such old and new forms of 
accumulation, and the existence (and increase in) a “spectacular investment frontier in 
conservation” (Sullivan, 2013a: 198) and the lucrative gains involved. Analyses of 
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commodification, marketisation and financialisation of nature are very useful to understand the 
structural (including state) forces and drivers behind offsetting and to formulate critiques. The 
conceptualisation of offsetting as a political strategy to assure neoliberal hegemony and stability 
of capitalism, which needs to expand constantly to accumulate capital – manifest in moves to 
impose market relations on previously “uncapitalized environmental phenomena” (Robertson, 
2004: 365) – can be problematic, however, for a number of reasons that I explore below. I argue 
that the focus on marketisation helps reify – and runs the danger of naturalising – the very idea 
of markets, it ignores the distinct non-market genealogy of biodiversity offsetting, it may reflect 
a problematic state-market distinction and relationship, and can lead to the conflation of 
neoliberal theory with neoliberal practice.  
Essentialising and naturalising the market? 
Marketisation analyses rest on the acceptance of biodiversity offsetting as a market instrument. 
This may be helpful to understand particular features of biodiversity banking schemes 
(particularly in the US and in Australia) and to analyse the discourses around offsetting, but not 
to understand (project) offsetting in Europe. When examining biodiversity offsetting in practice, 
it becomes clear that there is very little ‘market’ in many of these so-called ‘market-based’ 
instruments – the history of offsetting is a history of regulatory mechanisms in the US, Australia 
and Germany. Marie Hrabanski shows that the re-invention of offsetting as ‘market-based 
instrument’ (MBI) is relatively recent (2015). “Compensation mechanisms”, she argues, have 
“undergone a ‘renovation’ on both the international and national environmental policy scenes”, 
which she describes as “active modification and adaptation of existing mechanisms as market-
based instruments to facilitate their implementation in different contexts” (2015: 143). This 
results from political influence, not “actual scientific progress in ecological or economic 
sciences” (Calvet, Guillaume, and Claude, 2015: 492). Only in the last ten years, in response to 
these political influences, has offsetting become associated with an economic and market 
vocabulary in the academic literature, associated with ‘ecosystem services’, ‘costs’, ‘market’, 
‘incentive’, ‘trade’ and others, and accompanied by changes from ‘ecological compensation’ 
and ‘mitigation’ to ‘biodiversity offsetting’ (Calvet, Guillaume, and Claude, 2015: 497). This 
framing appeals to decision makers in an era where association with neoliberal theory trumps 
any alternative, and framing in neoclassical economic language appeals to corporate leaders, 
politicians and many green economy supporters. The MBI framing is based on the appeal of 
markets and association with internalisation of externalities more than offsetting in practice. In 
fact, once analysed in practice, it become apparent that project-based offsets do not resemble 
MBIs at all, and even the market-nature of established banking system (as in the US) is 
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questionable at best (see also Pirard, 2012; Boisvert, Méral and Froger, 2013; Boisvert, 2015; 
Vaissière and Levrel, 2015). “MBIs as a category look more like an asylum country for all tools 
with a price component” (Hrabanski, 2015: 144). This is illustrated by Louise Carver (2015) and 
Louise Carver and Sian Sullivan (2017) who illustrate the politically fabricated supply and 
demand dynamics, prices, offsetting ratios and multipliers (see also Brock, 2015). The 
application of key offsetting principles, such as ecological equivalence – prerequisites for any 
alleged market-construction – is “frequently incomplete or absent”, Holly Niner and colleagues 
show in the context of marine biodiversity offsetting in Australia (2017: 22).  
Yet, despite the notable exceptions explored above, the market logic in offsetting is frequently 
not questioned. Sarah Benabou states that “[t]he market logic behind habitat banking has been 
particularly pervasive in the development of voluntary biodiversity offsets” (2014: 104). Yet, as 
many of these works themselves show, the concept of the ‘market’ is meaningless when 
abstracted from actually existing local market infrastructure. Critiques of ‘marketisation’ thus 
run the danger of reproducing the conceptualisation of ‘the market’ as separate from, and 
outside of, the political realm, the ‘legitimate’ sphere of political decision making and 
(supposedly) democratic negotiation. While criticising the supposed depoliticisation (and 
pointing out the political nature of valuation processes, methodologies and processes), much of 
the literature does not go far enough in overcoming this divide. Critiques framed around ‘the 
market’ can reproduce its associations with “a natural system that might bear upon us equally, 
like gravity or atmospheric pressure” (Monbiot, 2016). This hides the way the idea of ‘the 
market’ operates as empty signifiers whose power lies in its mobilising capacity rather than 
essence. Mobilising in the interest of ‘the market’ really tends to represent “what corporations 
and their bosses want” (Monbiot, 2016). Rather than accepting a market imperative, we need 
to de-naturalise these market-relationships, identify and examine the agencies behind them, 
and deconstruct their underlying power relations and corporate and state interests (and how 
they overlap).  
Reliance on a universal logic of (neoliberal) capitalism to understand offsetting thus risks 
essentialising the idea of offsetting itself, ignoring the importance of the social context within 
which offsets are embedded and within which it is mobilised for particular political economic 
purposes. Critique of marketisation or neoliberalisation may unintentionally close down more 
fundamental critique by taking for granted the system in which these processes take place, thus 
reifying this very system; a statist capitalist system based on social and ecological exploitation. A 
critique of offsetting as commodification, marketisation and financialisation of nature can thus 
prevent a more fundamental questioning of the underlying growth imperative, industrial 
39 
 
expansion, a debt-based financial system and the infrastructure and energy projects upholding 
the political economic system as well as, importantly, the legitimacy of the state – which 
offsetting helps legitimise, I will argue. It may further obscure more nuanced analyses that help 
investigate more specific rationales that are invoked as well as the more fundamental role of 
offsetting in the violence inherent in the infrastructure/extractivist projects that they are meant 
to legitimise as well as the social role in pacifying and co-opting critique.  
Governing through markets: overcoming the state-market divide  
Critical political economists have long recognised that the role of the state has not diminished 
under neoliberalism but has been transformed (i.e. Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
Similarly, the role of states in protecting corporate interests and acting on behalf of, rather than 
in opposition to, capital, is not new. This protection involves the violent policing of dissent, 
introduced above and explored in more detail in later chapters. In the FoN literature, offsetting 
has been analysed as a manifestation of public-private collaborations (Robertson, 2000, 2004; 
Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2009; Sullivan and Hannis, 2015; Carver and Sullivan, 2017; Brock, 2015). 
These analyses show very well the (sometimes resisted) historical development of offsetting 
and the ‘institutional expansion’, the “process whereby particular relations of power become 
anchored in people’s routine strategies and so are woven into the fabric of social life” (Konings, 
2010: 742), involved in offsetting. Yet, these analyses not only continue to implicitly examine 
offsetting as market instruments, as I argued above, but they also continue to conceptually 
separate these two spheres. Instead, I argue, the literature would benefit from considering how 
the state governs through these so-called market instruments.  
This problematic conceptual separation between markets and states is particularly visible in Karl 
Polanyi’s work, and those inspired by him. At first sight, his conceptualisation of embedding and 
re-embedding markets and his recognition of the institutional infrastructure within which this 
takes place constitutes a radical (double) move to overcome the market-state divide (Polanyi, 
1944). Instead, political economists have shown, this approach continues to reproduce and 
essentialise the concept of the market as a separate entity and a pre-existing market logic 
(Cooper and Konings, 2015; Konings, 2010; Krippner, 2010). Neoliberal conservation practices 
such as offsetting should not be read as ‘market dis- or re-embedding’, but as governance tools 
that have no external logic, but through which the state accomplishes specific (socio/political 
economic) objectives.  
Implicitly, many analyses continue to assume that the contemporary neoliberal world and the 
subjugation to a quantitative economic logic are based on this inherent market logic, 
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contributing to the naturalisation, normalisation and depoliticisation of the market idea. This is 
visible, for instance, in Castree’s view on marketisation; “that is, the assignment of prices to 
phenomena that were previously shielded from market exchange or for various reasons 
unpriced” (2008a: 143, emphasis added). This example illustrates the reproduction of the 
conceptual separation of the market and state.  
This literature thus cannot account for the way (the idea of) ‘the market’ is used by the state to 
exercise control, to govern, and to restructure our relationship with nature. A better 
understanding of this function of so-called market instruments would help overcome a 
problematic Polanyian heritage, and a tendency to conflate neoliberal theory and practice.  
Neoliberal theory, neoliberal practice and the need for distinction 
This could further benefit from a more critical questioning of the difference between neoliberal 
ideology, with its belief in the necessity to construct markets, and neoliberal governance, whose 
managerial emphasis is under-recognised (Knafo et al., 2018, see section 2.2). Sam Knafo and 
colleagues have recently conducted pioneering work in tracing the historic lineage of neoliberal 
managerialism (2018). Although in practice, they argue, neoliberal managerialism has always 
been about engineering, creating and exploiting competition and competitiveness, its aim has 
not been to promote market rule, but it has historically been characterised by distrust of market 
rule (2018).  
Even among critical political economists, managerialism has been understood as the 
mobilisation of resource and bureaucratic means that contribute to the enforcement of market 
mechanisms and shaping of the state to conform to a market logic (Peck, 2010a). Consequently, 
the state would itself increasingly act in ‘market-ways’ or ‘like a firm’ (Davies, 2014). Rather than 
accepting managerial governance as extension and intensification of neoliberal theory, or 
simply to ‘entrench capitalism’ or ensure capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005), Knafo and 
colleagues identify a distinct social lineage, rooted in the early post-war era and involving 
important changes in the US American defence sector, the pioneering role of the RAND 
corporation and managerial innovations through American business schools (2018). The 
development of managerial governance was based on a new science of decision making 
grounded in the scientific tools of Systems Analysis, game theory and the calculative technology 
of cost-benefit analysis (Knafo et al., 2018). The basis for this kind of governance was the 
empowerment of managers rather than ‘market ideas’ of efficiency (which were mobilised 




Accepting this starting point facilitates seeing how so-called MBIs – or ‘neoliberal technologies’ 
such as offsetting – lead to enhanced state power (cf. Konings, 2010; Brock, 2015) rather than 
loss of state control, as globalisation critics have long advocated. Even critical FoN scholars still 
appear to – implicitly, rather than explicitly – accept neoliberal theory and free-market ideology 
at face value, grounded in neoclassical economic mythology (e.g. Spash, 2015). Where the 
difference between neoliberal theory and practice is increasingly acknowledged, it tends to rest 
on the view of policy as failed application of theory, ‘too simplistic (theoretical) blueprints’ 
(Büscher and Dressler, 2007) or flawed neoliberal theoretical understanding of human nature 
(Fletcher, 2014; Büscher et al., 2012) – rather than recognition of the distinct managerial 
lineage of neoliberal policy outlined above. Robert Fletcher, for instance, states that neoliberal 
(conservation) practices can be ‘antithetical’ to neoliberal ideology and blames it on the 
particular ‘virtualistic vision’ that underlies market mechanisms, “insofar as they seek to 
transform the world to conform to a model that is assumed to already exist” (2014: 88). This 
vision, he argues, “contains fundamental errors while offering such impossible criteria for 
fulfilment that reconciling theory and practice would in fact be quite difficult” (2014: 88)8. The 
state continues to be seen solely as a regulatory power, rather than integral to these markets: 
“an essential neoliberal tenet dictates that primary responsibility for allocating resources should 
be left to market actors, with the state acting mostly to provide the legal and administrative 
structures shaping markets rather than intervening directly” (Fletcher, 2014: 92).  
Recognising this distinct lineage, and therewith the difference between neoliberal theory and 
practice, helps me overcome the deductive reasoning and continuous privileging of neoliberal 
theory as explanatory device. This reliance is not useful methodologically, analytically or 
politically. While important to recognise the power of neoclassical mythology, this discourse, I 
argue in chapter three, plays an important legitimising rather than driving role; with ‘the 
market’ as powerful rhetorical device rather than inherent logic. This is not to deny the 
importance of novel technologies in the (discursive) remaking of nature into “nature that capital 
can see” (Robertson, 2006), but to refrain from assigning performativity to the discursive 
reconstitution of nature as ecosystem services or natural capital and pointing instead to the 
instrumental use of such framings for political purposes. Instead, an analysis through the lens of 
neoliberal managerialism can point to the important role of offsets as social technologies to 
manage dissent. 
                                                          
8 Similar arguments have been made by Bram Büscher and Wolfram Dressler (2007) and others. 
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Keeping in mind the development of managerial governance as science of decision making, this 
approach further helps focus on the agents of governance (Knafo et al., 2018) rather than 
privileging overly structuralist explanations around commodification and financialisation of 
nature. Managerial governance helps point towards bureaucratic forms of control, including 
monitoring and surveillance that have become important parts of the biodiversity knowledge 
infrastructure as well as reliance on scientific expertise (including particular kinds of quantitative 
data and corresponding processes of classification, categorisation and commensuration). But it 
goes beyond these dimensions, involving a radical transformation of the ‘science of 
administration’, based on statistical tools and quantification, benchmarking and standardisation 
for decision making to deal with uncertainty and the use of cost-benefit analysis (Knafo et al., 
2018). Richard Lane traces the foundational role of ‘the environment’ in cost-benefit analysis 
(2015). Whereas Knafo and colleagues explore the role of performance assessments, league 
tables, shareholder value metrics for enhancing the power of new managers to deal with 
uncertainty, similar dynamics can be observed in the processes of making Europe’s nature 
offsettable (chapter three) through complex methodologies, and the collection and analysis of 
‘environmental intelligence’ – ecosystem metrics and data – for classification, commensuration, 
surveillance and monitoring. Managerialism is based on surveillance and policing (Springer, 
2012; Peck, 2010b). The real object of managerialism, surveillance and policing, however, is 
social: making people legible and governable (Scott, 1998). It is triggered by the need to manage 
(possible) dissent, and the risks it poses to corporations and states. 
Moving away from nature as ‘object of governance’? 
Despite recognition of the role of offsetting in legitimising unsustainable business operations 
(e.g. Seagle, 2012; Sullivan, 2012; Carver, 2015), there seems to be a tendency to take at face 
value the claim that biodiversity offsetting is being implemented as a tool to manage 
biodiversity loss, thus taking for granted the idea of nature as the main ‘object of governance’. 
The analytical starting point (with few exceptions, such as Benabou, 2014; Curran, Hellweg and 
Beck, 2014; Sullivan and Hannis, 2015) thus tends to be the alarming rate of biodiversity loss 
and the ability of capitalism to turn this crisis into an accumulation opportunity. This is visible, 
for instance, in the way even critical scholars tend to anchor their critiques in the omnipresent 
conventional definition of offsetting first put forward by offsetting champion Kerry ten Kate and 
colleagues as “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm 
to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity” 
(2004: 13). While scholars then go on to critique offsetting in practice, the theoretical starting 
points are not questioned enough. Even critical analyses that do not accept many of the 
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underlying assumptions of offsetting tend to reify and therewith legitimise the very ideas that it 
entails – such as the intended driving force (conservation needs); the intentionality behind 
offsetting; the ‘unavoidable’ nature of the harm to biodiversity; subordinated to the ‘need’ for 
‘development’ projects; and the very concept of no net loss. Adopting, rather than questioning, 
this definition not only turns them into the most widely cited offsetting publications, but lends 
IUCN/Insight Investment and BBOP legitimacy and authority. This raises questions around their 
institutionalisation in private governance arrangements and the reinforcement of offsetting 
ideology which will be further explored in chapter three. 
Critics often point out that offsetting policies ignore the ‘real’ reasons for biodiversity loss, and 
reproduce the same political-economic patterns and power relations that are responsible for 
biodiversity loss in the first place. This starting point is nevertheless accepting biodiversity loss 
as a material risk (usually to corporate profits), rather than the need for social control and 
stability to secure accumulation, caused by the lack of licence to operate (reputational and 
regulatory – social – risks). Clive Spash (2015) and Sian Sullivan (2012), on the other hand, both 
show how offsetting serves to legitimise and facilitate, rather than prevent destruction and 
degradation: “The model is development-led: it requires ecological degradation in order for 
conservation units or credits to attain market value” (Sullivan, 2012: 24, emphasis added). 
To understand the development of (project) offsetting in Europe, I suggest that it is more 
productive to approach offsetting through the crisis of legitimacy that has become a problem 
for (extractive) industries and governments, the desperation of conservation organisations, the 
increasingly visible inherent tensions and contradictions of the green economy, based on social 
and ecological exploitation, degradation and violence. This goes beyond Olivier Thébaud and 
others’ view of offsetting as tool “to manag[e] the ecological costs of economic development” 
(2015: 114) to be seen as social technology of governance. Offsetting thus constitutes, I hope to 
show, not just a way to profit from the ‘expansion of markets’ into environmental governance, 
but a response to this legitimacy crisis of corporations, but also of states and international 
institutions such as the EU, who are constantly involved in state-building to legitimise their very 
existence.  
Just how novel is biodiversity offsetting? 
Lastly, the critical offsetting literature tends to focus very much on recent offsetting initiatives 
(apart from a number of analyses of the US American and Australian schemes (e.g. Robertson, 
2004; 2006; Salzman and Ruhl, 2002; Maron et al., 2012, 2015; Wotherspoon and Burgin, 
2009), and the supposed novelty of such schemes, particularly where framed as market-
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instruments, in natural capital language. This can be useful to highlight the new dimensions of 
offsetting initiatives, the advanced simplification and abstraction of biodiversity, the novel 
technologies, techniques and metrics, as well as their roles in the green economy which now 
“recognizes, includes and, consequently, further intensifies the exploitation of ‘nature’, 
enmeshing further natural resources into the machinations of economic and financial 
structures” (Dunlap and Brock, forthcoming; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012; Dunlap and 
Fairhead, 2014). Yet, this focus risks neglecting the long history of offsetting (and the human-
nature relations it is grounded in) and the way it is used for particular political purposes, rather 
than constituting a simple ‘rollout’ of neoliberalism and expansion of markets. Compensation 
has long formed part of legislative requirements, Marie Hrabanski shows, but “these regulatory 
devices were non-binding and seldom applied” (2015: 144; see also Moreno-Mateos et al., 
2015). Only since the renewed interest in offsetting over the last two decades have they 
become known and criticised as MBIs. Yet, she continues, “MBIs constitute an extremely 
heterogeneous group that makes little sense from an economic theory perspective. These 
instruments do not share many characteristics and show a very loose relation to markets as 
defined by standard economic theory” (Hrabanski, 2015: 143-144; Pirard, 2012; Boisvert, Méral 
and Froger, 2013). This renewed interest in offsetting is exactly due to its ability to capture 
imaginations and appeal to the ‘virtues of efficiency and effectiveness that standard economic 
analysis tributes to the market’; virtues projected onto biodiversity offsetting (Boisvert, Méral 
and Froger, 2013: 1132). But its relative recent popularity needs to be investigated through its 
use to legitimise industries in the time of crisis, and to ‘green’ developments in- and outside 
Europe; connecting ‘beyond-Europe extractive industries’ with in-Europe large infrastructural 
developments (Sullivan, 2013b). Its roots lie in the fundamental dynamics and violence inherent 
in extractivism, industrialism, green economic ‘progress’ and (ecological) modernisation. Taking 
these seriously yields a ‘deeper’ and richer history of offsetting. They will be further explored in 
the following section on human-nature relationships and violence. 
2.4. Humans, nature, non-human nature?  
“[S]ocieties that dominate nature also dominate people”, Murray Bookchin argues (in the words 
of Sale, 2000: 122), quoted in length in the introduction. Going beyond a focus on marketisation 
enables us to look at offsetting as manifestation of more fundamental dynamics of control and 
violence based on the separation between human and nonhuman natures – going to the root 
causes of many of the ecological and social crises that originated with industrialism, the spread 
of industrial agriculture, plantations, and colonial conservation. Industrialism here refers to “the 
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existence of complex mechanized systems of production that are built upon centralized power 
and the exploitation of people and nature” (Green Anarchy #13, 2003: 1). Industrialism is 
inseparable from state power. Any critique of industrialism  
is a natural extension of the critique of the state, because industrialism is inherently 
imperialistic, genocidal, ecocidal, and patriarchal. In order to maintain an industrial 
society, you must set out to conquer and colonize lands in order to acquire non-
renewable resources to fuel and grease the machine (Green Anarchy #13, 2003: 1).  
The industrial society relies on human and nonhuman displacement, cheap wage labour, 
coercion, centralisation and specialisation, undermining local autonomy, self-sufficiency and 
non-instrumental (and non-economistic) relationships and values. The mechanistic worldviews 
that came to replace the latter have been fundamental to the development of (colonial) 
conservation policy for the sake of resource policy and social control over colonised peoples, 
and form the basis for consequent processes of domestication, objectification and exploitation 
that give rise to the instrumental view of nature that makes commensuration and fungibility of 
nature possible. Domestication denotes both “the process by which human beings tame, 
control, breed and genetically modify other forms of life” as well as the (forced) shifting of 
nomadic populations to settlement for governability and social control, closely related to the 
idea of ownership (Green Anarchy #13, 2003: 1). It resembles what Daniel Quinn, in his novel 
Ishmael (1992), describes as the transition from ‘leavers’ (those who accepted what earth 
provided) to ‘takers’ (those who demand what they want from the earth) and it is here that he 
locates the roots of unsustainability. With it comes alienation, the human separation from 
direct experience and disconnection from the human and nonhuman natural world around us, 
leading to disempowerment. Alienation is visible in the very naming and framing of nature, the 
categorisation and classification as ‘species’ and ‘biological diversity’ (see chapter three) that 
gives rise to the view of nature as external and ‘aggregate’, and the creation of 
commensurability based on such aggregates.  
It is here, Murray Bookchin (as well as many other before and after him) argues, where we need 
to locate the hierarchies that not only corrode social but also ecological life (1982). The violence 
inherent in these hierarchies is manifest in the objectification, (binary) categorisation, 
domestication and domination of human and nonhuman nature, the alienation that has come 
with separation and specialisation/division of labour and loss of connection to land. Taking this 
seriously shows how offsetting represents and reproduces this separation of humans and 
nonhuman nature, further entrenching the hierarchies: “by placing fungibility at the core of 
biodiversity policy”, Hannis and Sullivan argue, “it further downgrades such relationships ... A 
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key message of offsetting, in fact, is that human habitat is best separated from nonhuman 
habitat, and that nature is best preserved by separating it from our daily life and safely 
enclosing it elsewhere” (2012: 15). This separation of human and nonhuman nature is closely 
related to multiple human systems of oppression and hierarchy based on binary understandings 
of gender, sexuality, race and class, the construction of human and non-human ‘others’, and 
their representations as ‘deviant’ and ‘unnatural’. Such hierarchies continue to be visible in the 
underlying racist assumptions about local (indigenous) people’s unsustainable practices that 
form the foundation for ‘avoided degradation’ underlying offsetting projects and the supremacy 
assigned to Western science at the cost of exclusion of alternative value and knowledge systems 
(cf. Kill and Franchi, 2016). Domestication of nonhuman nature and humans has always gone 
hand-in-hand; through colonialism, genocide and ecocide – “When the land is needed but 
labour is not, the most likely outcome is the expulsion of people from the land” (Li in Hall et al., 
2015: 470). Such expulsion for offsetting purposes has been documented in Madagascar by 
Jutta Kill and Giulia Franchi (2016).  
As nature is externalised and ‘othered’ (Chapter three), socially constructed economic systems 
become naturalised through the (ab)use of biological concepts, such as growth and recession, 
yield, or evolution. The very naturalisation of the market explored above plays into this dynamic. 
A problematisation of the illusion of the “infinite substitutability” of this external nature 
(Sullivan, 2010: 116) which underlies offsetting, and the belief in human ability to restore and 
recreate nature (analysed in chapter six) is closely associated with the high-modernist 
fascination with technology – what Herbert Marcuse would call “technology as ideology”:  
Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices and 
contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the same time a mode of 
organization and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of 
prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination. 
Technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as 
abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil (1978: 138-9). 
Taking such critiques seriously leads to an analysis of offsetting in relation to processes of 
legibility, governability and control over nature. They help understand the underlying dynamics, 
power relations and assumptions about human-nonhuman nature relationships of offsetting; 
and show how offsetting increases the alienation from nature, deepening the “cultural poverty” 
of viewing nature as a mere provider of marketable services to humans (Sullivan, 2009). They 
further point to the important role of the state in offsetting, and the violence inherent in it. 
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2.5. Situating violence  
This violence, in its different manifestations, deserves some elaboration in the last section of 
this chapter. It becomes visible, firstly, in the reductionist and instrumental reframing of nature 
that is inherent in making nature offsettable, and the quantification, objectification and 
commensuration that offsetting involves. Camila Moreno and colleagues have coined the 
concept of “ecological epistemicide” (2015), the violent processes of classification and 
quantification; and therewith numerical domination and exploitation that is exercised through 
its reduction to quantitative values. It makes nature conform to performance standards, 
indicators and lending requirements, therewith legible and governable. “In order to control an 
uncontrollable”, Peter Gelderloos has argued, “it must first be named. All domination flows 
from an original categorical enclosure” (2017: 45). Taking this epistemological violence seriously 
involves a rejection of anthropocentrism and the notion of a “universal epistemology” (Franks, 
2014: 703) and a recognition of diverse ontologies (Sullivan, 2017a). Such a commitment 
accepts that “[n]o single branch of knowledge can demarcate universal principles for the 
liberation and operation of all other social practices” and “[d]ifferent practices have different 
categories of experience, truth conditions, discourses and rules, and whilst they frequently 
intersect, no single practice and its underlying norms takes priority” (Franks, 2014: 703, as 
previously articulated by Bakunin, 1970, among others). 
Accepting that the state and capital are not distinct but form “integral parts of the totality of 
capitalism” (Springer, 2010: 535), secondly, redirects attention to state violence and the 
disciplinary power of the state. This helps overcome an overemphasis on neoliberalism: “while 
the rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques of neoliberal governance are new, the 
disciplinary logic of the state remains unchanged” (Springer, 2012). Instead, it facilitates a more 
systemic focus on the violence inherent in extractivism, industrial development and 
infrastructure. The “natural resource base upon which industrial societies stand is constructed 
in large part through the use and threatened use of armed violence [and it] quickly becomes 
apparent that armed violence and the environmental degradation associated with it are 
intimately woven into the everyday lives of core nation citizens through the purchases they 
make and the fuels they consume” (Downey, Bonds and Clark, 2010: 437-8). This armed 
violence is visible in the increasing militarisation and surveillance of nature to protect against 
“uncivilised natives”, i.e. in physical violence against local poachers – what Rosaleen Duffy has 
coined “war by conservation” (2016, see also Büscher and Fletcher, 2018, in press). It is also 
manifest in the violent policing and suppressing of resistance and disciplining of dissent 
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explored in chapter six. Lastly, emphasis on state and corporate violence facilitates exploring 
the slow violence inherent in extractivism and resulting climate change and biodiversity loss 
introduced in the Introduction. 
2.6. Conclusion  
Moving away from the marketisation focus, following Bruce Braun, allows me to  
tell the story of neoliberalism and neoliberal natures less in terms of the inherent 
creativity of capital – a temptation into which radical critique too often falls — and more 
in terms of the absorption of energies and conditions that neoliberal capitalism 
presupposes but does not itself produce (2014: 2).  
Offsetting is then the outcome, rather than source, of these transformations; and can be 
conceptualised as the “absorption of critique” (Nelson, 2014: 1) – to pacify and co-opt critics, 
improve governability and social control, and enhance power. This is not to underplay the 
importance of banking schemes. Instead, it is to shed light on a rather under-researched way 
offsets are used that is not a market-way at all. This conceptualisation allows for a focus on the 
“consolidation of aggregate thinking”, the reliance on assumptions and calculations of 
“ontological equivalence” (Sullivan, 2017a: 229) or “species equality” (Regnery, Couvet and 
Kerbiriou, 2013), and, most importantly, the diversity of practices that claim to achieve NNL, 
their political effects and their productive power. It also allows for focus on the underlying 
premises of repair and restoration that many offsetting projects are based on, the 
“accumulation by restoration” (Huff and Brock, 2017) which reflects a shift towards an 
“economy of repair” (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012), facilitating a double process of profit-
making. This is also not to deny the importance of the intensification of certain financial 
processes, assignment of property rights, private ownership, the ideological foundations of 
offsetting, anchored in discourses around the commodification and marketisation of nature, 
and the role in generating financial funds, at times accompanied by loss of access to land and 
livelihood, displacement and further marginalisation. Instead, I hope to show, students of 
offsetting can learn from recent scholarship on neoliberal managerialism, to understand 
changes and discontinuities in current modes of conservation and green economy practices 
more generally, historicising and analysing current offsetting developments. To do so, in the 





3. Making Europe’s nature offsettable: the spectacular performance of 
sustainability through discourse and (community of) practice 
Anchoring offsetting in the European conservation landscape, or Making Europe’s nature 
offsettable, has required, and continues to require, a lot of hard work. As argued in the 
Introduction, understanding this offset-making involves analysing the agency and the productive 
power exercised by offset-makers. Rather than falling back on explainations of the increasing 
popularity and legitimacy of offsetting as a natural expansion of capitalist market-making – or 
the mere institutionalisation of offsetting narratives – this chapter analyses the concurrence of 
the ideology, the practice, and the industry behind offset-making. For offsetting to become a 
legitimate policy option and corporate practice in Europe, this offsetting industry – a 
professionalised but diverse ‘community of practice’ of offsetting entrepreneurs – has been 
crucial. Their work builds upon, and draws on the natural capital and ecosystem services 
discourses, which are mobilised and reproduced through international (offsetting) events and 
conferences, including the 2013 and 2015 Natural Capital forums in Edinburgh and the 2014 
BBOP No Net Loss (NNL) conference, analysed below.  
Before analysing the EU’s attempt to further institutionalise biodiversity offsetting through the 
NNL initiative in chapter four, in this chapter I introduce the individuals and organisations, the 
discourses and ideologies, the spaces and places, and some of the technologies and concepts 
involved in making Europe’s nature offsettable. These processes have been fundamental to the 
establishment of offsetting as a social technology of governance and represent the spectacular 
performances of sustainability – the highly-productive theatrics of legitimising destruction – 
that underlie offsetting. Following this introduction, I first trace the discursive and ideological 
transformation of nature that allows for making it offsettable by examining how nature has 
‘become’ a global resource, ecosystem service provider and natural capital, and produced as 
corporate risk, accumulation opportunity and managerial object, requiring profitable 
securitisation. This helps me explore how offsetting has come to be seen as a mechanism to 
handle these risks and exploit these opportunities, situated as a solution to biodiversity loss and 
institutionalised into corporate-NGO partnerships, pilot projects and case studies. I examine 
these discourses and narratives within which offsetting is embedded not to assign 
performativity or agency, but to understand how they are selectively mobilised and drawn upon 
for offset-making and to accommodate particular industrial interests that will be explored in 
more detail in following chapters. They serve as ‘ideological backup’ for the processes of offset-
making explored below. Secondly, I analyse the development of the offsetting industry which 
has been fundamental in the spreading of offsetting ideology and practice. In this section, I 
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explore the different roles of these professionals, focusing on key actors and individuals 
involved. In the third section, I then examine this community ‘in action’, as I turn to the spaces 
and places of offset-making, where the aforementioned discourses are drawn upon to legitimise 
corporate and state practices. After introducing the three events I participated in, I analyse 
them through the lens of Guy Debord’s spectacle (1967) and Victor Turner’s ritual (1969), as 
instruments to create unity and ‘perform sustainability’. Within these spaces, I analyse the 
means and mechanisms, the techniques and technologies, and the visualisations and 
vocabularies by which offsetting is constituted and given the authority and legitimacy to 
become a policy instrument and corporate technology.  
3.1. ‘Selling nature to save it’ – tracing discourses, ideologies and 
knowledge systems 
We need a language that business understands … We are all astronauts … We are in this 
together, we need to fix this together (Peter Bakker, WBCSD, at the 2014 BBOP conference) 
Biodiversity conservation, Kenneth MacDonald argues, is “defined through the institutionalised 
association of individuals, organisations, bodies of knowledge and interests” (2010b: 256). 
Biodiversity offsetting relies on powerful ideological narratives and knowledge systems based 
on (eco)systems (service) and natural capital thinking and positioned in the new green paradigm 
of ‘valuing nature’; highlighting its monetary value to encourage protection and conservation. 
Based on “neoclassical mythology” (McAfee, 1999: 134), offsetting is legitimised by the need to 
internalise environmental externalities, notions of scarcity of natural resources, and ‘nature 
under threat’. So-called market forces are meant to distribute scarce conservation resources 
most effectively and preserve ecosystem services at the lowest possible cost (Ferraro and 
Simpson, 2002), leading to ‘win-win’ situations for buyers and providers – to show business 
leaders that “protecting nature can be a profitable corporate priority and smart global business 
strategy” (Andrew Liveris, CEO of Dow Chemical Company, in Walsh, 2011). The natural capital 
discourse is being mobilised to represent a new understanding and management of nature, 
abstracted from its local, and importantly social context, and subjected to processes of 
marketisation and financialisation. This discursive re-packaging of nature is grounded in a long 
history of framing and reconceptualising nature based on changing paradigms and a series of 
novel inventions, measurements and valuation techniques – from cost-benefit analysis (Lane, 
2015) to contingent valuation or Willingness to Pay – to ‘objectively’ quantify and abstract 
biodiversity impacts and opportunities. These all help to make nature ‘commensurable’ 
(Sullivan, 2009; Robertson, 2012) and facilitate the discursive alignment of corporate interests 
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and ecological sustainability which initially emerged as a challenge to growth-oriented capitalist 
‘Business as Usual’.  
The discourses and languages that invoke economic rationality and ‘the market’ to position 
offsetting, I argue in the literature review, constitute powerful mobilisers to draw in new actors 
and build novel alliances. In reality, however, there is very little ‘market’ in offsetting. 
Nevertheless, examining these discourses is important to understand their appeal and to 
explore the way they are used to draw in the conservation community (and by conservation 
organisations to pacify internal debate and get members on boards, cf. MacDonald, 2010b). 
This section aims not to explain the origins of offsetting itself, which has been popular in 
different parts of the world and industrial sectors for a long time. Instead, it aims to explain its 
(renewed) popularity in the European political-economic landscape by tracing the genealogy of 
the narratives that are frequently drawn upon for discursive justification. 
Nature as resource  
The separation of human and nonhuman nature alluded to in the introduction, the ‘othering’ of 
nature and the emerging view of nature as a resource that intensified during the Enlightenment 
period – fundamental to processes of domination and domestification of nature – lie at the very 
heart of offsetting. They facilitated, Arturo Escobar argues, a specific kind of resource 
management (1995) based on discourses around scarcity that ignore the abundance of 
resources for some, and the lack for others – in other words the inequalities and politics of 
resource access. The framing of ‘resources’ assigns importance to nature in that it is 
“considered useful for some higher purpose”; not for what nature is but what it can become 
(Escobar, 1995: 23). Conceptualising something (or someone) as a resource means placing them 
under the authority of production; like raw material that requires processing and allows 
exploitation. This conceptualisation of nature as resource started with the initial wave of 
commodification of land, marking the beginnings of capitalist development in Britain (Wood, 
1994) and was then exported through colonialism and imperialism to facilitate efficient 
‘planning’ to maximise resource exploitation and control over ‘unruly populations’. This first 
wave of enclosures was a violent process with long-lasting social and cultural consequences, 
imposing a particular view not only on nature, but also on people. Wolfgang Sachs has argued 
that  
interpreting the state of the world chiefly in terms of ‘resources’, ‘management’ and 
‘efficiency’ may appeal to planners and economists. But it continues to promote 
development as a cultural mission and to shape the world in the image of the West … 
[imposing on] people how to see nature, society and their own actions (1999: 55).  
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Nature as global (eco)system 
While the utilitarian view of nature as resource forms the foundation for European ‘resource 
management’, offsetting is further predicated on the conceptual ‘globalisation of nature’. This 
involves the view of nature as a ‘global system’ where – paradoxically – interconnections are 
discursively recognised, but subsequently denied in the acceptance of – and belief in – 
universality, substitutability, and commensurability of nature. This denial is essential for the kind 
of management – or managerialism – that offsetting is grounded in. Offsetting specifically 
involves the creation of equivalence between spatially and temporally separate natures 
(although the plurality of the word is not recognised). Only the view of the planet – but also of 
this rather recent and curious social construct of ‘biological diversity’ that excludes humans – as 
‘global’ creates the necessary linkages and interdependencies that allow for offsetting. Only this 
view of one planetary ecosystem with planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009), which 
encompasses the diversity of local ecosystems, opens up the possibilities for NNL policies.  
The very idea of a ‘global system’, and the consequent construction of biodiversity loss as 
‘global problem’, is startlingly recent, “deriving its main impetus from the ecological fervor 
fostered by the Club of Rome reports from the 1970s, which provided a distinct vision of the 
world as a global system where all parts are interrelated” (Escobar, 1995: 193). This shift is 
sometimes traced back to the 1969 beaming of NASA photos of planet earth from the moon, 
which marked not only the representation as ‘global’ but also, and at least as importantly, as 
“something to which we belong but which remains distinct from us” (Fournier, 2013: 64). The 
discursive work involved in the construction of that ‘one planet’ is visible in the milestone report 
“Our Common Future” by the World Commission on Environment and Development, under 
Norwegian chair(wo)manship, where it was claimed that  
Humanity’s inability to fit its doings into that pattern [of clouds, oceans, greenery, and 
soils] is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are 
accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from which there is no 
escape, must be recognized—and managed (1987: 1).  
It would be ‘Western rationality’ that needed to be positioned to solve these immense 
challenges: sustainable development – and later the green economy – became the new magic 
bullets to eradicate poverty and protect the environment (Escobar, 1995). The constitution as 
global is based on the proliferation of, and preoccupation with, aggregate numbers and 
statistics that hide inequalities and power relations, winners and losers, and risk homogenising 
and depoliticising ecological and social destruction. In his seminal work “A vast machine: 
Computer models, climate data, and the politics of global warming”, Paul Edwards traces the 
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construction of the global earth system that allowed for the establishment of the political reality 
of global warming and climate change, the history of climate modelling, large-scale data 
collection and analysis and the creation of the climate knowledge infrastructure (2010). He 
examines the scientific and political work that then became institutionalised in global 
institutions and ways of thinking – what he calls “infrastructural globalism” (Edwards, 2010). 
Similarly, the development of ‘global nature’ and ‘global biodiversity’ as distinct objects of 
knowledge and governance has been facilitated by the construction of ‘global earth’. A closer 
analysis of the role of scientific projects and programmes, measurements and classification 
systems, as well as frames and mobilising devices – such as the IUCN red lists of threatened 
species – and events – e.g. the UN International Year of Biodiversity or the International Decade 
of Biodiversity – reveals the work that has gone into this construction.  
The same systems-thinking, based on belief in an ‘adaptive whole’ and mechanical laws of 
nature, lies at the heart of mechanical philosophy that gained prominence in early modern 
Europe in the 17th century, describing the earth as a large-scale mechanism – modelled after 
machines, rather than organisms. Some of the assumptions and ideas of mechanical philosophy 
can still be seen in the paradigm of cybernetics. Cybernetic systems, according to cybernetics 
pioneer Norbert Wiener, are self-regulating systems with positive and negative feedback loops 
(Wiener, 1948). They are a special class of cause-and-effect (input-output) systems in which 
input is determined, at least in part, by output (Patten and Odum, 1981: 886) and serve to 
analyse relations between mechanisms and their environments.  
Some ecologists have argued that ecosystems constitute cybernetic systems that balance 
energy input and output, stabilised through feedback loops (Patten and Odum, 1981). Bernard 
Patten and Eugene Odum, well-known ecosystem theorists and ‘environmentalists’, have 
famously argued:  
For us, we must ask how it is that environment is always prepared and ready; why did it 
not become chaotic long ago, a disorganized heap of unprocessed and partially 
processes energy-matter residues from the evolutionary biology of past ages? The 
theory of ecology is not pat for us. We believe that to understand the organism in 
nature, its other half, environment, will have to be understood as well. To us, 
“environment” means environment unspecified, but “ecosystem” is environment 
specified. The ecosystem is the level of organization concerned with the orderly, not 
chaotic, processing of energy-matter in the biosphere. We do not believe that it is the 
goal of ecosystems to do this. They are not superorganisms. Rather, it is a constraint of 
existence that if living processes are not orderly, antientropic, then they will not persist. 
The balance of nature calls for a conjugate action-reaction kind of organization that 
creates order where there could be chaos as a matter of implicit design that simply 
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evolved over geologic time … If ecosystems are not cybernetic, then by what other 
means could the perceived harmony of the biosphere have evolved? (1981: 894). 
The idea of ecosystems was first put forward and used analytically among British colonial 
ecologists, most notably Arthur George Tansley, who developed a mechanistic view of ecology 
“suitable for creating a system of control of material and human resources in the empire” 
(Anker, 2001: 2). According to Tansley, the fundamental physical system includes friendly, 
hostile and inorganic habitat factors:  
The amount of matter and energy being constant, ecological factors must add up to 
balanced cycles of matter and energy. The idea of such cycles, in combination with 
thermodynamics, was an essential component of Tansley’s system of the human mind 
and of ecology (Anker, 2001: 38).  
In other words, the complexity of nature is composed of vast interconnected systems (or 
circuits) that link all plants and animals, and through which energy flows. 
This view needs to be understood in a political economic context where British colonial 
ecologists argued against South African ecologists, following Jan Christian Smuts, who promoted 
the paradigm of ‘holism’, an “idealistic ecology that could solve the empire’s environmental, 
social, and racial problems” (Anker, 2001: 2). Both knowledge networks were in search of tools 
to understand human-nature and human-society relations to develop administrative economic 
policies for resource management, population settlement and social control (Anker, 2001: 2). 
Peder Anker argues that the “main tension in the ecological domain was between South African 
idealists who thought of nature’s economy as fixed (by an omnipotent divinity, according to 
some), and British mechanists who thought that the economy of nature could be—and should 
be—planned. The social order of society was at the heart of the debate” (Anker, 2001: 4, 
emphasis added). Whereas British mechanists argued for an “ecological re-ordering of society, 
nature, and knowledge”, South African ecologists aimed to naturalise existing (racial) 
segregation (Anker, 2001: 4).  
Much ecological (ecosystem) work was based on the assumption of local people as inherently 
destructive – visible in the work of Thomas Ford Chipp, later director of Royal Botanical 
Gardens, Kew, who wrote that native people caused “’widespread destruction of the natural 
vegetation ... [of] considerable local economic importance’, [because of] ‘dense population,’ 
‘movement of tribes,’ and ‘political insecurity’” (Chipp, 1926: 194; see also Anker, 2001). The 
colonial administration, with the help of ecologists, was to restore the equilibrium that these 
people destroyed. This equilibrium thinking was based on connections that Arthur George 
Tansley made to the physical sciences, to borrow from their legitimacy, and to psychology – he 
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was fascinated by Siegmund Freud’s idea that the human brain was actually an electric machine. 
The newly created ecosystem knowledge was used directly by colonial resource management 
agencies, especially the Indian Forest Service, and facilitated by the development of aviation 
technology that enabled aerial mapping, surveying and classification. It contributed to the 
globalisation of the discipline and offered to ecologists the overview they required to ‘order’ the 
natural world according to imperial interests, “suitable for managerial overview” (Anker, 2001: 
116).  
Large-scale ecosystem research received a big push in the post-WWII era with the setup of new 
science programmes in the US, notably the International Biological Programme in the 1960s 
(Coleman, 2010a: 15). Ramón Margalef’s ideas on cybernetics (self-governing, or self-
organising) principles in the 1960s and 1970s, David Coleman argues, were crucial for this 
momentum and influenced “generations of ecosystem scientists” (2010a: 10). It was through 
the appeal, and shared understanding, of the ‘cybernetic machine’, to represent the way in 
which nature was to be controlled, that ecosystem ecologists were able to generate funding 
and set up a number of prestigious institutions and research programmes– such as the 
International Biological Programme, funded by the US Congress (Kwa, 1987). Its success was 
helped by the increasing availability of computers (to facilitate modelling) and the successful 
application of systems analysis in military and industrial settings around 1960 (Montague, 
2014). Computerised techniques had become popular in engineering and were now starting to 
be applied in systems ecology, generating tools and hypotheses for ecosystem ecologists, who 
tended to be “fascinate[d] with self-organization, response to disturbance, and emergent 
properties of ecosystems” (Montague, 2014).  
Systems ecology continues to be relevant for adaptive ecosystem management, theories of 
complex ecosystems, resilience theory, ecological engineering and ecological economics 
(Montague, 2014), within which biodiversity offsetting is embedded. It suits all too well 
neoclassical economic worldviews around ideas of equilibration, Pareto optimality and 
optimisation. It can be found in new conservation paradigms of nature corridors and ecosystem 
(service) management, based on problematic notions of natural equilibrium, harmony, balance 
and functional order (Leach et al., 1999), consolidated in the biodiversity “knowledge 
infrastructure” (Edwards, 2010)9 and institutionalised in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD, 1992), the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005) and The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB, 2010), among many others. The idea of a stable state, of a 
                                                          
9 Knowledge infrastructures, Paul Edwards states, “comprise robust networks of people, artefacts, and institutions that generate, 
share, and maintain specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds” (2010: 17). 
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natural balance of nature, which allows for abstraction and separation of different ecosystem 
functions that can be removed somewhere and replaced elsewhere is crucial for the theorising 
of offsetting. The remarkable similarity to neoclassical economic conceptualisations of the 
economy is no coincidence: both rely on the human capacity to model, manage, manipulate and 
engineer (ecological and economic) systems; to control and restore ecosystem functions or 
even entire ecosystems and (national) economic processes, respectively. Both are 
conceptualised as external to social-political processes, as separate entities that can be steered 
through the use of large-scale aggregate data sets, methodologies, mapping exercises and (GIS) 
surveying. These are some of the artefacts and practices that are so fundamental for Paul 
Edwards’ infrastructural globalism, supported by the increasing inclusion of global policy 
objectives into national and EU policy documents. Furthermore, both draw on the same 
theoretical repertoire around competition, innovation and survival of the fittest. 
Nature as ecosystem service provider, nature as Natural Capital 
Just as the idea of the ecosystem, initially a radical concept that grew out of ‘progressive’ 
colonial social and ecological concerns, helped generate significant funds and mobilise 
institutions, nature’s reframing as natural capital and ecosystem services has come to play a 
remarkably similar role. Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes – not least carbon markets – 
have been channelling billions of dollars into conservation projects designed maintain the 
planet’s ecosystem infrastructure (Carroll and Jenkins, 2008). Ecosystem services have been 
defined as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MA, 2005). Erik Gómez-Baggethun 
and colleagues trace the origins of the term to the late 1970s, when ecologists tried to raise 
public interest in biodiversity conservation, before it became mainstreamed in the 1980s, with 
the advance of methodological work to calculate the economic value of ecosystem services 
(2010). In perhaps the most famous (and controversial) ecosystem valuation study, Robert 
Costanza and colleagues estimated the “value of the world's ecosystem services and natural 
capital” to lie between US$16 and US$54 trillion per year (1997), later adapted to US$125 and 
US$145 trillion per year (2014).  
The concept of natural capital, the world’s stock of natural assets, can first be found in “Small is 
Beautiful” by German statistician and economist Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1973) and is now 
closely associated with ecological economists Herman Daly and Robert Costanza. Both – natural 
capital and ecosystem services – were quickly picked up by conservation groups, environmental 
consultants, ecologists and policy makers to frame debates and legitimise certain managerial 
practices (figure 2). The 2005 MA and particularly the 2010 TEEB report, a global initiative 
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aiming to end the ‘economic invisibility of nature’, constituted two milestones in their 
popularisation and institutionalisation.  
 
 
Figure 2 Origins of the ecosystem concept (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010: 1213) 
This new language was justified by the need to overcome the systematic undervaluation of 
nature in decision making and the lack of quantification of natural capital for the sake of 
comparing it with the value of economic services and manufactured capital (Costanza et al., 
1997). If valued in monetary terms, previously un(der)valued natural services – or ‘externalities’ 
– could thus be more explicitly incorporated in economic decision making to correct alleged 
market failures (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). This could be accomplished thanks to the 
expansion of monetary valuation techniques by environmental economists in the second half of 
the 20th century, based on hedonic pricing10, observed consumer behaviour, travel cost 
methods, stated preferences and contingent valuation methods, among others (Gómez-
Baggethun et al., 2010). Essential to the ecosystem service/natural capital paradigm are the 
problematic assumptions that environmental economics inherited from neoclassical economics: 
the ‘Rational Economic Man’, the belief in price mechanisms, Pareto efficiency and 
optimisation, and assumptions about human behaviour – depicting humans as utility 
maximising, whose preferences can be inferred from (and reduced to) cost-benefit analyses. It 
further necessitates the discursive commensuration (the creation of equivalence), the 
                                                          
10 Hedonic pricing refers to the valuation of ecosystem services which directly affect market prices, often environmental attributes 
that impact housing prices. 
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‘aggregation’ (the calculation of ‘net’ quantities) and the possible ‘capitalisation’ (the 
“leveraging [of] conserved ‘standing natures’ as capital assets”) of nature (Sullivan, 2017b: 66). 
These enforce human-nonhuman relationships that are stripped of their ecological and social 
context and uniqueness, and convert nature into universalised and standardised units, to fit the 
two-dimensional matrices that biodiversity offsetting requires. These processes are constitutive 
of particular understandings of nature, they ‘remake’ nature into “third nature” (Hughes, 2005). 
In practice, ecosystem services usually have no value until they become business inputs or 
business risks. The very concept of services detaches the ‘service’ from the provider – it does 
not matter what or who provides the service, as long as the service is being provided. Service 
provision can be natural (e.g. the service of a wetland) or artificial (a water purification plant). 
While some ‘co-benefits’ (such as birdlife habitat) may be acknowledged, in essence it is only 
the service to humans that counts, and if human-built infrastructure outcompetes natural 
services, the incorporation of ecosystem services will lead to loss, rather than conservation of 
nature.  
Both concepts gained momentum in a moment of crises in the early years of the 21st century, 
legitimising not just Business as Usual, but the intensification of “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Harvey, 2004) and “accumulation by restoration” (Huff and Brock, 2017), 
further explored in the next chapter. Initially, they emerged out of frustration with the 
economic growth-paradigm and constituted somewhat radical tools to draw attention to the 
loss of nature that sustains human life (as well as ‘the economy’). Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, 
for instance, used natural capital to argue for downsizing economic production (1973; Sullivan, 
2014). The use of the term was pedagogic, “to demonstrate how the disappearance of 
biodiversity directly affects ecosystem functions that underpin critical services for human well-
being” (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010: 1213). Yet, both concepts were soon used by different 
people with different intents: “Indeed, in its inauguration in both environmental and ecological 
economics it already meant contrary things, and was used for varied ends and with diverse 
outcomes” (Sullivan, 2014: 6). Erik Gómez-Baggethun and colleagues explain this with the “slow 
move from the original economic conception of nature's benefits as use values in Classical 
economics to their conceptualization in terms of exchange values in Neoclassical economics” 
(2010: 1216), resulting in application and co-optation for very different purposes than originally 
intended. Paraphrasing Maria Åkerman, Sian Sullivan argues:  
the polysemic metaphor of nature-as-natural capital, whilst metaphorically strong and 
heuristically powerful, is analytically weak. This enables the metaphor to perform 
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different work for different groups of people in diverse contexts, a disparate mobilisation 
that permits the metaphor to act in the world with varying effects (in press: 7). 
The economistic conservation language around these metaphors marks a “discursive shift” (cf. 
Sullivan, 2014) in the history of conservation paradigms, into which offsetting becomes 
embedded – reconciling formerly incompatible ideas around ecological conservation and 
economic growth. This reframing of nature in instrumental and anthropocentric terms opens up 
the possibility to monetarily value and to assign a price to ecosystem functions. Its importance 
lies in the way it reinforces a particular world view that is “projected as a universal, value-free 
system of knowledge, which has displaced all other belief and knowledge systems by its 
universality and value neutrality, and by the logic of its method to arrive at objective claims 
about nature” (Shiva, 1996: 268). Its political appeal facilitated the recent hype around 
offsetting and other so-called market-based conservation instruments – the narrative is used to 
support offsetting practices, and the idea of ‘the market’ acts as a mobilising device within this 
narrative. The powerful language then lends ideological support for business representatives to 
position themselves as saviours of nature and to entrench their powerful position in the global 
political economy.  
From nature as global to local nature: double process of abstraction and managerial 
interventionism  
What has been conserved is an abstraction: a net amount of habitat, which serves as a 
proxy for a net amount of biodiversity, both of which are located elsewhere ... It exists 
outside history and has no place (Hannis and Sullivan, 2012: 16). 
Paradoxically, it is once the discursive work of turning biodiversity into a ‘global resource’ in the 
form of a global ecosystem has been completed, that nature must once again be abstracted and 
removed from its social and ecological (in as far as these two are separable) contexts to allow 
for NNLs conservation. Having recognised the interdependence and interconnectedness of this 
global system, this interdependence is subsequently denied in the acceptance of, and belief in, 
universality, substitutability, and commensurability of nature. In other words, nature needs to 
be constructed as one, only to be broken down into many exchangeable parts. The offsetting 
narrative relies on this creation of equivalence between spatially and temporally separate 
natures. Only the view of biodiversity as ‘global’ creates the necessary linkages and 
interdependencies that allow for offsetting, and only this imaginary and narrative of ‘one 
planetary ecosystem’, which encompasses the diversity of local ecosystems, opens up the 
possibilities for NNL. It now does not matter where nature is saved, as long as the balance is 
even. Camila Moreno and colleagues have called this reframing of nature “ecological 
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epistemicide” (2015). In their excellent epistemological and historical critique of the particular 
ways ecological crises become subject to particular knowledge regimes, they show how  
quantification has become the chief mode of political communication and is strongly 
linked to the subjection of all possible social issues to an economic logic. Quantification 
offers a kind of currency in international exchange and allows for a redistribution of 
responsibility in governing Planet Earth (2015: 11).  
Simultaneously, the view of nature as one global system fosters an “economy of visibility” 
(Escobar, 1995: 195), where nature and humanity are ontologically flattened. At the same time, 
some human activities are pointed out, others ignored. Poor people’s activities tend to be 
singled out, decontextualised, and blamed for environmental destruction – while the failure of 
supposedly ‘rational’ exploitation and management practices, which all too often turns out to 
be less-than-rational, is usually not (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). Based on the colonial legacy of 
conservation, the poor and their relationship to the land tend to be constructed as ‘irrational’, 
as lacking environmental consciousness and as threats to nature. This facilitates the 
construction of Western experts – and corporate actors – as the saviours of nature. Businesses 
are positioned as rational and utility-maximising, reacting solely to incentive structures and 
doing what makes (business) sense. If corporate behaviour leads to degradation, this is due to 
the lack of internalisation of externalities. Offsetting through avoided loss – the protection of 
nature that would otherwise be lost – depends on hypothetical baselines against which credits 
are calculated and loss is modelled. Here, again, the construction of local people as biodiversity 
risk and the positioning of corporations that offset – regardless of how much destruction they 
cause elsewhere – as the protectors of biodiversity becomes integral to the idea of NNL (e.g. 
Seagle, 2012; Brock, 2015). 
The framing of ecological crises as ‘global’ assigns responsibility to managers and scientists, and 
serves to legitimise a particular political response in the form of neoliberal top-down political 
projects, corporate-led initiatives and social technologies of governance. This response is 
embedded in the hegemonic political ideology of economic growth, progress and rationality, 
and informed by ‘objective’ (natural) science – manifest in requirements of ‘sound science’ or 
‘evidence-based policy making’. Such views feed into the Anthropocene discourse of “we are all 
in this together” – empowering some actors and solutions over others. The Club of Rome report 
– a milestone in the ‘globalisation’ of ecological crises – was followed by a special issue of 
Scientific American on “managing planet earth” (September 1989) – 182 pages of ‘expertise’ to 
legitimise and plan this global management – the overwhelming majority written by white, male 
natural scientists from the global North. The contributions reveal “the essence of the 
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managerial attitude” and make clear that what is at stake “is the continuation of the models of 
growth and development through appropriate management strategies” (Escobar, 1995: 193). 
Rather tellingly, one of the contributors asks: “What kind of planet do we want? What kind of 
planet can we get?” (Clark, 1989: 48). The globe becomes an “object of appropriation for a 
collective humanity”, invoking associations of heritage and property (Ingold, 2000: 39). All too 
easily, management becomes interventionism for the sake of ensuring productivity, or, today, 
sustainable use and ecosystem service provision (Ingold, 2000). As Arturo Escobar describes:  
’We’ have the responsibility to manage the human use of planet Earth. ‘We’ need to 
move peoples and nations toward sustainability by effecting a change in values and 
institutions that parallels the agricultural or industrial revolutions of the past. The 
question in this discourse is what kind of new manipulations can we invent to make the 
most of the Earth’s [scarce!] ‘resources’ … But who is this ‘we’ who knows what is best 
for the world as a whole? (1995: 193). 
Today’s ‘we’ are Earth System scientists, deciding on planetary boundaries to delimit global 
management strategies – the “metaphorical engineers” (Castree et al., 2014). The resulting 
Earth System narratives invite “navigating”, as the record-cited synthesis of “Navigating the 
Anthropocene: improving Earth System Governance” (Biermann et al., 2012) suggests. To 
navigate, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, means to steer, control, or direct course. 
Maarten Hajer and colleagues describe this trend as “cockpit-ism”; “the illusion that top-down 
steering by governments and intergovernmental organizations alone can address global 
problems” (2015: 1651). Rather than control of planetary systems, Andrew Stirling argues, we 
should be speaking of “reproducing privilege”, leaving power relations and inequalities 
unchallenged:  
With the focus on managing ‘Earth systems’ and ‘the planet’ itself, the issue is more the 
envisioned object of governance, than the modalities ... [not targeting] entrenched 
industrial interests, technological infrastructures or cultures of inequality and 
consumption, but the natural processes of ‘planetary control variables’ and ‘Earth 
systems’ (2015, emphasis added). 
This managerial emphasis is embodied in particular scientific frameworks, assessments and 
research programmes. Historically heavily dominated by the natural sciences, Earth System 
Science, with high-level financial and institutional support, has more recently been opened up 
to include the ‘human dimensions’ of global environmental change. The assumption is 
that people and the biophysical world can best be analysed and modified using similar 
concepts and protocols (for example, agent-based models). A single, seamless concept 
of integrated knowledge is therewith posited as both possible and desirable, one focused 
on complex ‘systems’ (Castree et al., 2014: 764).  
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Earth System scientists include environmental economists, behavioural psychologists, political 
scientists, researchers of legal, management and business studies, and environmental planners 
– many of whom focus on altering human behaviour, adjusting monetary incentive structures, 
examining rules and institutions for sustainability, and promoting green growth (Castree et al., 
2014). The exclusion of the vast majority of humanities and less positivist social sciences, and 
the associated refusal to examine more fundamental structural changes and alternative socio-
economic pathways, and to explore the diversity of human values risks “political complicity” to 
business as usual and adherence to the status quo (Castree et al., 2014: 764). 
A good example is the Earth System Governance (ESG) project, one of four Earth System Science 
Partnership programmes, which “sees an urgent need to develop better governance 
mechanisms and institutions at all levels to cope with this emerging earth system 
transformation” and speaks directly to policy makers. Its Science Plan, the ESG’s guiding 
document, starts with the same depoliticising and homogenising language that we may 
recognise from Anthropocene and planetary boundary discourses: “Humans now influence all 
biological and physical systems of the planet. Almost no species, no land area, no part of the 
oceans has remained unaffected by the expansion of the human species” (Biermann et al., 
2009: 4). The task is clear: the ESG Partnership has declared the “‘urgent need’ to develop 
‘strategies for Earth System management’” (ESG, n.d.). The institutional fragmentation of earth 
system governance is seen as a major reason for failures to effectively address environmental 
crises; the lack of a “coherent, systematic, structured system of global environmental 
governance” (Biermann and Pattberg, 2012: 265). It feeds into advocacy for a World 
Environment Organisation, a new specialised UN agency to cooperate closely with the Bretton 
Woods institutions (Biermann and Simonis, 1998), which calls for privatisation and allocation of 
property rights – enhancing “global managerialism [that] seems to consolidate the power of the 
already powerful” (Newell, 2001: 43).  
We can further observe the use of a particular systems thinking introduced above; future-
oriented long data runs, statistical modelling and scenario research to understand and solve 
environmental crises; models that, as Ariel Salleh suggests, “tend to abstract, conflate or reify 
grounded ecological, social and embodied processes” (2015: 435), based on new criteria of 
evidence, validity and reliability. Embedded in ideas of rationality, objectivity and universality, 
ESG thinking is “embodied in this ideology of modernization”, operating with an ‘flat earth’ 
model that is depoliticising and homogenising, and based on linear thinking of cause and effect, 
predictability and control. “The result is not science, but ideological scientism” (Salleh, 2015: 
436). This is taken even further in the casual calls for “large-scale geo-engineering projects … to 
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‘optimize’ climate” by natural scientists such as Paul Crutzen (2002). The recently initiated 
“Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Project”, directed by Janos Pasztor, senior 
advisor to the UN secretary-general on climate change, points to increasing embrace of 
geoengineering also by UN bodies (Carnegie Council, 2016). The resemblance to Arturo 
Escobar’s analysis is remarkable: “Once again, we find the familiar figure of the Western 
scientist turned manager … it is still assumed that the benevolent (white) hand of the West will 
save the Earth” (1995: 193). Western scientific expertise is used by international 
conservationists, governmental authorities and NGOs “to legitimise their control over the ‘last 
tropical forests’ by claiming that ultimately they are the only ones who have the necessary 
knowledge and expertise to devise feasible strategies of protected area management” (Nygren, 
2003: 47).  
Intersecting with this framing – and constituting the other side of the ‘corporate conservation 
coin’ – is the construction of ‘nature as risk’ that will now be explored. 
Nature as risk, nature as profit: securitising (against) nature 
The framing of nature as risk to corporate bottom lines allows for its quantification, 
incorporation into business operations and management. But what exactly is the ‘risk’ 
associated with nature, and how was it created? Michael Power traces the recent history of the 
pervasive narrative of risk and risk management, arguing that in a short time period, many 
public and private sectors (including universities and hospitals) have been transformed around 
discourses of financial, health, legal and political risks; institutionalised into standardised 
organisational forms (2007). He sheds light on the role of “managerial and administrative 
practices organized for the explicit purpose of representing and handling risk” (2007: 4-5). The 
language of risk has become embedded in the neoliberal logic of opportunity, enterprise and 
value creation (Power, 2007). However, while difficult to quantify, corporate risks of legitimacy 
and reputation are not inherently uncertain – in fact, corporations invest considerable financial 
resources in mapping resistance, undercover intelligence and hiring consultancies and PR firms 
to face these risks (Lubbers, 2002, 2012). Rather than dealing with “a world which is out of 
control” (Power, 2007: 5), with an uncertain future and unknown effects of biodiversity loss on 
operations, these corporate risk management strategies manage well-known yet difficult-to-
predict risks of resistance and regulation – made more legible and predictable through political 
lobbying, data collection and a diversity of strategies to co-opt, divide-and-conquer and 
suppress resistance (Brock and Dunlap, 2018).  
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In this context, offsets thus constitute “an implicit invitation and incentive to go from risk 
prevention and precaution to risk management” (Lorch, 2008), embedded in a culture of 
frameworks, benchmarks, procedures and mechanisms to ‘perform sustainability’. These 
procedures are meant to manage corporate biodiversity risks through “highly rationalized and 
mechanistic procedures … designed to safeguard the company by minimizing disruption, loss or 
damage to corporate reputation or business operations” (Kemp, Owen and van de Graaff, 2012: 
3).  
However, risk is a social relation (Soederberg, 2016). While biodiversity loss has become a risk 
to corporate legitimacy and reputation, to facilitate the financialisation and economic 
exploitation of this risk, international bodies, such as the World Economic Forum, have worked 
hard to “constitute biodiversity loss as a material risk to the ‘bottom line’ calculations of 
investors and insurers” (Dempsey, 2013: 41). Through discourses, reports and new calculative 
devices they aim to “render biodiversity loss legible in the language and metrics of financial risk” 
(Dempsey, 2013: 41). These efforts are supported by the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), whose work appears to be dominated by the extractive industries11 
(Moody, 2001), by leading environmental institutions such as the IUCN, the World Resources 
Institute and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)’s Finance Initiative, by 
investment firms and industry consultants such as PriceWaterhouse Coopers and McKinsey & 
Company (e.g. pwc, n.d.), and in collaboration with business schools, other academic 
institutions and NGOs (WWF, n.d.a). WWF, for instance, has been collaborating with Aviva 
Investors and Investec Asset Management to position biodiversity loss as a business risk through 
colourful interactive websites and reports (figure 3). The organisation further participates in the 
Natural Capital Finance Alliance and has developed novel mapping tools (in collaboration with 
the University of Oxford and the Simon Fraser University, among others) to make these risks 
legible and manageable (WWF, n.d.; WWF-Sight, n.d.). 
 
                                                          
11 The WBCSD was established just before the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 by Stephen 
Schmidheiny and Maurice Strong (‘Czar’ of UNCED). Maurice Strong had an interest in oil and mining (through Ontario Hydro and 
PetroCanada) and Stephen Schmidheiny was associated with Holderbank, the world’s second largest cement producer, and sat on 
the boards of Nestlé and the Union Bank of Switzerland (Moody, 2001). In 1999, following a ‘stakeholder dialogue’ with trade 
unions, academics, churches and indigenous peoples and civil society groups, the WBCSD published a report (“Meeting Changing 
Expectations”) that showcased the industry’s CSR engagement – authored by Phil Watts (Shell International) and Lord Richard 




Figure 3 Biodiversity risk as business risk (WWF, n.d.a) 
The biodiversity risk is constructed as a ‘neoliberal risk’, “optimistically situated as an 
opportunity for innovation and accumulation that cannot only be managed but profited on” 
(Emel and Huber, 2008: 1397). As the WBCSD states: “Somebody’s risk is someone’s 
opportunity” (in Dempsey, 2012: 42) – be it an investment opportunity, restoration profit or 
biodiversity offset. This is a securitisation in the social sense, where corporations are required to 
deal with biodiversity for the sake of legitimacy to protect their bottom lines, rather than a 
financial practice.12 Fundamental to this securitisation process have been initiatives that provide 
the data, tools and methodologies required, including the EU’s Mapping and Assessment of 
Ecosystems and their Services programme, part of the European Biodiversity Information 
System for Europe. IUCN, in collaboration with the Biodiversity Consultancy, BirdLife 
International and Vulcan Inc., a private company set up by Microsoft co-founder, investor and 
philanthropist Paul G. Allen, created a Biodiversity Return on Investment Metric that “measures 
the contribution that investments can make to reducing species extinction risk” (IUCN, 2017: 1). 
The various mapping exercises are fundamental for the categorisation and classification of 
‘Europe’s nature’ (into no-go areas and go-areas), making it legible, governable, and offsettable.  
These risks are then managed to “yield opportunities” (Soederberg, 2016: 6), and offsetting is 
positioned as an insurance mechanism. “Biodiversity business risks”, Jessica Dempsey argues, 
“are a crucial part of the promissory ‘green economy’, an economy that acknowledges and 
manages the risks to ecosystems and biodiversity by finding new sites for opportunity and 
profit, while at the same time ‘saving the planet’” (2013: 42). To facilitate the exploitation of 
                                                          
12 The latter refers to the financial practice of pooling debt and selling cash flows as securities against this debt. 
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these opportunities, in the transnational offsetting community (and specifically within BBOP), 
much work and resources have gone into establishing the ‘business case’ for biodiversity 
(offsetting) (e.g. IUCN, 2011; NABU, 2013; UNEP and WCMC, 2010; FFI, 2011; iied, UNEP and 
ECMC, 2014), discursively positioned around the regulatory risks, but especially the operational 
risks posed by biodiversity loss. This construction as ‘risk’ is grounded in diverse collaborations 
and partnerships with NGOs, conservation organisations, academics, practitioners and 
consultants. As one environmental consultant, when describing their corporate environmental 
impact assessment work, explains to me:  
[After having finished your work you] end up with [a] risk matrix! With numbers 
in it … [But we know:] This is gonna be a hard sell … [So we tell the client:] ‘This 
is a corporate risk, a risk of public perception and negative campaign’. [We tell 
them:] ‘You need to understand your share prices may go down’ (B7). 
Risk assessments have come to form the basis for an entire industry of auditors and consultants 
(explored below) who reproduce and stabilise the notion of risk. These assessments are now 
required by many of the international institutions whose (financial) backing industries rely upon. 
The World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), for instance, requires 
public disclosure of all revenues collected from natural resource companies for the extraction of 
oil, gas and minerals, and has established an external verification process. Following pressure 
from the EBRD (among others), these assessments have become part of investment rating 
agencies, who have further included membership in the EITI into their risk assessments of 
resource-rich economies (Smuts, 2010: 11), thus incentivising not only companies, but mining 
host countries to engage with biodiversity risk management, too.  
The production of a nature as risk that “capital can see” (Robertson, 2006) and – more 
importantly – that can be offset – requires calculative devices that serve to ascribe values of risk 
from biodiversity loss to businesses (Dempsey, 2013). As Larry Lohmann argues, “the tasks of 
disentangling, isolating, commensurating and ‘thingifying’ uncertainties” – or risks – involves 
“painstaking, innovative, contingent political work by a variety of interested actors” (2010: 229). 
This is the work that occurs in the places and spaces of offset-making – in consultants’ offices, in 
corporate boardrooms, and the transnational conferences and meetings explored below. These 
places and spaces are infused with power relations, human interactions, personal dynamics, 
professional relationships and friendships, which intersect and shape the framings and 
discourses introduced in this section. These discourses are responsive, dynamic and flexible. 
Indeed, their very power lies in this adaptability to changing political economic and legislative 
requirements and their capacity to reproduce, co-opt and incorporate critique – just as the 
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green economy discourse itself. The 2016 World Bank report on offsetting, for instance, clearly 
engages with civil society critiques and critical media coverage (e.g. Monbiot, 2012; Carrington, 
2013):  
Enabling Destructive Projects? Biodiversity offsets are sometimes viewed with scepticism 
because of concerns that they may provide a “license to destroy” by facilitating the 
approval of environmentally highly damaging projects. However, biodiversity offsets are 
intended to improve the net biodiversity outcomes from development projects that are 
considered to be more or less inevitable, and where the mitigation hierarchy (avoid, 
minimize, restore, and then offset any significant remaining damage) has already been 
applied. In such cases, the real question might not be whether the project will be built, 
but how, when, and with which financing. As a conservation tool, biodiversity offsets 
would not appropriately be used to facilitate habitat losses or harm to species that 
otherwise would likely not take place at all (Ledec and Johnson, 2016: 13). 
One of the strengths of offsetting projects, I argue in this dissertation, lies precisely in this ability 
to engage, to bring together, to form partnerships and novel alliances, incorporating and 
pacifying resistance and discontent.  
Having introduced the discourses and narratives within which offsetting is embedded and 
legitimised, I now examine the individuals and organisations involved in (re)producing these 
discourses and offsetting practices. 
3.2. Introducing the offsetting industry  
We – the financial institutions, conservation organizations, governments and industry 
[that are involved in biodiversity offsetting] – working in this space are part of a growing 
Community of Practice (Conzo, 2012, representing the IFC). 
Entire new industries have been developing for and through the green economy, and neoliberal 
conservation practices more specifically. They are organised in, and themselves structure, new 
political spaces where policy instruments are negotiated and institutionalised – such as the 
places and spaces of offset-making introduced below – and connect those sites and initiatives. 
The community of practice that Anna Conzo describes above – which I call the offsetting 
industry – is one such industry. It resembles Peter Haas’s “epistemic community”, a “network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (1992: 3). 
These professionals “physically and ideologically migrate across the once well-defined 
boundaries separating governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
private sector” (MacDonald, 2010b: 256-7) – as well as academia. The community is “small and 
interactive”, tightly interwoven, with close personal relationships and “actors circulat[ing] 
between the various organizations” (Benabou, 2014: 110).  
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These institutions and individuals play different (but overlapping) roles in offset-making in 
Europe, fundamental to its normalisation and institutionalisation. In this section I explore their 
roles, and categorise them as:  
• offset-drivers (e.g. through financial sponsorships) 
• legitimacy-lenders (playing ideological roles in the normalisation of offsets, 
possibly public facing) 
• connectors (linking across places and spaces, informing policy and corporate 
practice) 
• risk translators (turning biodiversity into corporate risk and translating into ‘the 
language of business’)  
• innovators (developing metrics, technologies, techniques) 
• knowledge-producers (through data collection) 
Business and Biodiversity Offset Programme  
I start this investigation with the single most important driving force behind offset-making in 
Europe and central point in the network of the offsetting industry: the Business and Biodiversity 
Offset Programme (BBOP), established in 2004 by Kerry ten Kate as part of Forest Trends, an 
advocacy organisation that aims to “conserve forests and other ecosystems through the 
creation and wide adoption of a broad range of environmental finance, markets and other 
payment and incentive mechanisms” (Forest Trends, n.d.). BBOP is a partnership of over 80 
companies, government bodies, financial institutions and nongovernmental organisations with 
the goal to disseminate biodiversity offsetting. It consists of an advisory group, an executive 
committee, a secretariat and regular members: companies with biodiversity footprints to offset 
(mainly from the mining, infrastructure and energy sectors)13, service providers (i.e. 
environmental consultants)14, financial institutions15, governments and intergovernmental 
organisations16, conservation and civil society groups17, and individuals. After years of lobbying, 
                                                          
13 They include Ambatovy Project, Eiffage, Électricité de France, ERAMET, Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara AB  (LKAB), Newcrest Mining 
Limited, Solid Energy Coals of New Zealand, Sveaskog, Tahi Estate and TOTAL SA. 
14 They include Arup, Biotope, Daemeter Consulting, deVilliers Brownlie Associates, Earth Trade, Ecoacsa, EcoDecisión, 
Environmental Resources Management, Golder Associates, Markit Environmental Registry, Namibian Uranium Association, Nature 
Task, Poulton Environmental Strategies, Proforest, Resource Environmental Solutions, LLC, Response Ability, Inc., SLR Consulting, 
Treweek Environmental Consultants, The Biodiversity Consultancy, Environment Bank, Tonkin and Taylor, Wave Action, Wild 
Business and Wildlands Inc. 
15 They include CDC Biodiversité, Citi, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Global Environment Fund, IFC and Inter-
American Investment Corporation. 
16 They include a number government departments/ministries/local governments, including the Namibian Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, IUCN, international conventions and UN bodies. 
17 They include African Wildlife Foundation, BirdLife International, Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (Funbio), Conservation International, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Fauna & Flora International, Forest Trends, Rainforest Alliance, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, The 
Nature Conservancy, WWF-UK and others. 
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publishing and networking, BBOP has developed into the most powerful and widely recognised 
authority on offsetting. Its main roles could be described as offset-driver, connector and 
innovator. BBOP’s offsetting standards and design guidelines (e.g. BBOP, 2009, 2012) have 
travelled through the offsetting world and been picked up by international financial institutions, 
conservation organisations, national governments and corporations alike, becoming governance 
norms and standard setters (Penca, 2015). Their success may lie in the perfect fit with the 
demands of Power’s audit culture (1996): the emphasis on measurable outcomes, standards, 
best practice and making operations auditable (rather than accountable). BBOP promotes 
offsetting across the world; through pilot projects, publication of toolkits and principles, regular 
offsetting trainings, and webinars. BBOP members chair discussion groups, such as the LinkedIn 
NNL group, organise meetings, publish newsletters and provide an online ‘offsetting library’, 
while fostering the Community of Practice. The organisation was initially sponsored by the Alcoa 
Foundation, the Australian government, USAID, the IFC, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund and 
the German development bank kfw (Darbi et al., 2009). Its 2014 conference sponsors – offset-
drivers – included major construction and infrastructure companies, banks and conservation 
organisations (figure 4).  
While BBOP can be described as more than the sum of its parts, one key individual stands out: 
founding director Kerry ten Kate. Kerry ten Kate enjoys privileged access to policy makers and 
high-level corporate representatives alike. A former barrister, she served on the Secretariat of 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, then founded the consultancy 
Environmental Strategies, worked as policy adviser at the Royal Botanic Gardens (Kew) and as 
Director of Investor Responsibility at asset manager Insight Investment. As BBOP director, she 
advises governments, intergovernmental organisations, companies, banks and NGOs on NNL 
and Net Gain of biodiversity policies. Kerry is a member of the UK’s Natural Capital Committee, 
IUCN's Species Survival Commission, the Aldersgate Group and a Conservation Fellow at the 
Zoological Society of London (ZSL). She has written over 100 papers, book chapters and articles 
(including for Science and International Affairs), and has broadcast for BBC Radio 4 and the 
World Service. Research participants describe her as “very charismatic” and a “great networker” 
(C2), and fundamental to BBOP’s success and the promotion of offsetting in Europe – “the 




Figure 4 BBOP conference sponsorship 
An army of environmental engineers 
SRK [consulting] UK and SRK South Africa have been involved in [EISAs] for mining, 
transport and dredging in the undisturbed rainforest of the Guiana Shield. As well, SRK 
UK undertook an … [ESIA] for the Malmbjerg Molybdenum Project in Greenland within 
the Arctic Circle, where breeding and moulting areas for Pink-footed geese and Barnacle 
geese exist. Both these species have high global conservation value. We are working to 
recommend appropriate offset areas that help protect these valuable species (Morrill, 
n.d.: 11). 
The second most important driving force is the army of environmental engineers that consists 
mainly of environmental consultants and biodiversity advisors – many of them BBOP members – 
who have been crucial to offset-making in international offsetting-spaces and local offsetting 
projects. Consultants play a crucial role in neoliberal managerialism and audit culture, 
facilitating the outsourcing of corporate tasks and responsibilities to ‘specialists’, and 
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contributing to securitisation against biodiversity risk. Many of them trained ecologists, they act 
as knowledge producers, risk translators and innovators. In their role as connectors, they link up 
corporations and NGOs, and catalyse corporate conservation partnerships (see chapters four 
and five). Translation of (and securitisation against) biodiversity risks for corporations and 
investors takes place in and through these partnerships and their institutionalised forms, such 
as the EU Business@Biodiversity dialogue: “Compensating for development impacts on 
biodiversity can accelerate regulatory approval for development, enhance reputational value 
and secure additional finance for conservation” (Rayment and McNeil, 2014: 5). Environmental 
consultants are involved in every step of the offsetting process, from lobbying, planning, 
designing, implementing and monitoring offsets, producing the necessary methodologies and 
tools for their work and undertaking many of the political negotiations. They often enjoy high 
levels of trust and possess significant levels of power. One high-level consultant explains to me: 
As senior ecologist, you have access to the president of the company … They believe you 
are working middle road, compromises … that is gonna give them a biodiversity licence 
to operate… It’s important for a consultant to be always the same person, say the same 
things to NGOs, government and mining company… [I have to tell them:] It’s gonna be 
green, it’s gonna be good, there’s gonna be some lemurs, but it’s not what you had 
before (B2). 
A very small number of consultancies – most of them UK-based – seem to be dominating the 
field and re-appear in the multiple places and spaces of offset making, including the EC 
negotiations – most notably the Cambridge-based The Biodiversity Consultancy (TBC). TBC has 
worked with or for nearly all big offsetting players: BBOP, major corporations (Shell, Rio Tinto), 
governments (UK, New Zeeland), conservation organisations (Flora and Fauna International, 
IUCN), and the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM, introduced in more detail in 
chapter five). The consultancy has collaborated with both the IFC and the EBRD (chapter four) 
to develop their new environmental lending requirements – and set up offsetting projects to 
pilot these requirements – and published industry briefing notes and so-called independent 
reports (see also Benabou, 2014). Other important consultancies include Gelders, eftec and 
Bio3; all occasional or regular members of the NNL working group, analysed in chapter four. 
Scientists and academics 
The boundary between biodiversity consultants (or “private sector scientists”, Lave and 
Robertson, 2017) and academics is blurry. Offsetting projects frequently involve academic 
collaborators, and consultants publish in academic journals and advise policy makers. 
Conservation Letters, for instance, published “A process for assessing the offsetability of 
biodiversity impacts” in 2013; a ‘policy perspective’ co-authored by ten consultants (including 
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Kate ten Kerry), a then-government employee (who now works in the petrol industry) and a 
university zoologist (Pilgrim et al., 2013). Some consultants combine their consultancy work 
with (visiting) lectureships in ecology or conservation science, others move back and forth 
between the two sectors. Joseph Bull, for instance, director of the environmental consultancy 
Wild Business Ltd. as well as lecturer at the University of Kent, and two collaborators are 
working on an EC-funded Marie Curie Research Fellowship on NNL. Guy Duke from the 
Environment Bank (a private company working to ‘broker’ offsets for developers and 
landowners in the UK) is also a Senior Visiting Research Associate at the University of Oxford, as 
well as an evaluator of environmental research and Marie Curie proposals, and previously 
worked for the EC’s DG Environment where he helped launch TEEB and designed the 2006 EU 
policy that introduced the concept of ecosystem services to EU legislation (EC, 2006).  
This revolving door effect and the involvement of consultants in academic publications and 
spaces (such as conferences and talks) has been important for the normalisation and exposure 
of offsetting and the involvement of university scientists, but also the academic debate about 
offsetting (including through mutual citations). Academics can serve as legitimacy lenders and 
knowledge producers, further normalising and ‘professionalising’ offsetting. Their work is 
fundamental to the quantification and evaluation of ecological impacts and the construction of 
offsetting currencies and ratios explored below. Most importantly, maybe, they enjoy an image 
as ‘objective’ and ‘non-political’, which other actors lack. 
Conservation organisations 
Large conservation organisations such as WWF, IUCN and the Nature Conservancy have 
positioned themselves at the forefront of offsetting advocacy, and the language they use has 
become almost indistinguishable from corporate lobby work. The example of Jason Clad 
illustrates this point. Not knowing that Jason works for WWF, he could easily be mistaken for a 
CEO, as he proclaims on stage of the 2013 Natural Capital forum: “Governments don’t create 
markets. Markets create markets!” He embodies the repositioning of conservation in the 
interest of growth, also visible on his WWF expert web profile: “Our goal is to figure out how to 
produce more with less land, less water and less pollution, so we won't be the only species left 
living on this planet” (WWF, n.d.b, emphasis added). Conservation organisations are essential to 
the task – he himself, it is claimed, “gets things done on a global scale. His ideas are changing 
the way governments, foundations, researchers, and NGOs identify and address risks and 
opportunities for their work” (WWF, n.d.b). The latter hints at one the most important roles of 
conservation organisations as risk translators. Not only do they translate risks for their corporate 
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partners, but they are essential in the construction of biophysical risks in environmental policy 
making more generally (Forsyth, 1999). The role of conservation organisations will be explored 
in much more depth in later chapters. Suffice it here to say that they have been fundamental to 
the development of offsetting both globally and within Europe, as offset-drivers, legitimacy 
lenders and providers of the ecological expertise required for offsets. 
Restoration industry 
A Trophy Restoration: Berner Construction helped transform old mines in Pennsylvania 
into grazing land for the state’s wild elk. The clean-up was complicated, the job site 
remote. Berner’s Cat® D11 dozers were up to the challenge (CAT, n.d.). 
Contractors should keep their eyes and ears open for these emerging projects. When 
there's a lot of land to move, there's a lot of money to make. This emerging market 
trend could mean big business for your companies (Lombardo, 2015). 
As these two quotes – the first one from Caterpillar’s corporate website and the second from 
construction news provider ForConstructionPros – illustrate, land restoration has become 
business. In the US alone, the US$25 billion per year restoration industry employs more people 
than coal mining, logging, or steel production (Barrett, 2015). The restoration economy is driven 
not just by legislative demands for reclamation of mining sites but also the machinery industry 
itself, which acts as offset-drivers: construction giant Caterpillar, involved in design, 
development, production and marketing of machinery and engines, for instance, aims to  
catalyz[e] the industry of natural infrastructure restoration ... to engage in a discussion 
on the need for and the benefits of restoring degraded natural infrastructure – such as 
forests, prairies, agricultural lands, estuaries, coastal landscapes and wetlands – as well 
as the opportunities it offers with respect to the global sustainable development goals 
(Caterpillar, 2015b).  
Consultants hail the restoration economy (closely associated with (eco)tourism and recreational 
industries) as “the Future of Environmental Markets” (Kelly, 2015). The restoration economy 
will be introduced in more depth in chapter four.  
Corporate pioneers 
To appeal to the corporate community requires the engagement of ‘big-name’ CEOs, such as 
Jochen Zeitz, former CEO of PUMA18, chair of Harley-Davidson’s sustainability committee, co-
chair of The B Team with Richard Branson and recipient of the Special Advocacy Award for 
Responsible Capitalism, who spoke at the 2013 Natural Capital forum. Indispensable to the 
corporate conservation scene is the head of the WBCSD, Peter Bakker, whose appearances have 
                                                          
18 PUMA gained international attention upon publication of their ‘environmental profits and loss account’ in 2011. 
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become almost obligatory. His role is to reproduce the ideologies introduced above, getting 
corporate actors on board and constructing industry involvement as the solution, not the 
problem. In his usual style, positioning himself as “one of the good guys”, he appeals to civil 
society to “speak the language of business”:  
We were still talking about Ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss and I said: why 
don’t we talk about natural capital, then we get business on board … The world is in a 
systemic crisis. Governments cannot lead us out of there … [We businesses have to] 
come up with innovative business solutions … improve business case … [and] collaborate. 
Give me a 100USD per ton of carbon and the world will fix itself (NC2013). 
Corporations are assigned agency: “Business people are the ones doing things”, he proclaims at 
the 2014 BBOP conference, and explains to participants: “You just have to remember four 
words: plan, do, check, act!” In effect, corporate pioneers position business as rational, 
responding to demand and supply dynamics and following the ‘logic of finance’. Governments 
are encouraged to incentivise, steer and provide finance to de-risk conservation activities and 
investments (e.g. through the EIB’s Risk Sharing Instrument, and the EC’s Horizon 2020). 
Corporate pioneers thus act as legitimacy lenders and connectors. 
Conservation celebrities  
High-level corporate conservation events tend to be opened by conservation celebrities and 
political actors – legitimacy lenders – to attract participants and media attention, to convey the 
urgency of ‘the problem’ and to position ‘the event’ as essential to its solution. The 2015 
Natural Capital forum in Edinburgh, for instance, was launched by Scotland's First Minister 
Nicola Sturgeon, and featured a video message by His Royal Highness Prince Charles (figure 5), 
reminding participants that the “health of the economy depends on the health of the planet” 
and that it is due to the economic invisibility of nature that its value is not taken into account 




Figure 5 Royal opening (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
The appearences of conservation celebrities and political stars sometimes resemble spectacular 
performances (see third section) on their own, such as Tony Juniper’s keynote speech at the 
2013 NC forum and the presentation by a famous nature film maker, accompanied by a 
spectacular video installation in the background. Tony Juniper, former director of Friends of the 
Earth and now head of WWF, is one of the ‘rock-stars’ of the conservation scene, as well as 
well-networked fellow of the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership and 
advisor to companies (including Danone, Interserve and Skanska) on their environmental 
‘performance’. Conservation celebrities can create enthusiasm and get business leaders on 
board. 
Key individuals that travel across spaces 
It is hard to overestimate “the importance of individual relationships” and “personalities” in the 
world of offset-making, I’m told by one environmental consultant, particularly in corporate 
offsetting projects: “You need to know the IFC standards, et cetera, but nothing is gonna 
happen if you have no trust relationship with the client” (B2). A number of key individuals have 
been crucial to this network building and the development of relationships – most importantly 
Kerry ten Kate, introduced above. Another important and well-travelled individual is Julia 
Marton-Lefèvre, IUCN’s Director General, former Rector of the University for Peace, Executive 
Director of The International Council for Science and on the boards of the UN Global Compact 
and several academic institutions. 
As already apparent, many of these individuals’ careers have involved crossing the boundaries 
between governmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society and corporations and 
engaging in consultancy work, spreading offsetting ideas across sectors. Consider Eric Swanson, 
speaker on the Biodiversity Offset Demands panel at BBOP’s offsetting conference in 2014. Now 
76 
 
Chief Operating Officer at Forest Trends and Ecosystem Marketplace, he worked as managing 
director of Conservation Finance and Strategies at WWF (BBOP conference sponsor), where he 
“oversaw development of sustainable financing for highest-priority programs”, according to his 
Linkedin account. In his 10 years at WWF, he launched initiatives in biodiversity banking and 
headed a team that secured $391,000,000 from conservation finance mechanisms and deals, as 
well as funding through carbon offsets. Similarly, Glyn Davies, now executive director of global 
programmes for WWF and former academic researcher, previously worked for the EC and the 
ZSL, before joining WWF. Kirsten Hund, who delivered a presentation on the Scoping and Design 
Stages of NNL systems, is a senior mining specialist in the World Bank, former WWF regional 
advisor on extractive industries and environmental consultant. Michael Jenkins, founder and 
president of Forest Trends, used to be a World Bank advisor and worked for USAID and the 
Peace Corps. ‘Independent’ consultant Sally Johnson previously worked as an environmental 
specialist at the IFC and for the World Bank, as principal scientist at Rio Tinto, and wrote ICMM’s 
Good Practice Guidance on Mining and Biodiversity as well as internal guidance and policy 
documents for several mining companies. Jonathan Ekstrom, director of The Biodiversity 
Consultancy, has worked for civil society organisations, as scientist, for the mining and oil 
industries, in the forestry sector, the government and the financial sector. He has not only 
involved in design and implementation of Rio Tinto’s biodiversity strategy, but also the IFC’s 
Performance Standard 6 which mandates offsetting (see chapter four), as well as in Rio Tinto 
and BirdLife International’s conservation partnership.  
These individuals (representative  of others) are behind the numerous ‘private sector 
publications’ around offsetting, they are involved in policy advice, corporate projects and pilot 
studies, and through the presentations of these studies and pilot projects contribute to the 
discursive normalisation of offsetting – as well as ‘making it happen on the ground’. 
Partnerships 
The offsetting actors introduced above unite in novel alliances and corporate-conservation 
partnerships that are grounded in – and institutionalise – offsetting (as explored in more depth 
in chapters four and five). They form part of a larger “non-profit industrial complex that results 
in the surveillance, control, derailment, and everyday management of political movements” 
(INCITE, 2014) and helps pacify and co-opt resistance in- and outside of conservation 
movements (see also Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014). These partnerships are by no means 
uncontested: FoE International, for instance, withdrew its membership from IUCN in protest 
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against their corporate partnership with Shell. Similarly, they have triggered controversy within 
conservation organisations (e.g. MacDonald, 2010b).  
These partnerships involve many of the quantitative and spatial tools and technologies that are 
essential for the construction, translation and legibility of risks (Dempsey, 2013). With these 
tools comes the creation of knowledge and expertise empowering conservation organisations 
and the construction and spread of large-scale data that facilitates further monitoring and 
surveillance. This data not only translates into power and social control, but also new business 
opportunities for conservation organisations and consultancies, while shaping corporate 
priorities (Dempsey, 2013: 48). The EC has been financially supporting such collaborations by 
means of the Business and Biodiversity programme, funded through LIFE, the main financial 
instrument with which the EU finances environmental, nature conservation and climate action 
projects. 
The offsetting industry plays a major role in the (re)production of the transnational offsetting 
discourses introduced in the first section, and the industry itself is constantly reproduced in the 
transnational conferences that form offset-making spaces in Europe. It is to those localised 
manifestations of transnational offset-making that I now turn. 
3.3. The spectacular performance of conservation  
Having outlined the discourses and narratives within which offsetting is situated, and 
introduced the offsetting industry that spreads and translates these discourses, I proceed to 
explore some of the ‘places and spaces’ where Europe’s nature is made offsettable. These 
places and spaces can be on- and offline – physical meetings and conferences, written 
publications and reports, glossy brochures and fancy websites, webinars, YouTube clips and 
many more. Ecosystem Marketplace, for instance, an internet platform run by ForestTrends 
with the aim to “facilitate [environmental market] transactions (thereby lowering transaction 
costs), but also catalyze new thinking and spur the development of new markets and the 
infrastructure that supports them” (Ecosystem Marketplace, n.d.b), not only provides news on 
environmental market developments, but also constitutes a job-advertising site for the 
offsetting industry. In this section, however, I focus on the transnational conferences where 
offsetting is being showcased, negotiated and normalised. Following Kenneth MacDonald 
(2010b), I see these conferences as political sites that render legible the institutionalisation of 
particular conservation paradigms and ideas. It is here that sustainability is ‘spectacularised’, 
where the offsetting industry comes together and is reproduced, networking takes place, 
success stories are shared, and offsetting becomes ‘a thing’. This may occur without much 
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mentioning of offsetting: in discussions around mitigation hierarchies, NPI and NNL, which act 
like placeholders for offsets; That-What-May-Not-be-Named. And yet, it is omnipresent: how 
else would NNL ever be achieved? 
The first of the three sites that have played important roles in offset-making in Europe and will 
be drawn upon to illustrate my arguments is the inaugural W006Frld Forum on Natural Capital 
in Edinburgh in November 2013 (2013NCf). It was organised by the Scottish Wildlife Trust in 
association with UNEP, the IUCN, the WBCSD and the Natural Capital Coalition, attended by 
over 500 delegates from 35 countries. The second forum (2015NCf) took place two years later, 
in November 2015, in Edinburgh again and attracted 600 attendees from 45 countries. The third 
event I attended was the 2014 BBOP No Net Loss conference (2014NNLc) in Regent's Park, co-
organised by Forest Trends, BBOP, ZSL and the British Department for Environment, Food & 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA). The BBOP conference is explicitly built and structured around the role of 
offsetting in achieving NNL: aiming to “[p]rovide advice on the design and implementation of 
mitigation measures, offsets and conservation banks to those who need it” and to share 
experiences and best practice (BBOP, n.d.). The Natural Capital forums’ remit was wider. In fact, 
as will be discussed below, whereas offsetting was openly discussed at the 2013 forum, it was 
much less ‘present’ in 2015, by which time the concept had become more contested by civil 
society and mainstream media. The Natural Capital forums, according to the Scottish Wildlife 
Trust, are meant to promote “global action to protect and enhance natural capital, within an 
ethical framework, for the benefit of society, our economy and the natural environment” and to 
demonstrate “how profound change can only happen if business leaders, NGOs, governments 
and others collaborate” (World Forum on Natural Capital, n.d.). 
I approach these conferences through the lens of spectacle and ritual, both of which will be 
briefly introduced. In his original work on the role of spectacle in mediating social and 
environmental-human relations, French philosopher Guy Debord introduced spectacle as the 
consequence of the penetration of ‘commodity’ into mass communication (1967). He put 
forward a number of propositions. Most importantly for this research were his notions of 
spectacle as imposing a sense of unity onto “situations of fragmentation and isolation” (i.e. 
controversies around offsetting), as “an omnipresent justification of the conditions and aims of 
existing systems” (to legitimise corporate activity ‘as usual’), “condition[ing] people to be 
passive while sending them a continuous message that their only viable path to action and 
efficacy is through consumption” (i.e. pacifying dissent) (Debord, see Igoe, Neves and 
Brockington, 2010: 492). Spectacle makes “everything appear … as a commodity” by 
“presenting the world in terms of quantitative objects imbued with an inherent exchangeability” 
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with the aim to ensure “its own reproduction and thus the reproduction of the conditions that 
produced it and the relationships that it mediates” (Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010: 492). 
Spectacle can serve as an instrument for ideological and material domination, Kenneth 
MacDonald argues (2010b), which conditions people to be passice observers, rather than active 
agents. Whereas first developed in reference to the mass media, here, spectacle targets 
(communication to) more specific audiences: the (corporate) conservation and corporate 
communities (though certainly encouraging media outreach too). 
The second analytical device is Victor Turner’s concept of ritual (1969). Rituals are defined as 
patterns of acts that construct frameworks of meaning that go beyond the specific situational 
meaning (cf. Bernstein, 1975). Ritual, Robert Turner argues, “is found everywhere, and is 
normally intensely social. It usually entails the successful deployment of ritual symbols, in 
narrative structures akin to dramas, stories, and music” (2015: 32). Rituals “excite feelings of 
collective effervescence” (Bull and Mitchell, 2015: 1). Approaching offsetting conferences in 
light of their ritual characteristics makes visible the collective enactment (Coleman, 2010b) of 
the discourses introduced above. Kevin Carrico states:  
Ritual is arguably a universal feature of human social existence: just as one cannot 
envision a society without language or exchange, one would be equally hard-pressed to 
imagine a society without ritual. And while the word “ritual” commonly brings to mind 
exoticized images of primitive others diligently engaged in mystical activities, one can 
find rituals, both sacred and secular, throughout “modern” society ... Ritual is in fact an 
inevitable component of culture, extending from the largest-scale social and political 
processes to the most intimate aspects of our self-experience (2011). 
These aspects include conferences and meetings (e.g. Coleman, 2010b). Rituals regulate 
relationships between the individual and the group they are a member of (Ensor, 2015). At the 
same time, rituals are full of power relations (Bell, 1997). David Kertzer argues that ritual 
discourages critical thinking and dissent, because it confers legitimacy by naturalising ways of 
behaving (1988). This legitimacy is associated with persons, moral values, world views and ‘ways 
of doing things’ (cf. Moore and Myerhoff, 1977).  
Exploring offsetting through spectacle and ritual is helpful, I show in the remainder of the 
chapter, to understand their role in the creation of unity and consensus (in the face of 
controversies around offsetting), while naturalising a particular understanding of, and 
relationship with, nature. They further highlight the role and importance of partnerships, 
anchored in offsetting, in pacifying dissent, hiding the socially and ecologically destructive 
violence inherent in industrial development, especially extractivism. Offsetting thus becomes 
the enactment, or spectacular performance of conservation and of sustainability – through 
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colourful case studies and PowerPoint presentations, through the social relations between 
people in the room, the offsetting industry and an audience that is to be convinced of the 
‘usefulness’ of offsetting. Offsetting spectacle (in conference centres, brochures and 
conservation narratives) and the ritualistic enactment of unity, I argue, not only mediate 
corporate-conservation relationships, but help depoliticise and invisibilise corporate harm.  
Spectacle and ritual in the places and spaces of offset-making 
We are in the middle of London Zoo, next to the tigers’ habitat. Weird. This couldn’t be 
much less natural and more depressive, in my opinion. Everyone else seems pretty 
excited. But it fits quite well, actually: ‘nature’ behind iron bars, to be dominated, to be 
controlled, to be managed. Replaceable, commensurable. Separate from humans, both 
conceptually and materially, thick glass windows, trenches. Demarcations and 
boundaries everywhere. Signs and regulations. Inside, we discuss the implementation of 
no net loss policies on the ground (Fieldnotes, 2014NNLc). 
All three conferences took place in some of the most prestigious and spectacular places in their 
respective cities (the Edinburgh International Conference Centre and the Zoological Garden in 
London) and provide ethnographic data collection sites to understand the discourses that the 
offsetting industry reproduces and draws upon. Upon entering the buildings, one is immediately 
emerged in the Business and Biodiversity World. In the 2015NCf conference foyer, for instance, 
an insurance company hands out free reusable coffee mugs to encourage individual ‘green’ 
behaviour and appeal to participants’ feel-good eco-consciousness (figure 6), next to 
conservation organisations who are showcasing their publications. Business leaders, CSR 
professionals, consultants, researchers and conservationists have their first coffee or tea 
together, new contacts are being made, business cards exchanged. The visual arrangement 
invites unity and harmony, bringing together people who fight for a common goal. A glowing 
globe in the foyer, complete with industry icons rather than country names, signals: we are all in 
this together. One cannot but notice the absence of human or non-human nature on this globe, 




Figure 6 Conference Foyer at the 2015 Natural Capital forum (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
 
Figure 7 The globe as resource storage facility (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
Rituals are characterised by feelings of communitas and comradeship, Michael Bull and Jon 
Mitchell argue (2015). The message of a collective ‘we’ is enacted repeatedly throughout all 
three conferences, ritualised verbally and non-verbally, not least in Peter Bakker’s presentation 
and corresponding PowerPoint slide on the “collective global challenges” that “we face” (figure 




Figure 8 Presentation by Peter Bakker (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
To add to the sense of unity, ever-same blue-white screens with the NCf logo can be found 
across the conference venue and participants are walking around with hessian bags, decorated 
with the natural capital logo that they received upon registration. Throughout the conference, 
the foyer serves as a hub, bringing people together, channelling informal conversations over 
coffee (and wine), and creating a sense of community and inclusivity, encouraging identification 
with the natural capital project. 
The strife for unity is further visible in the framing and structure of all three events. The way 
meetings are organised, Kenneth MacDonald shows, is “built on intent” – with particular 
“objectives, desired outcomes, and seek[ing] to manage these in relation to the expectations of 
their intended participants and a wider audience” (2010b: 262). The ‘bringing together’ of 
different industries and professions to build alliances is the main goal of all three conferences.19 
This is visible in the way sessions are structured: Meetings tend to be organised around 
“artefacts” (MacDonald, 2010b: 264) both within and outside of conference rooms. In sessions, 
these can be colourful PowerPoint presentations with pretty nature and exotic animals (often 
presenting success stories and ‘lessons learnt’). Presenters are on stage, sometimes various 
meters ‘above’ participants, with special lights and in padded chairs– all lending them additional 
authority (figure 9). The order of chairs and benches for the ‘audience’ resembles that of 
university lecture halls. These arrangements, the required use of an audience-microphone and 
the actions of the chair help control circulation of information, facilitate the suppression of 
dissent and encourage “the disciplining practice of self-control” (MacDonald, 2010b: 264).  
                                                          
19 The ‘No Net Loss Summit’, for instance, aims to “bring together 300 experts and professionals from oil and gas, mining, 
infrastructure, hydro, wind, house-building, utility, forestry and agriculture, manufacturing and retail companies, from governments, 




Figure 9 Talk show-like arrangements at the 2015 Natural Capital forum (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
Plenaries and panels resemble talk shows to enjoy, often moderated by professional journalists, 
radio/television hosts or sponsors rather than conservation professionals, and often do not 
allow for questions of the audience to ensure smooth running. The audience’s only engagement 
consists in sitting back and being entertained, encouraged to remain passive. Panels and plenary 
debates are complemented by occasional innovative corporate-style ‘knowledge cafes’, 
‘marketplaces’ and workshops, broken up by ‘coffee & networking’ and ‘networking drinks’.  
Topics are broken up into ‘streams’: the 2015 NC forum, for instance, is composed of Streams 
A-D; Understanding & Managing Risk, Innovation and Tools, Focus on Finance & Investment, 
and Policy Dialogues. Case studies are not just case studies, but Stories from the cutting edge, 
or Quick-fire case studies. These streams are not assigned at random, but highly co-ordinated, 
and prepared by the organisers. Constant referral to previous and upcoming sessions (in the 
same stream) create coherence, and although participants are encouraged in the opening 
speeches to mix up and attend different streams, the streams are clearly designed to draw in 
and ‘capture’ participants, pre-structuring their conference experience.  
Ticket prices in the hundreds of pounds ensure not only high-level corporate participation but 
the effective exclusion of many (grassroots) NGOs which instead chose to stage protest outside, 
or organise alternative events (such as the “Nature is not for sale” conference in parallel to the 
2013NCf). CEO’s Networking Drinks, CEO’s Breakfast Roundtable and Young Leaders’ Sessions 
(on invitation only) provide special networking opportunities to (future) corporate leaders. Day 
one usually ends with the obligatory multi-course conference dinner (figure 10), here in a sky-




Figure 10 Conference dinner (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
Events, sessions and panels are designed to impose unity, to prove the viability and appeal of 
offsetting, to convince sceptics and to display the power of the existing community of practice 
that ‘already believes in it’. With the exception of a few individuals who raise critical questions, 
all conferences go very smoothly, without much open conflict. In the BBOP conference, critics 
from grassroots organisations (such as FERN and FoE International) are given the stage in a 
debate on day one, before proceeding to discuss the details, policies and experiences with 
offsets as if that discussion had never taken place. Tellingly entitled “Agree to Disagree”, the 
organisers attempt to construct consensus even in the only session where dissent is 
conspicuous and consensus impossible.  
The social reproduction of governance institutions and ideologies depends heavily on the 
appearance of success (Mosse in Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010). Drawing on Anna Tsing, 
Caroline Seagle argues that “corporate appeals to capital investment are embedded in an 
‘economy of appearances’” (2012: 448), involving both dramatic spectacles and exaggeration of 
profit potential. The latter – the work that has gone into making the business case for 
biodiversity offsetting – has already been explored above. The former, the spectacular 
representation of offsetting success is based on the appearance of unity, the celebration of 
(successful) case studies, appealing storylines and innovative celebratory events. The 
celebratory launch of the consultation on the draft Natural Capital Protocol or the new Peatland 
Code, an “innovative mechanism to enable business investment in peatlands, taking into 
account its many valuable services to mankind” (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015b), both 
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at 2015NCf, for instance, signal (corporate) action and success. ‘Successful’ case studies travel 
across conferences and contexts, celebrated as evidence of corporate leadership roles and 
positioning corporations (and partnering conservation organisations) at the forefront of 
innovation and sustainability.  
Case studies come with glossy brochures and fancy PowerPoint slides; branded with corporate 
and conservation partner logos, recycled over and over again, ritualistically performed in 
different places to different (yet similar) audiences. They act as mobilisers by inspiring and 
normalising. Maybe the most famous is Rio Tinto’s (highly controversial) flagship project in 
Madagascar, planned from the beginning to act as pilot for testing strategies of stakeholder 
dialogue and dialogue in the face of expected resistance (Mulligan, 1999). Others include 
ArcelorMittal’s mining iron ore in the highly biodiverse Nimba Mountains region in Liberia which 
is offset by the protection of a formerly protected area that is alleged to be threatened by local 
communities (Ledec and Johnson, 2016: 46). Case studies include 2014 BBOP conference 
sponsor Ambatovy Joint Venture, led by Sheritt Internationbal Incorporated, a large-scale nickel 
and cobalt mining and processing operation in Madagascar, meant to achieve a net gain of 
biodiversity through offsets.20 
These case studies not only showcase innovative approaches and ecological engineering, 
restoration and rehabilitation skills – spectacularised with before-and-after shots resembling 
beauty makeovers. They also communicate that ‘offsetting works’. “Success”, Jim Igoe and 
colleagues argue, is “itself an extremely valuable form of ‘symbolic capital’ … that circulates far 
beyond the scope of specific interventions” (2010: 496). Weaknesses are framed as technical 
challenges or design flaws. In the conference context, they further channel debate around the 
technologies, methodologies and innovative tools employed, creating consensus through 
acknowledgment of diversity in approaches. 
Accounting technologies and ‘eco-informatics’ (Sullivan, 2010) 
New technologies are constantly needed. It’s not enough to turn nature into ‘ecosystem 
services’. Services need to be bundled and stacked 21, disentangled and picked apart, to 
make sure not a single service goes unexploited. There is always more (well-paid) work 
to do for the army of environmental engineers (fieldnotes, 2013NCf). 
                                                          
20 The offsetting project, developed in collaboration with Missouri Botanical Garden, Conservation International, Wildlife 
Conservation Society, Forest Trends, IRD France, the University of Antananarivo and a number of other NGOs, has become a BBOP 
Pilot Project in 2006 and includes community forest management zones, community ‘education’ and a number of programmes to 
introduce “more efficient rice production”, among others (Ledec and Johnson, 2016: 54).  
21 Bundling involves combining different ecosystem services to sell to one buyer; stacking involves selling multiple services provided 
by the same ‘piece of nature’ to different buyers (see Robertson et al., 2014). 
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…and if we do this, and it’s gonna happen, accountants will save the world. Sorry, civil 
society! (Peter Bakker, WBCSD, at the 2013NCf). 
Tools and technologies for biodiversity valuation (to establish equivalence between natures and 
to operationalise NNL) constitute key focal points around which discussions are structured, 
disagreement channelled and engagement mobilised. But they not only anchor debate, they are 
also key for the construction and translation of corporate risks that offsetting is positioned 
against. The Integrated Biodiversity Assessment Tool (IBAT) is one such example of a calculative 
device to transform biodiversity risks into material risk (Dempsey, 2013). IBAT, created by a 
number of conservation organisations, provides information on the spatial distribution of 
‘valuable’ biodiversity, therewith creating ‘no-go zones’, but also ‘go zones’; “[a] whole world of 
lands and waters, species and spaces where one may not have to worry about biodiversity 
issues” (Dempsey, 2013: 48). NGOs are fundamental in this process of classification and 
creation of hierarchies between valuable and nonvaluable nature. Jessica Dempsey goes further 
in her critique: “This is another mapping of useable and un-useable space, similar to colonial 
mappings that demarcated spaces of ‘useable Africa’ and ‘unuseable Africa’” (2013: 48, drawing 
on Ferguson). Such instruments facilitate the inclusion of people’s concerns into corporate 
project planning, before projects are met with resistance. The tool, an Economist article 
suggests, “might have saved Transneft, a Russian pipeline firm, the one billion dollars it cost to 
shift their pipeline route after persistent protests about the sensitive ecosystems around the 
original route” (Dempsey, 2013: 47). At the same time, ‘no-go’ areas can become business 
opportunities themselves – as eco-tourism sites, Payment for Ecosystem schemes or offsetting 
opportunities. 
Technologies are central to the quantification and valuation of the nature that is to be offset 
and nature that serves to offset, and the construction of ‘offset currencies’ and ‘offset ratios’. 
The exact numbers, as explored elsewhere, “don’t matter” (B1, B7). They are politically 
negotiated (B1, B4, B5, B7; see also Carver, 2015), amenable to creative modification to balance 
and negotiate conflict, and subject to financial pressures (cf. Carver and Sullivan, 2017). 
Nevertheless, an uncountable number of accounting techniques exists, based on a range of 
indicators from area-based measurements to complex ecological processes. Some of the 
indicators are straightforward, such as surface area (in hectares), habitat quality (hectares 
multiplied by indices of habitat quality), or even conservation significance (qualitative 
assessment of ecological significance). Others are more complex, including species-level 
information for key species habitat (such as Rio Tinto’s Unit of Global Distribution metric for 
high priority species), or multipliers to address additional layers of uncertainty including indirect 
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impacts. These are often “based on less precise ‘guesstimates’ or ‘rules of thumb’, with or 
without scientific underpinning” as even the World Bank Group admits in its biodiversity offset 
“user guide” (Ledec and Johnson, 2016: 23). They are applied against counterfactuals, based on 
‘background rate of biodiversity loss’, to be subtracted from required offsets. 
Such technologies help channel and depoliticise debate around the challenges and failures of 
offsetting, by framing them around notions of inadequate or undeveloped tools and a lack of 
data on local ecosystem functions and biodiversity (as explored further in chapter 4). In other 
words, challenges become technical challenges – apparent in panel titles, such as the 2014NNLc 
Session 7 on “Safeguards and Tools” that asks: “Do companies and investors have the 
safeguards and tools at their disposal to apply the mitigation hierarchy to projects with rigour?” 
or Session 12 which investigates “Challenges for Impact Assessment Practitioners”. A variety of 
toolkits, assessments and standards have been developed by the offsetting industry to solve 
these ‘technical challenges’ (and legitimise the existence of the industry), including the IFC PS6, 
the BBOP Standard and Methodology Toolkit, the CSBI timeline tool, the Biodiversity Offsets 
Toolkit, the World Bank Safeguards process, and the IUCN’s Biodiversity Risk Assessment and 
Corporate Decision Support.  
These debates around specific concepts further create a common language of engagement. As 
any proper management technique, biodiversity offsetting comes with a myriad of concepts, 
principles, mechanisms and processes. Most important here are the mitigation hierarchy and 
the multiple safeguards that are invoked ritualistically in response to critique, used to draw 
boundaries and delimit the ‘un-offsettable’ while creating the ‘offsettable’. Both of these will be 
explored in more detail in chapter four. Others include mobilising metaphors such as 
additionality, equivalence, like-for-like, avoided loss, mitigation replacement ratios and 
currencies – or even the foundational concepts of NNL and NPI and the Environmental Impact 
Assessments within which offsets are embedded. These instruments and technologies are 
inherently social; they mediate relationships and grant authority and power to the offsetting 
industry. They represent the social function of offsetting itself. Two environmental consultants 
explain:  
An ESIA [Environmental and Social Impact Assessment] represents more than the 
document needed for project permitting or funding. ESIA is a process which, at its best, 
serves as the basis for building stakeholder relationships, managing risks, avoiding 
scheduling delays, identifying and solving problems, applying sustainable project 




Although never explicitly acknowledged in this way, the same holds true for biodiversity offsets. 
At the same time, these instruments not only help manage risk, but also outsource risk and 
responsibility to practitioners. The NNL working group, for instance, states that 
A major area of contention is that while the mitigation hierarchy is applied as a 
theoretical principle, some doubts remain about practical implementation in some cases 
… Biodiversity offsets have to be seen as a “last resort”, only to be applied after all 
appropriate measures to avoid and minimise adverse impacts have been taken. 
Determining how far to pursue each step in the hierarchy before moving on is therefore 
a critical decision process for practitioners (NNL WG, 2013c: 2). 
Offset ratios and currencies are used to calculate the required offsetting area or credit units 
needed to compensate for development projects. They are sometimes pre-defined, depending 
on the type of conservation action, or subjective determinations by regulatory authorities, 
taking into account proposed conservation actors and ‘risk factors’ (McKenney and Kiesecker, 
2010). Their assignment is based on a complex and negotiated quantification system – in points, 
hectares, trees or other units of measurements – justified in scientific terms (or worked out 
backwards, based on what the developer is willing to pay). When questioned, they tend to be 
defended with the ‘better-than-nothing-argument’ and their arbitrary assignment is often 
acknowledged. As one interviewee recalls about an offsetting project with a leading mining 
corporation:  
We [needed to] use a multiplier. We were sucking it out of the air – we came up with six 
times – no, started with eight. They wanted [a multiplier of one]. Eventually we 
negotiated down right to multiplier 4.8 to one … Most … large NGOs wanted a 10 times 
multiplier. [Later, the] client hugged me for pushing through 4.8, not 1 to 1 (B7). 
One research participant, who works as senior ecologist in a consultancy, recalls discussions 
inside BBOP about the negotiation of offsetting ratios that illustrate the lack of scientific basis: 
“At BBOP I was often arguing against academics and their incredibly stringent criteria – would 
take a few PhDs and 20 years to do” (B1). Scientific knowledge and authority is mobilised 
strategically, to legitimise certain strategies, but also to call for more metrics, innovation and 
financial support. “We are in the dark ages of understanding biodiversity”, Jonathan Baillie from 
the ZSL states in the 2014NNLc opening ceremony, “We need national red lists … we need to 
move to a currency, understanding how businesses can report”. The offsetting industry depends 
on such work. 
It is through these technologies and vocabularies that authority and authoritative knowledge 
are constructed, grounded in particular assumptions, worldviews and interests, framing the way 
forward. Such ‘technical means’ – every-day technologies and knowledges – are a precondition 
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for any kind of governance (Tregidga, 2013). The language and practice of accounting helps 
(re)frame biodiversity loss in technical language, depoliticise it and makes it suitable for 
particular ‘interventions’ – positioning corporate offsetting as solution. “Accounting can be used 
to make processes ’thinkable’ and ‘governable’ … and carries with it both definitional and 
legitimating potential” (Tregidga, 2013: 813, based on Russell and Thomson). Despite the 
irrelevance (in many cases) of the actual numbers, green accounting techniques and the 
innovative tools thus play key social roles in the places and spaces of offset-making.  
Spectacular nature  
Nature ‘itself’ plays a remarkably small role in these conferences apart from the role as ‘service 
provider’ and ‘victim’ of unsustainable practices, often by indigenous and other local people. 
‘Images’ of nature, however, are omnipresent, mobilised in form of pictures of pristine nature 
(such as figure 11 on the BBOP conference summary front page), exotic species and fluffy 
charismatic mega fauna – concealing, once again, the destructiveness that offsetting legitimises. 
 
Figure 11 Conference summary (Forest Trends et al., 2014) 
What is not quite clear is whether these photos are representations of the nature that is meant 
to be destroyed (but offset), the nature that is meant to be recreated or restored through 
offsets, or the nature that is meant to be ‘protected’. Neither does that matter, as long as these 
imaginaries unify conference attendants behind the ‘higher goal’ of nature protection they are 
meant to pursue. Such mobilisation is also visible online, as the following example illustrates. In 
2016, five bison calves were born at a restored wetland site in the US, which had been 
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established to replace wetland areas that were destroyed for the expansion of the O'Hare's 
airfield. The news was spread by AviationPros, the industry’s leading news source (figure 12), 
and the public was invited to see the herd (CDA, 2016). A webcam now operates 24 hours to 
observe bison grazing in one area (US Forest Service, 2016).  
 
 
The places and spaces of offset-making introduced in this chapter matter because they provide 
forums where offsetting ideology is performed, where offsetting becomes legitimised and 
normalised, and where the offsetting industry is reproduced. It is through the framings, the 
social relations and the spectacular performance analysed above that offsetting becomes a 
legitimate corporate and policy measure. These spaces are inhabited by actors and ideas, 
interests, and power relations. Within these spaces, actors use their (social) capital and other 
resources to pursue their interests; whether these resources are material (money), social 
(recognition, power, connections, position) or knowledge-based (ecological expertise, 
accounting knowledge).  
The places and spaces of offset-making are also highly ritualised. This ritualisation is verbal, 
playing out through the mobilisation of concepts and metaphors (such as mitigation hierarchy) 
to act as safeguards and boundary drawers. It involves high-level speeches with video-messages 
from conservation celebrities and corporate pioneers, narratives reiterating the gravity and the 
urgency of biodiversity loss and the need to work with business to tackle this problem. 
Ritualisation is also nonverbal, involving the use of artefacts such as ever-same PowerPoint 
presentations and case studies, and standardised conference agendas. These agendas are 
remarkably similar: opening and closing ceremonies, plenary sessions, breakout-sessions, the 
launch of some new initiative, conference dinners and coffee breaks. So is the behaviour of 
Figure 12 Bison herd on offset site, entitled "Bison Calves Born at O'Hare Modernization Off-
Site Wetlands Restoration Area" (CDA, 2016) 
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participants: listening, taking notes, contributing as expected, small-talking around tables, 
balancing coffee mugs while engaged in polite conversation, and exchanging business cards. 
Even innovativeness is ritualised, such as the use of Twitter which has become incorporated into 
the conference experience, and participants are called upon to use hashtags and engage online. 
These rituals help institutionalise the belief in the compatibility of economic and environmental 
concerns, creating harmony and unity. Just as religious belief systems tend to be highly 
ritualised, these discourses with their ideological undertones and assumptions are reproduced 
through rituals which legitimise and secure narratives and world views.  
Rituals and performance can be understood as representational or as generative (Bull and 
Mitchell, 2015: 9). In these conferences, I understand them as generative: reproducing a 
community of practice – the offsetting industry – and a corporate-conservation paradigm within 
which offsetting is embedded. Calling them rituals emphasises the social nature of the 
performance (Faucher-King, 2005), and their fragility: 
Since ritual is a good form for conveying a message as if it were unquestionable, it often 
is used to communicate those very things which are most in doubt ... Ceremony can 
make it appear that there is no conflict, only harmony, no disorder, only order, that if 
danger threatens, sage solutions are at hand, that political unity is immediate and real 
because it is celebrated, and so on. Ritual can assert that what is culturally created and 
man-made is as undoubtable as physical reality. Whether a ceremony succeeds in its 
purpose is another question, a question about operational efficacy (Moore and 




3.4. Conclusion – enacting the theatrics of legitimising destruction through 
spectacle and ritual 
In this chapter I analysed offset-making in Europe as a spectacular performance of sustainability 
by exploring the discourses and ideologies that legitimise and normalise offsetting, their 
enactment ‘on stage’ (figure 13) at natural capital and NNL conferences, and the offsetting 
industry that is forming through and around offset-making places and spaces. 
 
Figure 13 Theatrical performance on stage (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2015a) 
This was done through the lens of Guy Debord’s spectacle (1967) and Victor Turner’s ritual 
(1969), examining the positioning of corporate offsetting practice as rational and scientific 
response to solve a global problem, supported by Western rationality often vis-à-vis 
unsustainable and ‘uneducated’ local communities. Offsetting, I argued, involves the discursive 
framing of nature in typologies of business risks – to be incorporated into balance sheets – 
where nature is, once again, ‘othered’, to be controlled and managed – based on the long 
history of capitalism and nature relations of coercion and control. This production of nature as 
risk relies on the translation work of the offsetting industry to make it legible and associate it 
with resistance and reputation. 
The reliance of anti-political managerial governance on ever-more sophisticated measurements 
and technologies is characterised by Marcuse’s (1964) vision of “technology as ideology”, based 
on one-dimensional thinking around ideas of value, nature, humans and science. Already in 
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1964, he saw that the “universal quantifiability is a prerequisite for the domination of nature” 
(Marcuse, 1964: 168) and enables the myth of scientific objectivity and rationality. To keep up 
this myth requires a particular view of human and nonhuman nature, of nature as (eco)system 
and of nature as risk – exactly the kind of knowledge systems that offsetting is embedded in. 
Having introduced the discourses, the offsetting industry, and some of the places and spaces of 
offset-making in Europe, I now move across the channel to examine the legislative process 
behind the (attempted) institutionalisation and normalisation of offsetting in EU policy making – 





4. Introducing No Net Loss: an attempt to anchor offsetting in the European 
political economy  
The EC’s No Net Loss initiative (NNLi) does not mark the introduction of biodiversity offsetting 
into the European political economy. Neither does it mark the introduction into its legal 
framework. European firms have engaged in, and pioneered, voluntary project offsetting in- and 
outside Europe for years; European banks have been pushing for project offsetting in the 
European periphery and beyond; EU member states have had offsetting or compensation 
legislation in place for decades (Germany), others have started to develop it more recently 
(Spain) or initiated pilot projects to test offsetting in the planning process (UK). Offsetting is 
already part of the European conservation legislation; it is required under the Habitats Directive 
for ‘significant adverse effects’ under certain (restrictive) conditions to maintain the overall 
coherence of the Natura2000 network (EC, 2007/2012) and forms part of the Environmental 
Liability and Impact directives. Nevertheless, a mandatory instrument based on the EC’s NNLi 
would mark a turning point for offsetting inside the EU, making it a fundamental principle of 
European conservation, land use planning, application procedures and corporate behaviour. At 
the time of writing, the future of the NNLi is unclear; it appears to have ‘stalled’, or even ‘died’, 
according to some observers, while others are convinced that it will re-surface closer to 2020, 
when the EC is forced to admit its failure to achieve its biodiversity action target of No Net Loss 
(NNL). Either way, the initiative played an important role in the normalisation and legitimation 
of offsetting in Europe and beyond, adding the political weight of the EC to a political 
instrument which is being adopted by corporate and state actors across the world.  
In this chapter, I explore the recent history of, and dynamics within, the NNL working group and 
the interests of, and the relationships between, the different actors involved in the group. The 
aim is to unravel the (social) mechanisms of corporate power that enabled its institutional 
ascendance in the EU. The NNLi represents, I argue, an attempt 1) to manage, flexibilise and 
weaken existing nature legislation in the EU; 2) to secure access to land and capital by 
(European) firms; and 3) to manage and diffuse dissent and resistance, facilitating the 
management and flexibilisation of the very concept of limits to ecological destruction and 
accumulation. It reflects corporate frustration with current EU nature protection legislation, 
which is, despite all its shortcomings, lack of funding and bad implementation, quite effective. It 
further plays into the promise of the newly emerging restoration economy, and is facilitated by 
a political climate within the EC that is, today more than ever, concerned with the overriding 
principle of external competitiveness to facilitate accumulation and growth.  
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While offsetting tends to be conceptualised as an ever-new frontier in the drive to commodify, 
marketise and financialise nature (chapter two), not enough attention is being paid to how it is 
used as a strategy to push for flexibilisation of legislation, while expanding corporate and state 
control over human and nonhuman nature. Offsetting, whether as part of a mandatory 
legislative framework or as corporate risk management strategy, relies on particular ways of 
dealing with nature and humans, certain assumptions and understandings of the human-nature 
relationship, problem constructions and transformations of local people into enemies of nature.  
Flexibilisation involves the weakening and bypassing of existing nature legislation, and 
securitisation – the constitution of nature as business risk – allows for the construction of 
natural capital as “life insurance” (EC, 2011a). The focus on flexibilisation allows me to draw 
attention to the historical conjuncture at which biodiversity offsetting is being positioned 
(discursively) as a solution to biodiversity loss, just when recognition of the failure of the ‘green 
economy’ to address the multiple social and ecological crises we are witnessing is growing 
among people around the world. It thus allows me to show how biodiversity offsetting – and, in 
this case, negotiations around biodiversity offsetting – function as a technology of governance. 
At the same time, this focus allows for an exploration of the underlying assumptions and beliefs 
of biodiversity offsetting; of the restorability, commensurability and manageability of nature: 
the ‘net’ in NNL policies. These assumptions, embedded in a particular kind of Western science 
and conceptualisation of nature, rely on a range of new valuation techniques, measurements, 
and concepts – from ‘mitigation hierarchy’ to ‘additionality’ – and make nature subject to 
performance standards, monitoring and assessments, while being framed as business risk and 
opportunity for growth (chapter three). This further legitimises the de-politicising 
managerialism and top-down global governance in which offsetting can serve as rationalising 
technique for enabling accumulation and social control.  
This chapter begins by introducing the NNLi, the working group and its members, their interests 
and roles, as well as the political economic and legal context in which it was established. The 
remainder of the chapter will be structured according to the three parts of my argument 
outlined above. In the first section, Flexibilising and managing stringent EU nature legislation, I 
explore how the initiative relates to the attempt to weaken existing European conservation 
legislation. I briefly sketch out some of the history of industrial relations upon which the EU was 
founded, and the role of industrial interests in European integration, particularly the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and their influence in shaping policies for the purpose of 
external competitiveness that became the EC’s main goal. I then contextualise the NNLi in the 
political economy of REFIT, the Commission’s management tool to increase competitiveness by 
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‘cutting red tape’, that was used explicitly in an attempt to weaken and ‘modernise’ nature 
legislation by streamlining and subordinating it to the imperative of growth. Despite the 
discursive focus of neoliberalism on deregulation, this goes to the core of the kind of 
managerialism, manifest in ‘new public management’ for the sake of competitiveness – turning 
risk into profit – which characterises neoliberal governance (outlined in chapter two).  
In the second section, Securing access to land and capital, I situate the NNLi in the global 
political economy of biodiversity offsetting and examine its role in legitimising large-scale 
(infrastructure and mining) projects and making these industries ‘sustainable’. Large-scale 
infrastructure projects – whether roads, trains or electricity projects – have always played a 
special role in EU integration and EU-(state)-building (Balanyá et al., 2000), and the ‘greening’ of 
these infrastructures, which are increasingly facing resistance on social and environmental 
grounds, hinges on notions of offsetting and ‘neutrality’. Access to land, I argue, increasingly 
depends on biodiversity offsetting both for capital acquisition and legal institutional access.  
In the third section, Dealing with dissent, I focus on the role of the NNLi working group and 
corporate-conservation partnerships around offsetting in dealing with resistance and generating 
a licence to operate. This involves divide-and-conquer tactics and depoliticisation as a political 
strategy, and exploring the way working group negotiations operated and ‘stumbled forward’, 
through very political yet fundamentally depoliticised debates on safeguards, limits and 
concepts – mobilising metaphors – that contributed to its shadow-existence. The focus on 
methodological issues and corporate case studies allowed the debate on offsetting to move 
forward, with concepts such as the mitigation hierarchy acting like vehicles around which new 
networks of consultants and ecologists have formed and new industries have emerged (as 
explored in chapter three). Despite its problems, lack of enthusiasm and weakening of 
ambitions and outcome, the working group has been important in institutionalising offsets and 
advancing this debate. Lastly, I explore the potential of the initiative to facilitate the 
flexibilisation of limits to development, and its role in the growing restoration economy in the 
conclusion. 
4.1. Introducing the No Net Loss initiative... 
The NNLi is embedded in a long history of conservation policy in the EU. The two cornerstones 
of the European conservation policy are the Birds Directive (Council Directive 2009/147/EC on 
the conservation of wild birds), initally adopted in 1979 and replaced in 2009, and the Habitats 
Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
97 
 
and flora), adopted in 1992. A number of other policy instruments and pieces of legislation 
affect biodiversity (loss), either directly or indirectly (such as the Environment Liability 
Directive). Under the Birds and Habitat Directives, EU member states are required to designate 
and manage conservation areas to protect around 2000 threatened species and habitat types 
that are perceived to be “of European importance” (EC, 2011b). These Special Protection Areas 
and Special Areas of Conservation together make up the Natura2000 network. Natura2000 sites 
are co-funded by member states and the EC through a number of different budgets (including 
the LIFE programme, which will be discussed later). The network is severely under-funded. It 
was estimated that funding amounted to €550-1,159 million/year in 2011, representing 9-19% 
of the estimated financing needs of €5.8 billion/year during the budget period of 2007-2013 
(Kettunen et al., 2011: 5). Compensation for damage of Natura2000 sites is a legal requirement 
under the Birds and Habitats Directives and the Environmental Liability Directive. Like-for-like 
compensation for residual impacts of developments is legally required under Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive.  
The creation of a European habitat banking system, based on the trade of biodiversity credits, 
has been explored and advocated by the EC since 2007, when it issued a green paper on 
market-based instruments for environmental protection for consultation (EC, 2007), supported 
by some industrial lobbies (mining, construction) and opposed by others (agriculture). Following 
the failure of its 2010 No Loss of Biodiversity objective, adopted in 2001 by EU Heads of State 
and Government and in 2006 by the EC (EC, 2006), the concept of “No Net Loss” was first 
introduced in a legal document in the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2020. The strategy was tabled 
by the EC in May 2011, and adopted by the European Parliament under the title “Our life 
insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020” (EC, 2011a). Action 7 of the 
strategy outlines the need to “[e]nsure no net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services”, and 
pledges that, in collaboration with the member states, the EC will “develop a methodology for 
assessing the impact of EU-funded projects, plans and programmes on biodiversity by 2014” 
and work towards “proposing by 2015 an initiative to ensure there is no net loss of ecosystems 
and their services (e.g. through compensation or offsetting schemes)” (EC, 2011a: 12).22 The 
NNL principle occasionally ‘bubbles up’ elsewhere in the European policy landscape: the 
Roadmap Resource Efficiency Europe, for instance, reiterates the NNL principle “to foster 
investments in natural capital and to seize the full growth and innovation potential of the 
                                                          
22 The Environment Council of Ministers further stressed “the importance of further work to operationalise the 'no net loss' 
objective of the Strategy for areas and species not covered by existing EU nature legislation” (Council of the European Union, 2011).  
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‘restoration economy’” (EC, 2011c: 12), and promotes the use of innovative financial 
instruments more generally.  
A working group on No Net Loss of Ecosystems and their Services was established under the 
Common Implementation Framework to further develop this policy and work out 
recommendations. In preparation for the NNLi, the EC commissioned four studies on habitat 
banking on the EU; “Policy Options for an EU No Net Loss Initiative” (IEEP, 2014b); “Exploring 
potential demand for and supply of habitat banking in the EU and appropriate design elements 
for a habitat banking scheme” (ICH GHK, 2013), “Biodiversity metrics and mechanisms for 
securing long term conservation benefits” (ICF and IEEP, 2014) and “Supporting the elaboration 
of the Impact Assessment for a future EU Initiative on No Net Loss of Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services” (IEEP et al., 2016).  
Of particular interest is the “technical report” commissioned by the DG Environment on “The 
Use of Market-Based Instruments for Biodiversity Protection – The Case of Habitat Banking”; 
meant to investigate the potential of offsetting for EU nature conservation and led by London-
based environmental economics consultancy eftec (Dickie and Tucker, 2010). The consultancy 
has been at the forefront of NC accounting and habitat banking, designing policies and 
investment strategies that involve offsets in collaboration with public and private sectors (such 
as British Gas Plc and Unilever), and was instrumental in the setup of offsetting pilots in the UK. 
Ian Dickie, director at eftec, was himself active member of the working group before he was 
commissioned by the EC to lead the work on the report. A trained economist, he previously 
worked as head of economics for the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Europe’s largest 
conservation charity, to advocate recognition of the value of the environment in decision-
making. The report was co-authored by Graham Tucker from the Institute for European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP), an equally offset-enthusiast green think tank, in collaboration with, 
among others, Kerry ten Kate, environmental consultant Jo Treweek, Jon Ekstrom from The 
Biodiversity Consultancy and Joshua Bishop from the IUCN. Given their CVs and affiliations with 
institutions that benefit financially from offsets (and the footnote on page i that eftec itself 
“offsets its carbon emissions through a biodiversity-friendly voluntary offset”) it might come as 
no surprise that the report enthusiastically endorses offsetting and even suggests a 
transnational habitat banking scheme (Dickie and Tucker, 2010: 249). Recommendations 
include the altering of existing environmental directives such as the Habitats Directive and 
Environmental Liability Directive to improve the feasibility of a habitat banking scheme (Dickie 
and Tucker, 2010: 127) – a contentious proposal that was never publicly supported by EC 
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officials. However, as I argue below, it only fitted too well with its agenda to open up and 
weaken existing nature legislation. 
...and the working group  
The NNL working group that was set up to work out details of the proposed new initiative was 
composed of selected members from different sectors: member states’ (environmental) 
ministries23, ‘experts’ from environmental consultancies and similar bodies, individuals from 
BBOP/Forest Trends, representatives from industry associations, nongovernmental 
organisations representing civil society and landowners, EC officials, and a number of individuals 
(introduced below). The group held six formal meetings between February 2012 and July 2013, 
as well as a joint workshop with BBOP and a habitat banking workshop24. Meetings were usually 
attended by 15-20 individuals, many of them core to the offsetting industry explored in chapter 
three. They revolved around a number of recurring agenda points: the discussions of four 
documents that were produced collectively; the mandate of the working group, scope and 
objectives of the NNLi (NNL WG, 2013a), operational principles (NNL WG, 2013b) and glossary 
of terms (NNL WG, 2013c); complemented by case studies, experiences and lessons learnt; and 
the presentation of the four studies commissioned by the EC that have been introduced above. 
Following the last meeting of the group, and final changes to all documents, it became quiet 
around the NNLi (for reasons that will be explored below).  
The most important function of the working group, I argue below, has been to create 
stakeholder dialogue, to bring conservationists, industry representatives and policy makers 
together. The working group was composed of different representatives from different sectors. 
Member states mainly sent representatives from ministries or environmental protection 
agencies, many of whom had no or very little previous knowledge of offsetting. All but one of 
the ‘experts’ were employed by environmental consultancies or similar professional 
associations with a (financial) interest in offsetting, either because they work with or for 
corporations who offset, or because of paid policy consultancy work (The Biodiversity 
Consultancy, Environment Bank LTD, BIOTOPE, BBOP/Forest Trends, eftec, Institution of Civil 
Engineers, European Chapter Society for Ecological Restoration, Bio3).25 Of the seven NGOs that 
participated, three were land owner/hunting associations (Confederation of European Forest 
Owners, European Landowners Organization, Federation of Associations for Hunting and 
                                                          
23 and comparable institutions 
24 Meeting dates: 17/02/12, 04/07/2012, 07/11/2012, 04/02/2013, 23/05/2013, 04/07/2014; workshop dates: 22/05/2013, 
03/07/13. 
25 A handful of additional individuals from the Committee of the Regions, the UK Wildlife Trusts and the EIB attended occasionally. 
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Conservation of the EU), one was IUCN, known for its pro-offsetting stance, and three were civil 
society organisations (CEEweb for Biodiversity, BirdLife Europe and FoE Europe). The latter 
represents the only grassroots organisation. BirdLife International – despite taking a critical 
stance towards the NNLi – has been criticised for collaborating with Rio Tinto on its NPI policy 
that includes the controversial offsetting project in Madagascar. More critical NGOs and 
individuals who engaged with the NNLi (such as FERN or Corporate Europe Observatory) were 
not invited to join the group; a number of applications to join were rejected.  
The composition of the working group illustrates a more recent shift within the EC on who 
counts as ‘civil society’. Whereas corporate representatives have always held a privileged place 
within EU policy making, particular commercial interests (such as landowners, farmers and 
foresters) are increasingly being recognised as civil society representatives, I am told by one 
conservationist (C5). They receive co-grants from the DG Environment and are increasingly 
considered ‘stakeholders’. The EC, the interviewee explains, “has been systematically blurring 
the lines” of “who is civil society” (C5). Industry representatives were from CEFIC (European 
Chemical Industry Council), Euromines (European Association of Mining Industries, Metal Ores 
and Industrial Minerals), EURELECTRIC (the Union of the Electricity Industry), ESPO (European 
Seaports Organisation), Copa-Cogeca (European farmers) and Cembureau (manufacturing 
industry).  
The industry representation illustrates which industries are the most interested in offsetting. 
Indeed, I was told by working group members, it was these industry associations who pushed 
for a legally binding approach to offsetting – particularly those in the mining business (C1, C3, 
A2). The legally binding approach would provide legal certainty, I was told by a senior BBOP 
member; “Business is very rational ... They’re willing to pay for clarity. They can manage risks. 
They rather pay a bit more up front and be able to speed up getting permits and avoid big legal 
actions” (C2). Much of this interest is based on fears of losing competitiveness vis-à-vis smaller 
companies, one environmental consultant explains. Euromines in particular, I am told by 
another working group member, “has really been driving the offset agenda… [They are a] very 
important lobby – very powerful” (C4). Yet, industry representatives are far from forming a 
“unified front”, because position vis-à-vis offsetting very much depends “on [the] precise nature 
of business operations” (C2). The role of corporate interests will be elaborated in more detail 
below.  
The single strongest driving force, I am told by various working group members, has been the 
army of environmental engineers (consultants, ecologists and environmental economists) 
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introduced in chapter three, in concert with IUCN, who are lobbying for the application of NNL 
to all drivers of biodiversity loss in Europe (B3, C1, C5). Financed mainly by corporate clients, 
many consultants are convinced that their work is a “way of working with wildlife”, as one 
consultant tells me; “want[ing] to make an impact” (B5). “[It’s been] consultants who have been 
very aggressively driving the offsetting agenda”, one of them explains, most notably Kerry ten 
Kate, arguably the single most important individual in the world of biodiversity offsets. An NGO 
representative describes:  
Kerry [has been] one of the most vocal drivers of the thing. A couple of meetings ended 
up as duals between me and her … [Consultants were there] not just to provide 
information, [but] trying to sell the product. In her case the product was really BBOP, 
with [the] offset agenda behind it … [Their message was:] You can do offsets properly 
and BBOP is the proper way of doing them. The EC just needs to write BBOP into 
legislation. (C5) 
This confirms the important role of offsetting industry explored in chapter three, led by BBOP 
and IUCN – “the strongest sponsors” of offsetting in NNL negotiations, according to one 
environmental consultant (B6). They were supported by officials from the UK Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the private Environment Bank – both involved 
in setting up pilot projects to modify the British planning system and facilitate housing 
development, and represented on BBOP’s advisory board. The Environment Bank lobbied for a 
mandatory instrument in form of a framework directive for the sake of facilitating development. 
In an email to EC officials (obtained through FoI request), Guy Duke from the Environment Bank 
writes: 
Third party offsetting enables offsetting to ‘go to scale’ by delivering greater supply 
more rapidly, thereby facilitating (rather than blocking) development, enhancing 
competition among offset providers and reducing unit costs for developers ... [T]here is 
no impact on the developer’s bottom line … [Offsetting] offers considerable financial 
gains to developers, notably increased certainty and speed through the planning system, 
decreased risk, and transfer of long-term liabilities, but also in many cases other benefits 
including gain in net developable area, and reputational enhancement. Thus, offsetting 
does not put a brake on development; rather, the evidence from the US suggests it 
brings forward c. $100 bn per year of development by an average of 5 months (email to 
Director General of the environment Karl Falkenberg and director of Natural Capital Pia 
Bucella, 05/05/2014, emphasis added). 
Especially remarkable is the promise of conversion of non-development land into development 
land – which supports concerns around the permission of development which would have not 
been allowed to go ahead without offsets, and continues to be denied in public.  
Similar levels of enthusiasm were shown by government representatives from the Netherlands 
and France, with some mixed support from German members. The Netherlands in particular has 
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promoted a landscape approach to conservation and been criticised for an increasingly flexible 
interpretation of the Habitats Directive, allowing for offsets to compensate for damage to 
protected areas (Verschuuren, 2010). The offset-enthusiasm of the Dutch government has been 
documented elsewhere: it was at the request of the Dutch government that BBOP submitted 
the idea of biodiversity offsets to the Conference of the Parties to the CBD in 2008 (Penca, 
2015: 99). Most member state representatives in the working group, however, had no strong 
position on the issue given their lack of pre-knowledge, I am told.  
EC support was mixed. The biggest supporters of the NNLi were Francois Wakenhut, then-head 
of the Biodiversity Unit in the DG Environment and member of the TEEB Coordination Group, as 
well as officials from the DG Growth, a much more powerful part of the EC architecture. A high-
level EC official criticises that the NNL was imposed “from above” (A4); it encountered some 
resistance from members of DG environment, many of whom are sceptical of offsets:  
Offsetting has been parachuted into the biodiversity strategy and council conclusions, 
pushed for by the Commission and certain member states, until it took on a life of its 
own in the hands of Francois Wakenhut … He wanted something to his name, something 
in the ‘spirit of new things’; overcoming ‘yesterday’s conservation’, entering the Brave 
New World of ecosystem services, natural capital accounting and offsets (A4). 
The offsetting industry is closely connected to – and networked with – not only key EC officials, 
but especially with domestic policy developments in the UK. The close relationship between 
consultants and British government officials is only one of the reasons for their influence. 
Another conservationist tells me: 
Well, Brussels speaks English. [There has been an] army of British academics, 
consultants, NGOs, government bodies [promoting offsetting] … and everyone gets 
dragged into it. The English were getting excited about it, and when the English are 
getting excited about it, it becomes European and global (C5).  
Yet, not everyone was as enthusiastic as ‘the English’. 
‘Nature is not for Sale’ – civil society resistance against offsetting  
At first unnoticed, the EU NNL policy process quickly generated media discussion and civil 
society engagement. Whereas many large conservation and environmental NGOs embraced 
offsetting, a small number of grassroots, social and environmental justice groups and academics 
challenged the policy process and mobilised around it. They organised a number of public 
events to raise awareness, launched videos (Fern, 2014; Counter Balance, 2013) and published 
media articles, reports and offsetting case studies (e.g. FoE and Fern, 2014) to generate debate. 
Under the motto “Nature is not for Sale” (Nature Not for Sale, n.d.), an alternative discourse has 
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been put forward, in which offsetting, as the newest form of commodification and 
financialisation of nature, was harshly criticised. Activists staged a protest in front of the 
International Conference Centre during the First International Forum on Natural Capital in 
Edinburgh in 2013 and organised a counter forum where academics and activists debated the 
dangers involved in “making nature pay for its protection”, as one panellist described it, and 
strategised how to mobilise and form alliances to fight these developments. A number of 
meetings took place in Brussels, where strategies were formulated to resist the NNLi. One 
working group participant recounts: “[There was a] big fight! Which wasn’t envisaged or 
wanted. The Commission was dragged into it against its own will. While the mainstream NGOs 
were ‘gearing up for the fitness check’” [explained below] (C5). This “opposition to offsets”, I am 
told by an EC official, “has dampened enthusiasm … Offsetting has become a toxic word” (A2). 
In response, the language within which offsetting was embedded had to be changed, and NNL 
discussions recast in the language of ‘neutrality’ and ‘net positivity’ – with increasing focus on 
the mitigation hierarchy. Similarly, in the transnational offsetting world, the language of 
offsetting lost much of its appeal following public criticism, especially in the English-speaking 
news media; sometimes replaced by NPI, net gain and natural capital.  
The correlation between the public delegitimisation of offsetting in the UK and Brussels is 
probably not a coincidence. “Those George Monbiot articles”, an EC official tells me, “of course 
they were sent around the Commission too…” (A2). “NNL isn’t trendy anymore – natural capital 
is”, I am told by another research participant from an environmental consultancy; “[o]ffsets 
have proven really challenging – even big companies have been experiencing that” (B6). “They 
[corporations and consultants] speak in different terms now”, another respondent explains (B2). 
This new language, however, is based on the very same assumptions and mechanisms, just as 
the mitigation hierarchy itself is reliant on offsetting as ‘last resort’. But why was it pushed so 
ambitiously in the first place? In the next section, I go on to explore some of the drivers and 
motivations of the initiative. 
4.2. Flexibilising and managing stringent EU nature legislation 
The adoption of the 2020 biodiversity strategy that introduced NNL into EU conservation policy, 
following the failure of the previous No Loss of Biodiversity objective, needs to be 
contextualised in the recent attempt of the EC to ‘open up’, flexibilise and weaken existing 
European nature conservation legislation. Although biodiversity continues being lost in the EU 
at an alarming rate, the two EU conservation directives that form the pillars of EU conservation 
policy – the Habitats and Birds Directives – are considered to be quite effective and have 
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provided measurable conservation benefits (Donald et al., 2007; Gruber et al., 2012; 
interviews). The strict wording of the directives, and the fact that  
economic considerations can play no vital role in the establishment of the Natura2000 
Network impl[y] that, in some instances, economically valuable tracts of lands, such as 
port areas and other industrial estates, also have to be designated as a Natura2000 site, 
at least when they qualify as most suitable sites according to the Habitats and Birds 
Directives (Schoukens and Cliquet, 2014: 198).  
Under the ‘landscape approach’, member states – particularly the Netherlands and Belgium – 
have increasingly incorporated offsets into development projects and interpreted the Habitats 
Directive in progressively more flexible ways. 
In the last decade, however, EU judges have ruled more strictly on the Habitats Directive, and 
attitudes towards more rigorous enforcement have shifted on the national level (Schoukens and 
Bastmeijer, 2015; Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016). Following initial reluctance by national courts 
“to scrutinize planning decisions in the light of the procedural and substantive requirements set 
forth by the EU nature directives, recent case law developments showcase a greater willingness 
to apply a rigid standard of review in this respect” (Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016: 12, citing 
Zijlmans and Woldendorp). Judges have increasingly shown willingness to stop development 
projects on the basis of inadequate assessments or incorrect application of species protection 
rules (Verschuuren, 2010; Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016). The increasing conflict between 
development projects, particularly major infrastructure and renewable energy projects 
(interviewee), and conservation of Natura2000 sites and species protection led to the view of 
the directives as burdensome “obstacles to development”, two interviewees from an 
conservation organisation and the EC explain (see also Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016). This 
increasing scrutiny has led developers to resort to offsets to compensate for damage to 
Natura2000 sites (Verschuuren, 2010; Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016). However, the European 
Court of Justice made the use of offsets for private developments increasingly difficult by 
upholding the need for “imperative reasons of overriding public interest”, as specified in Article 
6(4) in the Habitats Directive (in Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016: 12). The directives thus became 
increasingly unpopular with many political and business leaders, a conservationist explains (see 
also Schoukens and Cliquet, 2016). 
It may thus not come as a surprise that despite – or because of – widespread acknowledgement 
of the conservation success of the two directives in the face of lack of funding and miserable 
implementation (see also Potočnik, 2012), they were included in the EC’s Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance (REFIT) – Fit for growth programme (EC, 2013a) in 2013. A year later, President 
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Jean-Claude Juncker explicitly mandated Environment Commissioner Karmenu Vella to evaluate 
and assess the potential for ‘merging’ and ‘modernising’ the two directives (Juncker, 2014). 
Under REFIT, the Commission evaluates whether EU regulation is “stifling businesses”; with the 
aim to “streamline legislation and reduce regulatory burdens”, “simplify or withdraw EU laws, 
ease the burden on businesses and facilitate implementation” (EC, 2013a, emphasis added) – 
with the overriding objective of external competitiveness. As then-president José Manuel 
Barroso was quick to add, however, REFIT would “not put into question the important benefits 
for citizens and business of EU regulation, particularly the rules underpinning the Single Market” 
(Juncker, 2014). The outcomes of REFIT include the “simplification” and “burden reduction” in 
the areas of animal health, consumer product safety and clinical trials for pharmaceuticals (EC, 
2013a). These actions are being justified under the “smart regulation” paradigm (EC, 2010b), 
based on cost-efficiency and facilitation of the overriding objective of economic growth – and 
allegedly in response to citizens’ concerns that the EU “generates too much red tape” (EC, 
2013a). The driving force behind REFIT was the “High Level Group of Administrative Burdens in 
the EU”, set up in 2007 with support of the European Council, led by British Prime Minister 
David Cameron and chaired by the German right-wing politician Edmund Stoiber (EC, 2013b), 
“Mr. Red Tape” (Sarmadi, 2014). The group is composed mainly of high-ranking business 
representatives and some government advisors or members. It is pushing a clear deregulatory 
agenda and the four members representing public health, workers, consumers and 
environment strongly dissented to the final report of the group, including its recommendations 
for REFIT, framed as a “competitiveness test” (Kosinska et al., 2014). Recommendations include 
the withdrawal of legislative proposals on soil protection, access to environmental justice and 
shale gas regulation, among others (Kosinska et al., 2014).  
The inclusion of the European nature legislation, supposed to “ensure the best possible 
cost/benefit ratio for EU regulation” (EC, 2014), constitutes a poorly disguised attempt to 
further weaken and flexibilise the two directives. Given that “[t]he Commission has [already] 
undertaken economic evaluations of the benefits of the ecosystem services of Natura 2000”; 
and that such evaluations are now being applied in some member states (EC, 2014: 13), a REFIT 
evaluation would have “inevitably” weakened the directives – likely to allow for offsetting inside 
the areas currently protected under Natura2000 legislation, an interviewee from a conservation 
organisation explains. Currently, the NNLi is being designed only to cover unprotected areas, 
although this has been contested by some working group members (NNL WG, 2013a). The 
announcement of the evaluation of the EU nature legislation was met with outrage by the 
conservation community; over 120 European NGOs mobilised against the “opening up” of the 
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two directives, and received overwhelming support by citizens and a number of member state 
governments (e.g. Joint Links, 2014). Within weeks, over 500,000 individuals participated in the 
public consultation and appealed to EU decision makers to “save our nature laws and make sure 
they work properly” (Nature alert!, 2015). Following public pressure, first the European 
Parliament and then the Commission pulled back, publicly announcing that the directives were 
‘fit for purpose’. The REFIT negotiations not only triggered overwhelming public response – 
unexpected by the EC – but also put on hold all other initiatives in the DG environment. 
“Because of REFIT – everything is frozen”, I am told by an EC official. Rather than being 
incorporated into the re-working and ‘modernising’ of the directives, the recommendations that 
came out of the NNLi working group will now form part of the action plan to ‘improve 
implementation’ of the directives. 
According to working group interviewees, the NNL initiative was originally intended to cover 
Nature 2000 sites, for instance by replacing the conservation directives with a new Biodiversity 
Framework Directive; it started “much more ambitious” (civil society interviewee). Especially 
industry representatives promoted this flexibilisation for “more efficient compliance with 
existing legislation” (industry response on 15/03/2012: 1). Soon, however (and confirmed by the 
massive civil society campaign against REFIT), it became clear to the EC that “you can’t touch 
the two directives”, a conservationist explains. Natura2000 sites became off-limit even before 
the working group was set up. As one interviewee describes: “It started sinking. Then the 
tsunami arrived. The new Commission [demanded]: focus on REFIT, no new legislation!” A 
member of a large conservation organisation tells me:  
Very early on, in 2012, it became clear [to us] that the NNLi was about writing a new 
directive… We were against it – [we knew it] would undermine existing directives … We 
knew that this won’t be pretty in the current political climate. So we started sabotaging 
it from day one, entered alliance[s] with more radical NGOs (C5). 
Much of the resistance was not in opposition to the idea of offsets as such, but against what 
they represented; a new era of regulation in favour of business interests, a fundamental 
restructuring of European nature legislation to accommodate industrial development, and a 
way to “get rid of” the Birds and Habitats Directives (C3). One working group member from a 
conservation organisation is worth quoting at length: 
The directives are hated so much because they actually save biodiversity. Others – less 
so. The EIA [Environmental Impact Assessment] directive [was] reformed 3 years ago – 
no one questioned it, it has never been under fire. In fact, it has even marginally been 
improved … [it is] not threatening to developers, [it is] just process-based … [You] just 
need to report and quantify things and then you can build your motorway… Lots of 
people got exceptions (agriculture, fishers … villa builders …) [it only applies to] 
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motorways and other big projects. But the directive created a whole industry of tame 
consultants that produce bullshit [to push these projects through]. It’s been great for 
growth and jobs. But not [for] saving nature … The Habitats and Birds Directives are 
fundamentally different because they have outcome obligations (favourable 
conservation status) – that hurts. Despite all of their issues… Ultimately, [with these two 
directives, you] can actually squeeze people. The Court of Justice and EC have been doing 
good [work] of strengthening it [by developing] all kinds of definitions… e.g. any activity 
with significant damage is captured … a fight what is ‘significant’ … was won. You 
actually need to look at alternatives … mitigation is not compensation … needs to be 
done before! Overriding public interest … is ‘relatively upheld’ … It’s been starting to bite 
… to make a difference. Today, trashing nature in Europe is more difficult than 20 years 
ago (C5).  
The relative success of the two directives generated a backlash, particularly by farmers, 
foresters, developers and the mining and cement industries. A high-level EC official confirms my 
initial thoughts. “They want to flexibilise”, the interviewee explains, “the DG feels threatened” 
(A4). They hint at a “power struggle inside the Commission” (A4). The biodiversity unit has been 
losing power within the EC, and is increasingly forced to look for “innovative solutions that don’t 
put a burden on industry”, while substantive finances have been poured into research budgets, 
“to keep up the high profile in the EC … to be seen as doing stuff” (A4).  
The next section contextualises this political climate and the power shift in the EC, putting them 
in dialogue with the historic alignment of EU policy objectives with (extractive and 
infrastructure) industry interests and illustrating their importance to understand the NNLi. 
Conservation, extractivism and infrastructure in the EU 
Historically, European nature conservation legislation has formed a significant pillar of EU 
legislation, and the transnational nature of many environmental problems has played an 
important role in the public legitimisation of the post-war economic boom European project 
and European integration. Increasingly, however, all new legislative initiatives are being dictated 
by the mantra of external competitiveness. Just as old policies are tested for ‘hindering 
competitiveness’ under REFIT, new policies need to comply with the same imperative – more 
openly and explicitly than ever before, I am told by a research participant from the EC (A2). The 
DG’s focus has shifted from “strong laws enabling suing corporations that violated the Habitats 
[directive] towards weaker, price-based instruments”, the interviewee continues (A2). The shift 
under EC president José Manuel Barroso has often been assigned to the growing influence of 
economically more liberal countries (Parker, 2005), confirmed by his consequent appointment 
at Goldman Sachs. Yet, this is not a personal game, but marks a systemic paradigm shift – 
becoming ever more apparent. “The new Commission [under president Juncker]”, I am told by 
one working group participant, “had three aims: kill the Habitats Directive, kill the air package 
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proposal and kill the circular economy proposal. In other words: kill all new environmental 
proposals, and attack the single best pieces we have already” (C3). 
EU policy making and integration have always been shaped by corporate – and particularly 
extractive/energy and infrastructure/construction – interests; the very origins of what is now 
the EU lie in coal and steel. “Historically”, Tamás Hámor argues, “the mining industry has 
received privileged treatment within the European Community” (2004: 252). This corporate 
influence is present across stages of the policy making process; before and during proposals, 
and even at the implementation stage (Grant, Matthews and Newell, 2000). European 
integration began with the Schuman Plan in 1950, when the European Coal and Steel 
Community was launched in response to fears of the use of Germany’s coal and steel industry 
to build another war machine, and to take a first step toward deeper European integration 
(Alter and Steinberg, 2007). Infrastructure and extractive interests continued to shape European 
integration. Bastiaan van Appeldoorn traces this influence in his work on the ERT, an alliance of 
the corporate executive of Europe’s leading corporations, representing the “interests and 
power of the most transnationalised segment of European capital” (2010: 157). The ERT was 
fundamental in shaping European governance and European unification through its privileged 
access to the European institutions. Two former EU commissioners (Etienne Davignon and 
Francois-Xavier Ortoli) were involved in the formation of the ERT and became members shortly 
after their retirement (Rutherford, 2011)26.  
After having accomplished the setup of the single market (and with it the re-launch of European 
integration the Commission desired), the ERT “turned then to its next priority: the development 
of ‘Europe’s infrastructure ... A single interacting system or mega-network with a single output: 
mobility” (van Apeldoorn, in Balanyá et al., 2000: 22). To support the unrestricted flow of goods, 
and therewith economic growth, the ERT (with the EC) argued  
for the adoption of the environmentally controversial Trans-European Networks (TENs). 
TENs is the largest transport infrastructure plan in history. It includes a number of built 
and unbuilt monsters: the Channel Tunnel, the Øresund Bridge connecting Denmark and 
Sweden, a series of high-speed train links, numerous airport expansions and 12,000 
kilometres of new motorways (Balanyá et al., 2000: 22-23). 
The ERT was the key force behind the Channel Tunnel between England and France (together 
with Alistair Frame of Rio Tinto!), the development of the European high-speed rail system and 
a European-wide road building project (Moody, 2001). By intensively lobbying national 
transport ministers, the ERT contributed to bringing TENs onto the EU agenda, including them 
                                                          
26 Another noteworthy member has been Rio Tinto’s former director Andrew Buxton. 
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into the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and finally securing additional funding for their 
implementation –justified with the need for international competitiveness. “With a total 
estimated budget of 400 billion Euros, the Trans-European Networks (TENs) are the largest 
transport infrastructure programme in the history of the world” (Balanyá et al., 2000: 68).  
With the development of the internal market – promoted by the ERT – the relationship 
between corporations and EU institutions, and particularly the EC, changed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This was the time when the lobbying industry, already established in US 
politics, took hold and developed in the EU, as the Commission “was busy drafting some 300 
single market directives which would form the skeleton of a single European market” (Balanyá 
et al., 2000: 3). Euromines, for instance, was set up in 1996 to represent national mining 
associations vis-à-vis EU institutions. In this period, the EC  
began to engage industry in strategic alliances … and has since actively encouraged the 
involvement of large corporations and pan-European industry associations in the 
Brussels political apparatus. These partnerships add weight to EU initiatives, and they 
tend to strengthen the Commission’s position vis-à-vis member state governments 
(Balanyá et al., 2000: 4).  
This proved helpful for corporations to enforce their interests, because many decision making 
processes tend to be less transparent and accountable than national government decisions.  
While civil society organisations have also been gaining more influence over this time period, 
their influence continues to be significantly weaker than that of their corporate counterparts. 
The latter dominate both quantitatively (in number of lobbyists, number of meetings with policy 
makers and resources at disposal) but also in terms of diversity of “types of organisation at the 
European level through which it can represent its views” (Grant, Matthews and Newell, 2000: 
46). Large corporations tend to have their own Brussels representatives, but are also members 
of different industry representation bodies, roundtables, product-level associations, informal 
dining clubs and others – in addition to national governments that can often be persuaded to 
lobby for them (Grant, Matthews and Newell, 2000). NGOs’ financial and human resources are 
much smaller, they tend to be consulted less, and their voice is given less weight. Although the 
situation is slightly better in DG Environment – where NGOs hold more power than in any DG – 
DG Environment is one of the weakest DGs vis-à-vis powerful DGs including Trade and 
Competition. These “structural advantages enjoyed by business interests aris[e] from the 
congruence between their objectives and those of the EU” (Grant, Matthews and Newell, 2000: 
50) – in addition to imbalances of resources and relationships, but also the structure of the EC, 
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where CEOs act as “legitimizers for Commission officials, who, as appointed office-holders, 
h[o]ld no direct political legitimacy” (Green Cowles, 1997: 130; cf. also Bouwen, 2009).  
This becomes visible upon examination of the meetings and communication outside of the NNL 
working group structure: A letter by civil society organisations concerned about the NNLi that 
was signed by a coalition of 64 European NGOs received a short email in response, thanking 
them for their letter and pointing to the public consultation on NNL. Mining industry 
representatives, on the other hand, were granted repeated face-to-face meetings with high-
level EC officials, involving AngloAmerican, Euromines and what is likely to be AngloAmerican’s 
PR firm, Hanover communications, with Francois Wakenhut himself 27. In addition, EC officials 
held meetings to discuss the NNLi with MIRO, the German representation for mineral resources 
– followed by an invitation of two high-level EC officials to MIRO’s meeting on resource security 
and environmental protection (which was accepted) – and with German industry association 
BDI and coal mine operator and energy company RWE. Unlike other industry presentatives, 
mining representatives advocate for a voluntary offsetting instrument – with maximum 
flexibility – which would also involve the agricultural, fishery and forestry sectors.  
The close relationship is not only manifest in frequent meetings and close personal 
relationships, but also visible in the revolving door phenomenon: often, European 
commissioners leave their positions to join the private sector, especially in the extractive and 
energy sectors28. The EC itself, though usually displayed as the ‘civil service’ of the EU, holds 
policy initiating powers and “is fundamentally involved in EU decision-making at all levels”; it 
tends to define itself as “engine of integration” (Shore, 2007: 180). In his ethnographic work on 
EC elites, Chris Shore argues that “elite life among European civil servants is highly ritualistic, 
performative, and concerned with prestige and power between different Directorates” (2007: 
183). The power game between DG Environment and DG Biodiversity, and the fear of loss of 
image testifies to this.  
Large-scale infrastructure projects continue to play a particularly important role in legitimising 
supranational forms of governance and intervention. The aforementioned TENs of 12,000 km of 
new motorways, announced in 1991, are only one such example (Balanyá et al., 2000: xi). 
Today, these financial flows continue as part of the Connecting Europe Facility, which supports 
investment into transport, energy and digital infrastructures for the sake of growth and 
                                                          
27 Emails 25,27/09/2013; see FoI request. 
28 Former commissioner Peter Sutherland, for instance, later became chairman of BP and joined Goldman Sachs. Former 
commissioner Etienne Davignon later joined Société Générale and became director on the board of energy and utility company 
Suez, while working as special adviser to development commissioner Louis Michel.  
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competitiveness (EC, n.d.a). The €50 billion allocated in the EU 2014-2020 Budget demonstrate 
the critical and strategic importance of this policy area. Franco Bassanini and colleagues argue 
that “EU Project Bonds may become a central pillar in the building of European infrastructure 
and smart energy and information systems, to achieve the objectives of the EU 2020 Agenda” 
(Bassanini, del Bufalo and Reviglio, 2011: 2). Investment needs for TEN-Transport alone, it was 
estimated in 2011, amount to €500 billion, in addition to €1,100 billion to implement TEN-
Energy projects before 2020 (Bassanini, del Bufalo and Reviglio, 2011). Many of these projects 
will cut through both protected and non-protected natural areas, leading to habitat loss and 
likely triggering local resistance across the EU. The transnational nature of such projects is what 
makes extraction, infrastructure and energy policy so important to EU integration and ‘EU-
(state-)building’. In a different context, Chris Shore has illustrated how the “instrumental use of 
cultural policy as a tool to promote the EU’s integrationist agenda bore striking parallels with 
the strategies and techniques used by national elites in the formation of European nation-states 
during the 19th century” (2004: 10). This helps explain the renewed impetus that has recently 
been put into the EU energy policy – its new energy union – which lies at the infrastructure-
extraction nexus. 
Energy union 
Further future demand for more flexible conservation policies, the ability to offset damage 
inside and outside Natura2000 sites and the need to avoid costly legal battles ia likely to be be 
intensified by Europe’s new energy union. The creation of the energy union was one of 
incoming EC president Juncker’s top political priorities, to “ensure secure, sustainable, 
affordable and competitive energy for all citizens” (EC, 2015: 1), reducing dependence on 
Russian gas, creating an internal energy market, increasing energy efficiency and reducing GHG 
emissions through carbon markets as well as research and innovation in low-carbon 
technologies. The energy union is embedded in a long history of energy in the EU. Following the 
initial cooperation in the European Coal and Steel Community, further harmonisation of 
member states’ energy policies has long been on the policy agenda, but governments hesitated 
to transfer control over their energy policies to the EU (Andersen, Goldthau and Sitter, 2017). 
Historically, many member states have close ties to their energy companies (see chapters five 
and six), many of which remain state-owned; and governments consider control over their 
energy supply as a vital area of national policy (Harvey, 2015). Nevertheless, since the 1970s, 
the EU has been devising policies regarding supply security and promoted energy market 
liberalisation, and energy policy was institutionalised in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 (Morata and 
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Solorio Sandoval, 2013: 556). Since then, the EC has developed an Energy Roadmap 2050 as 
well as ambitious plans to harmonise and unify energy markets in the energy union.  
The union, spearheaded by Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, known to have opposed ambitious 
climate policy in the past (Peterson, 2015), is hyped as a “grand Marshall Plan for the EU”, 
hoped to “unlock investment across Europe, and ... bring lower emissions and greater 
efficiency” (Harvey, 2015). Critics warn that plans will further entrench and subsidise fossil fuels 
dependence, trigger centralisation of control over energy production and increase corporate 
power over energy policy (Queally, 2015). The union is widely seen as the product of 
geopolitical considerations to “loosen Russian grip on gas” (Traynor and Neslen, 2015). It 
demonstrates a shift from liberalisation of energy markets towards interventionism into 
domestic energy policy to promote international competitiveness, jobs and growth, in addition 
to leveraging power over Russia (Andersen, Goldthau and Sitter, 2017). In addition to the 
construction of new fuel pipelines and gas infrastructure (Harvey, 2015), the energy union 
requires a vastly expanded energy infrastructure including pipelines and power (smart) grid 
“capable of managing and distributing energy from renewable sources” (Šefčovič, 2014: 2) – in 
other words, the public financing of vast and profitable projects for private developers.  
To create this integrated ‘single energy market’, the EC drew up a list of 195 key infrastructure 
‘projects of common interest’, some of which – such as the Euro-Caspian Mega Pipeline – are 
considered ecologically disastrous and have triggered fierce resistance (Queally, 2015). And yet, 
these projects, according to the EC, may benefit from “accelerated planning and permit 
granting” and “streamlined environmental assessment processes” (EC, n.d.b). The renewable 
energy infrastructure expansion is expected to lead to biodiversity loss outside protected areas 
and cut through Natura2000 sites. For this purpose, the EC commissioned a number of high-
level reports on the impacts of renewable energy infrastructure which recommend offsetting 
(Bertzky et al., 2011; Tucker and de Soye, 2009). Already in 2009, Graham Tucker from the IEEP 
(who also co-authored the EC-commissioned report on EU habitat banking introduced above) 
and Yves de Soye from IUCN, propose a NNL policy to mitigate the impacts of renewable energy 
infrastructure on EU biodiversity, “supported by a policy framework for biodiversity 
compensation, e.g. offsets and habitat banking” (2009: 78). In 2011, Monika Bertzky and 
colleagues also recommended the consideration of a NNL policy “for delivering habitat 
enhancement and restoration measures, which could help reverse habitat fragmentation” 
(2011: 27); particularly to compensate for the “unavoidable residual impacts” of hydropower 
dams (2011: 19). The recent – more stringent – ECJ interpretation of the nature directives may 
pose obstacles or costly delays (i.e. through court cases) to these megaprojects. Their 
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‘unavoidable’ impact on Europe’s nature, and the need to manage increasingly militant 
resistance against such projects puts pressure on developers to invest in – and engage in policy 
discussions around – offsetting.  
Offsets may further be required under potential lending requirements by international financial 
institutions (explored in the next section): the energy union is meant to leverage private finance 
guaranteed by public money (Crisp, 2015). For this purpose, two financial instruments – the 
Natural Capital Financing Facility and Private Finance for Energy Efficiency – were launched in 
2014, providing some initial 200 million in long-term low-cost loans, technical support, and 
credit risk protection for banks (see below) – which include finance for biodiversity offsetting 
projects. “These blended funds can help biodiversity blossom and truly become an engine for 
growth”, environmental Commissioner Karmenu Vella praised them enthusiastically (Crisp, 
2015).  
In the next section, I will further examine the role of these two financial instruments – and 
international financial institutions and their lending requirements – in the normalisation and 
institutionalisation of offsetting in Europe. Access to land and capital, I show, has come to rely 
on offsets in a number of industries. 
4.3. Securing access to land and capital 
Especially in the extractivist and infrastructure sectors, biodiversity offsetting has become an 
important mechanism to deal with increasingly difficult access to land and capital for new 
operations or project expansions. The lack of access to land has become a major concern for the 
extractive industry, as easily and cheaply accessible land has become scarce (more accessible 
deposits have been exploited, remaining deposits face physical constraints), and increasingly 
restrictive legislation makes it more costly and difficult to displace local communities (Seagle, 
2012; explored in more detail in chapter five). Offsetting can not only provide a social licence to 
operate and a source of legitimacy through collaboration with conservation organisations and 
(supposedly) ‘science-based’ biodiversity consultancies, but also grant access to additional land 
for conservation (generating additional income through ecotourism, as Rio Tinto has 
demonstrated in Madagascar (Seagle, 2012; Kill and Franchi, 2016). While the relationship 
between extractivism, financial institutions and offsetting will be covered in more detail in 
chapter five, in the following section I introduce the role of project finance.  
Following increased pressure and resistance against many of the large projects it financed, the 
World Bank started to strengthen its environmental lending criteria in the mid-1990s, as 
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multilateral development banks, development assistance agencies and other UN bodies began 
to demand EIAs for major developments (Dashwood, 2012). In light of a number of high-profile 
court cases involving mining companies in the 1990s, commercial banks and private insurers 
were getting concerned about liability risks (Dashwood, 2012; Danielson, 2006), and some 
public insurance institutions began to impose “green conditionality” (Wälde, 1992: 341). In 
response, the World Bank launched the two-year Extractive Industry Review (EIR) in the early 
2000s, a multi-stakeholder round of negotiations, and then updated its performance standards 
on environmental and social sustainability for project finance. These standards define lenders’ 
roles and responsibilities for manging their projects, as well as the requirements to receive IFC 
funding. Performance Standard six (PS6) of the eight standards is called “Biodiversity 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources” and its stated aims are 
to protect and conserve biodiversity, to maintain benefits from ecosystem services, and to 
promote sustainable development (IFC, 2012a, 2012b). It covers projects in modified, natural or 
critical habitats that potentially impact/are dependent on ecosystems over which the client has 
direct management control or significant influence. Under these standards (which are based on 
and explicitly reference BBOP principles), clients may degrade or convert natural habitats if “no 
other viable alternatives within the region” exist; following consultation, application of the 
mitigation hierarchy and mitigation measures designed for NNL (IFC, 2012a: 3). In addition to 
these requirements, legality needs to be demonstrated when the area concerned is already 
protected; consistency with the area’s management plan, and consultation with “sponsors and 
managers” of the protected area, as well as, in seemingly secondary priority, with affected 
communities and indigenous people (IFC, 2012a: 5). Measurable conservation outcomes are 
“reasonably expected to result in no net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity” (IFC, 
2012a: 2, emphasis added). Net gain is required in critical habitats.  
The revised standards took effect six months after publication, and therewith became part of 
the Equator Principles (EP) (Exhibit II); a credit risk management framework for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance. Since the EP are based 
on IFC performance standards, PS6 therewith became a requirement for the over 70 export 
credit agencies and private commercial banks that adopted the EP. Although originally 
developed for project finance lending requirements only, the PS6 quickly became “more 
pervasive than expected” (Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro, 2012: 5). Financial institutions and 
other organisations quickly started “to regard PS6 as a benchmark of best practice generally, 
and to draw on it to guide lending and investment decisions for projects that do not involve 
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project finance” (BBOP, 2012: 6). It was adopted by some non-OECD29 governments and 
supported by parts of civil society (Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro, 2012). Even multinational 
corporations that do not rely on bank financing are now subject to PS6 in case of “purchase or 
joint venture with smaller PS6 financed companies” and/or partnerships with “host 
governments with IMF financing” (Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro, 2012). 
In a similar process to the IFC, the EBRD updated its social and environmental policy to include 
offsetting requirements in 2014 (EBRD, 2014a, 2014b). Following review and stakeholder 
workshops led by The Biodiversity Consultancy – active member of the offsetting industry 
introduced in chapter three – the EBRD published its Performance Requirement 6 (PR6) on 
“Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources”. PR6 
prescribes the adoption of the mitigation hierarchy, “with the aim of achieving no net loss of 
biodiversity, and where appropriate, a net gain of biodiversity” (EBRD, 2014a). The EBRD has 
committed to the promotion of EU environmental principles and standards, including the 
conservation directives. The latter marks the distinction between the IFC PS6 and the EBRD PR6 
– while they are almost equivalent in substance, the EBRD PR6 requires projects to comply with 
the intent of the Habitats Directive. This shows the importance of the institutionalisation of NNL 
objectives in European policy making not only for national governments, but also for EU-
supported projects in- and outside its territory. This influence will be illustrated in the following 
section. 
Exporting offsets – examining (European) finance abroad 
Particularly in Eastern Europe and states in the global South, civil society interviewees have 
reported, EBRD and IFC financing had an impact on the way large projects – such as mining 
projects or dams – are being carried out and permitted. Local campaigners involved in the anti-
financialisation of nature network have criticised that PS6 and PR6 serve to legitimise the 
continuation of extractive megaprojects and are likely to facilitate their expansion even into 
protected areas. Since many countries in which the IMF invests have no legal framework for 
offsetting in place, international financial institutions have promoted changes to environmental 
laws and regulations in these countries, especially in the global South (Kill, 2016b).  
Armenia serves as a good example to illustrate this point, pointing to the role of the IFC and the 
EBRD in ‘importing’ offsetting into a country without offsetting framework. Following an 
extensive Environmental Impact Assessment, the private corporation Lydian International30 and 
                                                          
29 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
30 Lydian International is registered in British Jersey, Channel Islands, and listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.  
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its Armenian subsidiary (Geoteam CJSC) – with IFC and EBRD funding –applied for permission to 
develop the country’s largest open pit gold mine in Amulsar.31 The EBRD is providing equity 
financing, “earmarked for financing of the Environmental and Social Mitigation Measures … 
[including] a biodiversity offset programme” (EBRD, 2016, emphasis added). Following initial 
failure to engage with stakeholders and to get a social licence to operate (bankwatch network, 
2012), after extensive baselines studies and collaboration with different institutions and 
experts, the company drew up a Biodiversity Management Plan with the aim of no net loss of 
biodiversity. To compensate for ‘residual impacts’ of the mine on highly sensitive internationally 
protected flora (particularly the potentilla plant) and fauna (especially the brown bear), the 
company is implementing a conservation offsetting programme designed by the UK-based 
environmental consultancy and BBOP member Trewood. In its Biodiversity Action Plan, 
prepared by Trewood, the company commits to net gain of biodiversity with respect to impacts 
on critical habitat. Specificities are laid out in its Biodiversity Offset Strategy, where Lydian 
promises the “establishment of a new National Park at Jermuk” (appendix 3: 6), to prevent 
overgrazing and poaching: “Gains would be achieved by a) conferring protection from 
disturbance and poaching through establishment of the Protected Area and b) improving 
condition of degraded natural habitat” (appendix 3: 6). To protect threatened species, the 
company further plans to conduct research into moving endangered Potentilla porphyrantha 
plants from the mountain, cultivate and return them upon mine closure and a baseline study 
looking at the presence of brown bears. The National Park planning process is being led by 
WWF Armenia, and the methodology to calculate offsetting metrics (figure 14) – remarkably 
similar to the British metrics – by Treweek consultants.  
 
Figure 14 Metrics used to calculate NNL in Armenia (Treweek, n.d.) 
                                                          
31 Amulsar Mine is meant to begin operations in 2018, with the planned extraction of 10m tonnes of ore (containing 7.8 tonnes of 
gold) per year, and close in 2029 (Liakhov, 2017). “The Armenian government”, Peter Liakhov has argued, “charges some of 
the lowest fees for exploiting natural resources in the world, and after a 2012 legislative change promoted by the World Bank, 
doesn’t even charge companies for cleaning up after mining operations cease” (2017).  
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Campaigners criticise that the offsetting area is already a national protected area, financed by 
the Austrian and German development agencies, UNDP and WWF, and is not currently under 
threat of destruction (thus lacking additionality) (personal communication). The offsetting 
project does not address the likely negative effects on the region’s mineral water, the nearby 
Sevan lake and neighbouring villages. Villages are likely to be affected economically and fear 
displacement, destruction of social fabric and loss of livelihood due to poisoning of apricot fields 
– which will disproportionately affect women, a campaigner explains. She further criticises the 
(ongoing) legal changes in national policy as the project devolves. One campaigner explains: 
“Legislation is being amended in line with the project needs. Not the other way around. [This is] 
corruption” – whereas previously, Lydian would not have been allowed to mine in this highly 
vulnerable and protected habitat, the company was able to alter legislation “in their interest” 
(personal communication). This shift from companies “breaking the law to changing the law”, 
another campaigner explains (personal communication) is significant because it shows precisely 
what biodiversity offsetting represents: the flexibilisation of legislative limits and the 
collaboration with state actors for access to finance and to land.32 Conditionalities imposed by 
international banks that trigger legislative changes in host governments are not new – just think 
of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. In the face of resistance against offsetting 
and slow progress with regards to the NNLi, the EU has now, however, set up a facility that 
allows for the direct financing of offsetting activities without a legal framework in place – the 
Natural Capital Financing Facility (NCFF). 
Natural Capital Financing Facility – privatising public conservation funds 
The NCFF is a green financing scheme that operates as a joint facility between the EC and the 
EIB. Its pilot phase started in 2014. With an initial budget of €100 million (and an additional €10 
million for technical assistance), it is supposed to trigger private investments for 10-12 revenue-
generating pilot schemes, based on debt and equity funding (Gilbertson and Coelho, 2014). 
Each of these projects will receive between €5 and €15 million, either through debt funds or 
through financial intermediaries (credit lines). Biodiversity offsetting is meant to be a key part of 
these projects, in addition to green infrastructure, Payments for Ecosystems and Pro-
biodiversity and adaptation businesses. Funding for the NCFF comes from the LIFE programme, 
the key EU funding instrument for environmental protection, nature conservation, and climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Half of its budget supports good practice and demonstration 
                                                          
32 Others involved in the offsetting plans are the University of Cambridge Botanic Garden (UCBG) and WWF Armenia, as well as a 
number of Armenian scientists and members of the environmental community. According to one interviewee, the mining company 
spent significant funds on the EIA, gaining support from the scientific and environmental community; “Everyone from [the] scientific 
community [has been] bought up” (personal communication). 
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projects that contribute to the implementation of the EU biodiversity policy. Since its 
establishment in 1992, it has (co-) financed over 4,500 conservation projects with 
approximately €3.1 billion, most of which is dedicated to the Natura2000 network (EC, n.d.c). 
Whereas until 2014, all LIFE funding was awarded as public grants to conservation and 
environmental projects, the new (2014-2017) programme has been presented as especially 
flexible and strategic, as the funding is being channelled through the EIB in order to provide 
loans and finance for bank lending to offsetting and green infrastructure projects (Gilbertson 
and Coelho, 2014). The NCFF thus constitutes another pilot project, designed to “test the 
profitability of switching from public grants to using other financial instruments” (Gilbertson 
and Coelho, 2014: 5). It can also be read as outsourcing and de-democratisation: EC DG 
Environment will now be responsible for policy and decision making while the EIB manages 
NCFF “by providing a risk-sharing facility for private financial institutions, tech support and long-
term loans” (Gilbertson and Coelho, 2014: 5). The money that is channelled to finance (private) 
offsetting projects (outside Natura2000 sites), consequently, is not only diverted from the EU 
conservation budget, but also originally intended for Natura2000 site conservation – which is 
already chronically underfunded.  
These funds are now managed by a non-democratic financial institution that lacks public 
accountability, and their diversion from existing funds raises problems of additionality. The 
NCFF thus seems to constitute a rather convenient way to bypass public opposition to offsetting 
and all of the ‘difficulties’ associated with having to follow (relatively) democratic and 
transparent policy making procedures – institutionalising “by doing” (personal communication 
with campaigner). It further illustrates how so-called private ‘markets’ for conservation finance 
rely on public financing (Kay, 2018) – in this case, public conservation funds. 
4.4. Dealing with dissent 
It is not a coincidence that the industries most interested in biodiversity offsetting 
internationally and as part of the NNLi (energy, mining, cement, construction) are among those 
most targeted and resisted by indigenous groups, social movements and some (Western) 
environmental NGOs and conservation organisations. Mining companies, introduced in more 
depth in chapter five, deserve some special attention here. Especially, but not exclusively, in the 
global South, (large-scale) mining operations – often conducted by London-based mining 
conglomerates – have always been sites of gross human rights violations and ecological 
destruction, but also of resistance and contestation. Examples include the infamous Columbian 
Cerrajón mine, but also the Welsh Ffos-y-fran mine or the German Hambach coal mine 
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discussed in chapter six. With the material and geographical expansion of mining into more 
ecologically sensitive and socially vulnerable areas in the last decades – reaching new frontiers, 
moving more soil and water than ever, and affecting more communities – resistance to mining 
projects is becoming a serious concern for mining companies (Conde Puigmal, 2015: 5; see also 
Evans, Goodman and Lansbury, 2002). Whereas historically, opposition to mining was linked to 
labour and health issues, today, communities are increasingly fighting mining projects for 
environmental justice reasons and challenging corporations and governmental authorities over 
their lack of representation and participation in decision making (cf. Conde Puigmal, 2015) as 
well as the imposition of industrial development with little input. This poses new challenges to 
corporations’ social acceptance and licence to operate – especially when protests are linked 
transnationally (becoming more visible also in the global North, exposing companies to NGO 
campaigning and consumer boycotts), supported by solidarity groups abroad, and linking into 
struggles against imperialism, patriarchy, corporate exploitation and ‘green growth’. In 
response, I will show in chapter five, corporations are in need of new sources of legitimacy.  
In Europe, transnationally organised resistance against coal mining in particular has been 
growing over the last decades, with resistance intensifying. In May 2016, as part of the global 
campaign ‘Break Free from Fossil Fuels’, 400 activists shut down the UK’s largest open-cast coal 
mine, the Ffos-y-fran mine (the expansion of which is supposed to be biodiversity-offset). 
Shortly after, in Lusatia (Germany) 4,000 activists from across Europe blockaded a Vattenfall 
coal power station for three days, forcing it to shut down completely and causing considerable 
financial damage. Across the world, an estimated 30,000 people took direct action against coal 
mining in May 2016 alone, risking arrest and state violence to interrupt coal mining (Break Free, 
2016). Images and videos of these actions were shared by hundreds of thousands, triggering 
renewed debate around coal.  
In the face of this opposition, loss of access to (cheap) land and social licence to operate, and 
stricter project finance lending requirements that affect access to capital and cost time and 
resources, the industry has had to invent new ways to legitimise its operations. Under the 
banner of “green mining” or “sustainable mining”, biodiversity offsetting has been one of the 
mechanisms the industry has been using for this goal, as I show in chapter five (cf. Seagle, 
2012). The importance of biodiversity offsetting not only lies in its claim to compensate for the 
ecological impacts of mining projects and therewith ensure continued growth. More 
importantly, this particular social licence to operate is based on the enrolment of old and new 
conservation actors into the “business and biodiversity” agenda to construct the corporate 
sector as “saviours of biodiversity”, to pacify resistance and to divide-and-conquer movements 
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and NGOs. One biodiversity consultant, responsible for large offsetting projects for mining 
corporations, explains their strategy to minimise local resistance:  
The advice I always give really early on … is to go to these groups individually. Often, 
they are fighting amongst themselves. [Make use of] messy relationship between them 
and between government NGOs, work out stakeholder group and talk to them … [tell 
them:] you won’t like what we do, but we are trying to minimise impacts. Often, we end 
up hiring people, specialists, through these NGOs (B7). 
Similarly, Lori Anna Conzo’s quote at the beginning of the introduction illustrates the role of 
offsetting in managing people, not nature. In the following sections I will explore two ways 
through which this management takes place: firstly, the enrolment of (large, Western) 
conservation organisations in conservation partnerships around offsetting projects globally, and 
the NNL working group more specifically, hand in hand with the delegitimisation and 
marginalisation of grassroots organisations (see also chapter five), and secondly, the 
‘depoliticisation through technicalisation’ in the NNL working group discussions.  
Pacification through dialogue: introducing corporate-conservation partnerships  
Conservation partnerships, Kenneth MacDonald argues, reflect the ideological and material 
alignment with the corporate sector that can be traced back to the changing institutional 
context towards more (externally funded) project-based conservation and a new governance 
network involving external control of conservation organisations, and the associated internal 
restructuring and new entrepreneurial strategies inside organisations (2010a, 2010b; cf. 
Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014). These changes were partly a response to the sharp reduction in 
conservation funds and shifting of funding to large conservation organisations, which 
constituted a ‘political opportunity’ for big NGOs to become serious actors in environmental 
governance, but also derived from cynicism about the little change that could be brought about 
through engagement with international organisations (Newell, 2000). The less confrontational 
attitude and desire to collaborate with corporations of environmental NGOs more widely, Peter 
Newell has argued, is further related to the growth of many NGOs, which “means that they 
cannot afford the risk of litigation undertaken by companies against their direct actions. They 
now have sizeable assets that would be threatened by successful court action against them” 
(2000: 36-7). NGOs thus ‘de-radicalised’, and their roles shifted from knowledge producers to 
consultants, fund raisers and project implementers, financed through international project 
finance and development funds (MacDonald, 2010a). Reliance on dependable funding sources 
and legitimacy led them to embrace the international neoliberal conservation agenda, Kenneth 
MacDonald argues, as they increasingly sought for ways to make biodiversity “pay for its own 
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salvation” (2010a: 521). At the same time, such partnerships have helped transnational 
corporations display themselves as “champions of sustainability” (Dauvergne and LeBaron, 
2014: 153).  
The emergence of the CBD and the Global Environment Facility, and the associated 
consolidation of state actors in biodiversity governance, shifted financial resources from core 
funding towards project-based funding related to the CBD’s programme. This reduced 
organisations’ agenda setting power while granting more power to the corporate sector. It 
further paved the way for corporate-NGO partnerships to fulfil CBD conditionalities and gain 
legitimacy, grounded in the need to develop “working alliances” (MacDonald, 2010a: 534). 
Competition for market share and brand recognition with “conservation competitors” increased 
(Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010; Chapin, 2004). Alliances with indigenous peoples and local 
communities “largely disappeared”, Mac Chapin argues, “displaced… by talk of changed 
priorities, with a new focus on large-scale conservation strategies and the importance of 
science, rather than social realities, in determining their agendas” (2004: 18). For the corporate 
sector, this ‘engagement’ increased legitimacy vis-à-vis public and policy making circles, helped 
justify its involvement in international biodiversity spaces (such as CBD meetings), and to 
control their environment to ensure access and use rights to resources (cf. Chapin, 2004).  
This ideological alignment, demonstrated discursively – as organisations were “finally speaking 
the language of business”, as WBCSD president Peter Bakker praised at the Second International 
Forum on Natural Capital in 2015 – but also through the provision of expertise and ecological 
data that is indispensable for corporate biodiversity management, not only changed the focus 
of many organisations’ work, but also their internal structuring. Increasingly, conservation 
organisations started to be managed like businesses – hierarchically and top-down – to fit with 
the prevailing corporate logic, manifest in the importance of ‘acquisition divisions’ (with 
fundraising becoming a top priority), PR departments and communication strategies; going 
hand-in-hand with the ‘professionalisation’ or corporatisation of organisations, and the 
corporate branding – worth millions of dollars, in many cases – served and defended by high-
powered lawyers and marketing consultants (Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014). The pressure to 
achieve short-term results and not upset corporate funders changed the tone and content of 
campaigns, and attracted criticism that “fixation with fundraising ... trumped truly effective 
campaigning” while ignoring systemic issues of neoliberal capitalism (Jarman, 2016; see also 
Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014; MacDonald, 2010a, 2010b).  
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These changes are further reflected in recruiting practices. Today, board members, directors or 
executives travel back and forth between institutions. Robert Napier, for instance, became 
WWF’s new chief executive in 2000, after having been a senior manager at Rio Tinto (then RTZ), 
Fisons, known for its peat digging activities, and quarrying firm Redland. Corporate-NGO 
offsetting partnerships further entrench these relationships. In its pioneering offsetting project 
in Madagascar, Rio Tinto collaborates with IUCN, Kew and Missouri Botanical Gardens, and a 
number of international and Malagasy conservation organisations (e.g. the national partner of 
BirdLife International) – as well as academics that serve on the project’s advisory board (Kill and 
Franchi, 2016). The involvement of, and legitimacy associated with, conservation organisations 
(hand-in-hand with marginalisation of more radical movements) make local resistance more 
challenging – especially when communities are misinformed and not aware that they lose their 
livelihoods because of biodiversity offsetting, rather than ‘regular’ conservation efforts, as in Rio 
Tinto’s Madagascar project (Kill and Franchi, 2016). At the same time, conservation 
organisations that might otherwise criticise the project for its ecological impacts are ‘co-opted’ 
and drawn into the project. Already in 1999, Philip Mulligan warned of the potential of the 
project to greenwash and – through participation and monopolisation of the scientific discourse 
around the project – legitimise Rio Tinto’s mining activities while constructing local activities as 
harmful. He argues that “[t]he whole process of environmental and social impact studies is 
designed to co-opt people into a process of approval. Outcomes are validated by a process 
whose terms are set by the company” (1999: 55). 
Such divide-and-conquer strategies contribute to internal division in the conservation 
community, where more mainstream conservation organisations are pacified and more radical 
grassroots group are marginalised. Cooperation between (mining) corporations and large 
conservation organisations in the global South has led grassroots groups to openly criticise and 
distance themselves from such organisations. FoE International, for example, has voted not to 
engage in any collaboration with WWF, maybe the most influential global conservation 
organisation, due to its partnerships and projects in the global South, which led to violent abuse 
and displacement of local communities. They have become “part of the problem, not the 
solution” according to Southern FoE groups (interview), not only because of their conservation 
projects, but also their self-censorship, so as not to “’jeopardize’ future efforts to secure 
donations from certain industrial sectors”, as WWF officials have been reported to state during 
a board meeting (Glüsing and Klawitter, 2012). Survival International recently launched a formal 
OECD complaint against WWF for violent abuse and land theft “carried out by anti-poaching 
squads which it in part funds and equips” (2016). 
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Strategic partnerships, sometimes in combination with the systematic marginalisation of 
grassroots or more ‘radical’ movements (Brock, 2015), thus helped entrench the growing 
material and ideological divide between international conservation organisations and grassroots 
groups (MacDonald, 2010a, 2010b). Internal opposition against partnerships – e.g. within the 
IUCN at World Conservation Congress – has always existed, but has become less visible over the 
years (MacDonald, 2010b). Some of this discussion is being shifted to online spaces, such as 
debate on the new IUCN biodiversity guidance on offsetting (IUCN, 2016; BBOP, 2016). At the 
same time, such partnerships have been incentivised by international institutions.  
The EC financially supports business-NGO collaborations by means of the Business and 
Biodiversity programme, funded through the LIFE programme – though many projects, tellingly, 
are implemented through the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. These 
are increasingly run according to principles of cost-efficiency, competitiveness and profit-
orientation, an interviewee reports. A similar trend can be observed with the LIFE programme, 
which is supposed to test new or novel (read: business-led) ways of dealing with environmental 
problems and involve the establishment or use of ‘good practice’. Through the Business and 
Biodiversity Campaign (under the slogan “Biodiversity – it’s your business”, Global Nature Fund, 
2013) the EC promotes NGO-business partnerships, helps showcase business commitments and 
initiatives, and promotes “Business and Ecosystem Services” opportunities.  
This not only normalises the idea of corporate conservation, but also the ecosystem services 
and natural capital framing, and paves the way for offsetting and other ‘innovative’ instruments 
(as explored in chapter three)33. The NNLi thus not only responded to the increasing resistance 
against large-scale developments that can be witnessed in the EU, but also provided a forum to 
bring together ‘biodiversity stakeholders’. It acted as a vehicle around which organisations were 
mobilised, engaging more ‘moderate’ organisations while excluding more grassroots or ‘radical’ 
groups. In the following section, I will explore some of the ways this was done within the NNL 
working group. 
Depoliticisation and the politics of stakeholder engagement 
The setup of the working group – its composition, outlined in the beginning of this chapter, and 
its agenda, with meetings structured around PowerPoint presentations of case studies and 
corporate projects, lessons learnt and challenges to address – was intended to facilitate a 
                                                          
33 Another example are the campaign’s public landscape auctions, where “bids are made for elements of the landscape or local 
biodiversity” (Global Nature Fund, 2013: 5). These auctions are advertised as follows: “The successful bidder supports the 
management and preservation costs of the chosen item. The expertise center Triple E has developed the concept. It is an original 
way for businesses, corporations and other interested parties to actively become a stakeholder of the unique biodiversity we have 
in the EU. Make your bid for nature!” (Global Nature Fund, 2013: 5). 
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particular kind of discussion. Rather than engaging with the fundamental problems of offsetting, 
the underlying assumptions and ideologies, or the social and ecological effects, the working 
group negotiations were shaped and framed in particular ways – through the agenda that had 
been prepared, the questions raised, and the problems posed. The framing was what that 
James Ferguson would call “anti-political” (1994; Büscher, 2010; Mosse, 2004). Anti-political 
policy discourse helps to “conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the 
enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute agency and to multiply criteria 
of success within project systems” (Mosse, 2004: 663). The objective of the working group was 
never to debate whether NNL was to be achieved through offsetting – “the objective of the 
working group was to support the EC”, a working group participant explains (C1). 
This began with the selection of working group members – the vast majority of non-
governmental members represent industry and land-owners as well as ‘experts’ (mostly 
members of the offsetting industry) with few critical voices in the room. Through the EC’s 
framing as ‘experts’ – evoking associations as non-political, neutral and objective – and by 
scheduling much of the available (and scarce) working group time to these ‘experts’ and their 
presentations, the agenda was shaping the discussion. At the stakeholder workshop “Policy 
Options for a No Net Loss Initiative” (03/07/2013), for instance, all sessions (apart from opening 
and closing speeches) were led by these ‘experts’ – all consultants – on the need for measures 
to achieve NNL, the mitigation hierarchy, residual impacts and lessons learnt. These ‘experts’, a 
working group member tells me, were granted a kind of authority that was hard to contest by 
those more critical of offsetting or those new to the field.  
The agendas of the meetings resembled a ritualistic performance of the ever-same agenda 
points: updates from other working groups, presentations of case studies, policy instruments, 
lessons learnt or a new offsetting study, discussion of the four working documents, and wrap-up 
– broken up by two coffee breaks and a lunch break – and the occasional extra agenda item. 
‘Experts’ were invited to present case studies that became the starting point for debate. 
Whereas inherently political and contentious, these discussions were presented as “technical 
discussions”. A couple of discussion points deserve more in-depth analysis. 
One ever-recurring theme in the working group were the limits of offsetting. These discussions 
were particularly important for the discursive establishment of offsetting because it was 
precisely through the emphasis on ‘what cannot be offset’ that the debate on ‘what can be 
offset’ was settled. Through constant reiteration that development in Natura2000 sites cannot 
be offset, for instance, other natural areas become offsettable. These boundaries may be 
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contested: a number of industry representatives and ‘experts’ continued to challenge the 
‘limits’ demarcating Natura2000 sites. The delineation of the ‘un-offsettable’ – however 
unstable – is furthermore crucial for the perceived legitimacy and credibility of the group, and 
the pacification of critics. A similar function is played by the design principles to ensure best 
practice, following – not surprisingly, and just like most definitions and principles – BBOP’s 
offset design process. These safeguards act as insurance against critique and uphold the 
ideology of offsetting. The most important vehicle through which ‘best practice’ is to be ensured 
(reiterated in governmental documents, bank regulations and elsewhere) are the BBOP 
standards, which have become a fundamental pillar of international biodiversity offsetting 
governance – powerfully represented by Kerry ten Kate herself. “Some impacts cannot be 
offset”, she emphasises repeatedly (e.g. ten Kate and Narain, 2012: 33), which implies that all 
other impacts can be offset. Similar statements are made by natural capital advocates and the 
offsetting pioneers introduced in chapter three, in order to pre-empt critique, to control the 
framing of critique, and then to channel critical debate towards methodological challenges and 
technical solutions introduced below. In effect, these boundaries and safeguards help make 
biodiversity – and biodiversity performance – auditable, account-able and measurable. The 
constant qualification and relativisation is crucial. The very emphasis that “[e]ven within ‘like for 
like’, not all hectares are equal” (ten Kate and Narain, 2012: 35), for instance, and the idea of 
“offsetability thresholds” (Ledoux, 2012: 7) end up having the opposite effect – creating the 
illusion of fundability and offsettabiliy, while normalising offsetting, appealing to reason, 
relativising initial scepticism and easing fears.  
Having noted the importance of boundary drawing, I now move on to another crucial mobilising 
metaphor in the NNLi working group discussions: the mitigation hierarchy (figure 15). Corporate 
conservation – and biodiversity offsetting in particular, I have shown in chapter three – relies on 
spectacular performance (Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010). The mitigation hierarchy is a 
great example of such spectacle that serves to visualise a particular abstract conceptualisation 
of nature – categorised into red or yellow when ‘impacted’; green when offset or ‘saved’ (figure 
15) – while invisibilising the actual destruction of particular places, the social relations around 
them, the epistemicide and the (slow) violence inherent in, and the corporate and state power 
mobilised for this end. Once again, the mitigation hierarchy represents the epistemologically 





Figure 15 Mitigation hierarchy according to BBOP (2014) 
Many different versions of the mitigation hierarchy exist, in various shapes and colours, and yet 
the design choices are never problematised – such as the dark green colouring to represent the 
sustainability of the project, the simplistic, sharp contours that hide the uncertainties and 
possible failure of the restoration activities that may be counted as offset, the smaller size of 
‘residual impact’ and ‘offset’ in relation to ‘predicted impact’ and ‘minimisation’, the linear 
nature of the process and the representation of nature as stable and static system, rather than 
fluid and responsive. The image thus constitutes a powerful tool to structure NNL thinking, as 
well as a symbol of authority and expertise, mobilised to anchor the debate around offsets. It 
serves to visualise and represent offsetting as science-based, or ‘serious business’. Once again 
this allows positioning the mitigation hierarchy as insurance against doubts and critique – often 
perceived as too complex (and intimidating) for non-experts, yielding authority to those able to 
mobilise it in their interest “[You d]emonstrate the entire mitigation hierarchy – [critics] get 
over doubts and concerns [that offsets act as] licence to trash”, an environmental consultant 
explains (B7). In effect, the mitigation hierarchy thus helps position offsetting as the outcome of 
a rational trade-off; depoliticising NNL negotiations through the representation of conflict as 
technical, while obscuring the politics of and around nature, the destructive corporate agency 
and the violence against human and nonhuman nature. 
The second important mobilising device in NNL negotiations were the recurrent case studies 
and pilot projects that travel across places and spaces of offset making (as introduced in chapter 
three), and continue to be recycled and mobilised for the political project that offsetting 
constitutes. Their presentations resemble rituals not only to ensure the smooth running of the 
meetings, but to ‘thingify’ offsetting. It should come as no surprise that many of the case 
studies that were introduced at the conferences explored in chapter three re-appear at NNL 
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working group meetings – such as the (contested) Ambatovy mining project in Madagascar or 
the Strongman pilot project, designed to offset Solid Energy New Zeeland’s coal operation, both 
BBOP pilot projects. Not only do these give corporations and ‘experts’ the chance to 
demonstrate their political goodwill, their ecological expertise and complex methodologies 
(resembling product advertising for the offsetting industry). They also create the impression of a 
well thought-through offsetting ‘practice’ (qualified, of course, by the constant emphasis on the 
need to fine-tune methods and further develop assessments and better standards) that can be 
trusted to deliver NNL in Europe.  
What these concepts and case studies have in common is that they enable the depoliticisation 
of the debate through their framing around methodological challenges. This framing around 
methodological challenges and the boundaries of offsetting, and the structuring of negotiations 
around success stories, pilot projects and lessons learnt, makes dissent more difficult. Space for 
dissent is narrowed down to revolve around methodologies and data, to do with mitigation 
replacement ratios and currencies (How to measure biodiversity? How measure its ‘quality’? 
What unit of measurement and what ratio should be used to calculate required offset area?), 
definitions of NNL, ecosystem functions, critical habitat, additionality and temporality. The 
framing as methodological challenges invites solutions based on better methodologies and 
assessments, better metrics and baselines, better data or more capacity building. Importantly, it 
shifts responsibility to practitioners and ‘experts’ who are in charge of monitoring, 
measurements, restoration success and compliance with performance standards. 
Despite the contested nature of the accounting technologies, the metrics and assessment 
methods employed (Robertson, 2012; Lockhart; 2016; Carver and Sullivan, 2017), and the 
importance of equivalence and additionality, little space was granted for real debate on these 
issues, a working group member recounts. Instead, ‘experts’ were to pass on expertise to those 
new to the group, a number of whom had never heard of offsetting before and struggled to 
follow the debate. “It was so complicated and technical that I abandoned the group 
afterwards”, I was told by one working group participant who attended the first meeting; 
another one explains that “the language [was] too technical … [I] had no idea what was going 
on” (B7). Yet, this framing around methodological challenges and lessons learnt did not go 
unchallenged: critics continued to raise more systemic issues including the drivers of 
biodiversity loss in Europe (Should agriculture be included in the initiative? How can the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy be reformed? What about fisheries?). These debates tended to be 
shut down quickly, I am told by one of these critics, or reframed. The issue of habitat 
fragmentation as a major cause for biodiversity loss, for instance, was easily reframed in 
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technical terms that allow for offsetting to be situated as a solution; by focussing on offsets to 
achieve habitat connectivity and green infrastructure funding.  
The working group itself thus engaged stakeholders not only through debate that – through this 
focus on methodological challenges, mobilising concepts and case studies – contributed to the 
normalisation and legitimisation of offsetting, channelling NNL debate. It played into wider 
reconfiguration of EU policy making and its political landscape and the further entrenchment of 
the role of industry associations and corporations as legitimate actors in the conservation arena, 
while dividing-and-conquering the movement and co-opting critical voices. The role of the 
working group discussion in reconciling different stakeholders’ views becomes visible in this 
quote by one of the ‘experts’: 
People came to [the meetings] from philosophical standpoints, not problem-solving, 
technical, or policy relevant. [It was] all about building capacity for policy relevance … 
Decision making in the EU – [is all about] reaching consensus (C1). 
“[It was a] trust building exercise”, another participant states. That is not to say that NNL 
discussions were not very contentious or without conflict. The most contested discussion points 
revolved around the question of whether compensatory measures should be allowed inside 
Natura2000 sites; whether activities outside the network could finance Natura2000 sites; the 
scope vis-à-vis other sectors; the inclusion or exclusion of agriculture, fishery and forestry; the 
question of biodiversity versus ecosystems (services) and landscape approaches; the (lack of) 
emphasis on avoidance; the question of voluntary versus mandatory instruments; and the 
possibility of cross-boundary schemes – where no consensus was reached until the end. 
Differences in opinions and interests became visible particularly between corporate 
representatives, environmental consultants and conservationists, and these conflicts played a 
role in the ‘apparent death’ of the initiative which will be briefly discussed in the conclusion.  
4.5. Conclusion – flexibilisation of limits and accumulation by restoration?  
In a nutshell, the right to ignore a legal limit can be bought (Kill, 2016b: 6). 
Since the last meeting of the NNL working group, the NNLi has “lost steam”, a conservationist 
describes, and died what he calls an “apparent death” – ready to come back when needed. This 
loss of steam, I suggest, is due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the strong and unexpected 
mobilisation and resistance against the initiative on the part of civil society, combined with 
increasingly critical public media coverage (overlapping with the resistance against British pilot 
projects) and, importantly, huge civil society mobilisation against REFIT, took the EC by surprise 
and made the implementation of a controversial initiative more difficult. Secondly, I suggest 
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that there was a conflict of interests within the working group between two particularly 
important groups that were in favour of a NNLi for different reasons: Whereas many of the 
‘experts’ (environmental consultants) advocated a stringent application of the mitigation 
hierarchy, the use of complex methodologies and precautionary measures to ensure NNL or net 
gain of biodiversity, these aims may have clashed with the aims of industry representatives to 
flexibilise existing legislation. Many industry representatives favoured the integration with (and 
weakening of) the existing system, advocating acceptance of “trade-offs, reasonable 
displacement and temporary degradation” of what they call ‘ordinary biodiversity’, and backing 
the simplest and cheapest way of offsetting (comparison of habitats rather than complex 
metrics) with very few categories (such as ‘forest’, ‘mountain’ or ‘coastal’). The EC, on the other 
hand, did not stand united – the Commission should not be seen as a single, unitary 
organisation, Pieter Bouwen has taught us (2009: 19). It was lacking the necessary enthusiasm 
for driving the process forward – initial top-level support withered, and many EC officials had 
been sceptical of the initiative from the start. Industry representation was divided on the 
inclusion of agriculture, forestry and fisheries – the only reason European farmers and 
landowners joined the working group in the first place was to ensure they would not be covered 
by it. Many member state representatives, on the other hand, lacked pre-knowledge and 
understanding, causing frustration among other working group members.  
Nevertheless, bits and pieces of the initiative remain alive; they re-appear under different 
names and in different guises. To facilitate the ‘smarter’ implementation of the nature 
directives (and following the defeat of REFIT), offsetting has recently become part of the new 
EU Action Plan for nature, people and the economy (EC, 2017a). Under this new plan, the EC 
will “[d]evelop guidance and a set of practical tools to support the integration of ecosystems 
and their services into planning and decision-making processes at local, regional, national and 
EU levels (by 2018)” and assist planners and decision-makers to “implement best practices for 
plans and projects to minimise and compensate for unavoidable residual impacts on ecosystems 
and their services” (EC, 2017b, emphasis added). The (worrying) spirit of the action plan 
becomes clear in this introduction:  
Cases of inflexible application of species protection rules, delays and unnecessary 
burdens in permitting procedures and insufficient stakeholder awareness and 
participation can create unnecessary tensions between nature protection and socio-
economic activities. The action plan will set out measures to promote smarter 




Interesting, and testifying to the toxicity of these terms, is the avoidance of any mention of 
offset or NNL – instead, the plan is framed around compensation and flexibilisation.  
The current political climate leaves little hope for a biodiversity policy that challenges, rather 
than strengthens corporate power and puts nature above economic growth. Conservation 
campaigners and critical social scientists have played a core role in dampening the initial 
enthusiasm among conservation groups and policy makers over the last years, but even if 
ambitious NNL legislation is currently out of sight, many of its underlying assumptions and 
drivers live on. Discussions around the NNLi – as well as the increasing use of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive discussed above – have opened the door to a more fundamental re-definition 
and rethinking about limits to corporate activity within the EU and beyond. In this redefinition, 
the idea of ‘inevitable destruction’ (or ‘residual impacts’, to use the language of the mitigation 
hierarchy), campaigners fear, becomes ‘allowable destruction’.  
This implies that offsetting can give corporations certainty and predictability in their accounting 
practices, as ‘limits’ to the acceptable loss of nature become reconceptualised as offsetting 
‘costs’ which can be managed. Limits to destruction become locally meaningless, as they are 
turned into ‘net’ limits, as part of ‘net’ positive impact policies or goals. Limits can lose their 
‘absoluteness’ and become negotiable – breaching them is not penalised (through penalty 
payments or permit withdrawal), but can be incorporated as project cost into corporate 
accounting frameworks (Kill, 2016a). Legally, this implies a move from fines to costs: costs that 
can be incorporated into business operations and accounted for in cost-benefit analyses, 
therewith increasing certainty over the future and managing risks associated with biodiversity 
loss, but more importantly reputational and regulatory risks associated with corporate 
exploitation of human and nonhuman nature. This makes operations – and future expenditures 
– more calculable, changing corporate strategies and business models, an interviewee explains. 
David Moreno-Mateos and colleagues have argued that 
Offsets erode the very meaning of strict protection of species and habitats. By allowing 
exceptions, offsetting policies state that it is not necessary that every individual of a 
species or element of a threatened habitat is protected to ensure its persistence…. 
[Offsetting] allows bypassing restrictive regulations, in particular, by those who can 
afford to pay for it (2015: 557). 
Uncertainty, aggravated through resistance, used to be a liability, but is now turned into a profit 
opportunity (chapter three, see also Soederberg, 2016) for a new industry eager to transform 
this risk by means of calculative devices and innovative new methodologies and techniques.  
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While in theory, offsets should constitute the last resort in the mitigation hierarchy, their 
introduction can alter incentive structures away from avoidance and minimisation, campaigners 
fear (and anecdotal evidence already confirms). A restoration ecologist admits: “My concern for 
a NNL Initiative is that the concept could be abused to destroy nature if the mitigation hierarchy 
is not fully and properly implemented, as we all know that law enforcement is often weak”. This 
may ensure the granting of project permits that may have otherwise not been granted – in 
areas that are currently protected. Biodiversity offsets can therefore constitute a way to 
flexibilise these limits, most dangerously those related to Natura2000 sites. The risk of not 
receiving planning permission or a concession is thus – for a financial price – turned into 
“greater certainty for businesses”, as the Australian environmental minister described the aim 
of offsetting (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012).  
Whereas traditionally, penalty fees for violating limits were paid to state/regional authorities, 
offsetting costs are private expenditures paid to other private bodies (Kill, 2016a), usually those 
undertaking restoration work within or outside the EU, or towards the securitisation and arming 
of anti-poaching squats and military equipment as well as drones and helicopters to monitor 
conservation areas and local communities, where European corporations are involved in 
offsetting in the global South. Legal requirements for offsetting thus play an important role in 
the newly emerging European ‘restoration economy’ (WRI, n.d.) or restoration industry 
introduced in chapter three.  
Accumulation by restoration? 
The restoration economy facilitates what Amber Huff and I analyse as “accumulation by 
restoration” (Huff and Brock, 2018) – reflecting a fundamental shift to an “economy of repair” 
(Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012: 242). “Rather than addressing the drivers of economic and 
ecological crises”, we argue,  
accumulation by restoration further ingrains the dominant ‘exploit-deplete-mitigate’ 
green growth paradigm, facilitating socially and ecologically destructive development 
through a spectacular high-stakes ‘shell game’ involving the spatial, temporal, and 
social displacement of both destruction and culpability (Huff and Brock, 2018).  
The restoration economy, I suggest, is driven by a political commitment to green growth and in 
response to the crises of growth generation and investment opportunities in the face of falling 
rates of return, new business risks and legitimacy crises. These risks are successfully converted 
into new profit opportunities (Soederberg, 2016) through the creation of conservation as a new 
asset class (Kay, 2018). This goes beyond the extension of “neoliberal conservation” (Büscher et 
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al., 2012) or the privatisation of environmental governance in that it fundamentally reshapes 
the governance of nature itself and reconfigures the roles of actors and arenas in which it takes 
place – visible in the role of (international) finance (IMF, pension funds, EIB, EBRD) and 
consultants (BBOP, Ecosystem Marketplace, private consultants). Accumulation by restoration 
relates to the rise in private conservation areas; the private ownership of land for the purpose 
of restoration and improvement of its ecological functions. They can be conceptualised as green 
grabs (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012), aimed to capture resources in the expectation of 
profits (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata, 2015). These profits are generated through the sale of 
restored land as asset class to the land owner, as well as the generation of (carbon or 
biodiversity) offsets. Conservation finance profits can be generated through exploitation of 
price differentials between market prices for industrial lands (e.g. those used for agriculture, 
forestry) and ostensibly degraded, conservation-ready lands (Kay, 2018), in part through 
restoration work (such as establishing tree plantations) and rezoning tricks.  
The underlying restoration ecology, the academic discipline that studies habitat restoration and 
recreation that forms the basis for offsetting through restoration, ecologists have warned, is still 
relatively young and “many of the expectations set by current offset policy for ecological 
restoration remain unsupported by evidence” (Maron et al., 2012: 142). The “ecological 
evidence base for restoration offsets [lend] little support that current theory and practice leads 
to a no net loss of biodiversity” (Curran, Hellweg and Beck, 2014: 630).  
This business is closely related to the offsetting industry and especially the army of 
environmental engineers (consultants, ecologists and environmental economists) who make 
careers out of this new economy – and, of course, the development of new opportunities 
around ‘green mining’ (chapter five) or ’sustainable infrastructure’ as outlined above. Particular 
interest has been shown by the construction sector, which also happens to be involved in many 
of the large-scale projects that require offsetting – or greening – to begin with. At the forefront 
of the restoration industry is construction machinery and equipment giant Caterpillar Inc. 
(introduced above), leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and 
natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomotives, who claims to be a 
“champion of construction sustainability” (Stoikes, 2015) and recently hosted the first major 
national summit on infrastructure restoration. In their own words:  
a fully integrated industry has yet to develop. In an attempt to catalyze the industry of 
natural infrastructure restoration – helping to move it from a strong concept to a 
sustainable business model – Caterpillar is convening diverse stakeholders for the 
Restoring Natural Infrastructure Summit in New York City (Caterpillar, 2015a).  
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Caterpillar’s vice president with responsibility for its Earthmoving Division has stated that “[w]e 
believe this could represent new opportunities for Caterpillar and our customers” (Caterpillar, 
2015a). At the summit, Caterpillar joined co-panellists The Nature Conservancy, JPMorgan 
Chase and the US Army Corps of Engineers to show that “investing in nature is smart business” 
(Shayon, 2015). 
The restoration economy further links the EU NNLi with increasingly prominent green 
infrastructure initiatives which are expected by the EC to serve as “catalyst[s] to economic 
growth” (EC, n.d.c) and the EC’s aim to restore, by 2020, 15% of all degraded ecosystems, as 
laid out in the 2020 Biodiversity Strategy (EC, 2011a). Green infrastructure, according to the EC, 
constitutes  
a strategically planned network of natural and semi-natural areas with other 
environmental features designed and managed to deliver a wide range of ecosystem 
services [aiming to] improve environmental conditions and therefore citizens' health and 
quality of life. It also supports a green economy, creates job opportunities and enhances 
biodiversity (EC, n.d.c).  
In the 2020 Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, the EC was tasked to “[p]ut forward 
proposals to foster investments in natural capital, to seize the full growth and innovation 
potential of Green Infrastructure and the ‘restoration economy’” (EC, 2011c: 12). In practice, it 
requires and promotes the monetary valuation of ecosystem services by calculating the cost 
differentials between green (natural) and grey (human-made) infrastructure developments.34 
Offsetting fits in all too well with this new agenda. 
In this chapter, I situated the development of the EU NNLi in the European political economy of 
offsetting, extractivism, large-scale infrastructure developments, finance and resistance, to 
show how the initiative constitutes a social technology of governance to manage increasing 
difficulties to access land and finance for new large-scale development projects, intensifying 
resistance against these projects and the need to secure a social licence to operate. The 
initiative has helped strengthen the European offsetting governance framework and the 
offsetting industry; legitimising, and giving political weight to other offsetting efforts. The 
initiative shows that – similar to offsetting internationally – offsetting is fundamentally 
concerned with managing humans – most notably the conservation community, in this case – 
rather than managing nature; just as it is about securing against social risks (land, acceptance, 
finance) rather than material risk of the effects of biodiversity loss on corporate bottom lines. 
As a risk management tool – or risk insurance – NNLi legislation would further facilitate the 
                                                          
34 Green infrastructure developments are further supported with project funding through NCFF and under Horizon 2020, engaging 
civil society and researchers. 
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transformation of limits for the sake of competitiveness and capital accumulation, further hiding 
the destruction, exploitation and violence involved in industrial development.  
In effect, the NNLi contributes to the further entrenchment of corporations into the European 
political economy, by allowing for the flexibilisation of limits and reducing the possibilities to 
challenge – legally, discursively, morally – corporate destruction and exploitation. It further 
naturalises the role that corporations have come to play in neoliberal conservation, establishing 
corporations as responsible corporate citizens and saviours of nature – themes that will be 




5. Green extractivism: a brief history of green mining and better coal 
In today’s political debate it may sound like misnomer to put coal and sustainability together 
... but I can assure you ... [coal will continue to be a] vital energy and strategic resource, 
essential to the world’s energy and security objectives … and for a world where no one is left 
behind (Benjamin Sporton, director of the World Coal Association, Sustainable Coal forum, 
London, 31/10/2017). 
Until two months ago I didn’t associate coal with sustainability ... But coal has an important 
role to play (Steve Kenzie, Global Compact, Sustainable Coal forum, London, 31/10/2017) 
The mining of metals, minerals and fossil fuels has been central to the consolidation of 
industrial civilisation, capitalism and state power (Malm, 2014, 2016; Lasslett, 2014). States are 
shaped fundamentally by the industry in mining-dependent countries (Shafer, 1994). Essential 
mining infrastructures such as electricity and transport are often (co-)financed by national or 
local governments, while many minerals and fossil fuels are central to key state interests, 
whether energy provision for economic growth or minerals for security interests, warfare and 
the exercise of state control (Ranta-Tyrkkö, 2014). At the same time, few industries are as 
socially and ecologically destructive as mining. Extractive operations continue to lead to the 
displacement of people and exploitation for cheap (slave) labour, as resources are being 
extracted with little or no regard for the social and ecological impacts on local communities or 
the global climate (Evans, Goodman and Lansbury, 2002; Madeley, 1999). Due to its nature as a 
“high-risk industry” (Evans, Goodman and Lansbury, 2002: 37) and its dependence on vast 
amounts of capital, access to land, and backing by international financial institutions, the 
industry is particularly vulnerable to public pressure. To ensure continued access to land and 
finance in the face of (increasing) resistance both in the global South and North, mining 
companies are in need of a ‘social licence to operate’ by mining-affected communities and 
support by state actors. In the last decades, I will show, biodiversity offsets have started to play 
an important role in gaining this licence to operate, and the legitimacy required by the industry.  
In this chapter I explore the role of offsetting in the industry’s efforts to present itself as ‘green’ 
or ‘sustainable’ in search of this legitimacy. I examine how the new paradigm of ‘green mining’ 
or ‘sustainable mining’ has become institutionalised through novel alliances, discourses and 
corporate technologies to pacify and silence opposition. I examine the specific mechanisms and 
underlying assumptions it relies upon. Biodiversity offsetting, I argue, has come to play the role 
of a risk insurance mechanism to deal with increasing risks to reputation, access to land, finance 
and, ultimately, profit, that mining companies are confronted with. Postcolonial scholars have 
developed the concept of extractivism, broadly defined as the “remov[al of] natural resources 
from their points of origin and dislocate[ion of] the emplaced benefits they provide” (Willow, 
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2016: 55), which, they argue, is itself a colonial ideology bound to state power (Acosta, 2013; 
Willow, 2016). I ask how offsetting – as one of a number of corporate strategies to co-opt, 
pacify and suppress resistance – has an impact on, or reconfigures, this corporate-state 
relationship. Within the self-proclaimed ‘reinvention of mining’ (e.g. KIN, 2015)35, I argue, 
offsetting not only serves as an important mechanism to ‘greenwash’ and legitimise mining 
operations, but more importantly helps naturalise their activities and construct mining 
operators as saviours of nature, as indispensable parts of the global political economy and as 
good corporate citizens, while anchoring the new managerial logic of risk management. This 
chapter thus develops further the ideas and arguments introduced in chapter four that 
examines the way offsetting functions as a social technology of governance and constitutes an 
anchor for processes of participation and consensus-oriented stakeholder engagement. Even 
the World Bank recommends: “Effective stakeholder engagement is needed to help ensure the 
success of all types of development and conservation projects, including biodiversity offsets” 
(Ledec and Johnson, 2016: 21). It shows how these processes draw in conservation 
organisations and other (potential) critics to the ideology and practice of offsetting, while 
suppressing more fundamental critique and flexibilising the limits to allowable destruction 
(through development or extraction). In effect, I suggest, this contributes to the invisibilisation 
of the “slow violence” (Nixon, 2011, 2009) inherent in mining as well as the violence against 
those resisting mining operations across the world. 
In chapter three I explored the role of the expansion of risk management ideas and audit 
culture in the development of offsetting, framed around the ability to hold corporations to 
account – through the magic bullets of transparency, accountability, and stakeholder dialogue. 
This discourse fits well with the new paradigm of consultation and consent, while ignoring the 
lack of power on the part of communities to actively shape or resist operational decisions 
through such channels. It is against this background that I situate the following history of ‘green 
mining’ and introduce ‘Bettercoal’, the supply chain management system pioneered by German 
energy company and coal producer, RWE. After providing some background to the increasing 
resistance the mining industry is facing across the world, I introduce the major industry 
initiatives set up to pioneer ‘green mining’ and ‘sustainable coal’. This introduction is followed 
by an analysis of the place of offsetting in ‘green extractivism’, situated within the various 
mechanisms – novel alliances and partnerships – through which mining becomes ‘green’, and 
an exploration of the diversity of strategies to pacify and criminalise resistance against large-
scale mining, lending legitimacy and credibility to the mining industry while facilitating land 
                                                          
35 See also this TEDx talk by a South African miner (Turton, 2013). 
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grabs and ‘greenwashing’. The chapter will end with some concluding thoughts before I 
examine how these dynamics plays out in the German Rhineland in chapter six.  
5.1. Extractivism, resistance and the state 
Many of the worst environmental disasters and human rights violations in the past half century 
took place in the mining and petroleum industries (Warhurst, 2001). This has been well-
documented in different places and contexts in the global South, where many of the world’s 
largest and most important minerals and deposits are found, exploited by transnational 
corporations for consumption and shareholder profit in the North (e.g. Evans, Goodman and 
Lansbury, 2002; Rajak, 2011a; Lasslett, 2014; Kirsch, 2010). Historically, mining operations have 
contributed to increasing global economic inequalities, socio-ecological injustices and “unequal 
ecological exchange” (Hornborg, 1998), while cost–benefit language has often been (and 
continues to be) used to excuse the damage caused in one place, outweighed by the overall 
financial benefits to a region or country. Ecological and social degradation, displacement and 
coercion in the global South are thus framed as ‘costs’ for local and global development.  
Similar environmental injustices can be observed within the global North, where indigenous 
groups, environmental justice movements, community groups and local initiatives have long 
been resisting the imposition of large mining operations. Multiple fault lines between 
communities and the state-mining complex, often structured along differences in class, gender 
and race, can be found across the world, as can be witnessed in the state of deprived villages in 
the UK, the US and elsewhere. Mining tends to take place in (politically and spatially) peripheral 
regions of the North, such as Eastern Europe and indigenous territories in Scandinavia. The 
spatial aspects of mining, Satu Ranta-Tyrkkö argues, are thus “intimately linked with the 
wielding of political and economic power” (2014: 107) and grounded in what Timothy Brennan 
calls “consciously chosen blindness … towards discursively and carefully obscured peripheries, 
[or] zones of invisibility” (2006: 101-112). The “politics of invisibility” (Ranta-Tyrkkö, 2014: 101) 
and “psychology of denial” (Nixon, 2011: 20) “actively produce … under- and unimagined 
communities, and [slow] violence – occurring gradually and out of sight – imposed by the 
world’s resource omnivores upon those less privileged” (Ranta-Tyrkkö, 2014: 101).  
In the last decades, large-scale mining (exploration and production) has expanded into some of 
the most remote and biodiverse areas of the earth, many of which have traditionally been 
occupied by indigenous peoples (Whiteman and Mamen, 2002; Rosenfeld Sweeting and Clark, 
2000). This encroachment of the new resource frontier is driven by global mineral demand, 
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technological advances and liberalisation of mining laws through revisions of national mining 
codes and investment laws to incentivise investment into mineral ‘development’ – in 
combination with privatisation of land and resource extraction companies. International 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are heavily subsidising the industry, particularly 
larger projects (Ranta-Tyrkkö, 2014), and supporting (foreign) private sector involvement in 
mining through structural reform programs and pushes for liberalisation (Whiteman and 
Mamen, 2002). In 1992, the World Bank started to push for the privatisation of mining 
companies with its “Strategy for African Mining” (World Bank, 1992).  
Industrial development, frequently without real indigenous peoples’ consultation or 
participation in decision-making (Whiteman and Mamen, 2002), also continues on indigenous 
lands in the global North, including North America, Australia and Northern Europe. It is not only 
in India that ‘sustainable’ mining operations contribute to the cultural genocide of indigenous 
populations (Padel and Das, 2010). In Sweden, for instance, indigenous Sami people are 
resisting the expansion of mining operations that make their traditional livelihoods impossible, 
while similar struggles can be observed in Finland (Ranta-Tyrkkö, 2014) and in North America 
(cf. Huseman and Short, 2012), among others. 
Large-scale mining operations are not only frequently sites of gross human rights violations and 
ecological destruction, but also sites of resistance and contestation, labour struggles and 
movements for ecological justice, often led by indigenous communities and women’s 
movements (Bell and Braun, 2010). As the analysis by the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) illustrates (figure 16), mining-community conflicts have increased drastically in 
recent years, driven mainly by economic and environmental justice issues (Global Witness, 
2015; Guardian, 2017). The number of killings of environmental and land defenders has risen 
steadily, with the mining industry constituting the “most deadly industry”, the Guardian reports, 
based on figures by Global Witness (Guardian, 2017). Not only are these struggles intensifying, 
but they are increasingly transnationally linked, gaining support through the spread on social 
media, international solidarity campaigns (such as the London Mining Network, n.d.) and NGO 
advocacy. They come at great cost for corporations: the ICMM has estimated the “cost of 




While often triggered by specific issues around local environmental pollution or public health, 
many revolve around fundamental questions of resource control, corporate power, alternative 
developmental pathways and democratic control. They may be fuelled by frustration with local 
or national resource governance, power inequalities and political action by state actors. While 
the state is integral to mining operations, as outlined above, it is also frequently contested in 
mining conflicts. Chris Ballard, for instance, explores how state claims to sovereignty are being 
challenged in the villages of the remote ‘resource frontiers’ in Asia-Pacific, Africa and South 
America, and claims to mineral ownership are challenged or denied (1997). The contestation is 
visible in this quote of a local landowner over mine development negotiations: “The developers 
are foreigners and the State is only a concept. It is us, the landowners, who represent real life 
and people” (Filer, 1996: 68).  
This more fundamental challenge to state and corporate power is important to keep in mind 
when examining the way the industry has responded to increased opposition. In the face of PR 
damage caused by mining conflicts, threatening access to (cheap) land and finance, the mining 
industry’s social licence to operate has become harder to establish. New barriers to entry, 
including requirements of Free Prior and Informed Consent, have forced the industry to invent 
new ways to legitimise their operations: to present mining as ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’36. This 
response took a very specific form, conducive to the stated goals of NNL and NPI of mining 
operations, and led by a handful of transnational corporations, most notably British-Australian 
multinational Rio Tinto. Biodiversity offsetting became the key technology through which the 
                                                          
36 I use ‘green mining’ and ‘sustainable mining’ interchangeably in this chapter. 
Figure 16 Mining conflicts from 2002-2012 (Diez, 2016: 5) 
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mining giant claims to have a NPI on the world’s biodiversity, and operationalised to 
compensate for the impacts of its ecologically and socially disastrous ilmenite mine in southeast 
Madagascar (Mulligan, 1999; Seagle, 2012; Kill and Franchi, 2016), its copper mine in Mongolia 
(Tricario and Richter, 2017) and its Dampier Salt operations in Western Australia (Rio Tinto, 
2012b), among others. Between 2001 and 2014, 32 major corporations have publicly 
committed to NPI or NNL policies, among them 13 leading mining/minerals companies (Rainey 
et al., 2015), a number that has further increased since then (interviewee).  
5.2. The birth of ‘green mining’ and ‘better coal’ 
I don’t see myself why mining can’t be just as responsible as the tourism which 
we run in our national parks in the U.S., with all the roads and hiking trails and 
the campgrounds and facilities required for tourists. With mining, they could 
come into a conservation area for 20-30 years and leave an endowment; 
whereas with tourism, when do we get rid of these people and what do they 
leave behind? (Frank Vorhies, Senior Advisor for IUCN, in Hamrick, 2014). 
In 1997, on the initiative of Rio Tinto CEO Robert Wilson, Hugh Morgan from Western Mining 
Company and Doug Yearly from Phelps Dodge Corporation, the CEOs of nine major mining and 
minerals conglomerates – the crème de la crème in the mining business – met to discuss the 
new challenges their companies were faced with. Among them, in addition to the three CEOs 
above, were AAC, Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Freeport McMoRan and Newmont. They 
needed to respond to the intensifying resistance against large-scale mining projects around the 
world. Despite growing restrictions at home, transnational mining companies had been seeing 
significant mining expansion in the Global South in the 1990s, as new market economies were 
opening up in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia (Dashwood, 2012; Cohen, 1996). 
At the same time, international financial institutions imposed structural adjustment 
programmes onto indebted Southern countries that enforced the privatisation of state mining 
assets and liberalisation of mining laws to encourage foreign direct investment (Dashwood, 
2012). Between 1985 and 1995, more than 35 countries changed or enacted their mining laws 
(Dashwood, 2012; Clark, 1997). With this came increasing exposure to public criticism: “The 
industry as a whole suffered from a bad image due to widely publicized mining accidents in the 
1990s” (Dashwood, 2012: 79). Pressure from UNEP and some national governments increased, 
and the 1989 Basel Convention restricted the use of certain metals and minerals in consumer 
products, affecting mining companies’ access to markets, particularly in Europe.  
A number of prominent cases of resistance against, and legal challenges to, mining projects had 
further damaged the industry’s reputation in the 1980s and 1990s. In Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
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indigenous resistance to Rio Tinto’s subsidiary company Bougainville Copper Limited – including 
nonviolent civil disobedience and sabotage tactics – was violently suppressed by the PNG 
government and eventually turned into guerrilla warfare (involving the newly forming 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army) against the mine and the state (Lasslett, 2014). It sparked a 
civil war and counterinsurgency campaign by the PNG government and the mining company 
(with Australian military support and pro-state paramilitaries) that led to the loss of some 
10,000 lives, state-executed torture, extrajudicial killings, internment, mass forced displacement 
and other forms of violence by the government (Lasslett, 2014). The Anglo-Australian 
multinational mining company BHP was met with Indigenous resistance triggered by the 
ecologically disastrous impacts of riverine disposal of tailings from the Papua New Guinean Ok 
Tedi mine in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to lengthy legal battles against the company and the 
PNG government that were finally settled with out-of-court compensation payments in the 
2000s (Kirsch, 2010). The case (which took place in Australia, rather than PNG) constituted the 
first international lawsuit against a mining company and became an international cause celebre 
– triggering a wave of similar lawsuits against large mining operators in Indonesia, Bougainville, 
Solomon Islands, Nicaragua and elsewhere (Downing et al. 2002: 27). Chris Ballard and Glenn 
Banks (2003) consider these high-profile court cases ‘tipping points’ in the relationship of the 
industry with the public. In the Philippines, Rio Tinto invested into the Far South-East project of 
Lepanto Consolidated, but following resistance to their presence, and despite costly and time-
intensive efforts to buy agreement and suppress dissent (including well-documented attempts 
to influence local decision making, misrepresent local opinion, e.g. through falsifying signatures, 
and questionable efforts to influence local opinion to serve company ends, e.g. through 
expensive hotel stays), were forced to withdraw from the project (Nettleton, 2001). 
Public opinion of the sector had become particularly poor (Rae and Rouse, 2011) as its 
ecological legacy was ranging (and continues to range) from water pollution through acid-rock 
drainage, air pollution, smelting processes, toxic waste to earth displacement and habitat loss 
through open pit mining (Dashwood, 2012: 2; Miranda et al., 2003). Internationally, “media 
coverage and political focus applied to any mine ‘accident’ exceeds virtually all other industries” 
(Laurence, 2011: 282) and mines have increasingly been forced to close due to poor mine safety 
records (Laurence, 2011). Resistance movements have been linking up on both local and 
international levels – including international NGO campaigns, such as Oxfam’s mining 
campaigns (e.g.  Oxfam Australia, n.d.) – developing solidarity and political opportunities (Conde 
Puigmal, 2015; cf. Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006). Local resistance has therewith often become 
more visible and posed a PR problem for corporations. At the same time, resistance has 
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triggered violent responses by police, military as well as paramilitary and private security forces 
enforcing corporate interests.  
The trend continues today, with 2017 looking to become the deadliest for environmental 
activism – especially for those campaigning against mining – according to data by the UK 
watchdog Global Witness, published in partnership with the Guardian (Guardian, 2017). The 
employment opportunities that mining has traditionally offered have been increasingly curtailed 
with the automatisation of certain mining processes (Warhurst and Mitchell, 2000),37 increasing 
discontent. In other words, the industry’s PR departments were challenged to think of new ways 
to improve the sector’s image. 
Initial efforts to ‘green’ mining arose in response to these costly and time-intense legal battles 
and armed counterinsurgency measures, and attempts to prevent such levels of resistance in 
the future by ensuring a licence to operate through PR campaigns and local collaborations. In 
addition to the high financial and political costs associated with dealing with land conflicts such 
as the ones outlined above, the industry had been facing increasing difficulties to get access to 
new land and new concessions for their operations due to geological reasons such as increasing 
physical inaccessibility to new areas. With the institutionalisation of (indigenous) demands of 
Free Prior and Informed Consent into international policy and the increasing implementation of 
international human rights laws, companies were forced to adapt their business practices and 
change their corporate strategies – while able to turn these new challenges into ways to 
legitimise their operations. International and financial organisations were strengthening their 
lending conditions as part of their risk management strategies and in response to the adoption 
of international (inter-state) agreements. Despite their weaknesses, stakeholder consultations 
and engagement efforts take time and money – whether that actually ends up in local people’s 
pockets or elites’ accounts. The mining industry has thus been faced with increasing pressures 
to become, or at least to appear to become, more sustainable; to decrease their environmental 
footprint and to share their profits with local communities, to legitimise their operations and 
secure investments.  
5.3. From the Global Mining Initiative to the Mines, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development initiative 
At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 corporate representatives successfully defeated a binding Code 
of Conduct for transnational corporations that had been drafted by the UN Centre for 
                                                          
37 In South Africa, for instance, continued liberalisation and foreign investment and the associated restructuring has led to drastic 
changes in corporate culture and reductions in job security (Minnitt, 2000). 
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Transnational Corporations through the Business Council for Sustainable Development (now 
WBCSD) and the International Chamber of Commerce. Following this victory, they became more 
pro-active and involved in the drafting of environmental governance in the 1990s. The emerging 
‘Sustainable Development’ ideology, promoted by governmental, corporate and finance actors 
alike was vague enough to allow for a multiplicity of (often contradictory) interpretations and 
provided the background against which the aforementioned meeting of the nine mining CEOs 
took place in 1998. Following internal discussion, to improve their reputation and to pre-empt 
regulation, they launched what was to mark the beginning of the green mining paradigm – the 
Global Mining Initiative (GMI) – at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999, with start-up 
funds of approximately $4 million, provided by 28 companies (Phillips, 2006). The GMI was 
based at Rio Tinto’s headquarters in London and was later to be institutionalised into the plan 
of action at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. Its aim was “to develop 
their industry's role in the transition to sustainable development and to ensure its long-term 
contribution to sustainable development” (BASD, n.d.). The motivation was clear: 
[mining companies’] credibility had sunk to an all-time low. Opposition – 
specifically from communities on or around exploration and mining sites – had 
reached an all-time high. This had not only lengthened – sometimes to breaking 
point – the lead times between conceiving a project and constructing an actual 
mine. It had also contributed in the previous few years to a reduction in 
institutional funding for some projects and in particular for exploration 
(Nostromo Research, 2002). 
The GMI, it was announced, would “openly engage with environment groups, human rights 
groups and government” (in Moody, 2001). At the launch of the initiative, George Littlewood, 
consultant of a major Australian mining and fertiliser company, gave a speech in which he 
discussed the future of large-scale mining. He warned:  
[m]ining critics see the [extractive] industry as having a declining role in sustainability… it 
has slipped behind. There are measurable consequences for this. It has literally lost 
ground for exploration or has found that the conditions for entry have become too 
onerous … market access for some minerals has been under great pressure (in 
Littlewood and Wells, 2000: 1). 
Out of the GMI grew the two-year Mines, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) 
research project and dialogue. Although presented as an NGO-initiative, it was proposed by Rio 
Tinto and Anglo American (and supported by Western Mining Corporation) after the setup of 
the GMI (Moody, 2001) – just in time for 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
Likely in anticipation of the scepticism and critiques that were to follow, then-Rio Tinto CEO 
Robert Wilson, later director of The Economist and driving force in this process (Bezanson, 
Rajaobalena and Gérin, 2016), asked the WBCSD to contract the London-based International 
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Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) as project initiator. The IIED, some argued, a 
research organisation without expertise in mining, could be relied on to act in Rio Tinto’s 
interests – “or more accurately those of its chair Robert Wilson” (Nostromo Research, 2002). 
Already then, the Rio Tinto CEO was planning to make the Rio Tinto Madagascar mining project 
a “flagship project in sustainable development” (Bezanson, Rajaobalena and Gérin, 2016: 3). 
Robert Wilson had been outspoken about the need of the mining industry to deal with its 
critics; warning that the industry’s traditional responses – “to say that criticisms are ill-founded, 
to remind critics that they depend on mineral products, and to engage in education, advertising 
and public relations campaigns” (Briskey et al. 2001) — had been failing as the sector’s 
reputation continued to worsen. Stakeholder dialogue, he advocated, would be “the future” 
(Briskey et al. 2001). 
Not only were CEOs confronted with increasing opposition and historically low mineral prices at 
this time, but they were worried that environmental NGOs were increasingly involved in 
decision making in international forums such as the Rio summit and recognised the danger of 
being “legislated out of business” (in Dashwood, 2012: 231-3). Through a series of forums (and 
at least one closed meeting with a few leading development agencies) in London and Australia, 
then-director Richard Sandbrook, co-founder of Friends of the Earth, and his colleagues of the 
IIED attempted to “get British NGOs on board” (Nostromo Research, 2002). According to MMSD 
documents, the project involved “over 5,000 participants from various stakeholder groups from 
all over the world” (Sethi, 2005: 63), while critics have pointed out that the forums were 
eventually “boycotted by almost every knowledgeable critic of the company” (Nostromo 
Research, 2002; see also Corpuz and Kennedy, 2001; Whitmore, 2006). 
The leadership became concerned about the resistance of civil society movements, particularly 
indigenous groups, and responded with a policy paper on ‘stakeholder engagement’ (Moody, 
2001). At the same time, by early 2001, nearly thirty mining companies had signed up to the 
GMI/MMSD,38 as well as a couple of indigenous organisations, WWF and Conservation 
International. The final report and global conference of the same name, “Breaking New Ground: 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development” (MMSD, 2002), mainly focussed questions of 
responsibility for cleaning up mining waste and was, once again, boycotted by most indigenous 
peoples’ organisations, mining NGOs and mine-affected communities (Whitmore, 2006). It was 
criticised as glossing over many critical issues (Nostromo Research, 2002) and as mere PR 
                                                          
38 They include: Acan, Alcoa, Anglo-American (AAC), Barrick Gold, BHP, Billiton, Codelco (Chile), De Beers, EDM/Somincor (Portugal), 
Freeport Mc-Moran, Gold Fields Ltd, Lonmin, MIM (Mount Isa Mines), Noranda, Mitsubishi Materials/Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui 
Mining and Smelting, Newmont, Nippon Mining and Metals Norsk Hydro, North Ltd. (taken over by Rio Tinto in 2000), Phelps 
Dodge, Placer Dome, Rio TInto, Sibirksy Alumininum, Sumitomo Metal Mining, and Western Mining Corp (WMC). 
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exercise (Dashwood, 2012). The processs itself was critiqued for being framed as inclusive and 
consultative although its objectives, framework and structure had all been “unilaterally 
predetermined by the corporate sector” (Whitmore, 2006: 310).  
Simultaneously, companies increasingly invested in private consultancy services and PR services 
to improve their image, such as KPMG or the London-based Control Risks Group. The latter, 
founded in 1975, added a new “investigative division” in 1995 to promote the concept of 
‘corporate accommodations’ to corporate critics and to offer advice on “how to change aspects 
of their operations [e.g. to ‘green’ mining] without essentially altering their corporate culture or 
programmes” (Moody, 2001). Under the slogan of “Managing risk – maximising opportunity” 
the firm describes itself as a “global risk consultancy specialising in helping organisations 
manage political, integrity and security risks in complex and hostile environments … handling 
sensitive political issues and providing practical on-the-ground protection and support” (CRG, 
n.d.).  
According to Eveline Lubbers, the group constitutes an “institutionalized old boys circuit”, 
involving former high-rank police officers and ex-CEOs from transnational corporations (2000). 
In their unusual 1997 report “No hiding place: Business and the Politics of Pressure” (CRG, 
1997), the consultancy advises corporations how to gain a licence to operate in the face of 
increasing scrutiny of environmental and social behaviour. The practices involve undercover 
espionage of environmental activists and indigenous groups (personal communication), 
particularly involved in the energy and mining sectors, as well as the monitoring of resistance 
groups (Lubbers, 2002). It had been realised, as intelligence expert Roy Godson rightly 
predicted, that “manipulating NGOs would become one of the most effective means for 
companies to destabilize rivals and adversaries in the future” (in Lubbers, 2002). The 
consultancy has been criticised for being “closely associated” with “individuals and agencies 
involved in supplying mercenary assistance to governments and mining companies” (Moody, 
2001). The CRG collaborated with the MMSD and co-hosted a conference on corporate social 
responsibility issues in London in 2001 (Moody, 2001). 
Other actors who have been important to the credibility of ‘green mining’ are academics and 
church groups. Social scientists, especially anthropologists, have long been working as 
consultants, mediators or “brokers” for mining companies (e.g. Ballard and Banks, 2003). Most 
notable is maybe the Kellogg Innovation Centre (KIN) of the US-American Kellogg School of 
Management, one of the most highly ranked (and expensive) business schools in the world. The 
KIN was founded in 2003 by business leaders and academics and is advertised as “a unique 
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network of networks, one that crosses sectors— business, government, non-profit, arts, 
sciences, academia, defence—and literally spans the globe” (KIN, n.d.). The KIN Catalyst for the 
Mining Company of the Future, co-chaired by the Anglo American Chief Executive Mark Cutifani 
and KIN senior fellow Peter Bryant, aims to “recast the mining business model as a development 
partnership, working with stakeholders rather than at odds with them to pursue shared goals of 
prosperity” (KIN, n.d.). In 2011, KIN organised a five-day international conference on the 
challenges of the mining industry, with mining corporations, NGOs and indigenous groups, 
investors, researchers, and governments. The conference was financed by Anglo American, 
Caterpillar, AngloGold Ashanti, General Electric and other companies.39 The meeting initiated 
close dialogue with the Vatican, including a series of ‘Days of Reflection’ held at the Vatican, and 
similar dialogues with other church leaders (such as the Church of England and the Methodist 
Church) that are now happening across the world (KIN, n.d.).  
Individual social and natural scientists have also been involved in green mining. Presenting the 
findings of the EU-funded ‘Flexible and Mobile Economic Processing Technologies’ project, for 
instance, Anders Sand and colleagues showcase how to build social acceptance of the mining 
industry in the Nordic/European context (Sand et al., 2016). Strategies include “community 
involvement initiatives” (including a music festival inside a Finnish open pit mine), sponsorship 
of a Swedish basketball team, “trust-building exercises” with Swedish Sami communities, and 
open-door days for children in a Finnish gold mine (Sand et al., 2016). They warn their corporate 
audience that negative attitudes towards mining should be attributed to “fear, overestimating 
risks and impacts, or past negative experiences”, before admitting that they “can, however, also 
be legitimate” (Sand et al., 2016: 20). To increase acceptance, they recommend changes in 
educational mining degrees: the “modification of technical education” to include 
“communication skills (e.g. negotiation), social and environmental aspects” as well as lifelong 
learning initiatives involving ‘soft skills’ for mining professionals (Sand et al., 2016: 22). The role 
of academia, they advocate, should be facilitating stakeholder dialogue meetings – in other 
words lending their legitimacy to support mining vis-à-vis resistance (Sand et al., 2016). 
International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the EC have been supporting 
such academic involvement in green mining. The EC advocates for ‘greening mining’ to ensure 
raw material provision for competitiveness as well as the legitimacy of electricity provision 
(energy union) and its special role in the single European market (chapter four). The DG Growth 
(Internal market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) finances a sustainable mining research 
                                                          
39 The advisory council includes, interestingly, Melissa Rowe, vice president of RAND corporation and Reverend Séamus Finn from 
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, among others. 
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project (EC, n.d.d) as part of the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials. The OECD’s 
International Energy Agency, together with the Coal Industry Advisory Board, has collected 
“Case Studies in Sustainable Development in the Coal Industry” (OECD/IEA and COAB, 2006), 
and the British Department for International Development and the German Development 
Agency (with partners) set up a Sustainable Mining project targeting Chinese mining 
investments (EMM, 2016). 
5.4. Offsetting mining impacts – introducing the offsetting-extraction nexus 
Large conservation organisations had become increasingly enthusiastic about green mining and 
offsetting. In 2000, Conservation International published its “Guide to Responsible Large-scale 
Mining” in which offsetting was recommended to increase “the overall conservation benefits” 
of mining (Rosenfeld Sweeting and Clark, 2000). In 2003, IUCN and ICMM organised a joint 
workshop at the IUCN headquarters in Switzerland entitled “Mining, Protected Areas and 
Biodiversity Conservation: Searching and Pursuing Best Practice and Reporting in the Mining 
Industry”. Participants – among them Kerry ten Kate, and high-level representatives of Rio Tinto, 
Conservation International, Flora and Fauna International and IUCN – agreed “to explore the 
use of biodiversity offsets in recognition that there may be a point at which investment in 
biodiversity off sets provides greater social, environmental and economic benefits than trying to 
mitigate all impacts” (ICMM, 2005: 2; Benabou, 2014: 105).40  
A year later, Earthworks and Oxfam launched their “No Dirty Gold” campaign which involved a 
critical report against the mining industry, “Dirty Metals: Mining, Communities and the 
Environment” (2004). The campaign, Sarah Benabou argues, triggered 
a coordinated response on several fronts. On the one hand, the ICMM immediately 
responded by insisting on the fact that this report failed to take into account its 
commitments made during the MMSD process ... On the other hand, Kerry ten Kate 
undertook a series of interviews with major industrial players to clarify the concept of 
biodiversity off sets and make it relevant for business (2014: 105-6). 
The same year saw the foundation of BBOP and the publication of Kerry ten Kate, Josh Bishop 
and Ricardo Bayon’s report on the “business case” for offsets (2004). At the 2004 IUCN World 
Conservation Congress in Bangkok, Rio Tinto representatives ceremonially announced their 
collaboration with IUCN with the aim to have a NPI on biodiversity (Turner, 2014). Other NGOs 
that embraced offsets included WWF and Care International – “much to the frustration of mine-
affected communities” (Whitmore, 2006: 310). Simultaneously, the mining industry, supported 
                                                          
40 In the same year, the oil and gas sector started exploring the use of biodiversity offsets through the Energy and Biodiversity 
Initiative (EBI, 2003; Benabou, 2014). 
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by international financial institutions, continued to promote sustainable mining as part of the 
liberalisation of national mining codes, such as the National Minerals Policy in the Philippines 
(Whitmore, 2006).  
NGOs, partnerships and offsetting 
More mining-conservation partnerships around offsetting were established, as conservation 
organisations started to engage with business: Flora and Fauna International set up 
partnerships with Anglo-American, eni and Rio Tinto; Earthwatch Institute initiated a 
partnership with Rio Tinto; Conservation International began engaging with the mining sector in 
2000 through their Centre for Environmental Leadership and Business and collaborated with at 
least 11 different mining companies in 14 countries in the following ten years (Smuts, 2010). In 
2014, 70% of ICMM members reported to have biodiversity partnerships in place (IUCN and 
ICMM, 2014: 3) – many with large conservation or development organisations (such as WWF or 
Oxfam America), faith organisations (especially the Catholic Church) and international financial 
institutions. Some of these partnerships are also financially supported by the EC through the 
Business and Biodiversity Campaign (financed with LIFE funding money). 
The role of conservation organisations is to grant the project credibility and legitimacy, to 
contribute ecological expertise, to lend the offsetting project the image of a credible scientific 
process and to select ‘offset currencies’ and ‘offset ratios’. They further bring in the metrics and 
measurements that form part of environmental impact assessments and help to quantify 
mining impacts. As Mehrhad Nazari, environmental consultant at Prizma LLC, and Don Proebstel 
of Gold Reserve Inc. describe:  
NGOs can assist in assessing and validating baselines and benchmarks, selecting 
appropriate “offset currency” and indicators (hectares, trees or frogs?), identifying 
eligible components in view of the project specific context (planting trees, capacity 
building or trading-up to higher biodiversity priorities?) and use of multipliers (two trees 
planted for each tree removed?) (2009: 43). 
Companies rely on the credibility and legitimacy of these organisations: “Without the 
involvement of legitimate NGOs, most BDO [Biodiversity Offsetting] concepts may not gain 
credibility and would not be able to contribute to a social license” (Nazari and Proebstel, 2009: 
43). Conservation organisations further deliver the tools needed for the surveillance and 
monitoring of areas and local populations who are excluded from the areas, potentially 
contributing to their criminalisation and the militarisation of conservation areas (Duffy, 2016; 
Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). In addition, these partnerships help neutralise critique and 
create divisions in the environmental movement, triggering protest from grassroot 
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organisations who often oppose these partnerships (Brock and Dunlap, 2017, chapter six). Andy 
Whitmore from the Mines and Communities Network has warned that the industry may be  
using bodies of engagement, such as the MMSD, to seek out northern – often 
environmental – NGOs that it feels it can work with. This tactic is frequently used 
to isolate those who are critical of mining, but the worst part of the situation is 
that these organisations are then taken to represent ‘civil society’ positions on 
mining and therefore, to speak on behalf of communities who have never 
endorsed such an arrangement. Understanding and dealing with the different 
groups within ‘civil society’, and as a result dealing directly with affected 
communities, is essential to establishing real trust (2006: 313). 
Church groups and academic institutions also lend legitimacy and “symbolic capital” (Kirsch, 
2014: 181). Jutta Kill and Giulia Franchi’s case study of Rio Tinto’s Madagascar offsetting project 
illustrates this: following a community meeting to discuss the offsetting activities that was 
described as ‘fiasco' by participants, the next meeting was arranged (by collaborating NGO 
representatives) to take place in the local church, to start with a church service followed by 
discussion of the offset project (2016). The aim was to “avoid disruption”, based on the 
expectation “that people would remain calmer in a church” (Kill and Franchi, 2016: 14).  
In 2001, the GMI and MMSD had founded the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) to improve the social and environmental performance of the industry, bringing together 
23 mining and metals companies and 30 regional and commodities associations. The council, 
which claims to “serve as a catalyst for change; enhancing mining’s contribution to society” 
(ICMM, 2017), drew up the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework, a voluntary and widely 
criticised41 initiative. The initiative is based on ten principles derived from industry-led 
standards, and was adopted in May 2003. ICMM members are obliged to report their 
performance in accordance with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. In collaboration 
with the ICMM, the GRI has developed a mining-specific standard for sustainability reporting: 
the GRI Mining and Metals Sector Supplement (piloted in 2005). 
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, IUCN and ICMM launched a 
controversial partnership that further institutionalised offsetting as part of ‘green mining’ – but 
was quickly re-framed as IUCN-ICMM Dialogue following protest by IUCN members, 
environmental and social NGOs, and indigenous peoples’ groups (Canadian Network for 
Corporate Accountability, 2006). Its aim was to establish ‘Good Practice Guidance for Mining 
and Biodiversity’ as well as biodiversity ‘reporting criteria’. They wrote an “[i]ndependent report 
on biodiversity offsets” (2013) and commissioned a ‘biodiversity performance review’, prepared 
                                                          
41 See for instance CNCA (2006). 
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by environmental consultants of Global Balance and The Biodiversity Consultancy (IUCN and 
ICMM, 2014), drawing from Insight Investment’s biodiversity benchmark, Fauna & Flora 
International’s Natural Value Initiative and the Mining Association of Canada’s ‘Towards 
Sustainable Mining Initiative’. Although increasingly hidden in glossy brochures and project 
descriptions, biodiversity offsets form the very foundation of these partnerships, as the final but 
crucial element for any biodiversity strategy and mitigation hierarchy.  
By 2002, sustainable mining had made it into the post-Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN, 2002), which also saw the launch of EITI, 
the self-proclaimed “global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources” 
(EITI, n.d.). The initiative is supposed to “help citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold 
their governments accountable for the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining 
industries” (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006; PWYP, n.d), focusing on issues of corruption and so-
called ‘good governance’ to respond to increasing evidence of the destructive social and 
ecological impacts of these operations. Signatories include the very same corporations profiting 
from this exploitation, such as Anglo American, Rio Tinto and Newmont.  
In July 2005, following internal debates and discussions with members, the ICMM published a 
proposition paper and a briefing paper on biodiversity offsets (ICMM, 2005a, 2005b) thatclearly 
display the influence of – and cross-reference – Kerry ten Kate, IUCN, Fauna & Flora 
International and Rio Tinto’s work (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon, 2004). The two papers re-
position the industry as central not only to tackling biodiversity loss but also to poverty 
alleviation, electricity, water, housing and transport provision as well as equitable development. 
Offsets, particularly the rehabilitation of brownfield sites, were to make the industry 
biodiversity-neutral and compensate for its negative biodiversity impacts (ICMM, 2005a, 
2005b).  
The close relationship between these initiatives and BBOP is not just grounded in personal 
connections, and particularly the role of Kerry ten Kate; the mining industry continues to play a 
structurally important role in BBOP. Until 2016, its Executive Committee was chaired by Sophie 
le Pennec, director of the Environment Group of French mining corporation ERAMET, and five 
of the ten corporate members of the BBOP Advisory Group belong to the mining sector. BBOP 
has published a document entitled “Offsetting Environmental Impacts to Facilitate Mining” 
(Fish, Snashall and Streater, n.d., emphasis added), and many of the case studies and pilot 
projects that are so important for the development and reproduction of the offsetting industry 
involve mining companies. At the same time, biodiversity offsetting has become a central 
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mechanism in the repositioning of the transnational mining industry to manage reputational 
and regulatory risks. Through implementation on the ground and institutionalisation into 
organisational structures, offsetting has come to constitute an important tool for the industry to 
achieve this ‘sustainability’; to manage the ‘risk’ of resistance and legislative changes, to ensure 
continued capital accumulation through investments, and to secure investors’ confidence. 
Beyond partnerships: dialogue through offsets, making risks legible and redefining sustainability 
Beyond their role as mobilisers of corporate conservation partnerships and other novel 
alliances, offsetting projects act as anchors for processes of participation, stakeholder 
engagement and dialogue. It is by means of discussions of offsetting initiatives (sometimes 
presented as ‘mere’ conservation activities to communities) that ‘stakeholders’ are brought 
together in community meetings (Kill and Franchi, 2016), but also in international offsetting 
conferences and corporate conservation conventions, such as the RWE recultivation 
conference. They thus fulfil a second important function: to make the risks associated with 
resistance (or “stakeholder expectations”) legible and to generate data to materialise these 
risks. The resulting environmental performance data is then communicated and further 
analysed, legitimised and materialised by a new industry of professionals surrounding the 
offsetting practice – including the corporate-financed GRI and the CDP (formerly Carbon 
Disclosure Project). The third function lies in generating or anchoring other forms of PR and 
outreach, enabling the industry to position itself at the forefront of sustainability and to 
contribute to the capturing of imaginations of a (better) future – effectively helping to enrol, co-
opt and divide-and-conquer the conservation community and local populations (as explored in 
chapter six).  
Making mining ‘sustainable’ has required a re-definition and further watering down of the 
concept of sustainability, positioning mining as a “development industry”, and reducing 
sustainability to a simple promise to “co-inspire, co-collaborate, co-innovate and co-educate” 
(KIN, 2015: 1-2). Through these discursive moves, ‘sustainability’ becomes depoliticised as 
technological innovation and redefined as long-term socioeconomic responsibility and profit 
opportunity that exceeds the duration of the mine, with depletion compensated by long-lasting 
wealth generation (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006). Indeed, the very idea of sustainability has 
come to be employed as ‘mobilising device’, or what Bonnie Urciuoli (in conversation with 
Michael Silverstein) calls a “strategically deployable shifter” (2003: 396). This is visible in the 
important role of offsetting initiatives in corporate CSR reporting, where mining companies play 
a leading role, frequently winning reporting awards and receiving praise for their reporting 
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standards (Rajak, 2011a). Already in the early 2000s, a survey by KPMG showed that the mining 
industry was moving towards a ‘leadership position’ in the disclosure industry (2002), and in 
2013 companies continued to deliver what KPMG call the “highest quality CR reports” (2013: 
13). Given the intense levels of resistance against many mining projects, it comes as no surprise 
that the mining and metals sectors score highest for “identifying key stakeholders” in their 
reporting (KPMG, 2013: 17). These (voluntary) reporting commitments have been analysed as 
“declaratory diplomacy” (Newell, 2000: 33) and serve to pre-empt the launch of specialist 
biodiversity metrics by major stock market indices to inform their investors about investment 
exposure to ‘biodiversity related risks’ (Rayment and McNeil, 2014). 
In addition to CSR disclosure awards, the industry has been praised for their green mining 
efforts. Following the establishment of the offsetting project for its ilmenite mine in Madagascar 
as part of its then-recent NPI policy (Seagle, 2012; Kill and Franchi, 2016), Rio Tinto’s QIT 
Madagascar Minerals (QMM) received the Nedbank Capital Green Mining Award in 2009 
(Prinsloo, 2009). The well-studied project has been criticised not only for failing to fulfil the NPI 
objective (Virah-Sawmy, 2014), but also for resulting in a double-landgrab from local 
communities (Kill and Franchi, 2016). The Green Mining award, itself another example of 
spectacle in service of corporate interests, is meant to honour “significant effort[s] in terms of 
protecting or improving the biophysical environment in which [a company] operates” (Prinsloo, 
2009). In ‘Mining Weekly’, QMM’s work is described as “building capacity for better use of the 
natural resources in Madagascar” and as effecting “long reaching and positive effects for 
society” (Prinsloo, 2009). “Active engagement with local, national and international 
stakeholders”, QMM’s representative is cited, “has been fundamental to the success of the 
project”. What is not mentioned in the piece are the company’s deliberate lies to communities 
about the offsetting project and its refusal to take seriously the concerns of local communities, 
as documented in detail by Jutta Kill and Giulia Franch (2016). Instead, sustainability is reframed 
– or performed – as extensive engagement with aid agencies and international institutions for 
capacity building and environmental protection programmes, in addition to the supposed NPI 
on the country’s biodiversity; establishing the company at the forefront of the sustainability 
frontier. 
5.5. Green mining of cleaner coal? 
In addition to these GMI/MMSD process and individual projects, green mining has been 
institutionalised in a number of sector- or regionally specific initiatives (such as the Canadian 
project ‘Towards Sustainable Mining’). In this section, I will focus on European initiatives, and 
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particularly the Bettercoal initiative. While most recent mining expansion has taken place in 
Latin America, Africa and Asia, many mine operators are European(-listed) companies, and have 
been at the forefront of ‘green mining’. New large mining operations have become scarce in 
Europe, but recently proposed new projects (such as Nant Llesg) or proposed project expansion 
plans (Ffos-y-fran, both in Wales) have incorporated offsetting into project applications. Other 
mining projects (such as RWE’s coal mines) are already being offset. Noteworthy in the coal 
sector are the US American ‘cleancoal’ marketing campaign – popularised in 2008 under threat 
of climate change regulation – and the international ‘Bettercoal’ initiative. The latter, an 
international initiative that is meant to ‘green’ the international anthracite coal supply chain is 
of particular interest in this research, as it was founded and led by German coal mine operator 
and electricity provider RWE, whose offsetting activities will be analysed in the next chapter. 
The initiative has incorporated offsetting into its code of conduct. 
Whereas some scholarly attention has been paid to the relationship between minerals mining 
and biodiversity offsetting (Sullivan, 2013b; Seagle, 2012; Kill and Franchi, 2016), and 
particularly the development of “green uranium” (Sullivan et al., 2016), the relationship 
between coal mining and biodiversity offsetting remains under-researched, with the 
noteworthy exception of Helen Tregidga’s analysis of the biodiversity offsetting practices of 
Solid Energy, a state-owned coal-mining company in New Zealand (2013). Yet, many – 
particularly opencast coal mine operators – have increasingly started to offset, while others 
have engaged in compensation for decades. In Australia and New Zealand, offsetting is legally 
required and frequently criticised; in Australia, the cabinet’s decision to allow for post-mine 
closure tree planting – as part of the rehabilitation of the site – to count as offsetting, triggered 
strong opposition from its own environmental department as well as the public (Hannam, 
2016). The incident illustrates the use of offsetting to facilitate coal mining, which continues to 
hold strategic importance to many governments. 
The coal industry is interesting for a number of reasons. Few industries are as hard to ‘green’ as 
the coal industry, due to its contribution to climate change and the irreversible ecological 
damage that coal mining – particularly opencast – causes. Particularly in Germany, Europe’s coal 
champion, the industry has proven particularly immune to climate change and environmental 
legislation, and employs an extraordinarily strong lobby (chapter six). At the same time, 
resistance against coal mining has been growing, with a diversity of actions taken against mines 
and power station intensifying. In May 2016, as part of the global campaign ‘Break Free from 
Fossil Fuels’, an estimated 30,000 people practised civil disobedience and direct action against 
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coal mines, risking arrest, to interrupt mining. Images and videos of these actions were watched 
and shared by hundreds of thousands of people, triggering renewed debate around coal.  
The industry has had to respond to the increasing NGO pressure as well as associated risks of 
stricter legislation and legal action against companies (interviewees; Löchte, 2013). In response 
to, and in expectation of, the anticipated increase of coal import for European electricity 
production and associated regulatory and reputational risks – in other words, to neutralise 
critique before it could negatively affect the corporations’ bottom lines – Europe’s largest coal 
importers, under RWE leadership, set up the Bettercoal initiative. The initiative claims to tackle 
supply chain issues related to the import of coal. Founding members, apart from RWE, include 
DONG Energy, EDF, Enel, E.ON, GDF SUEZ and Vattenfall. Since the foundation of the initiative, 
Fortum, Gas Natural Fenosa, Drax Power, EDP and Iberdrola have joined. As a senior 
representative of the initiative explains to me: “The buyers understood a) that they were going 
to be asked questions about their supply chain, and b) they were going to be asked to account 
for it”. In collaboration with consultants and NGOs, they set up the initiative and started 
working on a ‘code of conduct’, an ‘assessment toolkit’ as well as a ‘guidelines’ document.  
The initiative was formed in 2010 and registered as ‘non-profit’ in 2012. It grew out of the 
‘Dutch coal dialogue’, a “true” stakeholder dialogue that was achieving “real progress on 
transparency in the coal supply chain”, I was told by one interviewee who was involved in the 
dialogue. “Bettercoal killed the dialogue”, the campaigner explains. The initiative states to aim 
for “continuous improvement of corporate social responsibility, including social, environmental, 
and ethical practices, in the coal supply chain” (Bettercoal, 2013), to be achieved through 
engagement with stakeholders and mine operators to develop guidance on, and implement, 
responsible mining. ‘Bettercoal tools’ are meant to help companies “to improve good practices 
to protect workers, local communities and the environment from the potential negative impact 
of coal mining”, and follow-up of progress and reports are meant to be part of the continuous 
improvement objective (Bettercoal, 2013). Mine operators are asked to perform self-
assessments and accept independent site-assessments by third party assessors (chosen by 
Bettercoal) at the mine level, the results of which stay confidential. Members are meant to 
incorporate the results of the assessments into their due diligence processes and as a result be 
able to make better informed coal purchasing decisions. Underlying is the idea to take 
responsibility over the coal supply chain – improving practice through stakeholder engagement 
and the adoption of standards – to strengthen their licence to operate and construct an imagine 
as ‘responsible companies’. For this purpose, the initiative represented itself as a “multi-
stakeholder initiative” early on, involving, among others, Fauna and Flora International – 
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involved in (controversial) partnerships with Rio Tinto, BP, ChevronTexaco, Shell and others – in 
their Stakeholder advisory group42 and consulting with social justice and environmental groups 
during the setup of the initiative “to increase credibility”, as one research participant tells me. 
The first and the current chairs of the initiative’s board of directors are both from RWE. 
Making the coal supply chain ‘sustainable’ involves a number of managerial strategies including 
assessments, identification of good practice, standard setting, ‘independent’ certification, 
audits, stakeholder engagement as well as the requirement to offset, laid out in a number of 
guidance documents including the ‘Bettercoal Code Assessment Guidelines’; the ‘Bettercoal 
Code Self-Assessment’ and the ‘Bettercoal Code Assessment Procedures’. The code involves a 
number of principles, including compliance with national and international law, and requires 
companies to contribute to sustainable development and to “integrate practices that protect 
and support Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services impacted by their operations, throughout the 
life cycle of the mine” (Bettercoal, 2013: 5). Its original Code already required biodiversity 
impact assessments and compliance with the mitigation hierarchy, including offsets, reinforced 
by more recent requirements to comply with IFC performance standards.  
The initiative has been criticised for allowing mining in national parks and other protected areas, 
as long as it involves offsetting (ActionAid et al., 2014). In addition, critics argue, while the 
initiative presents itself as a multi-stakeholder initiative, e.g. by including a representative from 
a labour union and a large conservation NGO on their advisory board, it is clearly “designed by 
and for energy companies” (ActionAid et al., 2014, emphasis added). A minority of members of 
the “Technical & Advisory Committee” consists of non-industry “experts”, but the decision 
making structure is composed solely of industry representatives. Whereas the initiative claims 
to “take responsibility” (Löchte, 2013), its members and their suppliers cannot actually be held 
accountable for failing to address human rights violations and ecological disasters that have 
occurred in their mines (ActionAid et al., 2014). Two of RWE’s suppliers, for instance, are the 
infamous Columbian Cerrajón mine, established on indigenous land and leading to the 
displacement of the Wayüu nomad people (Lennox, 2012; Gedicks, 2003), and Drummond mine 
that made headlines for the murder of trade union activists (Rosser, 2015). The language of 
audits, accountability and responsibility hides the lack of decision making power of communities 
affected by coal mining – whereas corporations are required to ‘consult’ communities, the 
consultation does not need to be taken into account in corporate decision making. While this 
                                                          
42 Others include: Rio Tinto‘s Principal Advisor on coal; the senior vice president of ‘Equitable Origin’, an oil production site 
certification scheme; a senior advisor at the social justice organisation IKV Pax Christi; the Environment, Health and Safety 
Committee Lead at Glencore; a university lecturer; the Health, Safety and Sustainability Officer at IndustriALL Global Union; and the 
General Manager, Sustainable Development at Xstrata Coal. 
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language of accountability and transparency is persuasive, it covers up that Bettercoal neither 
actually reports – internally or externally – on its members’ purchasing decisions (ActionAid et 
al., 2014), nor publicly on their performance, one campaigner explains. The audits and self-
assessments are criticised as “absolutely insufficient” by another research participant, while the 
institutionalisation of community engagement aims to co-opt protest. 
In line with other green mining initiatives, Bettercoal serves as an illustrative example of how 
bad media attention is being managed, as Joachim Löchte states openly (2013). The initiative 
helps improve credibility and ensure that no legal action is taken against European companies, 
while having become a benchmark for auditing without being held accountable, grounded in 
discourses of transparency and responsibility. Yet, for civil society actors, tracing where coal is 
sourced continues to be impossible (ActionAid et al., 2014). Bad practice is framed according to 
the ‘bad apple principle’, and a number of technocratic solutions are presented to deal with 
these bad apples. “Risks are stage-managed”, a corporate research participant explains to me, 
where “credibility and transparency” matter. For RWE, who continue to play the leading role in 
the initiative, Bettercoal thus serves to outsource critique – through constant referral to the 
initiative vis-à-vis critics – and deflects from their own responsibility and role in environmental 
and social degradation. The “forward looking approach” of “continuous improvement” that 
defines the initiative helps invisibilise past ecological and social destruction and violence. In the 
spirit of ‘green mining’, the initiative thus serves to keep NGOs “at arm’s length”, a campaigner 
describes, to prevent substantive changes to their operations and to “greenwash” the industry 
(Ganswindt, Rötters and Schücking, 2013).  
5.6. Conclusion 
In recent decades, Peter Benson argues, “multinational corporations have strategically turned 
to a language of social responsibility and civic virtue to legitimize corporate activities with 
negative human and environmental consequences” (2012: 56; see also Rajak, 2011a), using 
idioms of ethics, health, environmentalism and corporate responsibilities. This involves the use 
and construction of “corporate oxymorons” which “conceal the harm caused by corporations to 
people and environments [and form part of] a larger set of strategies used by corporations to 
manage or neutralize critique” (Benson and Kirsch, 2010: 45). Green mining is an illustrative 
example of this process, involving a diversity of strategies – from the adoption of audit culture 
to offsetting – to manage critique. What is crucial to understand, however, is the way the 
industry’s conservation activities and sustainability discourses ‘speak to each other’ (cf. Seagle, 
2012). Green mining could only become reality because the ideologically compelling narrative 
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was complemented by corporate practices to feed into the narrative, including offsetting (which 
itself depends on compelling discourses and ‘spectacle’). These discursive articulations are 
manifest in CSR reports and case study presentations, glossy brochures and CSR awards. These 
practices and discourses represent an important change in the way corporations now rely on a 
variety of strategies and novel imaginaries (Brock and Dunlap, 2017) to deal with, and to 
neutralise, critique and resistance both on the ground and through increasingly 
transnationalised civil society campaigns. These strategies depend on good PR consultants, the 
willingness of conservation organisations, academics, and civil society organisations to 
collaborate, and therewith legitimise their practices, and the implicit or explicit engagement and 
support of government actors. In addition to lending legitimacy and credibility to these 
operations – entrenching their corporate role as good corporate citizens of legitimate states – 
this contributes to the re-shaping of biodiversity governance. 
Although the powerful role and private authority exercised by transnational mining 
corporations through initiatives such as the GMI, the ICME, the ICMM or the Bettercoal 
initiative is undeniable (Dashwood, 2012: 7), that is maybe not the most interesting effect of 
green mining and the institutionalisation of offsetting in the (now green) mining industry. More 
importantly, it is crucial to examine how they converge with state interests, and how these 
strategies are mobilised to control, suppress resistance, and ensure the smooth accumulation of 
capital and consolidation of state and corporate power (as will be explored in the case study in 
chapter six). In addition, the wider effects of these processes deserve attention. This private 
institutionalisation and pushing of offsetting has had consequences beyond corporate business 
operations and management. Mining companies, led by Rio Tinto, have been among the most 
active participants in BBOP as well as the European Biodiversity and Business platform, and in 
their development of standards and guidelines that influence EU policy makers and financial 
institutions. Offsetting initiatives by private actors have contributed to a wider transformation 
of biodiversity governance – visible in the ongoing struggle inside the EC – where corporate 
interests became ever more institutionalised and where more substantial mandatory legislative 
requirements or regulations is pre-empted. Cecile Bidaud and colleagues argue that “[e]arly 
adoption and proactive participation in these [offsetting] initiatives provides companies with 
the opportunity to influence international policy processes and provide technical guidance in 
this rapidly evolving field” (Bidaud, Hrabanski and Meral, 2015: 181). The key word here is 
‘technical guidance’, which hides the very political assumptions and decisions behind it. The 
Biodiversity Consultancy, which provides guidance and advice on offsetting to companies, is 
rather blunt about these opportunities; in its overview of the opportunities of offsetting for 
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corporations it recommends the “[c]onversion of offsets into flagship environmental and social 
projects within an overall corporate biodiversity strategy that aims to enhance the social licence 
to operate and goes beyond legislative requirements to demonstrate a company’s values” and 
promotes “[c]ompetitive advantage through custom-built offsets and the potential to inform or 
even shape government guidance, if clear policies do not exist” (TBC, 2014, emphasis in 
original).  
“The production and reproduction of structural violence”, Susanne Soederberg (as many others) 
has argued, is “inherent to accumulation. The role of capitalist states through their various 
modes of governance is to (continually) attempt to depoliticise and manage this violence” 
(2016: 1). In few industries is this violence as visible as in mining. Whereas to contain this 
violence, these managerial technologies have come to be framed in the language of markets; 
emphasising a separation between social and economic phenomena, individualising blame and 
responsibility (assigning it to particular corporations, for instance) and appealing to ‘rational 
behaviour’ (Soederberg, 2016), I hope to have shown how they operate as social technologies of 
governance to manage this violence and the resistance it triggers. These technologies are 
presented as apolitical, technocratic solutions, but serve to normalise and invisibilise the 
violence, the destructiveness of extractive industries and state-supported industrial growth, 
intensifying under neoliberalism (Bruff, 2016). Biodiversity offsetting serves to draw in 
conservation organisations, the offsetting industry and academics into the world of corporate 
conservation and green mining; anchoring corporations as saviours of biodiversity; ‘greening’ 
their operations and sometimes even legitimising cultural genocide through displacement and 
destruction of social and political structures in communities and social relationships (Padel and 
Das, 2010). These processes play into and reinforce narratives (and realities) of risk and audit - 
through co-option of once radical demands for transparency and accountability, and through 
pacification by means of spectacular conservation efforts that are meant to compensate for 





6. Licence to operate – licence to trash – licence to pacify? Biodiversity 
offsetting in the German lignite coal mining sector 
 [Compensatory] Recultivation is our business card for us mining companies ... It continues to be 
important to us to remain a reliable neighbour (RWE’s recultivation conference, 2017) 
The German state of North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) is not only the most densely populated 
area of Germany, but it is also home to the largest lignite coal deposit of Europe with some 55 
billion tonnes of coal. Much of the landscape is shaped by mining operations that were 
undertaken as early as the 16th century, as “[i]ncreasingly large opencast mines were moving 
‘through the landscape, devastating the original landscape on the working benches and 
establishing new landscapes on top of the mine’s backfill’” (Imboden and Moczek, 2015; citing 
Dworschak) – landscapes that are now dominated by industrial agriculture, high speed transport 
and electricity infrastructure, a dense network of cities and towns as well as some remnants of 
the old-growth forests that once covered the area.  
The last remaining one of these forests is the Hambacher Forst (figure 17), a highly biodiverse 
old-growth forest that is currently being cleared to give way to the expansion, or, in the words 
of RWE, the ‘migration’, of the Hambach mine – one of three lignite coal mines in the 
Rhineland, the world’s largest opencast lignite mine (Schmitz, 2006) and Europe’s ‘biggest hole’ 
(Michel, 2005: 16) (figure 18). Half of the landscape that once covered the mine area was 
forested, half of the forested area consisted of deciduous forests, “potentially the forests with 
the highest structural diversity and biodiversity composition in the region, and also likely to 
harbour species of special interest and concern” (Imboden and Moczek, 2015: 15). The 
Hambacher Forst – historically managed as communal land – constitutes what German 
biologists call a Maiglöckchen-Stieleichen-Hainbuchenwald, a type of forest characterised by 
lilies of the valley, pedunculate oaks and European hornbeam, protected under the EU Habitat 
Directive (Jansen, 2012). It is home to the endangered middle-spotted woodpecker, protected 






Figure 17 Hambacher Forst (own photo) 
 
 
Figure 18 The migrating mine (Perschke, 2012) 
The Hambacher Forst fulfils all requirements of the Habitats Directive to be recognised as a 
protected area and become a Natura2000 site – it is home to 142 species of special importance, 
including twelve strictly protected bat species (BUND, 2012). Yet, only two small areas located 
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outside of the mining area have been reported to the EC – against EU law, according to the 
German FoE group, BUND, who are currently suing the German government to stop all forest 
clearance on the basis of this omission. To compensate for the clearing of the Hambacher Forst, 
and especially the endangered Bechstein’s bat habitat, the mining company is legally required 
not only to recultivate the mining area after mine closure, but to implement additional 
compensation measures, or offsets (Ausgleichsmaßnahmen in German nature protection law). 
These measures are mandatory under German law: the mining laws that require restoration of 
mining areas, the German Nature Protection Law that prescribes the Impact Mitigation 
Regulation (explained in the introduction), as well as the EU Habitats Directive that dictates 
compensation for the loss of habitat of threatened species. Compensation measures for the 
Bechstein’s bat include 700ha of ‘bat infrastructure’ to connect remaining fragments of old 
woodland surrounding the mine and a €4 million ‘green bridge’ over the nearby A61 highway to 
serve as “crossing aid for the bats from Hambach Forst” (RWE AG, 2015a: 53). The most 
important compensation measure, however, is the newly restored natural area Sophienhöhe. 
The Sophienhöhe is an artificial low mountain range – the largest artificial mountain in the world 
– covering 13km2, with a height of 280m and praised for its ecological success in recreating 
habitat for number of species – as well as, coincidentally, a convenient way to dispose of the 
initial 2.2 billion m3 overburden (soil) that were generated in the first six years of the mining 
operation – before any lignite layers were reached at all (Imboden and Moczek, 2015). This 
mountain of ‘overburden’ has been restored and reforested following reclamation, blending 
and depositing of soil, to offset the destruction of the Hambacher Forst. While compensation 
measures are a legal requirement for mining operators in Germany, the Sophienhöhe goes 
much beyond these legal requirements. Historically, the company has always invested massively 
in recultivation and offsets – but these efforts have intensified even more so in recent years. 
RWE’s offsetting activities are embedded in a diversity of strategies, undertaken by RWE and 
the state of NRW, to manage resistance against its mining activities.  
The displacement and resettlements of homes, associated air pollution and the environmental 
destruction necessary for the ‘migrating mine’ has triggered resistance, beginning in the 1970s 
and continuing into the present – with citizen initiatives, mass-protests and a forest occupation 
attempting to block the expansion of the mine. Environmental activists initiated a campaign 
against RWE’s three coal mines in the Rhineland, with annual climate camps and mass-civil 
disobedience since 2010. Others engage in human chains, demonstrations, art performances, 
nature walks and legal battles against RWE. In 2012, forest defenders occupied the 
neighbouring Hambacher Forst to stop the mine. In November, over a four-day period, they 
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were forcefully removed by over 500 police officers in what is alleged to be the most expensive 
eviction in German police history. Following the eviction, a local resident bought land next to 
the forest to host a permanent protest camp. Shortly thereafter, the Hambacher Forst was 
reoccupied, and now serves as a permanent point of resistance against the mine. Forest 
defenders began living in tree houses to protect the forest, while working to stop the migrating 
mine, through road barricades, tree platforms, tree-spiking and the placement of ‘potential 
improvised explosive devices’43, and sabotage of coal-transportation infrastructure. Militant and 
peaceful protests actions have been met with increasing repression by security and police 
personnel.  
This violent repression complements a diversity of soft corporate strategies to secure 
acceptance of, and pacify resistance against the mine, anchored in RWE’s sustained ‘greening’ 
activities – most notably its offsetting work – which plays into a multiplicity of PR campaigns and 
CSR measures that RWE has engaged in for decades. RWE’s nature compensation work plays a 
fundamental role in lending legitimacy to – and ‘greening’ – RWE’s mining operations, by, firstly, 
acting as anchor for stakeholder engagement and partnerships, co-opting critics and dividing-
and-conquering the conservation community; secondly, establishing RWE as ‘good corporate 
citizen and responsible neighbour’; and thirdly, and most importantly, invisibilising the slow 
violence inherent in coal mining, and the violence exercised against those who resist its 
operations. It constitutes what Douglas Rogers has called a “corporate social technology” 
(2012), complemented by ‘soft’ strategies of co-option and engineering of consent as well as 
‘hard’ strategies of criminalisation and violent repression of resistance – while constructing the 
myth of ‘sustainable coal’ and maintaining a supportive regulatory environment. Offsetting – 
and RWE’s recultivation work more widely – I will show, has always been fundamental to this 
“engineering of consent”, the company’s licence to operate, its image as “good corporate 
citizen, and its claims to “upgrade nature” – of creating a “better nature” and a “better future” 
– through the use of spectacle, imaginaries and narratives to capture imaginations. RWE’s 
offsetting work forms the foundation for much of their outreach, communication and PR work – 
including tours through the offsetting area, scientific collaborations, educational material, 
environmental education activities, and partnerships with conservation organisations and 
nature lovers. Offsetting, I will show, thus not only acts as a social technology of governance to 
deal with dissent, but plays a fundamental role in the entrenchment and institutionalisation of 
RWE’s interests in the Rhineland, the (historically) unquestioned support for coal mining, and 
the normalisation and legitimisation of corporate and state violence against the resistance, 
                                                          
43 These are fake devices to keep police and security personnel out of the forest.  
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against the earth and against its inhabitants, especially those who are already marginalised, live 
in areas particularly affected by climate change, or close to a mine.  
This chapter provides a European case study of the role of offsetting in legitimising ecological 
and social destruction, illustrating how offsetting – through the ongoing co-option and 
suppression of contestation – is integral to accumulation and control, playing into processes of 
accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004) and accumulation by restoration (Huff and Brock, 
2017) – not through the creation of new investment opportunities or asset classes, but by 
securing RWE’s core activities – coal mining. Offsetting contributes to the reshaping of the 
politics, social relations and conceptions of ‘nature’ within communities to maintain operational 
legitimacy in the face of ecological crises, anthropogenic climate change and determined 
opposition. This is remarkable given not only the physical location of RWE’s mining operation – 
we tend to expect such processes in the global peripheries, not the heart of Europe – but also 
the close connection of RWE with the German state. The interests of the state, I will argue, are 
inseparable from RWE’s. This chapter thus also focuses attention on the power relations behind 
offsetting, and its productive power – by supporting claims of corporate citizenship, the role of 
the German state is strengthened too. 
This chapter proceeds, firstly, by providing some background on the Hambach mine, RWE and 
their political activities – from EU lobbying to collaboration with municipal politicians. I then give 
a short overview of the multiple forms of resistance against the mine, focusing on the dialectical 
interrelationship between resistance and “political reactions from above” (Geenen and 
Verweijen, 2017: 2). I analyse RWE’s efforts to ‘engineer consent’ and suppress resistance by, 
firstly, examining the multiple corporate social technologies that heavily rely on PR and CSR 
strategies and recreational infrastructure. This is followed, secondly, by an analysis of RWE’s 
‘harder’ techniques that involve the criminalisation and repression of, and violence against, the 
resistance. An overview of these strategies is crucial to understand the interplay with RWE’s 
nature restoration work, introduced in the next section. I then examine how offsetting plays 
into RWE’s novel imaginaries and narratives around a ‘better future’ and a ‘better nature’, 
naturalising RWE and facilitating its positioning as good corporate citizen, before I conclude.  
6.1. The migrating mine 
Excavation of the Hambach mine began in 1978 and is scheduled to be completed by 2045. The 
total allocated mining area covers 85 km2 or 8,500ha – 12,000 football fields (RWE Power, 
2014). The mine deposit holds some 2.5 billion tonnes of coal, with current annual extraction at 
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43 million tonnes (RWE Power, 2014) that involves the shifting of around six times as much soil 
(overburden) and the constant pumping of ground water to lower water levels to -500m. In 
total, the mine extracts more than one million tonnes of coal and cubic metres of overburden a 
day (Schmitz, 2006). Most coal is burnt in the four surrounding power stations, run by RWE. The 
biggest power station, in Niederaußem, is Europe’s single largest source of greenhouse gases, 
with annual CO2 emissions of 30 million tonnes (Michel, 2005: 16). The three RWE mines in the 
Rhineland together produce 14% of all electricity in Germany, and almost 50% of the state of 
NRW (RWE Power AG, n.d.). 
Lignite coal electricity generation was elevated to “strategic military status” in Nazi Germany 
under the 1935 Law for Promoting the Energy Industry, adopted to strengthen wartime 
capabilities and enable the eviction of entire communities for coal excavation (Michel, 2005: 
29). Despite pledges to remove all Nazi laws from the books, Jeffrey H.  Michel argues, “the 
spirit of these wartime expediencies prevails in many energy regulations to this day” (2005: 29). 
The Federal Mining Act, revised in 1980, stipulates the “compulsory relinquishment of private 
property to mining companies … by eminent domain whenever public welfare is served, 
particularly for providing the market with raw materials, securing employment in the mining 
industry, stabilizing regional economies, or promoting sensible and orderly mining procedures” 
(Michel, 2005: 41-2). In 2007, the constitutional court upheld these provisions in a case ruling in 
coal mining in the Rhineland, as long as resettlement lies in the “public interest” (Lohmann, 
2009).  
The Hambach mine alone ‘requires’ the displacement and resettlement of 5,200 people until 
2040 (Jansen, 2012; BUND, n.d.). A total of 42,000 people will have lost their homes in the 
Rhinish coal region by then; 142 towns and farms in 20 municipalities (dpa, 2016). Whereas in 
the past, resettlement conditions had been “generous”, one interviewee reports, more recently 
“RWE has become stingy. They pay for less and less” (F3). RWE’s compensation is based on 
house value, assessed by ‘independent’ experts, according to the company. However, residents 
criticise that they were not allowed to choose their own assessors, or verify the value assigned. 
Many residents become indebted and have to sell their houses back to RWE. Due to the time 
discounting in the valuation process, compensation often does not suffice for new buildings 
(Kirschengens et al., 1985: 22). Many have thus become tenants, being forced to rent from the 
company that was responsible for their displacement in the first place (Kirschengens et al., 
1985). Other residents speak of “compulsory expropriation” – against which suing is “pointless”. 
A number of lawsuits filed against the expansion of the neighbouring Garzweiler mine have 
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been declined by the courts (Martin, 2004). Elderly people frequently can not cope with these 
changes, I am told by residents, and “we have high suicide rates in the region” (F3).  
Twenty years before demolition, when mining plans become public, villages lose their 
future, any development perishes. No one builds any more, younger people move away. 
Years before resettlement, you have to negotiate with Rheinbraun [now RWE], you have 
to sell, otherwise you will be expropriated (Kirschengens et al., 1985: 1).  
 
6.2. RWE’S political power: Lobbying and revolving doors 
The Hambach mine is operated by RWE AG, the largest German electricity provider and leading 
utility holding company (RWE AG, 2015b), founded in 1898, which historically held monopoly 
control over the (West) German electricity grid (Spiegel, 1979). The history of the mine is also a 
history of RWE’s influence over local decision making processes, resettlement negotiations, 
regional planning and national energy policy, as will be explored below. RWE is the single largest 
European emitter, responsible for twelve percent of CO2 emissions in Germany (IWR, 2012). 
Although significant human and financial resources are spent on the cultivation of its image as 
‘sustainable’, the corporation is lagging behind in their investments into renewables and has 
only recently started to invest into wind, solar and thermal energy, outsourced into their ‘green’ 
daughter company, Innogy Lmt, in 2016. In 2016, only 5% of their electricity production in 
Germany was based on renewables, compared to 55% based on coal (Statista, 2018). The 
company is materially locked into the coal path (Haas and Sander, 2016). Following a period of 
low electricity prices, the company is in serious financial difficulties, with total debt equalling 
eight times its total revenue, and has been downgraded by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s to 
BBB/negative outlook, and BAA2/negative outlook, respectively (RWE Group, 2015: 11). In 2015 
alone, RWE shares lost 52% of their values (Andresen, 2015). Low shareholder returns and 
pressure from campaigners have led cities and communities to divest from RWE: The city 
Bochum, for instance, has started selling its 6.6 million RWE shares in October 2016 (Rorowski, 
2016).  
In July 2011, then-CEO Jürgen Großmann declared: “What is good for RWE, is good for the 
public coffers” (VKA-RWE, 2012) reflecting not only how corporations often position their 
interest as the “higher good” (Dugger, 1989), but also the close political financial entanglements 
between the corporation and local communities, explored below. Yet the claim that RWE’s 
operations benefit the public coffers disregards the German environmental ministry’s findings 
that roughly one billion Euro/year subsidies are provided to lignite power production, in 
addition to the financial burden of environmental and health detriments of at least 3.5 billion 
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euro/year (Lechtenböhmer, Kristof and Irrek, 2004; Michel, 2005: 5). Additionally, BUND 
estimates that up to 50 percent of resettlement costs in the Rhineland are born by the state and 
municipalities (Lechtenböhmer, Kristof and Irrek, 2004). Of the 182 million Euro spent to 
relocate the highway, necessitated by the mine expansion, RWE contributed 84.5 million Euro, 
the remaining 107.5 million were state funds (Meisen, 2014). 
Analysing the continuing political importance of mining in Germany, Jeffrey H. Michel (2005: 77) 
argues that: “The German lignite industry operates on the premise of overt political influence”, 
a skill undoubtedly mastered by RWE. One research participant goes so far as to claim that RWE 
is “the single most influential corporation in the German political landscape” (F5). Already in 
1979, the German news magazine Spiegel warned: “Unrivalled and barely manageable, RWE is 
ruling over one of the largest monopolies of the Western world” (1979). Yet, more often than 
not, this influence has been exercised in collaboration with, rather than opposition to the state. 
In the 1970s, municipalities held 60 percent of shareholder voting rights in NRW and thus had a 
significant say in corporate decision making (Spiegel, 1979). The strength of municipality 
decision making has made them important collaborators in legitimising RWE activities. 
Currently, 32 municipalities, 20 cities, seven associations and firms—large banks, insurances 
and the NRW Chamber of Agriculture—are RWE shareholders. The high level of financial 
entanglement and shared interests has helped RWE enforce its objectives, exerting political 
influence even when these appear to contradict governmental interests (Spiegel, 1979; Liedtke, 
2006; Gründiger, 2016; Hissel, 2015). 
Gerald Neubauer’s mapping of the relationship between German politicians and the coal 
industry exposed 17 high-level politicians spanning the political spectrum with close ties to RWE 
– as board chairs or board members – even in environmental ministries (2013). Two leading 
politicians were forced to resign in 2004 when it was exposed that they had been receiving 
payments from RWE of 60,000-81,000 Euro/year (Neuber, 2004), triggering the revelation of 
“[n]umerous illicit benefits provided by corporations to German parliamentarians” (Michel, 
2005: 77). In 2015, a German Member of European Parliament, active in the Environment 
Committee, had to step down from RWE’s advisory council (Bank, 2015). Currently, two of 
RWE’s board members hold seats in the German parliament or Landtag. Nationally, RWE has 
been at the forefront of lobbying efforts against the German energy transition (Energiewende) 
and for the extension of the operational lifespan of coal mines and nuclear power plants, 
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together with the influential neoliberal ‘cross sector cross party NGO’ Initiative New Social 
Market Economy, in which it plays a leading role44.  
In addition, RWE entertains very close ties with a number of DGs of the EC, where it promotes 
the Energy Union that involves EU-wide energy infrastructure development (chapter four), but 
also follows closely the climate change and nature conservation discussions (as visible in their 
communication and face-to-face meeting about the NNL, outlined in chapter four). Three of 
their lobbyists have direct access to EU institutions and their representation is further 
institutionalised in EURELECTRIC (also member of the NNL working group). In 2015, RWE spent 
two million Euro on lobbying in Brussels and received approximately 1.3 million Euro through 
research and development funds – such as the LIFE + programme (EU Transparency Register, 
2016). In 2010, RWE was awarded the “Worst EU Lobbying award” by environmental NGOs for 
its campaign against directives to impose reductions on industrial pollutants and CO2 emissions 
(FoE Europe, LobbyControl and CEO, 2010). 
These overlapping networks of power and influence are even more entrenched on the local 
level, as will now be illustrated. 
RWE in the Rhineland  
They are everywhere ... They managed to get people into all positions that matter … 
Wherever decisions are taken, you find people who work for RWE or have worked for RWE. 
They did that really well (member of local citizens initiative, F1). 
There is a unique structural dependency of local municipalities in the Rhineland on RWE’s 
financial wellbeing. Just under twenty-five percent of RWE’s shares are owned by local 
authorities (VKA-RWE, 2012), which makes local authorities not only licensers, shareholders and 
clients, but also RWE constituencies, employees and tax collectors. Refusal to license operations 
or grant permits would thus negatively impact municipalities’ ability to finance their budgets. 
RWE has been driving the privatisation of public utility companies, acquiring between twenty 
and seventy-five percent of shares (Rügemer, 2006), and through its subsidiaries RWE is 
involved in municipal electricity, gas and water distribution networks and street lighting systems 
(RWE Group, 2015: 89). Furthermore, in 2004 it was exposed that RWE convenes so-called 
“regional advisory councils” through which the company has been paying over 100 local 
politicians some 600,000 Euro/year (Spiegel Online, 2005). Financial payments by corporations 
                                                          
44 The initiative campaigns for cut-backs to the welfare state, for so-called ‘market-based’ instruments and ‘pro-business climate’ 
among policy makers and the general population (Speth, 2004) – as well as against the subsidisation of renewable energy as part of 
the Renewable Energy Law (Lobbycontrol, n.d.; Bundeskartellamt, 2011). Its board of trustees is chaired by Wolfgang Clement, 
former German minister – criticised for backing high subsidies to the coal industry of 80,000 Euro/job, and his outspoken support 
for the nuclear industry – and RWE board member since 2006. 
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to regional politicians – serving on boards of directors or (regional) advisory bodies – are 
explicitly legal under German law (Rügemer, 1997), and have been criticised by a previous 
minister of labour as “legalised corruption” (Spiegel, 1979).  
In addition, RWE’s power is engrained in their representation in local life, as the quote above 
illustrates. Whether it’s the city council or the local church council, several interviewees report, 
RWE has managed to “infiltrate” almost all local decision-making bodies (F1, F2, F3, F5, G1). This 
goes beyond astroturfing and proxy NGOs (discussed later), amounting to the appropriation of 
the structures of governance themselves. In the city council of Kerpen near the Hambach mine, 
a member of a local citizens’ initiative explains, thirteen of the former twenty-three members of 
the Social Democratic Party were current or former RWE employees. The personal 
entanglement between RWE and local politics, as well as its omnipresence within local political 
and social institutions, a local activist explains, makes opposition “much more difficult”. Local 
churches, for instance, although supportive of the resistance, do not publicly voice their 
support, the research participant continues: “[Y]ou will be held accountable for these 
decisions”; residents working for RWE will “watch you”, noting who helps the “rowdies” or 
“people from the forest” (F2). Similarly, a resident explains that criticising resettlement in 
Manheim was difficult: 
RWE’s former executive chairman is married to Manheim’s Ortsvorsteherin [similar 
position to that of a mayor]. His brother was chairman of the Bürgerbeirat [citizens’ 
advisory council, convened by RWE and the local government] and contractor. He 
profited [from resettlement] … it’s like a mafia … You don’t just go and say ‘Folks, I’m 
going to tread on your toes. Because then you end up with bruised toes (F3). 
At times, this dependence is more structural. Agricultural recultivation, for instance, is 
negotiated with the Chamber for Agriculture – itself a RWE shareholder and therewith 
dependent on RWE’s financial wellbeing.  
The ‘public-private partnership,’ emblematic of neoliberal contracting (Hildyard, 2016), 
between the company and the German state can also be observed in the close relations 
between RWE and the police. The head of the local police responsible for controlling the August 
2015 Ende Gelände mass direct action against the Hambach mine, for instance, was a member 
of RWE’s advisory board until just days before the protest action (CEO, 2015). The police have 
been criticised for using RWE vehicles to patrol the mine and transport arrestees (Blume, 2015; 
confirmed by activists) – testifying to a “private-public partnerships in the security realm” 
(Hissel, 2015). Activists have also reported close police-RWE collaboration in operations in the 
Hambacher Forst. In recent years, logging operations were accompanied by dozens of police 
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officers protecting every cutting vehicle. In addition, the NRW police force is controlled by the 
state’s parliamentary Interior Committee. One of its most active members is Gregor Golland, a 
member of the state parliament doubling as RWE employee with an annual corporate salary of 
up to €120,000 – only slightly less than his government salary of €128,712 (Funken, 2016a). Not 
only is he a deputy member of the environment and economic committees, with privileged 
access to information that could affect RWE (abgeordnetenwatch, 2017), but he is also 
responsible for internal security and police deployment – including major police operations in 
the Hambacher Forst. He has been vocal in his condemnation of the occupation and alleged 
violence, calling for a “tougher approach” (personal communication) towards “radicalised 
environmental activists” (KStA, 2016). 
These overlapping networks of power and influence point to the ways RWE are securing their 
unique political influence that are widely described as “political landscape gardening” by local 
residents and activists. RWE’s political influence testifies to an entrenched ‘private-public 
partnership’ with the German state, which, as will be described below, deeply shapes the 
‘managing’ of dissent and the ‘engineering’ of consent around the Hambach mine. The 
resistance movement against which this managing of dissent is directed will now be introduced. 
Resistance and contestation in- and outside the political forest 
Regardless of the oppression the state throws at the Hambacher Forest, like the 
microbes, insects, plants, birds, and animals cohabiting all of our living barricades, that 
remain alive with the spirit of resistance, Hambacher Forest will remain as not just a 
reminder but also a call to action… 
Day and night, we lay in the woods, watching, waiting, ready to strike at any moment, 
and should you imprison or strike down any one of us, as you now well know, there will 
be consequences, here in Germany, or anywhere else in the world where RWE spreads 
its sickening tentacles (Anonymous, 2016: 91). 
The history of the mine is also a history of resistance. When the mine was planned, permits 
were granted, and exploration began in the 1970s, the mine was justified as ‘without 
alternative’ – coal was seen as not only historically part of the Rhineland history, but 
indispensable for electricity production. Yet, despite intensive PR campaigns, from the very 
beginning of the Hambach mine – licensed in the midst of the oil crisis and among fears of 
dependency on foreign energy – local groups formed to resist the operation, the associated 
displacement and resettlement of villages and the planned relocation of a highway. While until 
then, Achim Schumacher and collaborators argue, “the reasonableness and necessity of mining 
were largely undisputed [in Germany], this mine development was the first to trigger 
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resistance”, representing changing public perceptions and attitudes towards large projects and 
rising environmental awareness (2014b: 26; confirmed by interviews G1). Citizens formed the 
first initiative against the mine in 1979, a students’ group was set up at Aachen University 
around the same time, and legal challenges against mine operator and planning authorities 
were launched45. Groups have organised various creative forms of protest, including concerts 
inside the mine by Klaus the fiddler and the Orchestra for Social Change, human chains and 
demonstrations. As early as 1982, activists, in collaboration with the bicycle club ‘Solidarity’, 
organised a cycling demonstration to Sophienhöhe to protest against the destruction of the 
Hambacher Forst: they ‘laid a wreath for ruined nature’, celebrated a ‘requiem for a lily of the 
valley’ and read poems (Springer, 1985: 76). While this resistance remained at the local level for 
many years, since 2011, annual climate camp and mass civil disobedience actions with over one 
thousand participants have targeted the three Rhinish mines, passing mine security, breaking 
police lines and shutting down the mines. The responding police violence led to hospitalisations 
(Kreutzfeldt, 2015) and made national and international headlines, triggering much support as 
well as negative responses.  
To stop the destruction of the forest and the expansion of the mine and to reclaim the forest as 
public space for people to meet, network and work together for social change, activists set up a 
forest occupation inside the Hambacher Forst in 2012. Despite a number of violent evictions 
(and re-occupations), they continue their forest and meadow occupation until today; they build 
tree houses, tunnels and barricades to stop the clearing, and carry out sabotage against RWE 
equipment and infrastructure (i.e. short circuiting power lines, burning of pumping stations, 
radio-masts and electrical transformers) and the ambushing of security-police patrols with 
stones, slingshots, fireworks and Molotov cocktails (Anonymous, 2016). At present, the 
encampment has been evicted (and reoccupied) three times. The occupied forest has been 
declared an “outlaw area” and been subject not only to police brutality and physical and verbal 
abuse by private security service and RWE personnel, but also to increased surveillance through 
helicopters, ID controls and security patrols. 
Having outlined the unique position that RWE occupies in the German political economy and 
introduced the resistance movement, I now move to explore the multiple soft and hard 
strategies that have enabled RWE to maintain a relatively good image in the face of strong 
opposition. 
                                                          
45 Other initiatives and projects include the Initiative Buirer für Buir, STOP RHEINBRAUN e.V., Citizens’ Initiative Bergbaubetroffener 
am Niederrhein e.V., Stoppt RWE, Network Bergbaugeschädigter, ausgeCO2hlt and Werkstatt für Aktionen und Alternativen. Legal 
challenges by BUND, the German section of Friends of the Earth, and a local landowner are still ongoing. 
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6.3. ‘Dirty coal is good for you’: engineering and buying consent through 
CSR, PR and outreach46 
The key question [for the energy sector] is … not how to avoid protest, but how we can 
manage protest” (Sebastian Schwark of the famous PR agency Hill+Knowlton, cited in Peter, 
2009). 
Rafael Pagan Jr. is considered a ‘guru’ in the PR industry and has been teaching multinational 
corporations – or their CEOs and CSR managers – how to ‘defend themselves’ against public 
interest activists. He is founder and former president of the Nestlé Coordination Center for 
Nutrition, where he promoted Nestlé’s controversial infant feeding formulae in the 1980s 
(Richter, 2001). He divided activists into four categories: radicals, opportunists, idealists and 
realists; and outlined a three-step divide-and-conquer strategy – to co-opt the debate and to 
isolate the movement – for corporations (Lubbers, 1999; see also Stauber and Rampton, 1995). 
The goal is “to isolate the radicals, cultivate the idealists and 'educate them into becoming 
realists, then co-opt the realists into agreeing with industry” (Lubbers, 1999). Already in 1982, 
he urged corporations to engage in dialogue with their critics to deal with the “international 
regulatory mood” and “remain in business” (in Richter, 1998). He outlined his wider PR strategy 
for TNCs in a speech to the Public Affairs council, where he recommended a number of 
strategies to deal with resistance. Judith Richter summarises: “organizing effective [business 
representation] NGOs”; “working with national and international civil servants ‘not to defeat all 
regulation, but to create regulation that legitimises and channels our rights, opportunities and 
contributions; reaching out to hold an ongoing dialogue with the many new publics whose 
understanding we need to remain in business; separating the ‘fanatic‘ activist leaders from 
those who are ‘decent concerned’ people, and ‘stripping the activists from the moral authority 
they receive from their alliance with religious organisations’" (Pagan Jr., cited in Richter, 2001: 
149).  
Such strategies became very important in the late 1980s and 1990s as pressure on the industry 
increased, threatening profits, access to land and ‘licence to operate’ (chapter five). The 
“science of propaganda”, John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton argue, is not new: they trace it as 
far back as Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1995: 15-17). Yet, the PR industry is a twentieth-century 
phenomenon, boosted during and after World War One. One of the earliest PR practitioners, 
Edward Bernays, claims that:  
                                                          
46 This heading draws on Stauber and Rampton’s Toxic sludge is good for you, an exploration of the “lies, damn lies and the public 
relations industry” (1994). 
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the scientific manipulation of public opinion was necessary to overcome chaos and 
conflict in society … In almost every act of our daily lives … we are dominated by the 
relatively small number of persons … who understand the mental processes and social 
patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind (in 
Stauber and Rampton, 1995: 23-4). 
The psychologist and corporate propaganda theorist Alex Carey warns:  
The twentieth century has been characterised by three developments of great political 
importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth 
of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy 
(1978/1995: 18).  
Communication theorist Harold Lasswell explains that ‘propaganda’ “is cheaper than violence, 
bribery and other possible control techniques” (1934: 524), or, in the words of Paul Virilio, 
“[b]eating an enemy involves not so much capturing as captivating them” (1995: 14). PR 
constitutes a struggle for the hearts and minds of people – whether to pledge loyalty to 
corporate brands or ‘engineer consent’ for megaprojects – which becomes visible in 
contestations over natural resources, whether traditional fossil fuels or renewable resources 
(Dunlap, 2018). This ‘new corporate activism’ involves a diversity of PR strategies – often 
integrated into CSR initiatives that enable corporations to accumulate and exercise power 
(Rajak, 2011a) – many of which are displayed by RWE and explored in the next section. 
Engineering consent: RWE’s corporate communication and astroturfing activities 
Since the approval of the initial plan for the Hambach mine, RWE has invested heavily in PR 
work to delegitimise opposition groups and win the ‘PR war’ for the hearts and minds of the 
general public (McQueen, 2015). In the early 1980s, RWE spent considerable financial resources 
to dispel public concerns about “irreparable ecological consequences” that had been raised by 
government authorities and environmental groups (Spiegel, 1982). In 1980, the environmental 
ministry suppressed a study warning of the disastrous ecological impacts of coal mining in the 
region (including biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and desertification) that doubted 
RWE’s ability to recultivate the area (Spiegel, 1982). This highlights how corporate PR strategies 
do not only involve promotion but also work via censorship that also affect the domain of 
‘science’.  
In addition, RWE built up their own channels to promote its image and message in schools, 
public events, museums, exhibitions, information centres and tourist sites. In its permanent 
exhibition in the 16th century castle Schloss Pfaffendorf, RWE host a museum about coal mining, 
with interactive exhibits and a big screen fifteen-minute video explaining coal mining 
technologies, safety precautions and their recultivation work. RWE rents out the castle for 
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weddings, Christmas parties, corporate and other events, and hosts free concerts during the 
summer. Likewise, in the Innovative Information Centre Niederaußem the company showcases 
its research on CO2 ‘cleaning technologies’ and ‘tomorrow’s technologies’ in an interactive 
exhibition. Above the edge of the Garzweiler mine, RWE built a skywalk to provide “the perfect 
panorama of coal mining processes, dumping of overburden and power stations” (RWE 
Generation, 2015: 28). This communicative social infrastructure supports RWE’s efforts to reach 
target audiences, promote desirable opinions, and sustain specific types of behaviour, which 
work towards ensuring a favourable public opinion to maintain political support and regulatory 
environment. 
In response to some political success and influence of NGOs, transnational corporations have 
started to use ‘astroturfing’ techniques to lobby decision makers – the creation of fake grass 
roots groups and campaigns to influence public opinion and lobby local and national decision 
makers for new legislation and regulations favourable to corporate interests (Austin, 2002; 
Peter, 2002; Williams, Munger and Messersmith-Glavin, 2013; Irmisch, 2011; Lyon and Maxwell, 
2004). These tactics are meant to complement increasingly aggressive PR campaigns and legal 
processes and capitalise on the public legitimacy and credibility of citizen initiatives. According 
to Claudia Peter (2002: 147), “the 1990s saw a virtual flood of Astroturf groups in Germany”. 
Already in the 1990s, RWE funded initiatives to resist wind energy development (Peter, 2002; 
Lobbycontrol, 2016; Smid, 2012). The company has continued to resort to astroturfing to 
safeguard their mining activities, being involved in a supposedly independent citizens’ initiative 
to defend lignite coal in the Rhineland under the slogan: “Our revier – our future” (Unser Revier, 
n.d.; Müller, 2016; Haude, 2015)47. The initiative claims to oppose the lobbying efforts of NGOs 
and “aggressive environmental groups” (Unser Revier, n.d.), but it was quickly revealed that it 
has close ties to RWE. Additionally, RWE has been involved in setting up two Facebook groups in 
which mine supporters regularly call for violence and abuse against forest defenders.  
Much of RWE’s PR work is being undertaken by the semi-outsourced “research centre 
recultivation”, responsible for ecological work, and heavily involved in the company’s outreach 
work, promoting RWE’s biodiversity management vis-à-vis external parties. Employees of the 
centre engage with the general public, lead tours through the offset area, collaborate with 
scientists and organise conservation conferences to promote the company’s recultivation work 
                                                          
47 The German term Revier is not only associated with the mining industry (coal-mining district), but also to denote police districts. 




and engage with conservation organisations. This work plays into RWE’s CSR work, to which I 
now turn. 
Omnipresent sponsorship: buying consent?  
RWE is “everywhere”, local activists explain, with its tentacles spread out “like an octopus”, 
fusing itself into the cultural and economic life around the mines. The company has 
“infiltrated”, I am told by a resident (F3), the social fabric of surrounding towns through 
sponsorship of local events and associations, seeking to gain legitimacy through the local 
authorities they sponsor. Sponsorships include events organised by police and fire departments 
(such as barbeques), bouncy castles for kids, ‘mobile fun centres’ and school events (E6, F2, F3, 
F5). The company sponsors local football clubs, carnival associations and parades, traditional 
festivals (Schützenfeste) and sports events for students, and finances a “baking cart” that drives 
across the country handing out baked goods, recipes, RWE material, and energy saving advice. 
Even the Michael Schumacher Cart and Event Center is financially supported by the company 
(MS-Kartcenter, 2016). 
The company further entertains a corporate volunteering initiative, RWE Companius, that 
finances initiatives and gives paid leave to employees participating in regional projects – over 
1,300 projects in 2015 (RWE Companius, 2016). Projects include caring for the elderly and 
raising awareness about, and funds for, child malnourishment among RWE employees (to be 
matched by the company), in partnership with the charity organisation Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe. 
The company is explicit about the aims of these initiatives: increasing a positive perception of – 
and identification with – RWE (RWE Companius, 2016). The project is accompanied by 
“promotional material” in the form of flyers, posters and information stalls in front of RWE 
canteens and inside (!) children’s day care centres, which constitute an opportunity to spread its 
message outside its usual channels. What the company does not promote is that as an active 
member of the Initiative New Social Market Economy (and a number of other associations and 
initiatives), it is itself part of the strong industry lobby for the neoliberal austerity policies 
(cutting social spending, taxes and privatisations) that entrench people’s dependence on the 
private sector (Speth, 2004) and weaken the social safety nets that make such engagement 
necessary in the first place.  
Every few months, RWE offers guided tours through their mines and power stations; events that 
are usually attended by hundreds of people, including visitors from neighbouring Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Local groups that it sponsors (such as the aforementioned Johanniter-
Unfallhilfe and the Schützenverein) sell cake, sausages, coffee and beer to the visitors, and tours 
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are promoted by local tourist associations and websites. In addition, the company hires a nature 
guide to offer regular hikes through the biodiversity offset site, the recultivated Sophienhöhe. 
The guide points out, explains and validates their recultivation work and specific measures 
taken to protect threatened species – including the relocated ant hills, bat boxes and dead tree 
trunks that are designated compensation measures for the loss of the Hambacher Forst. These 
sponsorships and events contribute to the normalisation of the company in the region and 
position RWE as “good corporate citizen”, part of the social fabric of the region, lending it 
legitimacy despite the high social, financial and ecological impacts of the mine. As a corollary, 
the resistance movement is slowly delegitimised.  
Shaping the next generation: RWE in schools 
“Few, if any, instruments shape national culture more powerfully than the materials used in 
schools” (The Economist, 2012). It is probably not a coincidence that much of RWE’s 
communication work takes place in and around schools. Since 1998, the RWE Foundation 
reports to support disadvantaged children and provide ‘energy education’ and other 
social/cultural initiatives. Since 2006, the company has distributed 742,000 lunchboxes among 
first-graders (Wahl, 2015). The foundation offers learning material and role plays for class use, 
supports the very popular (and prestigious) students’ research initiatives Jugend forscht and 
Schüler experimentieren and offers ‘Learn & Fun’ school trips into RWE power plants (3malE, 
n.d.) as well as “girls’ days” in its training centres. School projects are supported with a total of 
60,000 Euro for educational games, students’ experiments and competitions (RWE, n.d.a). 
According to the company, they bring in new, innovative ideas, lead to interactive learning 
games, experimental material – while anchoring positive associations with RWE from a very 
young age. School projects related to energy efficiency and saving electricity at home, for 
instance, create connotations with climate protection and progressiveness; and further reach 
out to parents and siblings, as well as students involved (Kamella, 2013). In a similar vein, RWE 
sponsors the Duisburg RWE Zoo School in the nearby zoo, where it offers “lively biology 
lessons” by “zoo pedagogues” to 10,000 students per year (Zoo Duisburg AG, 2016) – while 
destroying animal habitat in the Hambacher Forst.  
School initiatives also buy legitimacy and assuage resistance against the mine. According to 
activists, at the “peak of resistance against the mine” in Buir, the company offered to build a 
new ‘mobile’ stage for the school auditorium “with sound system and everything – and the 
expectation was to bring us ‘back on track’”—an attempt to mitigate local concerns with the 
mine. The WDR (West German Broadcasting) has reported about cooperation agreements with 
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two secondary schools in the middle of the mining area, where RWE agreed to offer school 
trips, internships and application trainings – in return for publicity in school publications and 
towards the press, as well as sign-boards in schools’ entrance areas (Wahl, 2015). The aim is to 
raise awareness among students about the significance and the use of the coal industry, 
society-wide as well as in the region – and to establish the company as “caring neighbour and 
corporation with social responsibility” (Kamella in Wahl, 2015). In 2012, 250 RWE employees 
were active as ‘energy ambassadors’ in German schools (RWE, 2012a). Not surprisingly, in their 
teaching material, RWE promote the indispensability of coal electricity (see below), highlighting 
the efficiency and ecological sustainability of their power plants and the significance for 
employment in the region. The material promotes the recultivation success on the Sophienhöhe 
offsetting site and the recreational opportunities provided (explored below), once again 
highlighting its recultivation work and the sustainability of its coalmining operation. Similar 
messages can be found in its two promotional videos that are meant to serve as educational 
material for students – where the Sophienhöhe is praised for its recreational opportunities. 
Another work sheet includes a fictional report of a teenager who was displaced from her home 
village and resettled; in RWE’s account, she was amazed by her family’s beautiful, modern, 
energy-efficient new house and the accessibility of her grandma’s new flat, and praised RWE for 
the many great projects in the new town (RWE, n.d.b)48.  
New recreational infrastructure to foster pro-corporate ideologies 
To pacify dissent against mining projects, Gavin Hilson, chair of Sustainability in Business and 
previously consultant for Newmont Gold Mining, Gold Fields and the World Bank, and natural 
scientist Barbara Murck recommend the following strategies: the “implementation of re-skilling 
programs … establishment of small and medium sized enterprises … Educational and Training 
Facilities … infrastructure projects such as road and rail development, hospital and school 
construction, and housing development” (2000). Although usually established in countries of 
the global South, rather than economically prosperous countries such as Germany, similar 
strategies can be observed in the Rhineland. Beyond educational infrastructure, RWE has 
initiated a number of social development projects in the coal region. They include new 
recreational infrastructure, a novel ‘speedway’ built on former coal train trails, and a signposted 
network of cycling and hiking tours that showcase RWE’s offsetting (recultivation) work. On the 
                                                          
48 Although the direct influence RWE is seeking to exercise through its engagement with schools is remarkably visible, the 
increasingly important role of corporations (as well as employers’ associations and trade associations) goes beyond the provision of 
teaching material and school partnerships. Reinhold Hedtke (2012) argues that the growing influence of industry lobbyists together 
with foundations and research institutes form a well-financed political-pedagogical network in Germany, supported by 
(economic)liberal and conservative politicians, advocating for a particular kind of economic education in schools and promoting 
corporate-friendly, politically conservative interests. Through its multiple associations and memberships (e.g. DIE, INSM) RWE forms 
part of this network. 
177 
 
Straße der Energie (energy route), a “tourist route through the Rhinish lignite mining area”, the 
visitor can witness RWE’s mines, recultivation work, processing facilities and electricity 
production from lignite coal, wind and solar (RWE, n.d.c). It guides the visitor through the 
“Garden of Technology” (co-funded by the EU’s Regional Development Fund) and RWE’s 
renewable energy installations. Half a dozen publications outlining these tours can be ordered 
from RWE; with maps, explanations, trail suggestions and promotional material.  
The most notable recreational infrastructure sponsored by RWE is the information centre and 
viewpoint tellingly named :terra nova (New Earth) (figure 19).  
 
Figure 19 :terra nova visitor centre (own photo) 
Co-financed by surrounding municipalities (Regionale, 2010), :terra nova is a restaurant/bar and 
information centre embedded in an artificial dune landscape and invokes associations of a 
beach resort. Its terrace overlooks the mine and is meant to constitute not just a viewing 
platform, but a beach-like atmosphere, with sunbeds, parasols, outdoor gym and parasols. 
Seated, enjoying a drink and some food from the :terra nova restaurant, the visitor can enjoy 
the view of the over 200-meter-long diggers that slowly move across the coal desert, appealing 
to fascination with huge machinery that symbolise modernity and progress. Next to the viewing 
platform, children are meant to play in the playground modelled after a shipwreck. The 
resemblance to a beach is not a coincidence – the pit is meant to be turned into a lake following 
mine closure. The centre houses regular social events, a ‘wedding-room’ and a football-golf 
course – as well as RWE’s recultivation centre. The building can be rented for (corporate) 
Christmas parties and is promoted as a meeting place to bring people together. I will return to 
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:terra nova below, after having outlined the hard strategies that complement RWE’s social 
engineering and greening strategies.  
6.4. Managing and repressing resistance: criminalisation, repression and 
violence 
To co-opt the environmental debate is one side of the coin, to demonize and marginalize 
the environmental movement is the other (Lubbers, 1999). 
Overlapping with RWE’s divide-and-conquer strategy one can observe strategies of 
stigmatisation, isolation and criminalisation of more ‘radical’ (or un-co-optable) elements in the 
resistance movement, leading up to the violent repression of more combative activists. On the 
one hand, the company is engaged in a “Peace Plan” as part of the “Hambacher Dialogue”, 
where it engages with ‘moderate’ protesters, and has undertaken a large-scale acceptance 
study, The Power of Participation, to explore how stakeholder engagement and dialogue can 
“avoid or reduce resistance” against megaprojects to protect “the future viability of our 
business” (RWE AG, 2012: 6-19). In their neighbourhood magazine, RWE printed an interview 
with Frank Brettschneider, who researches effective corporate communication strategies and 
advises corporations on how to pacify opposition groups (RWE Power, 2013a). On the other 
hand, more ‘radical’ protesters are criminalised and violently oppressed. 
In a newspaper interview, RWE CEO Peter Terium speaks of activists as criminals: “They have no 
ideology, they are sheer criminals and only interested in excessive violence” (Terium in Die 
Welt, 2016). Elsewhere, he describes the Hambacher Forst as “unbearable escalation”, speaking 
of “professional demonstrators”, coming to “riot” (in Balzter and Meck, 2016). “They come from 
other countries”, he continues “some from Eastern Europe, some from a particular scene in 
England” (Balzter and Meck, 2016), playing into xenophobic sentiments and fears of East 
European mafias that often dominate German right-wing media. According to other 
interviewees, activists come from “France and Finland” (E3). In the August 2013 edition of its 
‘neighbourhood magazine’ (figure 20) – coinciding with the annual anti-coal climate camp – 
RWE displays the resistance movement as “vandalistic” and life threatening to workers’ 
security, describing activists as “violent” and “radical” – as opposed to the company, which is 




Figure 20 “Opinion yes, vandalism no” – RWE Neighbourhood Magazine (RWE Power, 2013a) 
“Dear Neighbours,” asks the chairman of the RWE workers’ council on the opposite page, “how 
would you react if you were suddenly attacked with rocks at work?” The police union spreads 
similar images of ‘violent protesters’, warning of a “spiral of violence”. While criminalising the 
more ‘radical elements’, RWE highlights its commitment to stakeholder dialogue and 
partnership with local initiatives– essential for the long-term trust in, and local acceptance of 
the company (RWE, 2012b), e.g. through roundtable discussions with regional politicians. Yet, 
opposition groups in the region contest the company’s narrative of ‘good neighbourhood 
relations’. As one member explains:  
[They always say:] ‘the climate campers, they are Chaoten [rowdies], but the citizens’ 
initiatives … we are in good dialogue with them’. But that’s not true. You can’t be in dialogue 
with RWE. Dialogue is impossible … They tried to buy us as ‘mediators’ … you have to be very 
careful. 
Other interviewees recall how they are repeatedly asked to distance themselves from people 
engaging in “violent” resistance, or “the forest” (F2, F3, F4, F5). One member of a local initiative 
describes: “They criminalise and divide … They call on us: ‘Distance yourself from the forest. 
Those are all criminals’ … and part of the press is complicit in this” (F3). This textbook tactic to 
divide social movements (Gelderloos, 2013) is used to exploit and create divisions between ‘the 
forest’ and other parts of the resistance movement. Nonetheless, individuals and groups 
continue to support and show solidarity with the more combative parts of the movement, 
despite “occasional disagreement about methods”, as described by a campaigner. One 
interviewee tells me: the Hambacher Forst “wouldn’t be an ‘issue’ without [their] illegal actions, 
180 
 
without cables burning, without the occupation. They [the forest defenders] have been 
contributing so much [to the Hambach struggle]” (F2). Divide-and-conquer techniques have also 
been used to isolate and co-opt municipalities, e.g. with the threat of job losses. The mine and 
their operating facilities are spread over different administrative districts. Interviewees report 
how “local communities and cities were played off against each other” (F3, F5) with threats of 
moving facilities across local administrative boundaries. When one town legally challenged the 
relocation of the highway, I am told, it received a letter, warning of relocation of its operations 
elsewhere, “then you’ll just not be getting tax revenue” (F3). 
Members of citizens’ initiatives and ‘less radical’ groups have also been the target of 
defamation. People who “engage politically”, I am told, are frequently silenced through the city 
council, political intervention and other means, while stigmatised as “green wackos” (F2): 
“Initiatives are being stigmatised and criminalised … through skilled press work by different 
players, including politicians, trade unions, RWE, and the police”. The citizens’ initiative “Buirer 
for Buir”, for instance, was stigmatised as “liars” who “manipulate people” by the federal 
minister of transport at the celebratory opening of the new highway following relocation for the 
mine (F3). 
In addition, the resistance movement has frequently been subject to court cases and legal 
challenges. In 2015 alone, RWE has initiated legal action against 800 activists and journalists 
following violent oppression of protest with pepper spray and batons (Blume, 2015; see also 
Wyputta, 2012). Injunctions and Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP) are 
major tools of intimidation and discouragement of resistance. Most cases are soon dropped, 
but some are used as a deterrence mechanism to set an example, especially when activists 
refuse to identify themselves. Some interviewees (G1, F5) report arbitrary police harassment of 
activists, including the confiscation of bicycles as ‘stolen’ if owners could not recite the frame 
number (energiezukunft, n.d.), searching of cars with bumper stickers that suggest opposition 
to the mine (Zimmermann, 2016), constant surveillance, stop-and-search at the local train 
station as well as checkpoints that work to create a culture of fear – reinforced through 
constant surveillance. The Hambacher Forst occupation and the meadow occupation (as well as 
surrounding areas) have been under long-term surveillance, authorised by the Aachen district 
court (Hambacher Forst, 2016c). Both police and security services show constant presence 
around the occupation and use video recording and cameras to document activists (see also 
WDR, 2016). According to forest defenders, drones and helicopters have been used for 
surveillance purposes and members of citizens’ initiatives have reported being followed around 
by private security services (F2, G1).  
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This culture of threat and intimidation is further manifest in concrete practices against 
individuals. Activists have reported security guards “verbally engaging in rape fantasies as they 
intimidated locked on female activists while awaiting the police” (EF!, 2015; G1). The climate 
camp has also been subject to threats and verbal attacks by security guards, as well as 
threatening phone calls during the night (Wyputta, 2012). The former driving force behind local 
community protest against the mine, I am told, received threats against himself and his family. 
Kurt Claaßen, the owner of the meadow that is the site of the meadow occupation (himself 
sympathetic of the occupation), reported his garage being broken into and his car destroyed 
twice; windows broken and tyres dismounted (F2, G1). Hambacher Forest activists report police 
threatening to break their fingers and arms if they did not collaborate in collecting their 
fingerprints (Hambacher Forst, 2016a). 
Intimidation of protesters continues online. RWE employees created two Facebook groups, “For 
lignite coal and jobs, against eco-extremism” and “RWE-workers for fair reporting”, where coal 
proponents have been posting threats to activists (Döschner, 2015). These groups serve as a 
meeting point for RWE supporters, employees and climate change deniers, where they post 
verbal attacks and (death) threats against coal critics and denounce activists as ‘eco-terrorists’. 
At the coal tour through the mine, I could hear similar statements, for example when the bus 
driver comments: “No digger should ever stop for those activists who chain themselves onto it”. 
Harm to eco-activists is—consciously or unconsciously—applauded by RWE personnel, 
volunteers and sympathetic politicians. As part of RWE’s stakeholder dialogue, a number of 
local politicians came to see the recultivation work, suggesting that “someone should come and 
beat them [the activists] up”, complaining about the inability of the police to evict the forest 
occupation and continuing that “in France, at least they are allowed to shoot”. Such comments 
testify to the culture and institutionalisation of hate for those protesting and defending the 
forest from the mine. 
The organisers of the annual Rhineland climate camps were confronted with repression from 
the beginning, only to intensify with the second camp in 2012. Farmers, (football) clubs and 
other residents, research participants explain, were pressured not to provide land, water or any 
type of support for the camp (F2, F3, F5). The local football club, for instance, depends on RWE 
for advertising and sponsorship and is thus vulnerable to these pressures that “RWE exercises 
with all available means”. Farmers are in an equally precarious situation, one research 
participant explains: “if you’re a farmer and need to swap land in the future, you don’t want to 




This intimidation coincides with the suppression of critical media reports. On April 25, 2015, 
6000 people formed a human ‘anti-coal-chain’ to protest coalmining in the Rhineland, the 
largest demonstration the region had seen so far. When the Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, a large 
regional newspaper, reported ‘too positively’ on the event on the following Monday, two 
interviewees report, RWE sent a delegation to “exert pressure” on the chief editor–threatening 
mass-cancellation of subscriptions (F2, F3). The following day, a double-page editorial was 
published in the super-regional edition of the paper, entitled “Always accompanied by fear”, 
implying that RWE employees and train operators are under constant danger of being attacked 
by radical activists. Furthermore, research participants reported instances of attacks on and 
evictions of media representatives from the forest (G1, see also Hissel, 2015). In 2016, a 
sympathetic film maker was severely injured by police forces and hospitalised (Funken, 2016b; 
personal communication). He is not the only one, as shown below. 
Physical violence 
Violence is designed to silence. There are probably hundreds of acts of intimidation that 
go unreported because perpetrators have succeeded in their aim, using intimidation to 
'chill' the environmental or social critics concerned (Lubbers, 1999, speaking about 
police/corporate violence against activists in the US). 
While this might well be the case in the Rhineland, a number of activists have reported physical 
violence by police, by workers and by security forces, and some instances have been 
documented – such as the violent eviction of a train blockade in 2013 (figure 21), or what 
activists claim is the intentional running over of two activists following stone throwing by 
activists and threats by the driver (Schöneberg, 2016) (figure 22).  
 




Figure 22 Alleged running over of two activists in January 2016 (Elbrecht, 2016) 
While the opinion of RWE workers towards the opposition varies between individuals, some 
forest defenders reported attempts of citizen arrests, intimidation and beatings, as well as the 
hosing down of activists with water in freezing temperatures when locked-on to machinery. 
RWE security (technically only supposed to use self-defence when under attack), have been 
documented chasing forest defenders and cutting tree house ropes (to make activists fall six 
metres to the ground), using pepper spray, wearing masks, throwing rocks, using vehicles to 
intimidate or attack people, slashing car tires in the encampment, spitting on activists and 
letting dogs loose to follow them, activists report. During lock-on actions, security personnel 
actively beat people to the point of breaking bones, teeth and other body parts, while sexually 
harassing female activists. Similar allegations have been raised vis-à-vis the police. Forest 
defenders have reported serious injuries and abuse during and following arrest. This includes 
sprained wrists, haematomas, broken noses and fingers, lost teeth and refusal of medical 
treatment (Hambacher Forst, 2016b, confirmed by research participants G1). Some activists 
report that police pepper sprayed and kicked people’s faces with boots and beat them outside 
and inside police custody. At times, the police have fully surrounded the camp to enforce a 
strict stop-and-search policy that prevents people from moving and acquiring food and water 
for the camp. In 2015, after escalation of a protest, one of RWE’s private employees admitted 
that “violence emanated from police and security forces”, reporting “euphoric” mood among 
security personnel, looking to pick fights” (WDR, 2015).  
Having outlined the diversity of strategies to manage anti-coal resistance in which offsetting is 
embedded – and many of which are closely entangled with RWE’s recultivation work, such as 
RWE’s educational material about, or guided tours through Sophienhöhe – I now, finally, turn to 
the offsetting work itself.  
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6.5. No net loss of trees: offsetting RWE’s coal mining impacts  
We want this craziness to end. Not to be offset (local activist and resident) 
Quadratisch, praktisch, gut? (local activist and resident) 
A German reader will be familiar with the advertising slogan by popular chocolate producer 
Rittersport – literally translated into “Square, Practical, Good” – that has by now become a 
common German phrase to describe functionality. It is this phrase that one of my research 
interviewees used – reframed as a question, and with sarcastic undertones – in response to my 
question about RWE’s compensation measures to offset for the loss of the Hambacher Forst, 
and it describes well the scepticism with which these are perceived among those who are 
campaigning against RWE (F3). 
And yet, the legitimacy of German coal mining is closely associated with mine operators’ nature 
restoration work – both to rehabilitate former mining sites and to compensate for impacts. The 
history of coal mining in the Rhineland is thus also a history of nature restoration; fundamental 
to RWE’s processes of accumulation by restoration, explored below. Many of the area’s 
recreational green areas are restored mining areas, and many of its historic sites and tourist 
attractions are associated with the mining industry. The German term Baggerseen, which 
literally translates into ‘digger lakes’ and refers to flooded pits, has become a widely used term 
in the German language. Whereas historically, mining recultivation (conducted as early as 1784) 
had economic reasons, including dependence on forests as an important economic resource, in 
the 20th century, companies started experimenting with ‘greening land’ through planting 
different kinds of trees to stop erosion, increase land value and create hunting opportunities 
(Schumacher et al., 2014a).  
According to German mining laws, mining companies have a duty to reclaim or restore areas 
that are used for mining purposes (BBergG, 1980: §55). However, the Federal Nature 
Conservation Act and its requirements under §15 still apply – mining corporations still have to 
implement offsets in case of permanent loss of habitat (van Mäßenhausen, 2016). 
Compensation is considered in terms of functional restoration of the ecosystem – restored or 
offset elsewhere (BNatSchG, 2009: §15). If recultivation measures do not suffice, other 
compensatory/offsetting measures are required. These may involve forced displacement of 
people, according to mining laws (BBergG, 1980: §77). The German Impact Mitigation 
Regulation set out in the German nature protection law and its restoration and compensation 
requirements also apply to the mining industry, despite the “special status” of mining 
operations (van Mäßenhausen, 2016). To comply with the Habitat Directive, German nature 
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legislation stipulates that projects that impact EU Natura2000 sites require EIAs (BNatSchG, 
2009: §34) that may require compensation. However, any project of overriding public interest 
(if no viable alternative is available) may be permitted even if the EIA is negative (BNatSchG, 
2009: §34). While neither the German law nor the Habitats Directive specify “overriding public 
interest”, resource security is commonly included (van Mäßenhausen, 2016). In addition to (and 
beyond) legal requirements, reputational risks have led Rhinish coal operators to restore and 
recultivate natural and agricultural areas. From the beginnings of their mining operations in the 
Rhineland over 100 years ago, RWE devoted considerable financial resources on nature 
recultivation work to gain and maintain a social licence to operate in a densely populated area, I 
am told by RWE representatives (E3, E5). Today, recultivation work is undertaken by RWE’s 
recultivation research centre in collaboration with the Cologne Bureau for Faunistics and 
countless volunteers. The research centre is not only responsible for the planning and 
implementation of RWE’s recultivation work but appears to undertake PR and stakeholder 
outreach, promoting the company’s biodiversity management to external parties, student 
groups and politicians. Although the company has only recently adopted the language of 
‘offsetting’ (following an IUCN partnership and resulting evaluation of its restoration work, 
explored below), the Sophienhöhe, designated offset for the Hambacher Forst, is praised for 
leading to NNL, and even a net gain of trees. The site far exceeds previous rehabilitation and 
compensation efforts; it has become a restoration laboratory, and plays a crucial role in 
securing acceptance for ‘Europe’s biggest hole’. 
The newly restored natural area and artificial low mountain range forms the heart of the 
biodiversity management plan of the Hambach mine. Some of the forested areas are designated 
for future timber harvesting (Schumacher et al., 2014b; E3, E4), while the area is also used for 
recreational purposes. The Sophienhöhe contains 150km of hiking and cycling trails leading to 
visitor points on top of the hills and different ‘eye-catchers’ including a Celtic tree circle, look-
outs and a ‘giant redwood trail’ as well as, initially, a moufflon wild park. In addition to RWE’s 
regular guided tours through the Sophienhöhe, the company produces maps that can be 
ordered for free through the RWE hotline.  
The offset site promises ‘no net loss of trees’, an RWE recultivation expert explains, with a 
diversity of unique ecosystems that has facilitated the return of rare species in the area. These 
measures exceed legislative requirements: Rather than simply planting cheaper monocultures, 
for instance, especially spruces, the company has invested substantial financial resources into 
creating biodiverse offset areas and turning them into recreational areas – even before 
compensation measures had become mandatory. Despite its rich ecological diversity and newly 
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created ecosystems – including local biodiversity hotspots and unique biotopes – many argue 
that the area cannot compensate for the loss of this ancient forest (Jansen, 2012; F1, F2, F3, F4, 
F5) – “it might take 100 years for the new forests to equal the rich biodiversity of the ancient 
woodland, particularly the old growth oak stands” (Imboden and Moczek, 2015: 18). 
In addition to the Sophienhöhe, RWE has implemented additional conservation measures that 
are designed to offset the loss of Hambacher Forst, including a network of bat highways 
(double-tree lines that attract insects for hunting) that are meant to facilitate the migration of 
the threatened Bechstein bat into other nearby forests, as well as wooden boxes to catch and 
relocate the threatened hazel dormouse and other bat-species. These measures form part of 
RWE’s accumulation by restoration, which will be analysed in the next section. 
Accumulation by Restoration in the Rhineland: re-building human and nonhuman habitat 
Accumulation by restoration, as explored above, denotes the making and securing of profits 
through recreation, or ‘repair’ of habitat – both human and nonhuman, as I will be arguing in 
reference to RWE’s recultivation work. This restoration is threefold: it refers, firstly, to RWE’s 
restoration of agricultural areas, which undergo a seven-year process of mixing soils to enable 
agricultural production following mining activity; secondly, to the company’s restoration of 
‘human habitat’ – the re-building of entire towns and villages that were destroyed in 
preparation of mining activity; and thirdly, to its ecological restoration activities of non-human 
habitat – biodiversity offsets, such as the Sophienhöhe. Each of the associated processes of 
accumulation by restoration will be explored in more depth, starting with agricultural 
restoration.  
The German Rhineland is one of the most fertile agricultural areas of the country, and large 
areas of land designated for mining activity were previously used for agricultural production, 
much of it by smallholder farmers. Some land is being returned to agricultural production 
following the ‘migration’ of the mine and the restoration of agricultural land. The latter involves 
land reclamation and the mixing of arable soils, with clay, sand, loam and humus (topsoil). RWE 
employees manage the land for seven years, primarily through bur clover planting, rather than 
food production, with the aim to “activate” the soil (RWE Power, n.d.b: 8). After seven years, 
the land is trandferred to farmers, who “are never given back the same land they once 
cultivated, but often fields that are much further away” (H2). The new land continues to be 
inferior, I am told, “the ‘trafficability’ is not optimal. You can’t drive on it when it’s wet” (H2). 
Only about half of the total recultivated area, however, is turned into agricultural land. By 2016, 
32,200ha of agricultural land had been converted for Rhinish mining activity, and only 53% 
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(12.200 ha) of the 22.800 ha of recutivated areas were returned for agricultural production 
(Adams et al., 2016: 7). Fig. 23 compares previous land use (“Landinanspruchnahme”) and 
rehabilitated areas (“Wiedernutzbarmachung”), with agricultural land in yellow, and clearly 
shows the reduction in total area. The red area shows the land area that is currently being 
mined by RWE; most of which will be converted into lakes (the Hambach lake alone will cover 
3750 hectares, Dworschak and Rose, 2009: 17). 
 
 
Figure 23 Area balance in the Rhinish lignite coal area in hectare (Dworschak and Rose, 2009: 5) 
Over the last 150 years, Friedhelp Kamphausen and Klaus Lohde have shown, land clearance for 
mining has “almost exclusively been at the expense of agricultural use” (2005: 299). 
Recultivation is negotiated with the Chamber of Agriculture, RWE shareholder, who negotiate 
agricultural recultivation on behalf of farmers, against nature reconservation interests (H2). 
“We negotiate for every hectare”, I am told.   
The big losers of RWE’s recultivation are small farmers. In addition to the loss of agricultural 
land for mining activity, agricultural land is taken out of converted for biodiversity conservation 
purposes, leading to higher market prices for land that disproportionately affect smaller farmers 
(Deter, 2013). The result is restructuring of ownership and concentration of land in hands of 
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fewer larger farmers, a research participant from the Chamber of Agriculture explains (H2, 
confirmed by Kulenovic, 2016), along with the loss of small businesses, restaurants and craft 
producers. In one of the resettled villages, the interviewee explains, “we used to have 12 farms. 
After resettlement, we were left with two or three … Many give up … They have been working 
on their land for generations, they don’t ‘warm up’ to the new land. Many wait till the coal 
comes and then they give up” (H2). Those who receive new land – often as far as 30km away – 
are more limited in their growing options, as some agricultural plants don’t grow on the 
restored soils, and organic agriculture is impossible. Animal husbandry – especially small-scale 
dairy farming – often became impossible, as the new land farm land was categorised as 
residential areas (Hennen, 2018). Others wait for years to receive new land (Silberer, 2013). 
RWE (shareholders), meanwhile, not only profit from their core mining business, but further 
receive EU agricultural subsidies of 304 Euro per hectare during the seven years of agricultural 
recultivation, amounting to half a million Euro in 2010 (WDR, 2011), and slightly under 400,000 
in 2017, including a “greening premium” of 118,000 Euro, according to the Federal Office for 
Agriculture and Food (Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung, 2017). The company 
profits directly from its agricultural restpration, at the cost of small farmers. 
The second process of restoration involves the re-building of ‘human habitat’. As explored 
above, over 50 Rhinish villages and small towns have been displaced for mining activity over the 
last century, involving the destruction and relocation of entire villages. These processes have 
come at great human and material costs, involving the loss of social fabric in communities, as 
neighbourhoods were ripped apart (Silberer, 2013), and the disappearance of cementories and 
ancient cathedrals. Local infrastructures disappear first, I am told, including shops and bakeries 
(F1).  Many cannot afford to re-build their houses, because they lived on leased land, and 
compensation payments for leased land are very low (Hennen, 2018) – in addition to problems 
with price assessments, valuation processes and time discounting explored above. Others 
become indebted and forced to rent from RWE (Kirschengens et al., 1985).   
The last, and most important, process of accumulation by restoration occurs through the nature 
restoration processes explored above: the creation of biodiversity offsets, such as Sophienhöhe, 
through its own recultivation centre to enable claims about ‘no net loss of trees’, as well as 
through the generation and sale of eco-points, introduced in chapter 1. The former has already 
been introduced: it involves the restoration of formerly mined land to serve as offsets for the 
‘migrating mine’, and particularly the destruction of the Hambacher Forst. The biggest losers in 
this process are the endangered bats and other forest wildlife, and local communities 
(especially people who don’t own cars) who lose access to the forest. The latter – the 
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generation of eco-points – illustrates the novelty of the processes particularly well, and should 
be explained in more depth.  
German legislation enables private companies to sell eco-points for enhancing the status of 
natural areas they own. The ‘upgrade’ of a spruce forest to a beech tree forest, for instance, 
constitutes a compensatory measure that can be sold to a developer (Steinbach, 2015). The 
mining industry is involved in the provision of such compensation areas and has accumulated 
the ecological expertise and methodologies for this work. In NRW, the agency responsible for 
the provision of offsets, Landschaftsagentur Plus GmbH, a private enterprise with limited 
liability, constitutes a joint venture of RAG Montan real estate, daughter company of anthracite 
mining company RAG and green area management firm HVG. RWE has offered specialist 
environmental and recultivation services in the past (RWE Technology International, n.d.) and 
has advised the German government on mine rehabilitation (RWE Power International, 2008). 
The company sells eco-points generated through nature restoration or ‘upgrading’ to German 
municipalities (Hupp, 2016), such as the city of Brühl, located near the three Rhinish mines 
(Stadt Brühl, 2014). Some of these areas compensate for the expansion of its giant theme park, 
Phantasialand, and the associated loss of forest (Bezirksregierung Köln, 2015; Kirfel, 2013), 
other areas are used for rewilding projects in collaboration with other actors (e.g. Beckum, 
n.d.). Eco-points are generated through the ‘upgrading’ of forests, mentioned above, the 
conversion of agricultural land into grassland to protect local biodiversity (Stiftung Rheinische 
Kulturlandschaft, n.d.), or the plantation of fruit orchards (Schröter, 2013). Previously mined 
areas are sometimes ustilised as compensation areas by municipalities in the Rhinish mining 
area, against payment to RWE, as for instance the compensation concept for environmental 
impacts of the city of Hürth shows (Stadt Hürth, 2006). Through daughter company RWW 
(Rheinisch-Westfälische Wasserwerksgesellschaft, involved in local water management), RWE 
owns three eco-accounts through which it generates eco-points through reforestation and 
rewilding work (RWW, n.d.). In addition to eco-points, RWW offers a “complete service” to 
developers, the company advocates, including “planning and implementation of compensation 
measures” as well as “long-term maintenance” and “regular monitoring” (RWW, n.d.). 
Additionally, RWE maintains a number of its own eco-accounts, such as Villewälder in 
Weilerswist (Euskirchen), which are used to offset the implementation of housing projects 
(Schwarze et al., 2016: 22) 
The associated accumulation that is generated through restoration of human and nonhuman 
habitat and agricultural land is twofold. Firstly, it involves new value creation or capturing 
through the restoration process itself, e.g. new profit opportunities through the sale of eco-
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points, associated environmental services and agricultural subsidies. More significant, however, 
is the securing and protection of existing (and increasingly ‘at risk’) (shareholder) value creation 
against the threat of political decisions to phase out coal. This value creation relies on the 
legitimacy rendered by restoriation, collaboration and new partnerships with ecological groups, 
conservation organisations and ‘nature lovers’ (see next section), as well as the spectacle 
associated with turning mining into tourism experiences, mediating social relations between 
RWE and mining tourists.  
Land restoration, or the compensation of the destruction of habitat that was destroyed for 
industrial expansion, has historically been crucial for the legitimacy of mining activities. What is 
new, however, is the role of neutrality as mobilising metaphor (Huff and Brock, 2018) – as 
rhetorical device to legitimise new financial frontiers (Sullivan, 2013a) – and the creation of 
novel accumulation opportunities based on the ‘repair’ of habitat, in addition to the 
facilitatation and legitimisation of ongoing accumulation through destruction. The significance 
of these processes, I go on to show, not only lies in their ‘material manifestation’ and the profits 
realised. The significance of RWE’s restoration work, and especially the Sophienhöhe, lies in its 
productive power, its mobilising function as anchor for partnerships and alliances, its place in 
the eco-touristic development of the mine, and its role in capturing imaginations through novel 
imaginaries and narratives of sustainable coal mining. RWE mobilises these narratives to re-
shape the past and create a better future, and to establish itself as good corporate citizen and 
responsible neighbour – through the use of ‘spectacular conservation’ (chapter three), and 
narratives around better nature and a better future, effectively managing and pre-empting 
dissent and maintaining a favourable regulatory environment. I will develop these points in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
Green(wash)ing RWE and co-opting nature lovers – partnerships and collaborations around 
nature restoration 
Biodiversity offsetting, I have argued throughout this dissertation, can serve to co-opt critics and 
divide-and-conquer resistance. This section illustrates the place of RWE’s restoration work in 
the management of critique; it contextualises offsetting within the company’s greening efforts 
and analyses its role as anchor for a conservation partnerships and stakeholder dialogue. RWE’s 
restoration work plays into the discursive greening of RWE’s operations and their positioning as 
‘sustainable’ and good corporate neighbour. As part of their large PR campaign “voRWEg 
gehen”, a wordplay that translates into “leading the way”, the company has been trying to 
establish itself as environmental leader causing controversy in 2009 when their advertising clip 
(RWE, 2011) suggested significant investments into renewable energy, when at the time only 
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2.7 percent of their energy was based on renewables (Lobbycontrol, n.d.). Wind energy, 
featured prominently in the video, only contributed to 0.1% of the electricity it produced, and 
none of the six tidal power stations that were displayed in the video had actually been built 
(Lobbycontrol, n.d.).  
While offsetting is part of this greening exercise, it goes beyond it. In previous chapters I 
explored the importance of offsetting as anchor for corporate conservation partnerships, which 
are central for the mining industry and its social licence to operate – for their ability to lend 
credibility to the industry’s conservation work, to silence and co-opt critics and to divide the 
environmental movement (chapter four). Partnerships represent a “‘stakeholder’ form of 
politics, which obscures the existence of underlying social conflicts” (Newell, 2008: 523). To 
manage these conflicts, many mining companies have recruited leading NGO representatives 
and academics into their stakeholder boards or advisory councils. RWE is no exception. Its 
collaboration with conservation NGOs is institutionalised at different levels – internationally 
(through the Bettercoal Initiative introduced in chapter five), on a company-level (through its 
IUCN partnership, and other partnerships with German NGOs and government bodies), as well 
as locally, through partnerships with nature volunteers and the Kölner Büro für Faunistik. The 
company has enrolled two very prominent German environmentalists on its Corporate 
Responsibility Stakeholder Council: Christoph Bals, director of Germanwatch, and Professor 
Manfred Fischedick, vice president of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy. In its leading role in the Bettercoal Initiative, RWE claims to promote corporate 
sustainability in the international coal supply chain by auditing and stakeholder engagement. 
Campaigners, however, criticise RWE for ‘outsourcing’ their responsibilities to divert attention 
from their destructive operations, I am told by a member of a mining NGO (D5). The secret 
nature of the internal audits and their outcomes and the “forward-looking approach” of 
“continuous improvement”, which allows for ignoring the corporate crimes committed by 
RWE’s supply partners, make for what one research participant describes as a “perfect 
greenwashing tool” (D5). In the run-up to the 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, RWE 
announced a controversial biodiversity partnership with IUCN, which involved a study of RWE’s 
biodiversity management and restoration work around the Hambach mine. The study 
recommends:  
biodiversity loss is a risk factor to the company. However, if projected risks are managed 
properly (e.g. on the basis of the mitigation hierarchy), they can often be turned into 
opportunities to provide positive outcomes for biodiversity … such management 




To reduce reputational risks, it recommends better communication and interaction with 
stakeholders, and additional biodiversity offsets embedded in NNL logic and application of the 
mitigation hierarchy - despite recognition that offsetting measures “will never reach the 
biodiversity status of a mature forest” (Imboden and Moczek, 2015: 15-18). The report further 
advocates turning investment risks – diminishing raw materials, civil society concerns, access to 
capital, reputational harm – into profitable business opportunities including ‘branding’ 
opportunities, pre-empting regulations and public pressure (Imboden and Moczek, 2015). The 
partnership was widely criticised by German IUCN member organisations, and has not been 
renewed (E3; IUCN, n.d.). As a consequence, RWE established a new biodiversity policy in which 
offsetting is further institutionalised through its commitment to IFC performance standard 6 
and (for the first time!) the use of the mitigation hierarchy and the NNL concept (RWE Group, 
2016) – the idea that RWE has been using to legitimise its operations for many years (i.e. ‘we 
plant more trees than we cut down’), but had never publicly formulated as such.  
Locally, RWE engages with numerous local volunteers and conservation organisations, 
collaborating in biodiversity data collection and inviting them to their restoration conference, 
where their work is showcased, publicly acknowledged and applauded. This work, and the data 
they collect, is important to the restoration success, I am told, and RWE’s recultivation centre 
entertains close contact and personal relationships with these groups and individuals (E4, E5). In 
return, conservationists abstain from criticising RWE’s coal mining operations and the cutting of 
the Hambacher Forst (personal communication with conservationist).  
At the same time, RWE (re)produces narratives that serve to naturalise its activities and its place 
in the Rhinish political economy. This will be explored in the next section.  
Capturing imaginations: naturalising coal extraction, naturalising RWE, naturalising citizenship 
In the previous section I touched on RWE’s narratives of social and ecological responsibility and 
stewardship around its mining operations. In these discourses, the impacts and the risks of coal 
mining are normalised and naturalised “as the inevitable consequences of modernity” (Kirsch, 
2014: 1), or so-called ‘civilisation’. The legitimisation of coal mining is based on three main 
narratives, invoking particular fears and sentiments: firstly, the necessity of coal for energy 
security (with renewed impetus after the political decision to phase out nuclear electricity 
production); secondly, coal being a ‘domestic’ energy source for the ‘domestic’ market, and 
thirdly, the role of coal as source of employment and prosperity of the region (e.g. RWE Power, 
2013a – but also, for instance, in its teaching material). This discourse helps positioning 
coalmining as a matter of ‘national interest’ – fundamental to allow for displacement and 
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resettlement and to override environmental concerns. Each of these messages deserves some 
attention.  
The positioning of coal as indispensable for energy security constitutes a particular form of 
securitisation of the energy (discourse) that is particularly influential in policy circles and the 
media. To nourish these fears, RWE commissioned a study on “supply security” from the (pro-
business) Cologne Institute for Economic Research that was published in 2015 (IWKöln, 2015). 
Its PR appeals to fears of sitting ‘in the dark’ – when the wind stops blowing and the sky is 
clouded (RWE Generation, 2015). Already in 1979, a regional politician criticised, the company 
operated with “alarming news and horror images”; warning of blackout if no new power plants 
were built (Spiegel, 1979). Today, these fears are based on the ‘unreliability’ of renewables, 
warning of weather-related blackouts, while positioning coal as modern, reliable and 
“intelligent, flexible partner of the renewables” (RWE Generation, 2015: 3).  
The second message around the domestic nature of coal plays into economic nationalist 
discourses, invoking fears of dependence on foreign, potentially ‘less democratic’ countries and 
markets – although the European electricity grid is already so closely integrated that electricity 
is being imported and exported across boundaries. Germany is currently a net exporter of 
electricity, exporting some 10% of its electricity, mainly produced through the burning of coal 
(Agora, 2016: 1). This plays into the historic image of mining as ‘traditional’ and fundamental to 
the post-war economic recovery. “Mining is what helped us recover and rebuild after the war”, 
an interviewee explains, “that makes it very difficult to criticise” (F3). These sentiments were 
particularly important at the time of permit approval for the Hambach mine amid the oil crisis. 
From the beginning, I am told by a regional government informant, the Hambach mine was a 
“political project”, triggered by political fears of the increasing dependence on foreign oil 
imports, ignoring social and ecological concerns (H2). The interviewee continues: “The Hambach 
permit was approved in no time … people didn’t think that species protection would come to 
play such an important role … that there might by legislation on it” (H2). 
The third PR message around employment and prosperity is based on invoking fears of 
deindustrialisation, triggering images of the dark ages and pre-industrial primitivism. This 
discourse of civilisation, modernity and backwardness is frequently invoked by the mining 
industry across the world, often vis-à-vis indigenous concerns and local resistance. This is 
exemplified, for instance, in the words of former president of the industry’s trade union, then-
MP Ulrich Freese, who recently warned of the “end of the welfare state” (in Greuling, 2015). In 
his ‘sustainable mining vision’, mining engineer Ajoy Ghose claims: “Mining is, was and shall 
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continue to be the cornerstone of human civilization … without mineral raw materials human 
race literally regresses to a caveman existence” (2009: 2). Mining, in turn, is associated with 
(technological) progress and modernity, with conquest over nature, and engineering dreams. 
RWE’s promotional material – and the mining-eco-tourist infrastructure explored below – 
appeal to this fascination with big machinery symbolising modernity, showcasing its huge 
diggers, the “largest mobile machines of the world” (RWE Power, 2013b), steered through the 
most up-to-date GPS technology (RWE Power, 2014). Coal mining itself is naturalised both by 
embedding it historically, highlighting its long history in the region, as well as geologically, 
emphasising its naturalness. “It’s a natural product, just dead plants”, I am told repeatedly when 
participating in RWE’s guided tours. Such rhetoric suggests, Stuart Kirsch argues, “that the 
‘actions of the mining companies, while not themselves natural, are fully compatible with 
natural processes, and the resulting damage is either slight, irrelevant, or self-correcting if left 
to ‘natural’ processes’” (2014: 139; referencing McEachern; see also Evans, Goodman and 
Lansbury, 2002). This renders possible absurd political claims about coal constituting a 
‘renewable’ energy source, making coal phase-out obsolete – as overheard more than once by 
visitors of the mine – and effectively naturalising the mining process itself, while downplaying its 
social and ecological impacts. 
Not only are coal mining and dependence on coal electricity naturalised as outcomes of human 
‘progress’ – similarly, the growth of RWE, its close political ties, its previous monopoly over 
German electricity production, but also its hegemony in the Rhinish employment market and 
local dependence on the company are presented as a ‘natural order’. Yet, RWE has for decades 
lobbied hard for lower taxation and against the establishment of alternative sources of 
employment in the region (and continues to lobby on all levels of governance). In the 1950s, 
two interviewees report, RWE prevented the establishment of the automobile industry in 
Bedburg, a small town close to the neighbouring Garzweiler mine, to cement the town’s 
structural dependency on RWE by exercising pressure on the town government (F2, F3). These 
processes of naturalisation and establishment of RWE as responsible neighbour and citizen – a 
native or naturalised member of a state or community who is entitled to rights and protection – 
are achieved through positioning itself as ‘giving back’ and as ‘belonging’. The former – 
responsible neighbour – is achieved through employment, CSR projects, recreational 
infrastructure and recultivated ‘new nature’; while the latter implies being anchored not only in 
the political and geological landscapes but also in the cultural landscape, through sponsoring of 
arts projects, concerts, recreational infrastructure and historic monuments such as Pfaffendorf 
castle, that has been turned into a PR site. These strategies represent what Dinah Rajak has 
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called the “performance of corporate virtue” (2011b: 10). Whereas she analyses the CSR regime 
as the reinvention of “old regimes of corporate paternalism … within a modern morality of 
social responsibility” (2011: 10), the idea of corporate citizenship, I suggest, now serves to 
replace that morality with a social order in which the corporation is a valued member – citizen – 
of the community within which it operates. With these social responsibilities, in the era of 
corporate citizenships, comes a bundle of new rights and entitlements. Notions of responsibility 
tend to assign power to corporations to define their own conduct, covering up “the power 
relations which the seemingly benign language of 'responsibility' and 'citizenship' seeks to deny 
or obscure” (Newell, 2005: 542). The idea of citizenship, Roger White has argued, “has 
historically been a construction of property owners as a way to exercise privilege and power 
over poor migrants, and religious and racial minorities” (2004: 12). Corporate citizenship also 
goes beyond the idea of corporate personhood, attached to the enjoyment to certain human 
rights, in its association of belonging and civic duties. While the notion of citizenship implies a 
corporate responsibility to re-pay communities, Peter Newell argues, 
the range and level of obligations they are expected to fulfil are largely left to their 
discretion. The power to define the rights and responsibilities that underpin a social 
contract is not shared. Because in many settings companies have greater bargaining 
leverage and enjoy the backing and support of governments, the space for communities 
to contest rights and responsibilities is restricted (2005: 546).  
The idea of legal personhood, recently confirmed by US courts, is rooted in the very idea of 
incorporation, “to give substance or material form to something, to embody it” (Paul, 2011). It 
goes back to the British East India Company, incorporated by English royal charter in 1600, 
instrumental in the establishment of British colonialism and later functioning as governing 
bodies in the colonies (Paul, 2011). The concept of corporate citizenship gained traction after 
1996, when US president Clinton invited a number of business leaders to discuss corporate 
citizenship and social responsibility, urging them to “do well” while making money for their 
shareholders (Carroll, 1998). Being a “good corporate citizen”, according to Archie Carrell, 
includes to be profitable, to obey the law, to engage in ethical behaviour, and to give back 
through philanthropy (Carroll, 1998: 2). The concept has since been adopted by the World 
Economic Forum, and the UN (UN Global Compact, 2012). RWE is proud to be  
actively embracing its role as “good corporate citizen” by upholding its commitment to 
social responsibility. In addition to the RWE Foundation and the voluntary “RWE 
Companius” initiative, regional projects and classic sponsoring also play an important 
role when it comes to projecting the image of RWE not just as a successful company, but 
also as a good neighbour (RWE, n.d.d). 
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RWE is an active member of the CCCD – the German Centre for Corporate Citizenship – a 
business think tank that advocates corporate citizenship in Germany, as “the cornerstone of a 
New Social Contract” to “systematically connect … business goals and common good interests 
to create a win-win strategy for both business and civil society” and put them onto the political 
agenda (CCCD, 2010). Good corporate citizenship, according to RWE’s corporate homepage, is 
based on good neighbourhood relationships and continuous dialogue with “all societal groups”, 
and is manifest in local engagement and its “widely recognised high-quality recultivation 
efforts”, RWE’s CSR department states (RWE Power, 2013b). Recultivation work, including 
offsetting, is fundamental for ‘giving back’ and being accepted as a good corporate neighbour, I 
am told by an RWE interviewee (E4); complemented by (and promoted through) dialogue, 
information and open discussion (RWE Power, n.d.a). This includes consultation processes 
where “citizens [can] ask questions about the process [of mine expansion] and voice concerns” 
(RWE Power, n.d.a) – without any commitment by RWE to act on these concerns. 
The consequence of these ‘naturalisation processes’ is that RWE – just like the transnational 
corporation in the global political economy – has become a ‘taken-for-granted actor’ in the 
Rhineland, further “naturalizing a certain ontology, a world in which personified entities called 
corporations exist—entities with volition, agency, and moral judgment” (Foster, 2010: 99). This 
naturalisation goes beyond mere greenwashing. It legitimises and intensifies accumulation 
processes, and constructs corporations as benevolent citizens, bringers of prosperity and 
saviours of natural environments. The granting of citizenship has historically been politically 
contested (e.g. to non-white people or women) and points to the crucial role of the state in 
enforcing corporate ‘rights’, legitimising RWE’s operations and suppressing resistance. 
Ultimately, it is the state who grants citizenship and builds regulation ‘for’ rather than 
regulation ‘of’ business (Newell, 2001), and the ontology described above relies on the state as 
ultimate authority, playing an active role in protecting citizens’ (= RWE’s) rights, e.g. by 
protecting their logging operations as explained above. The naturalisation of RWE’s operations, 
and ultimately its own role in the Rhineland, is complemented by its efforts to shape the 
memories of the past, and imaginations of (a better) future.  
The spectacular (re)-imagination of a better future and a better nature 
RWE’s discursive work to naturalise its operations, and the imaginations of a ‘better future’, 
which will be explored in this section, need to be read against the ‘threat’ of the energy 
transition and the end of coal, but also a certain German nostalgia, romanticism and 
mythological attachment to (ancient) forests. Instead, RWE promotes a medium-term future 
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with coal, harmoniously co-existing with the slow (corporate-controlled) expansion of 
renewable sources of energy and the creation of a ‘better nature’ to compensate for the 
destruction of the Hambacher Forst. To analyse the role of imaginaries in RWE’s corporate 
messaging, it is useful to go back, once again, to Guy Debord’s spectacle, and Jim Igoe’s work 
around the importance of images, not only in “shap[ing] people’s perceptions of the world, but 
[in] mediat[ing] social and human-environmental relationships … in late capitalism” (2010: 375). 
I see these imaginaries as part of RWE’s efforts’ to ‘remake nature’ and transform (the image of) 
nature from coal to windmills as part of corporate-driven ‘spectacularisation of conservation’ 
(chapter three). As explored in previous chapters, spectacle imposes a sense of unity in 
situations of fragmentation, legitimising and justifying the hegemonic system and stipulating 
consumption as the (only) way of engaging with the world. It is grounded in the presentation of 
the world as quantifiable and commensurable, creating the appearance of exchangeability while 
concealing conflicts and contradictions, reifying the same conditions and relationships it is 
based on (Debord, 1967). It is further intensifying the alienation among humans and between 
human and nonhuman nature that offsetting plays into. It is these relationships between 
people, RWE and our (natural?) environment that I am interested in here; the way that RWE is 
incorporating the surrounding, shaping it and using it for rendering a positive image of its 
operations – and mediating people’s relationship to coal itself. Spectacle involves, in the 
Rhineland, the strategic positioning of windmills around the edges of the mine (figure 23) and 
the RWE-sponsored plantation of the last decades’ ‘trees of the year’ along the new highway 
along the edge of the mine (figure 24), both of which serve to signal its environmental 
stewardship and responsible behaviour, caring about the climate, and caring about educating 




Figure 24 Windmills at the edge of Hambach mine (own photo)  
 
Figure 25 RWE-sponsored 'trees of the year' along the dislocated highway (own photo) 
But even RWE’s offsetting work becomes subject to spectacularisation, exploited for advertising 
purposes. It is visible in its aforementioned promotional video – screened in cinemas and 
national TV – where RWE appears as self-proclaimed ‘energy giant’ (recurring in much of its 
advertising material) that resembles Shrek. The energy giant has trees growing on its shoulders, 
‘plants’ windmills and tidal power stations, but more importantly moves mountains, plants 






Figure 26 Energy giant RWE restoring nature, screenshot of RWE's promotional video (RWE, 2011) 
These three spectacular performances of sustainability contribute to RWE’s corporate display of 
good guardianship and responsible citizenship, once again remaking the (human) landscape and 
communicating the reconcilability of sustainability and coal. The windmills, representing a 
different kind of progress and modernity in times of energy transition and climate change, thus 
simultaneously serve as compensation measures for the mine (concealing the equally, if not 
more ecologically disastrous mining operations and displacement required elsewhere for the 
precious metals necessary for these windmills, Dunlap and Brock, forthcoming). Both the tree 
line (figure 24) and the friendly giant (figure 25) remind the passing passenger and the cinema-
goer, respectively, of RWE’s ecological concerns and commitment to recultivation work, 
creating a sustainable future.  
The most interesting example, however, is :terra nova, the information centre overlooking the 
mine that I introduced above, embedded in an artificial dune landscape. The resort-style beach 
landscape is no coincidence. RWE’s long-term management plans indicate that after the 
proposed mine closure in 2045, Europe’s ‘biggest hole’ is meant to be turned into Germany’s 
second largest lake by the end of the century. “It is supposed to look like a shoreline”, explains 
RWE employee Guido Johnen (in Wonnemann, 2013). This attempt to turn the present mine 
into a future lake attempts to do just as their slogan proclaims: “looking into the present and 
the future”, creating a “positive” landscape, not looking backwards, because “looking 
backwards can be painful”, as chief architect Dirk Melzer explains (Melzer, n.d.) – especially for 
those who experienced displacement because of the mine. The sunbeds and parasols, he 
explains, are “invitations to wait for the water” (figure 26). RWE attempts to market the re-
imagining of the future, constructing a win-win solution where coal mining leads to a better life 
and, importantly, “better nature”, with a new lake and commercialised recreational 
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opportunities waiting at the end of the mining tunnel. These new infrastructures are intimately 
tied to RWE’s greening efforts and claims of ecological sustainability, representing the 
neoliberal belief in consensus and seductive win-win solutions, based on the compatibility of 
capitalist growth and ecological sustainability (Büscher et al., 2012) – but also the capturing of 
imaginations founded on the erasure of the interconnectedness of natures, spaces and previous 
inhabitants (human and nonhuman) and the projection of new, artificial and mediated relations. 
This erasure and reconstruction of interconnection is a discursive and practical act of violence 
that is being invisibilised by RWE’s attempts to “green” mining. 
 
Figure 27 Waiting for the water (Merzer, n.d.) 
Not only does it hold the promise of a better future, a future where people will be able to enjoy 
the recreational opportunities that RWE is providing for them (just as most lakes in the 
Rhineland are former mining sites that have been restored to create recreational opportunities 
including swimming, cycling and water-skiing). But at the same time, it resembles the political 
‘threat’ (or promise) that RWE has been able to institutionalise in the political arena, nationally 
and especially in the NRW parliament (and constantly reiterates in its publications): coal is still 
the future – coal will be with us for a long time. This present and this future are to be consumed 
through the commodified ‘enjoyment’ of the view over the mine, connected – physically 
through a ‘jetty’ (figure 27) – to consumption of food, drinks and football-golf, but also 




Figure 28 The jetty connecting the restaurant with the shore (Merzer, n.d.) 
In combination with the diversity of recreational opportunities – regular tours through mines 
and power stations, cycling and hiking infrastructure, guided hiking tours through Sophienhöhe, 
exhibitions and museums, cultural events and the multiple attractions that can be found in the 
offset site (including the Celtic tree circle, viewing points, ‘giant redwood trail’, and showcased 
wildlife49 mentioned above) – :terra nova constitutes an “extractive attraction” (Brock and 
Dunlap, 2018: 40) that plays into RWE’s transformation of coalmining into a (eco)tourist 
experience. The spectacle of extractive attraction works to further normalise the mining 
processes that are being militantly resisted. In Uganda, Connor Cavanagh and Tor Benjaminsen 
have shown, ‘spectacularisation’ is fundamental in the production of carbon offsets that form a 
“process of interrelated accumulation and naturalization by dispossession” (2014: 56). In the 
Rhineland, :terra nova, Sophienhöhe and the new ‘energy route’ attempt to do the same by 
solidifying a unifying message, justifying the operation and encouraging people to participate as 
spectators, while further commodifying and selling the mining experience. Now parties rage 
(occasionally) and beer glasses cling over electrical humming and grinding gears of mining 
operations, bundling the ‘ecotourism-extraction nexus’, where extraction becomes integral to 
eco-tourist experiences (Büscher and Davidov, 2013), into one operation – mining tourism.  
The ‘spectacular’ mining tourism infrastructure around the Hambach mine helps invisibilise the 
violence required by the mine, and mediate and transcend the assumed contradiction between 
ecotourism and extractive industries. Sophienhöhe and the extensive network of cycling and 
hiking paths appease people’s love for forests, while :terra nova and other recreational-
educational sites romanticise notions of coalmining, providing an outlet for fascination with 
huge machinery that epitomises industrial progress, modernity, and human mastery over 
nature. This accommodationist philosophy manufactures a ‘win-win’ for hikers, cyclists, 
                                                          
49 The wild animals have all died or been removed at the time of writing. 
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conservationists and mechanical enthusiasts, establishing a self-reinforcing and inclusive 
approach that not only merges, but simultaneously articulates the ecotourism-extraction nexus. 
The successful mediation of this relationship and the different interests – ecological, social, 
economic – contribute to Guy Debord’s “omnipresent justification of the conditions and aims of 
existing systems” (Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010: 492) – a capitalist industrial system based 
on social and ecological injustice and exploitation, encouraging consumption as (the only) way 
to relate to one’s surrounding. It plays into RWE’s re-imagination of a future where coal is 
compatible with social and environmental responsibility and the creation of a better life – and a 
better nature. The creation of a better nature is best captured in this quote by one of my RWE 
interviewees: 
The great thing is … that the restoration work is better than [what was there] before. We 
can plan a new landscape … It’s a unique opportunity ... We can accommodate all interests 
(E3). 
The recultivated Sophienhöhe is meant to lead to a ‘net gain of nature’. Indeed, RWE derives 
legitimation from its claims that the company has “planted more trees that it had to fell”, a 
research participant explains (E3) – over 10 million new trees in the past three decades (RWE 
Power, 2014). While marginalising and naturalising forest destruction, RWE sees this as an 
opportunity to improve nature: “intervention in the natural world is an inevitable part of what 
RWE does, which is why we go out of our way to preserve and upgrade the habitats of native 
flora and fauna wherever possible” (RWE, n.d.e, emphasis added). This trust in the company’s 
capacity to engineer and remake nature for their own purposes is grounded in what James Scott 
describes as “high-modernist ideology”, characterised by overly optimistic  
self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the 
growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), 
and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific 
understanding of natural laws (1998: 4). 
The very idea of the ‘forest’, Nancy Peluso and Peter Vandergeest have shown, is the outcome 
of legislation, zoning, mapping and classification processes, subject to management by 
professional services (2011). German forests are highly regulated and mapped spaces, subject 
to management procedures, rules dictating visitors’ behaviour and prohibiting activities. They 
are cut through by designated trails for hikers, cyclists and horse riders, roads, car parks, high-
speed train infrastructure, and electricity grids; with a multiplicity of different signs and 
symbols, to assist and regulate activity. Most forests are commercially exploited, and forest 
owners constitute a powerful lobby at the national and European level. James Scott (1998) has 
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illustrated the transformation of nature into manageable natural resources, based on the 
utilitarian logic of efficient utilisation, that forms the basis of German scientific forest 
management – geared towards profit maximisation and control – which later spread around the 
world. The Sophienhöhe is not just a human environment – it is a corporate-controlled and pre-
planned recreated environment, designed to maximise biodiversity and recreational 
opportunities. Some trails are equipped with info-boards with QR codes, for smart phone 
equipped visitors—allowing people to learn via LCD screen about “the new landscape and its 
flora and fauna” (RWE Power, 2016). This information technology-approach mediates the 
‘visitor’s’ relationship with their natural environment, but also with the company, creating a 
corporate version of what Bram Büscher has coined “Nature 2.0” (2016). Hiking paths through 
the Sophienhöhe are not only heavily signposted but delineated by bushes that keep the visitor 
on the path, resembling what Jeff Ferrell (2012: 1688) calls “spatial environment[s] saturated 
with contemporary ideologies of containment and exclusion”. Policing takes place through 
signs, rules and ‘natural grids’, but also through visual clues that promote self-identification with 
the project and hiking regulations and through policing each other, reminding each other not to 
leave the trails. Individual agency or exploration beyond the pre-planned trail is discouraged. 
Sophienhöhe thus becomes a highly regulated, predictable and enclosed environment – like city 
parks positioned to serve as PR. It is fundamentally exclusive on a deeper level, in that it 
‘outsources’ the nature experiences that the people from Buir, the village adjacent to the 
Hambacher Forst could experience by simply leaving their front doors, and made it accessible 
only to those who have the time and motorised vehicle to drive around the mine in the first 
place.  
RWE’s recultivation and compensation work, which the company praises as ‘exemplary in the 
world’ is taking this belief in the ability to engineer, recreate and control ecosystem service 
development to the next level – visible not only in the Sophienhöhe, but also in their plans to 
turn the Hambach mine into an enormous lake following mine closure (made possible through 
offsets, which mean that RWE can break its obligation to restore the mining area to its previous 
state). The lake is designed to occupy an area of 4000ha, up to 250m deep and meant to be 
filled, over a 40-year period, with four billion m3 of water, diverted from the Rhine river. The 
river ecosystem is scheduled to be finished by 2080, although the feasibility and safety of these 
plans is questioned by ecologists50 (BUND, n.d.; F1, F4).  
                                                          
50 Specifically, they have raised concerns whether the rise of the ground water to original level might lead to drinking water being 
polluted by the toxins released during mining activities. 
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The connection of ‘leading’ restoration practice with the mining industry is especially interesting 
here – and not a coincidence. Not only is the mining industry particularly dependent on access 
to land, and in need of a licence to operate, but it is an industry that is particularly characterised 
by mechanisation; an industry that shifts more soil than any other sector; an industry that has 
‘mastered’ the domination of nature – and an industry that has historically celebrated this 
mastery of nature. Jeffrey H. Michel’s (2005: 18) portrayal of the nature of mining and the 
mining of nature in the Rhineland is worth quoting at length: 
Finite resources of coal and mineral deposits are considered expendable for sustaining 
the mining guild, whose tradition of self-confident rationalization has been captured in a 
slogan that resounds throughout the industry: “I am a miner. Who is more?” (Ich bin 
Bergmann. Wer ist mehr?). This robust profession is outfitted with suitable artifacts of 
masculine sensual gratification, from churning machinery and billowing smokestacks to 
the violent disfigurement of landscape that is reminiscent of World War I battlefields… 
The unconstrained virility implicit to penetrating the bowels of the Earth was captured 
by Friedrich von Hardenberg in his “Song of the Miner” (Bergmanslied) in 1802: A miner, 
the “Lord of the Earth” (Herr der Erde), becomes passionately enflamed in the depths of 
the mine, as if that were his bride (Und wird von ihr entzündet, als wär sie seine Braut). 
Offsetting and recultivation – indeed, the very need to conserve nature – may be belittled or 
ridiculed by the miner, just like climate change is still considered a myth by many RWE 
employees.51 Yet, the assumptions and underlying ideas of restoration – the belief in the human 
capacity to recreate nature and create ‘functioning’ ecosystems over 50-year periods – are 
remarkably similar to the characterisation above – the trust in rationalisation and 
mechanisation, and the ability to ‘play god’ and reshape the earth according to one’s liking. 
Even the RWE engineers and recultivation experts have had to realise the limits to their 
almightiness: Sophienhöhe experienced a number of landslides, requiring additional shifting of 
earth, and RWE had to close down its moufflon park because the animals kept getting ill. This is 
not to say that ‘old nature’ – such as the Hambacher Forst – was not shaped by humans. The 
forest was always a use forest, providing firewood for surrounding communities for thousands 
of years, and has been the source of mythmaking around its origins. The forest, and the stories 
surrounding it, have shaped the cultural history of the region. This uniqueness and the history 
of the forest distinguish it from the recultivated Sophienhöhe and get lost in the 
commensuration and homogenisation necessary for offsetting.  
The creation of equivalence and commensurability starts in the process of mapping, visible in 
the two maps inserted below, both taken from RWE’s conservation concept for the 
management of the Hambach mine (Schutzmaßnahmenkonzept) (RWE Power, 2013c). In figure 
                                                          
51 I repeatedly witnessed remarks which demonstrated this during participant observation at RWE mine tours, the RWE recultivation 
conference and in conversation with RWE employees. 
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28 we can see how the ancient forest (in the centre of the map, clearly ‘in the way’ of the mine) 
and the artificial ecosystem (top left, in the shape of a half-moon) become indistinguishable – 
topographically and ontologically ‘flattened’ (Sullivan, 2017a), and reduced to mere surfaces in 
the same shade of green.  
   
 
Figure 29: Map of the mining area from Schutzmaßnahmenkonzept (RWE Power, 2013c) 
On the next map (figure 29) Sophienhöhe (now in brown) is reduced to a ‘mitigation measure’ 
for bats and other species and given points in the “impact balance sheet” – and the Hambacher 
Forst disappears altogether – just like the human settlements that have already been displaced 
or are expecting displacement in the next few years. 
 
Figure 30 Map of the mining area with designated offsetting areas (RWE Power, 2013c)  
These maps, and the ontological flattening involved in their creation and usage help create the 
image of the “migrating mine”, as RWE claims (e.g. in its mine tours, the Pfaffendorf exhibition 
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and in personal interviews, E3, E4) – or as “a hole that migrates through the landscape”. On its 
website, the research centre recultivation describes: “First come the diggers… then nature 
returns” (Forschungsstelle Rekultivierung, 2016; figure 30). Underlying its wider PR material as 
well as these maps – only slightly more differentiated in personal communication – is the 
assumption that, at the end of the day, soil is soil and tree is tree. This facilitates the 
legitimisation of the mine as ‘temporary use of the land’ and the (widely spread) claim that the 
mine will leave no permanent impact. All disturbance, it is claimed, is purely temporary – a 
claim that is difficult to counter. “Maybe in 12,000 years, Sophienhöhe will be like the 
Hambacher Forst”, a research participant states, “but not any time soon. And even then – it will 
always be an artificial forest” (F3). 
 
Figure 31 “First come the diggers... then nature returns” (Forschungsstelle Rekultivierung, 2016)  
When looking at aerial images of the forest, or walking through and experiencing both forests 
first-hand, the differences become apparent (figure 31).  
 
Figure 32 Arial image of the Western side of the Sophienhöhe (top right), adjacent old-growth forest (bottom left) – 
the Hambach mine begins on the right side (RWE Power, 2013c) 
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“It doesn’t have a soul” is how two interviewees describe the offset area (F4, F5). The 
Hambacher Forst, on the other hand, I am told, is “full of history”. In recent years, the violence 
in and around the forest have shaped the forest and its meaning among residents and activists, 
turning it into a symbol for resistance – a “political forest” (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). The 
forest occupation – now inseparable from the forest itself, and frequently referred to as “the 
forest” – has had an impact on how many people relate to their environment and each other, 
creating new social relations and ways to engage with each other by striving to “live differently” 
(G1 
 
6.6. Conclusion – cheap electricity and better nature 
RWE’s offsetting work is fundamental to the multiple strategies of co-optation, pacification and 
(violent) oppression of dissent and resistance against coal mining in the Rhineland. The 
criminalisation as ‘(eco)terrorists’ helps create the culture of fear that in turn contributes to the 
legitimisation of violence by police and security forces. The violence is invisibilised by the 
numerous soft strategies, within which offsetting is embedded, creating the image of RWE as 
good corporate citizen, but also new dependencies and undermining people’s ability to make 
“political demands which may threaten continued 'goodwill' on the part of the company” 
(Newell, 2005: 547). Meanwhile, the displacement of entire villages increases social 
fragmentation and alienation from each other and the land. Coal mining – and its social and 
ecological ‘costs’ – are further normalised, while RWE’s role in shaping the physical, political, 
cultural and social environments in the Rhineland and beyond is further entrenched. The 
German state is intrinsically tied to fossil fuel interests, large-scale energy projects and 
infrastructure provision, having to defend such “critical infrastructure” projects at all costs 
(Europol, 2016: 8). It is no coincidence that “protests, vandalism, ‘blockades and “lock-ons”’ 
against resource extraction companies and large-scale infrastructure” are singled out in Europol 
terrorism reports (2016: 43), branding anti-capitalist, animal, anarchist and environmental social 
movements as ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist’ (Europol, 2016). This classification has justified 
surveillance and the use of undercover police and informants (Monroy, 2011; Lubbers, 2012; 
Williams, Munger and Messersmith-Glavin, 2013). The mine is ‘defended’, however, not only by 
state/security forces and the media, but also by those who are captivated by ideas of progress, 
modernisation and the green economy, having learned to hold dear the comforts gained and 
the ‘promise’ of good, ‘honest’ mining jobs.  
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RWE’s offsetting work can neither be reduced to a ‘greenwashing’ exercise nor can it be 
explained as rollout of neoliberal market-schemes for the governance of nature or the 
continuation and intensification of financialisation. It is integral to the very operation of the 
mine and plays a fundamental role in the management and engineering of consent and 
disciplining of dissent against coal mining in the Rhineland – a social technology of governance. 
It has become a source of power and plays a fundamental role in its licence to operate, while 
invisibilising the destruction and violence explored above. Based on state support and the 
structural dependence of local state actors, this contributes to the further legitimisation and 
entrenchment of corporate and police violence against activists, residents, nonhuman nature 
and the planet itself. The strategies that I outlined above are inherent to corporate business 
strategies to deal with – and securitise against – regulatory and reputational risks. This 
particular securitisation is directed against resistance and helps turn coal into a (national) 
security issue.  
Analysing these strategies helps identifying the productive power and concrete instances of 
agency involved in offsetting. This avoids invoking and reifying this nebulous concept of ‘the 
market’ by not taking for granted its role as start- and end-point of the analysis of processes of 
financialisation of nature. Consequently, “the market” is demystified and understood as a 
‘rhetorical device’ that plays a discursive role in the managerial governance characteristic of, 
and the resilience of neoliberal capitalism and its ability to turn risks into profits, but has no 
agency on its own. This allows us to go ‘deeper’ in the analysis of offsetting and how it re-
configures and entrenches human-nonhuman relationships based on separation and alienation 
– accompanied by loss of connection caused by displacement. Sophienhöhe transforms nature 
into a destination, separate from ordinary human life and re-sold as a single serving experience 
between work weeks, while the earth is mined and old-growth forests are destroyed.  
The intensification of control through the further domestication of nature, making nature 
legible and manageable, and its instrumentalisation for capitalist purposes is inherently political. 
“The political imposition on nature by the corporate/state”, Alexander Dunlap and James 
Fairhead argue, “creates ‘forests controlled’ as opposed to ‘jungles wild’” (2014: 942). This is 
the very process that the Hambacher Forst resistance is formed against. Whereas historically, 
colonial forestry was fundamental to the legitimisation of the state and the development of 
new forms of state power (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001: 763-4), here, corporate forestry – 
meant to offset forest cutting – plays a further role in the intensification and invisibilisation of 
(state-backed) ecological conflict, of corporate environmental disaster, and the inherent 
contradictions of the ‘green economy’. Historically, forests were fundamental for state building 
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processes – the Sophienhöhe, in contrast, is contributing to corporate citizenship building. As a 
privatised commodity under corporate management (to be ‘returned’ to the public in the 
future), the forest becomes part of that social order that legitimises the mine, expanding human 
politics onto this land. It legitimises and protects not only RWE’s role in ecological and social 
destruction but further facilitates processes of accumulation by restoration (Huff and Brock, 
2017). Through impact mitigation and compensation regulation, nature policy more generally 
(and lack of regulation when it comes to climate change policy), the granting of permits and 
financial and ideological backing, this legitimisation is backed by (and relies on) the state. The 
role, or complicity, of the state in the Rhinish coal mining is widely critiqued and constitutes a 
major source of frustration for residents and activists, illustrated in this graffiti on one of RWE’s 
(eco)tourist information boards denouncing the actions of RWE and the state (figure 32). Its 
writing translates as ‘[go] to hell, RWE’ and ‘father state you son of a bitch’.  
 
Figure 33 Graffiti near the Hambach mine (own photo) 
This corporate control represents not only an ever more utilitarian-economic outlook toward 
nature but the belief in the restorability of nature. A more attentive observer (or participant of 
RWE’s guided nature tours) will notice the “replanted nature” – dead tree trunks that are meant 
to provide artificial nesting opportunities, wire-protected ant hills, resettled from the 
Hambacher Forst or nesting boxes for bats that have been relocated from the forest. Nature is 
now reshaped by RWE’s developers who reconcile and manage different interests and 
reconfigure environments into carefully integrated zones of consumption of nature – non-
commercial and highly commercialised at the same time, as they serve to justify the hugely 
commercialised industrial electricity production system so fundamental to industrial capitalism. 
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The creation of this ‘better nature’ is based on the very same violent processes of classification, 
quantification and measuring of life – what Camila Moreno, Daniel Speich Chassé and Lili Fuhr 
have called “ecological epistemicide” (2015) – ignoring interconnections and social relations to 
the land and enabling claims of ‘net gain’ of trees’. Sophienhöhe is the outcome of RWE’s efforts 
to make nature commensurable, legible and controllable, requiring continuous surveillance, 
monitoring and ‘careful management’ – including regular fertilizer application for decades after 
planting. More importantly, however, Sophienhöhe represents the need to manage the growing 
and intensifying resistance against the continued processes of human and nonhuman 
exploitation, displacement, violence and alienation inherent to extractivism. This chapter aims 




7. Greening extractivism – conserving power: conclusion  
The State is in fact structurally indispensable for this predatory model to succeed, as it 
has the power to make it legally possible – by adjusting the rules of the game – but also 
socially justifiable – by allowing it in the name of a ‘public interest’ that is reframed so as 
to equate with private profit. This way, entire territories that are most targeted by 
extractive companies become also subject to repressive militarization, leaving little room 
for discussion and let alone opposition (WRM, 2017: 27). 
This thesis set out to understand the history, the development and the political economy of 
biodiversity offsetting in Europe and beyond. To analyse how offsetting emerged as a language, 
logic and tool of governance, I asked:  
• How has biodiversity offsetting been appropriated and revived by corporate and state 
actors in Europe and beyond? 
• What is the place of offsetting in the social governance of resistance and dissent and how is 
it shaped by that process? 
Through the exploration of the history and practices of offsetting I argued that biodiversity 
offsetting should be understood as a social technology of governance to manage resistance and 
dissent against corporate and state degradation and violence, and as an instrument to flexibilise 
restrictive legislation imposing limits to industrial expansion in Europe. Offsets, I have argued, 
are therefore less about environmental governance or the governance of biodiversity (loss) than 
about the management of people, particularly institutionalised in conservation organisations 
and environmental movements. Such management is thus more about political rather than 
environmental sustainability – just as the management of environmentalists is fundamental to 
environmental management (Elkington, 1994). Offsets act as social technologies to legitimise, 
rather than reduce or minimise, its destructiveness, they contribute to the intensification and 
expansion of the logic of growth, based on environmental and social exploitation. Consequently, 
they help strengthen, verify and normalise corporate and state power – legitimised by the 
illusion that ‘something is being done’ to deal with biodiversity loss, and manifest in the 
creation of new tasks, policy areas, corporate departments, spaces and places of governance. 
The latter effectively strengthens the state as a fundamental framework for dealing with the 
ecological crisis while naturalising the role of corporations as dependable governance actors. In 
effect, this leads to enhanced control over land and people, the spread of large (energy, 
transport) infrastructure projects and the invisibilisation of the violence involved in this system. 
This thesis further demystifies and denaturalises abstract ideas of the ‘market’. It challenges the 
emerging hegemony of critical analyses of offsetting that often resort to marketisation and 
financialisation as explanatory devices and contributes to the theorisation of the ongoing 
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transformation of neoliberal capitalism, statehood and corporate citizenship, as part of wider 
reconfigurations of governance that are the product of the dialectical relationship between 
capitalism, the state, and its critics.  
In this final chapter I provide a short summary of the chapters and main findings of this 
dissertation. I reflect on the empirical and theoretical contributions and the political 
implications of this research, suggesting the salience of an anti-statist, anti-authoritarian 
perspective to understand offsetting, to discern how it entrenches and ‘erases’ corporate and 
state power and violence.  
7.1. From Edinburgh conference centre into the ‘world’s largest hole’ – 
summary and main findings 
This thesis contributes to the emerging critical literature on biodiversity offsetting and political 
ecologies of the global North by documenting the politics of offset-making in three different 
case studies in different places – at high-level conference centres in Edinburgh and London, in 
European Commission meeting rooms in Brussels, and in and around the Hambach coal mine 
near Cologne, Germany.  
In the Introduction: conserving nature or conserving power?, I laid out the aims of this research, 
introduced biodiversity offsetting in Europe through the recurrent lenses of institutionalisation 
and normalisation, and outlined the structure of this thesis.  
In chapter two, Approaching biodiversity offsets: from financialisation to technology of 
governance, I explored the valuable contributions of the critical literature on offsetting so far 
and identified three weaknesses in the existing literature on offsetting: firstly, an inclination to 
essentialise and naturalise ‘the market’, risking reification of its power; based, secondly, on a 
problematic states-versus-market dichotomy that continues to be prevalent in much critical 
social science research; and, thirdly, the conflation of neoliberal theory and neoliberal practice. I 
argued instead for the positioning of ’the social’ as the primary object of ‘offsetting 
governance’, to ‘securitise’ against resistance, not biodiversity loss as such. 
In chapter three, Making Europe’s nature offsettable: the spectacular performance of 
sustainability through discourse and (community of) practice, I explored the distinct intellectual 
and institutional genealogies of offsetting. First, I analysed the evolution of a particular 
(Western) conceptualisation of nature that made processes of creating equivalence and 
commensurability of nature possible on a theoretical or ideational level. Only the imaginaries 
and narratives of ‘one planetary ecosystem’ and a ‘global biodiversity’, which encompasses the 
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diversity of local natures, open up the possibilities for ‘no net loss’. Offsetting involves, I argued, 
a double-process of abstraction: the move towards the construction of nature as one global 
system where all components are interconnected, and the subsequent denial of these very 
same interconnections to be able to break it up into its components – such as ecosystem 
services and functions – to commensurate and to offset. This conceptual development of 
‘nature’ then allows for the positioning of offsetting as an insurance mechanism to deal with the 
‘risk’ that nature constitutes, and turns this risk into a profit opportunity. In the second section 
of the chapter I introduced the ‘offsetting industry’ and some of the key actors involved in it, 
classified according to their roles. I paid particular attention to the emerging ‘army of 
environmental engineers’, fundamental to many of the partnerships and projects that offsetting 
is embedded in, the role of scientists and consultants who develop the methodologies, 
techniques and systems of classification that render offsetting credible and ‘scientific’, and the 
conservation celebrities who popularise and lend legitimacy to offsetting. In the last section, I 
analysed these narratives and individuals ‘in action’, in what I call the spectacular performance 
of conservation in and through Natural Capital and Offsetting conferences: the 2014 BBOP No 
Net Loss conference and the 2013 and 2015 Natural Capital forums. Through the lens of 
‘spectacle’ and ‘ritual’, I explored how the aforementioned narratives are played out on stage 
and how sustainability is performed through the discursive positioning of corporations as 
saviours of nature. I analysed how a sense of unity is created, a shared ‘we’ is produced and 
contesting world views are discouraged.  
Having laid out the institutional and discursive and landscape of power within which offsetting is 
embedded, in the next chapter, Introducing No Net Loss – an attempt to anchor offsetting in the 
European political economy, I then move to the policy space that has been most important in 
the political discussions around EU-wide offsetting: Brussels. I showed that the No Net Loss 
initiative constitutes an attempt, firstly, to weaken existing nature legislation in the EU; 
secondly, to secure access to land and capital by (European) firms; and, thirdly, to manage and 
diffuse dissent and resistance; effectively facilitating the management and flexibilisation of the 
very concept of limits to ecological destruction and accumulation. It played into a corporate 
frustration with current (surprisingly effective) EU nature legislation and the promise of the 
newly emerging restoration economy, facilitated by a political climate within the Commission 
that is, today more than ever, concerned with the overriding principle of external 
competitiveness to facilitate growth. To develop this argument, I contextualised the initiative in 
the political economy of REFIT, the Commission’s management tool to increase competitiveness 
and ‘modernise’ nature legislation by ‘cutting red tape’, and in the global political economy of 
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biodiversity offsetting, exploring its role in legitimising large-scale (infrastructure and mining) 
projects and making these industries ‘sustainable’. The ‘greening’ of these infrastructure 
projects – many resisted strongly – hinges on notions of offsetting and ‘neutrality’. Access to 
land, I argued, increasingly depends on offsetting for capital acquisition, as many international 
financial institutions now require offsetting for project finance, and for planning consent. Lastly, 
I argued that biodiversity offsetting is increasingly necessary to generate the social licence to 
operate that is needed by corporate and state actors in Europe. In this section, I focused on the 
important function of corporate-conservation partnerships around offsets in dealing with 
resistance through divide-and-conquer strategies to engage with conservation organisations 
and marginalise more ‘radical’ critics. I analysed the work of the EU No Net Loss working group 
and their very political yet fundamentally depoliticised debates on safeguards, limits, and key 
terms. The focus on methodological issues and corporate case studies allows the debate on 
offsetting to ‘stumble forwards’, with concepts and terms – such as the ‘mitigation hierarchy’ – 
acting as vehicles around which new networks of consultants and ecologists have formed, and 
the offsetting industry has emerged. Despite all of its problems, lack of enthusiasm and 
weakening of ambitions and outcome, the working group has been important in 
institutionalising offsets and bringing this debate forward. 
The chapter further showed that to understand offsetting in Europe, a sole focus on the 
legislative processes, Commission initiatives and state policy is insufficient. In the following 
chapter, Green extractivism: a brief history of green mining and better coal, I thus explored the 
development of (voluntary) project offsetting, focusing on the mining industry. Mining 
companies have pioneered offsetting across the world, actively showcasing and marketing their 
‘success stories’ involving biodiversity offsets in the global South. I analysed the role of 
offsetting in the development of ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’ mining, the important role of the 
mining sector in pioneering offsets internationally, the role of CSR reporting and audit culture, 
and the redefinition of sustainability that ‘green mining’ or ‘sustainable coal’ requires. I further 
introduced the ‘Bettercoal Initiative’, initiated and led by RWE, and its role in greening coal 
mining and ‘outsourcing critique’ by using the language of audit, accountability and 
transparency without changing business operations. In the positioning of offsetting as a 
management technique I drew on Michael Power’s work on audit culture and risk construction 
(2007) and James Scott’s ideas of legibility and control of nature (1989). These helped me 
analyse the ‘abstraction, rationalization, and expansion of risk management ideas’ (Power, 
2007: 3) in the development of biodiversity offsetting and their relationship to ecosystem 
service thinking and notions of stability and resilience. Focussing on the mining industry, I 
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showed how offsetting constitutes a corporate strategy to deal with regulatory and reputational 
risks that threaten the industry’s licence to operate and its access to land and capital. They have 
served as a vehicle to pacify and divide-and-conquer the larger environmental movement and 
to co-opt and re-shape civil society demands of accountability, responsibility and stakeholder 
engagement – initially brought forward to challenge corporate power – to fit the 
corporate/state agenda.  
Finally, in the last chapter, I analysed these processes of pacification and management of 
dissent in a case study in the German Rhineland: Licence to operate – licence to trash – licence 
to pacify? Biodiversity offsetting in the German lignite coal mining sector. To point to the 
specificities of the European political economy of conservation and mining, this chapter 
analysed the use of offsetting by Europe’s largest coal mine operator, RWE. Here, I explored the 
offsetting-extraction nexus in action, to illustrate the productive power, use and effects of 
offsetting in a local context, and show its fundamental role in the legitimisation of the ecological 
destruction and human dispossession associated with coal mining in the Rhineland. Offsets, I 
argued, constitute a foundational element of RWE’s strategies – or ‘corporate social 
technologies’ (Rogers, 2012) – of co-optation, violent oppression and pacification of militant 
resistance; positioning the company as ‘good corporate citizen’. They include working closely 
with national and local civil servants (police, politicians and administrators), volunteer 
programs, funding schools, sports clubs and cultural events, setting up astroturf groups and 
creating new physical infrastructures. These operations are complemented by actions by RWE 
security, employees and police to repress the existing and recalcitrant social movement(s) 
forming against the mine and the consequent destruction of the Hambacher Forst and 
surrounding towns. Embedded in these strategies, offsetting contributes, firstly, to the 
corporate colonisation of imagination, fundamental to RWE’s attempt to reshape the past and 
to paint a ‘better future’ as well as – crucially – a ‘better nature’, while claiming to make mining 
sustainable. Secondly, it helps further entrench and institutionalise RWE’s interests in the 
German political economy, shaping policy making and state action at all levels, while positioning 
RWE as a responsible corporate citizen. In effect, offsetting thus contributes to the 
normalisation and legitimisation of corporate, state and police violence against the resistance, 
against the earth and against its inhabitants, especially those who are already marginalised, 
those living in areas particularly affected by climate change, or close to a mine.  
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7.2. Consolidating state power and corporate citizenship: situating 
offsetting as technology of governance 
Throughout this dissertation, I argued for the need to go beyond an understanding of offsetting 
as a market-based instrument at the forefront of accelerating and intensifying processes of 
commodification and financialisation of nature, and for its re-conceptualisation as a social 
technology of governance and source of power. I drew attention to its productive role in 
securing, legitimising and intensifying industrial activity, particularly extractivism. Through 
examination of the distinct genealogies of offsetting in theory and practice, I pointed towards 
more fundamental processes of domestication, domination and commensuration of human and 
nonhuman nature, and the multiple forms of violence inherent in offsetting. 
The increased interest in offsetting, I argued, should be contextualised in the distinct 
managerial legacy of neoliberalism; marked by its emphasis on flexibilisation of absolute limits 
to allow for the pursuit of growth, while accommodating diverse interests and to weaken 
potentially restrictive regulation (such as the EU nature directives) and deal with legislative 
obstacles to development. The associated rise of ‘audit culture’ has encouraged the 
“ritualization of performance and tokenistic gestures of accountability” (Shore and Wright, 
2002: 81), triggering the “public perception that an activity is performed, while remaining in 
substance invisible” (Power, 1994: 305). It is no coincidence that the hegemonic discourses 
around sustainable development and green economy are so vague and flexible that they can be 
appropriated and instrumentalised for virtually any end; “neoliberalism’s very flexibility can be 
seen as one of its most essential characteristics” (Fletcher et al., 2014: 7; Peck, 2010) and 
greatest weapon (Kirsch, 2010).  
In effect, I argued, offsetting thus serves, firstly, to legitimise and secure accumulation, 
increasingly (and especially in Europe) by restoration, rather than avoided loss, and in addition 
to novel dynamics of financialisation of conservation. Secondly, it helps manage dissent against 
critical infrastructure and extractive projects through the mobilisation of offsets for corporate 
conservation partnerships that draw in critics and serve to enact the spectacularisation of 
conservation. Thirdly, offsets not only contribute to securing the role of the state and other 
transnational governance arrangements, but also the role of corporations as responsible 
citizens and indispensible parts of modern social reality, entrenching their power and 
invisibilising violence. 
Corporate (self-)representation as citizen not only increases corporate influence, but also 
ingrains the idea that corporations can act responsibly and can be trusted. “By seeing 
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corporations as people, we are persuaded that they have ethical values and consciences similar 
to our own, whereas of course a single-minded legal fiction which is scarcely even legally liable 
for its own activities has no ethics at all” (Spencer, 2004: 17) – overriding (legal) obligations of 
profit maximising and shareholder value notwithstanding. Offsetting thus not only legitimises 
the ‘status quo’, but contributes to a structurally changing landscape of power where 
corporations acquire a new type of citizenship52 with associated rights and responsibilities that 
would have been unthinkable a few decades ago. Corporations exercise this power to shape 
their surroundings: they create and alter, with the help of the state, cultural, social political 
landscapes as well as geographies and topographies. RWE builds mountains in the Rhineland 
and finances mountaintop removal in the US (Hecking, 2016); the corporation creates new 
ecosystems and destroys ancient habitats; villages and habitats are razed to the ground, 
‘compensated’ and ‘restored’ – tearing apart social fabrics and creating new material 
dependencies. Corporations shape the world “in accordance with their pursuit of profit, growth, 
and legitimacy”, Peter Benson and Kirsch have argued (2010: 459). The Natural Capital and 
Ecosystem Services discourses are meant to appeal to this very rationality – found in 
biodiversity accounting and green economic thinking and facilitating the making of the ‘business 
case’ for biodiversity offsets. 
This thesis questions this economistic rationality, grounded in expectations of rational utilitarian 
behaviour, and problematises the underlying universal epistemology (Franks, 2014) and 
anthropocentrism. Assumptions about human behaviour according to ahistorical and universal 
social laws (in rational, self-interested, utility maximising manners) are implicit in offsetting 
discourses around local people’s tendency to destroy nature on which offsetting baselines are 
based; their behaviour is deemed predictable and destructive – unless they are paid to act 
otherwise. Avoided-loss calculations further reinforce these assumptions, driven by the need to 
illustrate local threats to nature against which corporate conservation – offsets – can be 
positioned. This illustrates the need to critique some of the fundamental categories of thought 
and communication that underlie practices, including the belief in universal human-nature 
relationships and behaviours, but also the alleged commensurability (cf. Hannis and Sullivan, 
2012), quantifiability and restorability of nature. 
Throughout the thesis I emphasised the role of offsetting in invisibilising not just the epistemic 
violence inherent in these processes of commensuation, but also the forms of violence inherent 
in industrialism and extractivism, particularly coal mining – the violence against those resisting 
                                                          
52 This citizenship is further enshrined into international law and inter-state agreements, such as trade or investment agreements. 
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large-scale industrial/extractive projects and the accompanying social and ecological 
degradation and the slow violence against the earth and its inhabitants. This is insufficiently 
recognised in critical accounts of biodiversity offsetting. To make this violence visible, I showed 
that offsetting needs to be recognised as manifestation not just of the power of capital but also 
of state power. The state itself relies on social technologies of governance such as offsetting for 
its own legitimisation and reproduction. This is strengthened through the assignment of 
corporate citizenship, which assigns citizenship rights and recognises ‘legal personhood’ of 
corporations (Kirsch, 2014), but strengthens state authority, too. Offsetting thus does not 
contribute to the loss of state power and control, but to its entrenchment and expansion 
(Brock, 2015; cf. Konings, 2010).  
This thesis thus suggests the need for a more fundamental problematisation of the role of the 
state as system of oppression, tied to ecological destruction and inextricably linked to aims and 
practices of industrial progress, growth and extractivism. It points towards the need for further 
research that problematises the processes of domestication, alienation and exploitation that 
are inherent in industrialism and statism. Such work may investigate the violence inherent in 
the hierarchical ordering that lies at the basis of ‘the state’, and the associated processes of 
‘othering’ that involving human and nonhuman nature; visible in (neo)colonial divisions along 
lines of race, binary understandings of gender and sexuality, among others. These hierarchies, 
manifest also in human-nature relationships, allow not just for ‘marketisation’ but the very 
fundamental processes of abstraction, quantification and commensuration that offsetting 
requires, based on ideas of restorability and domestication.  
Many critical social scientists and campaigners continue to criticise biodiversity offsetting as a 
‘failed’ conservation instrument, mobilising around its failure to restore or protect nature, the 
creation of perverse incentives or ‘license to trash’, and framings as the newest frontier in the 
expansion of capital. Rather than simply criticising offsets on the grounds of ineffectiveness, this 
thesis asked: what exactly is being conserved – and renewed? If offsetting allows for, and even 
facilitates, the destruction of habitat, surely the label of biodiversity conservation instrument is 
undeserved. If, however, we recognise the role of offsetting in conserving corporate and state 
power, then offsetting is far from ineffective. Such a critique helps overcome the 
disempowerment that can result from critiques of commodification and marketisation, and 
struggles against ‘the market’, instead helping to identify agents of harm and perpetrators 
involved. It can make visible the possibilities for resistance where we can, and should, intervene, 
to ‘join a movement, rather than observe it’, creating spaces for creativity and re-imagination of 
the world we want to live in. It can form, I hope, the foundation for struggles towards – and 
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based on – alternative rationalities and values, for autonomy, solidarity, mutual aid, freedom 
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